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We are pleased to present, Performance Management: A Guide for City Leaders, a report written and published as a service to NLC members and all cities. This guide presents an overview of existing performance management best practices with an eye toward the future of service delivery in cities. We also aim to empower more city leaders to launch performance management programs in their own cities.Performance management and data analytics in general are key aspects of the continued shift toward data-driven decision-making in cities nationwide. Data-driven decisions help local governments provide city services that are efficient, effective and driven by community priorities. The value of making data- driven decisions is imperative as many cities continue to face the post-recession realities of decreased city revenues, limited intergovernmental aid and reduced municipal workforces. At the same time, there is a growing trend towards openness and making the inner workings of municipal governments more accountable and transparent.Looking to the future, as advanced data analytics and open data become more prevalent in cities, there will be more opportunities to prepare and predict service needs of constituents. We plan to continue highlighting the importance of this epochal shift in city governance through our City of the Future initiative that seeks to advise cities on coming trends and opportunities. Within the Center for City Solutions and Applied Research we strive to strengthen communities, transform and improve cities and assist city leaders.Performance Management: A Guide for City Leaders was developed through staff interviews and surveys with a cross-section of large cities across the United States. This work was supported financially by a grant to the National League of Cities Institute by The Pew Charitable Trusts. We join the authors in thanking the city officials who helped make this work possible, and welcome comments and thoughts from readers, as we continue to work to help city leaders lead.

This research aims to find out the relationship of transformational leadership with trust in the leaders of Balikpapan City (study in the millennial generation of Balikpapan City). This research uses a quantitative approach. The subjects of this study were 400 millennials in Balikpapan who were selected using simple random sampling techniques. The data collection method used is the scale of trust in leaders and transformational leadership. The collected data was analyzed with the Pearson Product Moment analysis test. The results of this study show that there is a positive and significant relationship between transformational leadership and trust in leaders who with r count = 0.852 > r table = 0.082 and values p = 0.000 r tabel = 0,082 dan nilai p = 0,000 < 0,050.

The shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractThe shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010.

ObjectivesWe examine political connections at the horizontal level of local government officials and their impacts on economic growth in China.MethodsWe identify two types of horizontal networks: hometown tie and alumni tie, and analyze the biographic data of the top officials of 256 prefecture‐cities during the period of 1999–2013.ResultsWe find a positive relationship between city leaders' hometown tie and economic growth, measured by either the relative GDP per capita growth rate or the GDP per capita growth rate. Furthermore, we find the positive relationship is more profound in the low market‐open cities. However, we do not find any significant impacts of the alumni tie on economic growth.ConclusionsThe hometown tie improves the city leaders' economic performance.