Suchergebnisse

Purpose
The European Union's (EU's) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has gained increasing attention as the EU faces new threats and challenges from its surroundings. As part of its CSDP, the EU currently runs six military operations and 11 civilian missions. This paper aims to analyze the EU's social media use of four CSDP missions and operations running in two regions: in the Mediterranean and in the Western Balkans.


Design/methodology/approach
The paper has a mixed-methods research design. A computer-assisted content analysis was conducted to extract data on the Twitter communication of the chosen missions, followed by a quantitative analysis on which elements of the EU's strategic communication can be identified. The timeframe for investigation was set up between 1 January 2019 and 31 August 2020.


Findings
Patterns of communication cannot be recognized either based on regional or on the civilian-military division. The strong connectivity with the accounts of other European actors and/or institutions is striking. This study finds that the concept of local ownership can be observed only at European level, local populations of the host countries are usually not targeted. Even though several elements of the EU's strategic communication are recurrent on the missions' official Twitter account, Twitter communication seems to be an intra-European communication tool.


Originality/value
The research revealed the main features of the Twitter communication of four CSDP missions. Due to the software-assisted methodology, measuring influence score was made possible, a feature that was still missing from academic literature regarding this specific area, the EU's CSDP.

France and Britain are sending a new signal: 12 years after the Saint-Malo Declaration,in which they called for the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy,in an unprecedented collaboration Paris and London have resolved to turn away fromthe CSDP for the time being. The agreements on bilateral cooperation made at theFranco-British security and defence summit on 2 November 2010 are clearly more thana savings package. In unison the two states have challenged their EU partners to enterinto clear commitments on the CSDP, and thus to clarify what can be expected from theEU in security and defence policy in the future

AbstractThis article investigates the impact that Brexit could have on the relationship between NATO and the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The relationship between NATO and CSDP has historically not been straightforward and Brexit seems to have intervened as an aggravating factor. In fact, the EU has launched a series of military initiatives and it has now renewed its ambition to create separate military headquarters from NATO. The UK will join countries such as Norway and Turkey in being a member of NATO but not of the EU, affording greater importance to NATO to the detriment of cooperation with its European allies. This article provides an analytical framework to analyse the possible effects of Brexit upon the EU–NATO relationship. In so doing, it lays out three distinct levels of analysis. These are the state level, the inter‐organisational level and, finally, the personnel level. The levels of analysis allow us to generate empirical observations, which then lead us to suggest three scenarios for the development of the EU–NATO relationship beyond Brexit.

France and Britain are sending a new signal: 12 years after the Saint-Malo Declaration,in which they called for the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy,in an unprecedented collaboration Paris and London have resolved to turn away fromthe CSDP for the time being. The agreements on bilateral cooperation made at theFranco-British security and defence summit on 2 November 2010 are clearly more thana savings package. In unison the two states have challenged their EU partners to enterinto clear commitments on the CSDP, and thus to clarify what can be expected from theEU in security and defence policy in the future

The purpose of this article is to understand the EU/UK security relationship after Brexit and the institutional form(s) it may take. Taking stock of the literature on the consequences of Brexit for European foreign affairs, this article employs a question-driven approach to examine uncertainties regarding the future EU/UK security relationship. These questions relate in particular to the United Kingdom's commitment to European security after Brexit, the nature of post-Brexit developments within the Union, and the European Union's willingness to afford the United Kingdom a substantial role after withdrawal. This article examines each of these questions in turn, before considering the viability of three frequently mooted institutional arrangements post-Brexit: UK participation in the CSDP as a third country; increased engagement with NATO that becomes the main platform for cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union; and the enhancement of bilateral ties between the United Kingdom and key European allies – especially France.

First published online: 11 September 2018 ; The purpose of this article is to understand the EU/UK security relationship after Brexit and the institutional form(s) it may take. Taking stock of the literature on the consequences of Brexit for European foreign affairs, this article employs a question-driven approach to examine uncertainties regarding the future EU/UK security relationship. These questions relate in particular to the United Kingdom's commitment to European security after Brexit, the nature of post-Brexit developments within the Union, and the European Union's willingness to afford the United Kingdom a substantial role after withdrawal. This article examines each of these questions in turn, before considering the viability of three frequently mooted institutional arrangements post-Brexit: UK participation in the CSDP as a third country; increased engagement with NATO that becomes the main platform for cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union; and the enhancement of bilateral ties between the United Kingdom and key European allies – especially France.

The newly agreed operational rules for Frontex allows the Agency to, among other things, buy or lease its own equipment for missions and/or to do so in co-ownership with the Member States and to request national seconded staff for its operations. The new rules are a major step forward in further developing Frontex's resources. Yet this progress has not been matched, despite the Lisbon treaty's protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation, and in light of the defence budget cuts being made in many European Union (EU) Member States, when it comes to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This article asks why, given that each policy area is ultimately aimed at the defence and security of the EU, are the innovations that have been agreed for Frontex not equally applicable to CSDP? Why have Member States increased cooperation under Frontex without equivalent or similar progress under the CSDP? This article aims to shed light on the differences and similarities of the two policy domains in order to see if a 'Frontex formula' could be applicable to the CSDP

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) represents an institutionalized attempt by European Union Member States to respond to the security challenges they confront. This paper discusses the evolution of this policy through the lens of political integration and international relations theories. The analysis integrates both the supranational and the national level, and demonstrates that European institutions have extended their privileges and sphere of influence with increasing organizational mandates. At the same time, participation by various levels in the creation of European security policies has evolved, and the inter-governmental level is often recognized as dominant. However, the question remains open whether this evolution of policy might be properly explained by several influential political theories that have shaped the European integration and security architecture in recent decades. Aspects of the CSDP institutional setting (its creation, goals and role) and the explanation of why security and defense policy is a complex dilemma of the integration process are discussed.

AbstractThis article demonstrates that it is doubtful whether the accountability mechanisms available in connection with operative missions conducted under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provide a sufficient level of protection when human rights are violated. The assessment of the CSDP accountability mechanisms—the Court of Justice of the European Union, domestic courts of EU Member States, and other mechanisms at the international level—is conducted in light of the requirements laid down in Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The consequences of the insufficiency of these mechanisms for the EU's accession to the ECHR are also touched upon.

Cet article examine dans quelle mesure le Brexit a engendré une désintégration administrative au sein de la PESC et la PSDC. Au lieu d'analyser les effets à long terme du Brexit sur la politique étrangère de l'UE, cet article se concentre sur les effets administratifs au quotidien du Brexit sur la PESC et la PSCD. L'article montre que l'effet réel du Brexit sur les structures et les ressources formelles de la politique étrangère européenne est moins prononcé qu'on aurait pu s'y attendre étant donné la faible participation du Royaume-Uni à ces structures avant le Brexit.