The social cost of entry contest in Cournot-Nash oligopoly
In: Journal of economics and business, Band 53, Heft 2-3, S. 139-152
ISSN: 0148-6195
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In: Journal of economics and business, Band 53, Heft 2-3, S. 139-152
ISSN: 0148-6195
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 23, Heft 8, S. 1375-1385
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 23, Heft 8, S. 1375
ISSN: 0305-750X
In: Economics & politics, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 471-497
ISSN: 1468-0343
A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that "resource wealth enhances regime durability" and "resource wealth fuels conflict."
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 313-336
ISSN: 1756-2171
If bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs, a first‐ or second‐price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller's value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue. We show that if entry costs are heterogeneous and private information, then the revenue‐maximizing reserve price is above the seller's value, a positive admission fee (and a reserve price equal to the seller's value) generates more revenue, and an entry cap combined with an admission fee generates even more revenue. Social surplus and seller revenue may either increase or decrease in the number of bidders, but they coincide asymptotically.
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Working paper
In: Journal of economics, Band 136, Heft 2, S. 97-114
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 124, S. S77-S91
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Working paper
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 74, Heft 4, S. 927-948
ISSN: 1467-8586
AbstractHow does cost uncertainty affect the welfare consequences of an oligopoly? To answer this question, we investigate a Cournot oligopoly in which firms produce a homogeneous commodity and market entry is feasible. Marginal costs are unknown ex ante, that is, prior to entering the market. They become public knowledge before output choices are made. We show that uncertainty induces additional entry in market equilibrium and also raises the socially optimal number of firms. Since the first change dominates, the excessive entry distortion is aggravated. This prediction is robust to various extensions of the analytical setup. Furthermore, the welfare loss due to oligopoly tends to increase with uncertainty.
In: The Manchester School, Band 85, Heft 4, S. 491-510
ISSN: 1467-9957
Although many papers consider the effect of switching costs on entry when the incumbent firm is privately‐owned, the effect when the incumbent firm is publicly‐owned has not been analyzed. We seek to fill that gap here and show that, unlike the case of a private incumbent where entry may decrease welfare, with a public incumbent entry always raises welfare. We also study whether the government privatizes the public incumbent firm and whether it deters entry. We find that switching costs reduce the range of values of the parameters for which privatization is chosen. Moreover, the government may prefer a private monopoly to a public monopoly or even a mixed duopoly. Finally, there is more privatization and less entry if the government decides on both privatization and entry than if it decides only on privatization.
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 140
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3263
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