Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, Cabinet Committees, and Cabinet Ministers
In: The Hollow Crown, S. 58-83
99096 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The Hollow Crown, S. 58-83
In: Public sector, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 8
ISSN: 0110-5191
In: Public policy and administration: PPA, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 67-84
ISSN: 1749-4192
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/inu.32000001930363
"Prepared by C. Edwin Davis."--p. [3] ; Bibliography: p. [18]-19. ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
In: European political science review: EPSR, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 115-133
ISSN: 1755-7747
AbstractThis article examines one arena of decision-making in cabinet government: cabinet committees. It assesses the relationship between the composition of cabinets – their party make-up – and the structure of cabinet committees. Cabinet committees are groups of ministers tasked with specific policy or coordination responsibilities and can be important mechanisms of policymaking and cabinet management. Thus, the structure of committees informs our understanding of how cabinets differ in their distributions of policy influence among ministers and parties, a central concern in parliamentary government. We investigate two such dimensions: collegiality – interaction among ministers – and collectivity, the (de)centralization of influence. We find that cabinet committees in coalitions are significantly more collegial, on average, than single-party cabinets, though this is driven by minority coalitions. At the same time, influence within cabinet committees is less collectively distributed in most types of coalitions than in single-party cabinets.
In: Talking politics: a journal for students and teachers of politics, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 11
ISSN: 0955-8780
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 80, Heft 3, S. 948-963
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 117-135
ISSN: 1467-9299
In: Population and development review, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 369-372
ISSN: 1728-4457
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 615-636
ISSN: 1744-9324
AbstractCabinet committees are important sites of executive politics in Canada. This article examines the extent to which two representational attributes—gender and region—determine influence, as a function of cabinet committee structure. Employing a dataset of ministers under the three most recent prime ministers, I find that female ministers are less likely than male ministers to be influential in terms of connections to other ministers, to belong to the core of most influential ministers and to be represented on the most powerful committees or chairing committees. However, there is evidence of improvement over time. While regional representation is an imperative in cabinet making for Canadian prime ministers, its role in determining ministerial influence within committees is not evident: ministers from less-represented regions are no more likely to be influential than other ministers. This analysis highlights a neglected but central arena for social representation in Canadian government.
In: British journal of political science, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 285-312
ISSN: 0007-1234
DECISION MAKING IN POLITICAL EXECUTIVES IS AN ODDLY NEGLECTED SUBJECT IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. THE ROLES PLAYED BY BOTH FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND LESS FORMAL MECHANISMS IN ARRIVING AT DECISIONS IN POLITICAL EXECUTIVES ARE SURPRISINGLY UNDERSTUDIED. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME IMPORTANT COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES BUT THESE HAVE TENDED TO FOCUS ON THE FOLE OF THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE - THE PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER.1 THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF CABINET SYSTEMS AS AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS HAS BEEN WELL BROUGHT OUT BUT A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWODK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VARIATIONS AMONG CABINET SYSTEMS IN THE ROLE OF DECISION ARENAS OTHER THAN THE FULL CABINET HAS NOT BEEN DEVELOPED. BLONDEL IN HIS WIDE-RANGING SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES GIVES ONLY A PASSING MENTION TO CABINET COMMITTEES. ACCORDINGLY, IN SEEKING TO PLACE THE ROLES OF CABINET COMMITTEES IN PERSPECTIVE, WE HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO DEVELOP OUR OWN FRAMEWORK OF DECISION ARENAS IN CABINET SYSTEMS.
In: Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive, S. 298-321
In: British journal of political science, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 285-312
ISSN: 1469-2112
Decision making in political executives is an oddly neglected subject in political science. The roles played by both formal institutions and less formal mechanisms in arriving at decisions in political executives are surprisingly understudied. There have been some important comparative studies of political executives but these have tended to focus on the role of the head of the political executive – the president or prime minister. The distinctive nature of cabinet systems as against presidential systems has been well brought out but a comparative framework for the analysis of variations among cabinet systems in the role of decision arenas other than the full cabinet has not been developed. Blondel in his wide-ranging survey of government structures gives only a passing mention to cabinet committees. Accordingly, in seeking to place the roles of cabinet committees in perspective, we have found it necessary to develop our own framework of decision arenas in cabinet systems.
In: Government & opposition: an international journal of comparative politics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 129-144
ISSN: 1477-7053
AbstractThe appointment of committee chairs to monitor the actions of ministers belonging to coalition partners has received considerably less attention than other mechanisms of policing the coalition agreement at executive or legislative level. We take a longitudinal perspective focusing on 11 Belgian cabinets (1980–2018) to study the determinants of such appointments and whether there is a substitution effect between shadow chairs, junior ministers and coalition agreements. Our findings indicate that the probability of appointing a shadow committee chair is higher when the ideological distance between the minister's party and the coalition is larger. Other key findings are that ministers facing hostile junior ministers tend to be shadowed by committee chairs as well, while shadow chairs are also more frequent in minimum winning coalitions.
The appointment of committee chairs to monitor the actions of ministers belonging to coalition partners has received considerably less attention than other mechanisms of policing the coalition agreement at executive or legislative level. We take a longitudinal perspective focusing on 11 Belgian cabinets (1980-2018) to study the determinants of such appointments and whether there is a substitution effect between shadow chairs, junior ministers and coalition agreements. Our findings indicate that the probability of appointing a shadow committee chair is higher when the ideological distance between the minister's party and the coalition is larger. Other key findings are that ministers facing hostile junior ministers tend to be shadowed by committee chairs as well, while shadow chairs are also more frequent in minimum winning coalitions.
BASE