Catastrophe Insurance
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 131-134
ISSN: 1468-0440
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In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 131-134
ISSN: 1468-0440
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 474-480
ISSN: 1468-0440
Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001 have focused attention on the appropriate role of government in providing insurance against catastrophes. This paper argues that wherever possible governments should follow policies which enable the continuation of a private insurance market. In the event that government must itself provide catastrophe insurance it should follow the same actuarially based pricing and reserving rules that would be followed by a competitive private market.
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Working paper
In: Asia-Pacific journal of risk and insurance: APJRI, Band 5, Heft 2
ISSN: 2153-3792
This paper proposes an integrated risk management plan for catastrophe risks in the European Union, consisting of three layers. The private markets would have the first layer of responsibility, while the National Catastrophe Insurance Organizations would represent the second layer. This layer would in turn be supported by the European Group of National Catastrophe Organizations (EUROCAT), a new organization operating under the auspices of the European Commission. An approach that utilizes a pan-European reinsurance program is proven to be the most efficient solution for minimizing the total cost of catastrophe risks in the European Union. EUROCAT would be a reinsurer of last resort and provide reinsurance to qualified state or regional catastrophe insurance funds. Member-state funds would be required to adopt adequate disaster response and management mechanisms and enforce reasonable building code, land use, and mitigation efforts to minimize the amount of insured losses. As the reinsurance premiums charged by EUROCAT would be risk-based, the pricing mechanism would be used to encourage active development and enforcement of these standards.
In: Cyber-Catastrophe Insurance-Linked Securities On Smart Ledgers - Long Finance, 2018
SSRN
In: Topics in regulatory economics and policy series : TREP 45
International audience ; This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
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International audience ; This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
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International audience ; This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
BASE
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
BASE
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
BASE
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
BASE
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent, each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not chosen appropriately.
BASE