Suchergebnisse

Cet article passe en revue la littérature récente sur l'estimation causale des effets de pairs. Après une discussion de la causalité en général, j'introduis le modèle standard d'effets de pairs dans les réseaux et je donne une illustration du problème de réflexion. Je présente ensuite différentes approches de l'inférence causale avec des données d'observation, avant d'introduire les approches expérimentales. Je passe en revue les problèmes d'estimation qui sont soulevés par les erreurs de mesure et d'échantillonnage, et je discute la façon dont ils affectent l'inférence causale dans les expériences d'effets de réseau et d'effets de pairs. La dernière section de l'article élargit la discussion pour couvrir les effets de pairs dynamiques et la formation des liens, et illustre les différentes significations que peut revêtir le concept de causalité dans l'estimation des effets de pairs. Classification JEL : C31, C21, C90

Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

Trust affects almost all human relationships – in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

Trust affects almost all human relationships – in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

While there is a substantial literature in labor economics and microeconometrics directed toward endogenous causal effects, causal effects have received relatively limited attention in accounting. This volume builds on econometric foundations, including linear, discrete choice, and nonparametric regression models, to address challenging accounting issues characterized by microeconomic fundamentals and equilibrium reporting choices. Both classical and Bayesian strategies for identifying and estimating accounting treatment effects are discussed extensively. This distinctive resource for researchers and students explores interactions among theory, data, and model specification considerations, and complements contemporary econometrics and statistics, as well as accounting. TOC:Preface. 1. Introduction.- 2 . Accounting choice.- 3. Linear models.- 4. Loss functions and estimation.- 5. Discrete choice models.- 6. Nonparametric regression.- 7. Repeated-sampling inference.- 8. Overview of endogeneity.- 9. Treatment effects: ignorability.- 10. Treatment effects: IV.- 11. Marginal treatment effects.- 12. Bayesian treatment effects.- 13. Informed priors.- Appendix: Asymptotic theory.- Bibliography.- Index.

This note illustrates a new method for making causal inferences with ecological data. We show how to combine aggregate outcomes with individual demographics from separate data sources to make causal inferences about individual behavior. In addressing such problems, even under the selection on observables assumption often made in the treatment effects literature, it is not possible to identify causal effects of interest. However, recent results from the partial identification literature provide sharp bounds on these causal effects. We apply these bounds to data from Chilean mayoral elections that straddle a 2012 change in Chilean electoral law from compulsory to voluntary voting. Aggregate voting outcomes are combined with individual demographic information from separate data sources to determine the causal effect of the change in the law on voter turnout. The bounds analysis reveals that voluntary voting decreased expected voter turnout, and that other causal effects are overstated if the bounds analysis is ignored.

The literature on father absence is frequently criticized for its use of cross-sectional data and methods that fail to take account of possible omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We review studies that have responded to this critique by employing a variety of innovative research designs to identify the causal effect of father absence, including studies using lagged dependent variable models, growth curve models, individual fixed effects models, sibling fixed effects models, natural experiments, and propensity score matching models. Our assessment is that studies using more rigorous designs continue to find negative effects of father absence on offspring well-being, although the magnitude of these effects is smaller than what is found using traditional cross-sectional designs. The evidence is strongest and most consistent for outcomes such as high school graduation, children's social-emotional adjustment, and adult mental health.

Business support policies designed to raise productivity and employment are common worldwide, but rigorous micro-econometric evaluation of their causal effects is rare. We exploit multiple changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a major program to support manufacturing jobs (Regional Selective Assistance). Area eligibility is governed by pan-European state aid rules which change every seven years and we use these rule changes to construct instrumental variables for program participation. We match two decades of UK panel data on the population of firms to all program participants. IV estimates find positive program treatment effect on employment, investment and net entry but not on TFP. OLS underestimates program effects because the policy targets underperforming plants and areas. The treatment effect is confined to smaller firms with no effect for larger firms (e.g. over 150 employees). We also find the policy raises area level manufacturing employment mainly through significantly reducing unemployment. The positive program effect is not due to substitution between plants in the same area or between eligible and ineligible areas nearby. We estimate that cost per job of the program was only $6,300 suggesting that in some respects investment subsidies can be cost effective.

AbstractPolitical scientists have long been interested in the persistent effects of history on contemporary behavior and attitudes. To estimate legacy effects, studies often compare people living in places that were historically exposed to some event and those that were not. Using principal stratification, we provide a formal framework to analyze how migration limits our ability to learn about the persistent effects of history from observed differences between historically exposed and unexposed places. We state the necessary assumptions about movement behavior to causally identify legacy effects. We highlight that these assumptions are strong; therefore, we recommend that legacy studies circumvent bias by collecting data on people's place of residence at the exposure time. Reexamining a study on the persistent effects of U.S. civil rights protests, we show that observed attitudinal differences between residents and nonresidents of historic protest sites are more likely due to migration rather than attitudinal change.