Suchergebnisse

THE AUTHOR ENDEAVORS TO ASSESS THE EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF THE RAWLSIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE. HE CONSIDERS WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO BRING THE RAWLSIAN JUST SOCIETY INTO EXISTENCE AND TO WHAT EXTENT EXISTING SOCIETIES CONFORM TO RAWLS' SCHEME.

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IS A RESEARCH PROGRAM THAT DIRECTS INQUIRY TO THE WORKING PROPERTIES OF RULES AND INSTITUTIONS WITHIN WHICH INDIVIDUALS INTERACT AND TO THE PROCESSES THROUGH WHICH THESE RULES AND INSTITUTIONS ARE CHOSEN OR COME INTO BEING. THIS ISSUE OF "PUBLIC CHOICE" IS DEDICATED TO THE UNIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC CHOICE INTO A SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM FOCUSSED ON CHOICES BETWEEN RULES, ON CHOICES SUBJECT TO RULES THAT DEFINE ANY COMMUNITY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTUTIONS AND ON THE MANNER WHICH SUCH INSTITUTIONS IMPACT ON COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING.

THIS ARTICLE DEPARTS FROM THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF RENT SEEKING WHICH REFERS TO RESOURCE-WASTING ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUALS IN SEEKING TRANSFERS OF WEALTH THROUGH THE AEGIS OF THE STATE. SOURCES OF INNEFFICIENCY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS MAY RESULT FROM VOTERS VOTING IN TERMS OF THEIR SPECIAL INTEREST OR BECAUSE THEY LACK INFORMATION ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE POLICIES. THE ARTICLE SHOWS THAT APPARENT MISTAKES BECAUSE OF A LACK OF INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL CONDITIONS IS EQUIVALENT TO "X-INEFFICIENCY IN THE MARKET BUT IS DIFFERENT THAN THE CONVENTIONAL RENT-SEEKING ACTIVITY DEFINITION.

THIS PAPER TESTS FOR SELF-INTERESTED BEHAVIOR BY LOCAL-GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS ENGAGED IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WITH PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS. A THEORETICAL MODEL IS DEVELOPED THAT SHOWS THE EFFECT OF NISKANEN-STYLE BUREAUCRATIC SELF-INTEREST IN THE TWO STANDARD BARGAINING MODELS: THE DEMAND-CONSTRAINED MODEL AND THE EFFICIENT-BARGAIN MODEL. THESE PREDICTIONS ARE THEN TESTED USING NATIONAL CROSS-SECTION DATA ON UNIONIZED POLICE, FIRE, AND SANITATION WORKERS.

THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES AND CRITIQUES THE MAJOR THEMES PRESENTED BY BENJAMIN RADCLIFF IN "LIBERALISM, POPULISM, AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE." HIS COMMENTS TOUCH ON RADCLIFF'S EFFORT TO RECONSTRUCT THE LOGIC OF LIBERALISM IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE THEORY OF VOTING AS WELL AS MAJORITY TYRANNY, CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND THE PROPENSITY FOR TYRANNY IN LIBERAL AND POPULISTIC SYSTEMS.

THE AUTHORS PROPOSE A NEW MODEL OF COOPERATORS' ADVANTAGE DEPENDING NEITHER ON SUPPLEMENTARY INCENTIVES NOR ON COOPERATORS' CAPACITY TO RECOGNIZE AND PLAY SELECTIVELY WITH OTHER COOPERATORS. RATHER, IT DEPENDS ON PLAYERS' MAKING THE PLAY-NO PLAY DECISION BY THE HEURISTIC OF PROJECTING THEIR OWN COOPERATE-DEFECT CHOICES ONTO POTENTIAL PARTNERS. COOPERATORS OFFER TO PLAY MORE OFTEN, AND FELLOW COOPERATORS WILL MORE OFTEN ACCEPT THEIR OFFER. WHEN CERTAIN BOUNDARY CONDITIONS ARE MET, THIS PRODUCES A HIGHER EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR COOPERATORS THAN FOR DEFECTORS. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THIS HEURISTIC IS SUGGESTED BY EXPECTATIONS DATA FROM RELATED SOCIAL DILEMMA EXPERIMENTS. MOREOVER, ITS USE CAN BE JUSTIFIED IN BAYESEAN TERMS. THE MODEL BRINGS BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY'S "COGNITIVE MISER" PARADIGM TO BEAR ON INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCERN WITH THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR AND SHOWS HOW, IF OTHER MECHANISMS PROVIDE A SUITABLE "INITIAL KICK," COOPERATION CAN EVOLVE IN THE ABSENCE OF ITERATION AND IN LARGE, MOBILE SOCIETIES.