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It is argued that commonly used metaphors based on the paradigmatic notion of "control" have ceased to be relevant to the analysis of contemporary policy dilemmas. Two new conceptions of the policy process have emerged from the new sciences of complexity. Both chaos theory & models based on the concept of organizational closure clearly reveal the self-organizing logic inherent in the problems confronting managers & policymakers today. Examinined here are the rationales for, & the potentials of, metaphors derived from those paradigmatic innovations -- innovations that can be situated within an emerging postmodern culture insofar as they emphasize indeterminacy & the role played by social actors in constructing social situations. It is also argued, however, that within very specific contexts, the notion of control may still be valid. 116 References. Adapted from the source document.

RESEARCH INTO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTROL HAS REVEALED THAT CONTROL NEEDS ARE KEY ELEMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT A "NEED FOR CONTROL" FRAMEWORK IS ALSO USEFUL FOR UNDERSTANDING ACTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS. IT CRITICALLY ANALYZES PREVALENT STRATEGIES FOR EXERTING CONTROL IN THIS DOMAIN AND PROPOSES ALTARNATIVE STRAEGIES WHICH PERMIT GREATER FULFILLMENT OF CONTROL NEEDS. THESE ALTERNATIVES EMERGE FROM AN EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SATISFACTION OF CONTROL NEEDS WITHIN THE SEPARATE BUT PARALLEL DOMAINS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS.

GLAUCON'S ADAPTATION OF HERODOTUS' ACCOUNT OF GYGES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS EXTENDED PRAISE OF INJUSTICE IN BOOK II OF THE REPUBLIC, MAY BE READ TO IMPLY A DESIRE FOR A SIMPLE AND PERFECT WORLD. PROFESSOR NICHOLS ARGUES IN THIS ARTICLE THAT THIS DESIRE UNDERLIES THE FOUNDING OF THE CITY IN SPEECH PRESUPPOSING THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL. IT IS A TRAGIC UNDERTAKING IN THAT IT IGNORES THE LIMITS TO WHICH HERODOTUS CALLS ATTENTION.

THE AUTHOR STATES THAT TACITUS OFFERED A BETTER THEORY OF DESPOTISISM THAN DID PLATO OR ARISTOTLE. HE DIVIDES HIS ANALYSIS OF TACITUS' THEORY OF DESPOTISM INTO: DESPOTISM AS ADMINISTRATION, THE OVERT MEANS OF CONTROL, ISOLATION AND PRIVATIZATION, MUTUAL SUSPICION AND CONTROL OF THE PRIVATE, THE DEPOTISM OF PLEASURE AND DESIRE, THE TYRANNY OF DESIRE, THE CORRUPTION OF LANGUAGE; AND INSINCERITY, HYPOCRISY AND ROLE-PLAYING. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES WITH AN ITEMIZATION OF SHORTCOMINGS IN TACITUS' THEORY OF DESPOTISM.

Consistent choice in an inconsistent world requires processes for both rational calculation & effective control. The budgetary process incorporates both of these functions. However, students of public sector budgeting tend either to ignore budget execution or to view the time expended by budgeteers on the execution of budgets -- as opposed to their construction -- as a gross misallocation of resources, seriously undervaluing the control function & the budgeteer's role in preventing control loss. At the same time, budgeteers frequently misuse the controls at their disposal. In certain cases (ie, where competitive supply of a public service is justified & in effect) expenditure controls are redundant & serve no real purpose. Budget execution is primarily concerned with two kinds of expenditure controls, allotment controls & fund reports, & is supported by position controls. The immediate purpose of these controls is to insure that purchases are limited to the amounts & purposes specified in the budget act. However, given the typical relationship between the budget agency & the operating bureau, their ultimate function is to prevent the bureau from distorting or concealing cost & production information to increase its bargaining power, & thereby to permit the budget office to ensure that the preferences of the state are at least approximately met. Performance standards & control rules also serve to avoid inconsistency between the budgeteer & the bureau, & to stabilize expectations about the ground rules for bargaining & the likely outcomes of the bargaining process so as to reduce the costs of uncertainty to both sides. 3 Figures, 30 References. HA.

SINCE THE 1980S, THE PRIVATIZATION OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAS GONE FROM NOVELTY ACT TO GLOBAL ORTHODOXY. MORE THAN 100 GOVERNMENTS HAVE SOLD STAKES IN STATE COMPANIES TO PRIVATE INVESTORS, RAISING $1 TRILLION AND TRANSFORMING THE STATE'S ECONOMIC ROLE. THOUGH PRIVATIZATION'S PROMISE MAY HAVE BEEN OVERSOLD, ITS ILLS HAVE ALSO BEEN EXAGGERATED. THE REAL QUESTION IS HOW - NOT WHETHER - TO TRANSFER STATE FIRMS TO PRIVATE HANDS. THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS HOW PRIVATIZATION IS MORE THAN AN ECONOMIC ISSUE, HOW IT HAS SHRUNK THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE, AND HOW IT BREEDS CORRUPTION.