Search results

Includes order forms. ; Includes index. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Cover -- Half-Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Thinking Government Website -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Thinking about Canadian Society and Government -- 2 Ideologies of Government and Public Service -- 3 Institutions of Governance -- 4 Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems -- 5 Organizational Design and Management Decision Making -- 6 Financial Management -- 7 Human Resources Management -- 8 Issues in Management Reform -- 9 Accountability: Responsibility, Responsiveness, and Ethics -- 10 The Challenges of Leadership -- Key Terms -- Index.

Abstract.Using time series, cross-sectional econometric modelling, an analysis is made of competing political and economic determinants of Canadian provincial government fiscal policy during the 1980s and 1990s. It is determined that provincial government spending responses to trade liberalization are dependent upon the ideology of the government and conditioned by the degree of provincial unionization. When relatively high levels of unionization prevail, those governments that typically spend the most reduce total spending to a lowest common denominator. However, when unionization is low, provincial government spending responses to increasing trade openness is primarily compensatory. This is in contradiction to the "race to the bottom" theory. The contingent nature of the provincial government spending response to trade openness means that despite overall pressures for fiscal convergence, political, economic and regional factors continue to contribute to distinct provincial spending policies.Résumé.Cet article utilise une modélisation économétrique transversale en série chronologique pour analyser les déterminants politiques et économiques en compétition au niveau de la politique fiscale du gouvernement provincial canadien durant les années 1980 et 1990. Il est établi qu'en termes de dépenses publiques, les réactions du gouvernement provincial face à la libéralisation des échanges sont tributaires de l'idéologie du gouvernement et déterminées par le niveau de syndicalisation provincial. Lorsque le niveau de syndicalisation est relativement élevé, ce sont les gouvernements provinciaux qui dépensent le plus qui réduisent leurs dépenses totales au plus bas dénominateur commun. Par contre, plus le niveau de syndicalisation est bas, plus les dépenses publiques face à la libéralisation des échanges sont principalement compensatoires. Cela vient contredire la théorie du " nivellement par le bas ". La nature conditionnelle de la réaction du gouvernement provincial en termes de dépenses publiques signifie qu'en dépit des pressions globales pour la convergence fiscale, des facteurs politiques, économiques et régionaux continuent de contribuer aux politiques de dépenses publiques distinctes.

IN CANADA, ENERGY POLICY HAS BEEN A HIGH PROFILE ITEM ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENDA IN THE PAST DECADE. THIS ARTICLE OFFERS A GAME-THEORETIC INVESTIGATION IN FIVE STAGES: A HISTORY OF THE PHASE OF CONFRONTATION; THE GAME-THEORETIC INTERPRETATION IS PRESENTED IN GENERAL TERMS; RELEVANT MEASUREMENTS ARE DERIVED; THE PROCESS OF A SEQUENTIAL GAME IS ANALYZED; AND, POLICY-RELATED IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS ARE DISCUSSED, ALONG WITH POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.

AbstractOver a decade ago, the federal Liberal government announced one of the most controversial policy initiatives in Canadian history, the National Energy Program (NEP). The bargaining that followed the NEP's announcement on October 28, 1980 is easily recalled; intense disagreements focussed on economic, partisan and, ultimately, constitutional issues. While these events have stimulated a wide range of investigations, a prominent gap exists in the scholarship: very few studies adopt a game-theoretic perspective. In seeking to explain strategic interaction over energy policy, such an approach might increase understanding of the difficult political processes surrounding the NEP in a wider context.These are five stages to the game-theoretic investigation that follows. First, a brief history of the phase of confrontation is provided. Second, the game-theoretic interpretation is presented in general terms, including participants, strategies and potential outcomes. Relevant measurements are derived in the third phase. In the fourth stage, the process of a sequential game is analyzed, in both abstract and operational terms. Fifth, and finally, policy-related implications of the analysis are discussed, along with possible directions for further research.