Suchergebnisse

Intro -- FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: ELEMENTS AND PROPOSALS -- FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: ELEMENTS AND PROPOSALS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE:BACKGROUND AND ISSUES -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- CROP INSURANCE HISTORY -- PROGRAM BASICS -- Types of Insurance -- Yield-Based Insurance -- Revenue-Based Insurance -- Whole Farm Insurance -- Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies -- Geographic Distribution of Program Participation and Indemnities -- Distribution of Producer Subsidies -- FEDERAL PROGRAM COSTS -- PRIVATE COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT AND RISK SHARING -- Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) -- Trends in A&O Reimbursement and Underwriting Gains -- INTERSECTION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS -- FARMER CONCERNS WITH CROP INSURANCE -- Rice Policies -- Trend Yields -- More Affordable Premiums -- Nursery Products -- "Shallow" Losses and Other Concerns -- PROPOSALS FOR THE NEXT FARM BILL -- Proposals for Enhanced Crop Insurance American Farm Bureau Federation -- Stacked Income Protection Plan or STAX (National Cotton Council) -- Crop Risk Options Plan or CROP (Representative Neugebauer) -- Farm Financial Safety Net (Crop Insurance Company) -- Proposals for Whole Farm Insurance -- REFRESH Act of 2011 (Senator Lugar and Representative Stutzman) -- Local Farms, Food, and Jobs Act (Representative Pingreeand Senator Brown) -- ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR THE NEXT FARM BILL -- Program Overlap -- Potential Linkage with Conservation Compliance -- Budget Savings -- CONCLUDING COMMENTS -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 CROP INSURANCE: SAVINGS WOULD RESULT FROM PROGRAM CHANGES AND GREATER USE OF DATA MINING -- ABBREVIATIONS -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- Background -- Costs of Crop Insurance Subsidies That Benefit Farmers -- Crop Insurance Participation and DisasterAssistance Payments

AbstractThis research explores the viability of an alternative design for crop insurance based upon farmer‐owned savings accounts that are regulated, monitored, and marginally assisted by the government. Such accounts could be an effective risk management tool for many farmers and could operate without major government subsidization. Relative to the current program, the proposed design should exhibit minimal moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and since farm‐level risk does not have to be priced, the proposed design eliminates the premium rating difficulties that weaken actuarial soundness and trigger the need for substantial external subsidies. In addition, administrative costs should be considerably lower.

The broad structure of Modified National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (mNAIS), the main crop insurance program in India, is technically sound and appropriate in the context of India. The NAIS is based on an indexed approach, where average crop yield of an insurance unit, or IU, (i.e., block) is the index used. The insurance is mandatory for all farmers that borrow from financial institutions, though insurance cover is also available to non-borrowers. The actual yield of the insured crop (as measured by crop cutting experiments) in the IU is compared to the threshold yield. If the former is lower than the latter, all insured farmers in the IU are eligible for the same rate of indemnity payout. Individual crop insurance will have been prohibitively expensive, or even impossible, in a country such as India with so many small and marginal farms. Further, the method of using an 'area based approach' has several other merits and, most importantly, it mitigates moral hazard and adverse selection. This report offers detailed analysis of a number of technical and operational issues which should be addressed if mNAIS is to be implemented. GOI is to be complemented on its bold vision of the future of agriculture insurance through modifying NAIS, an action which, if well implemented, has the potential for significant economic and political economy gains. The policy note World Bank (2010) supported this vision and offered specific policy recommendations for mNAIS, with reference to the Joint Group report (2004). This technical report is intended as a complement to World Bank (2010) and also to the previous technical report World Bank (2007a), by offering detailed technical analysis of a number of issues that will be critical to the success of mNAIS.

AbstractThis paper is an attempt to analyse the impact of a credit‐linked crop insurance scheme—the Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) of India—on crop credit or short‐term agricultural credit, especially to small fanners. A dominant view on rural credit institutions is that they are unwilling to extend adequate credit to small farmers on account of the problems of information and enforcement, and that a crop insurance scheme—because it faces similar problems—would make little difference. A common device used in rural credit markets with a view to limiting the consequences arising out of agricultural risk, information asymmetries and enforcement problems is collateral. Small farmers in developing countries do not own adequate land and other assets which can be used as collateral, and consequently face a situation of inadequate availability of credit. The question is whether crop insurance can serve as a substitute (perhaps partial) for collateral. In view of the above facts, this paper addresses the issues whether the CCIS led to a significantly higher flow of institutional credit to farmers, especially small farmers, and whether there was any improvement in the repayment of loan—in other words, whether there was any collateral effect. The analysis is based on empirical data from Gujarat (India). The findings show that there is a significant increase in the flow of credit to insured farmers after the introduction of the CCIS. The expansion is in both coverage and size—there was an increase in the number of borrowers, and also in credit per borrower as well as per hectare. The share of small farmers (with land holdings of 2 ha or less) in the total loan increased from 19 per cent to 27 per cent. There was a significant increase in the repayment of loan in absolute terms—repayment per farmer and repayment per hectare. But it is not clear if the propensity to repay improved. The expansion of credit appears to be what one may call a collateral effect.

The study was conducted to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of delivering Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation?s Rice Crop Insurance (RCI) program to farmers. Primary data were obtained through one-on-one personal interview with 50 insured and 50 uninsured farmers, using pre-tested interview questionnaires. Descriptive analysis was used to describe the implementing policies and guidelines of PCIC. The farmer?s level of awareness about the program, level of agreement about the effects of the program, and level of satisfaction about the program were determined using Likert scale. Results of the study revealed that in 2015, PCIC catered to 41,500 farmers in Region III, 68% of which availed rice crop insurance worth Php 857 million. Although PCIC only covered 12% of rice farmers in Pampanga, it was still able to accomplish its target amount to cover under different programs for Region III in the same year. The study also showed that RCI was highly subsidized by the government. Moreover, only 0.05% of the operational expenses can be paid through its income not generated from premiums. Of the 50 insured farmer respondents only 42% (84%) were aware that they have Rice Crop Insurance. The rest of the insured farmer respondents did not know that the government gave them free insurance premiums under the Registry System for Basic Sectors in Agriculture (RSBSA). At the barangay level, farmer?s names were listed. However, the farmers were not informed that they were part of the program. Overall, insured farmers have moderate level of awareness, while uninsured farmers have low level of awareness about the program. The study showed that after availing crop insurance, farmers had changed their sources of credit, thereby increasing the number of farmers borrowing from cooperatives and banks. Consequently, farmers were able to avail larger amount of loan with lower interest rate Among the 42 farmers interviewed, 40% agreed that RCI influenced their decision on the level of input use and decision to expand farm area. It was shown further in the study That PCIC delivered indemnity payments on time. The average amount of loss per hectare was Php 13, 023 while the average indemnity per hectare was Php4, 487. Consequently, the average reduction in the amount of losses was significantly reduced due to the indemnity payments received by farmers. The study also showed that the amount of indemnity payments received by farmers can only help them partially pay for their loans. Nonetheless, the farmers were very satisfied with the services given by PCIC, while the lending conduits were extremely satisfied with the services. Also, PCIC was satisfied with the services they provided for farmers, except for the timeliness of indemnities paid. Based on the results of the study, it is recommended for the PCIC Region III to devise efficient and effective techniques to educate farmers about Rice Crop Insurance. Likewise, more PCIC Personnel should be deployed during calamities that affect the entire region, to accommodate all insured farmers at the earliest time.