Suchergebnisse

Why do for-profit firms take voluntary steps to improve the environment? Brand appeal to green consumers or investors, the ability to influence or avoid regulation, or the experience gained for future regulation, have all been suggested as possible reasons. The empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. This paper uses 19 years of monthly stock price returns to examine the profitability of participation in the world's largest voluntary greenhouse gas mitigation program: the Chicago Climate Exchange. After controlling for systemic market risk as well as industry-specific shocks, we find no statistically significant impact of announcing to join CCX on excess returns. However, the market appeared to be sensitive to changes in abatement costs implied by CCX membership. Most strikingly, the progress of proposed greenhouse gas legislation (the Waxman-Markey bill) had a positive impact on excess returns for CCX member firms, suggesting that the most profitable incentive for firms to join CCX is to prepare for future regulation. Our results imply that relying on voluntary approaches alone to combat climate change may not be enough.

Why do for-profit firms take voluntary steps to improve the environment? Brand appeal to green consumers or investors, the ability to influence or avoid regulation, or the experience gained for future regulation, have all been suggested as possible reasons. The empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. This paper uses 19 years of monthly stock price returns to examine the profitability of participation in the world's largest voluntary greenhouse gas mitigation program: the Chicago Climate Exchange. After controlling for systemic market risk as well as industry-specific shocks, we find no statistically significant impact of announcing to join CCX on excess returns. However, the market appeared to be sensitive to changes in abatement costs implied by CCX membership. Most strikingly, the progress of proposed greenhouse gas legislation (the Waxman-Markey bill) had a positive impact on excess returns for CCX member firms, suggesting that the most profitable incentive for firms to join CCX is to prepare for future regulation. Our results imply that relying on voluntary approaches alone to combat climate change may not be enough.

The article examines the changing nature of politics in the United Nations climate negotiations through the lens of ecologically unequal exchange theory, focusing on the lead up to and aftermath of the 2015 Paris negotiations. We identify and discuss three areas of tension that have emerged within the G-77 coalition: tensions within the global semi-periphery, tensions between the semi-periphery and periphery, and tensions within the periphery. Together, these tensions challenge the main link of solidarity in the G-77 coalition: the idea that all countries in the global South share a common predicament in the global system, with the North solely to blame. Drawing upon this case, we offer three related insights to develop ecologically unequal exchange theory. First, theory and empirical work must better consider the role of the semi-periphery, and divisions within the semi-periphery, in reproducing ecologically unequal societies. Second, theory should account for how fragmentation between the periphery and semi-periphery may produce distinct challenges for peripheral states to resist governance forms which intensify ecologically unequal exchange. Third, theory should better account for the ways in which ecologically unequal exchange as mobilized as a collective action frame reflects and diverges from the real-world distribution of environmental goods and bads in the world system.

The article examines the changing nature of politics in the United Nations climate negotiations through the lens of ecologically unequal exchange theory, focusing on the lead up to and aftermath of the 2015 Paris negotiations. We identify and discuss three areas of tension that have emerged within the G-77 coalition: tensions within the global semi-periphery, tensions between the semi-periphery and periphery, and tensions within the periphery. Together, these tensions challenge the main link of solidarity in the G-77 coalition: the idea that all countries in the global South share a common predicament in the global system, with the North solely to blame. Drawing upon this case, we offer three related insights to develop ecologically unequal exchange theory. First, theory and empirical work must better consider the role of the semi-periphery, and divisions within the semi-periphery, in reproducing ecologically unequal societies. Second, theory should account for how fragmentation between the periphery and semi-periphery may produce distinct challenges for peripheral states to resist governance forms which intensify ecologically unequal exchange. Third, theory should better account for the ways in which ecologically unequal exchange as mobilized as a collective action frame reflects and diverges from the real-world distribution of environmental goods and bads in the world system.