Suchergebnisse

En julio de 1993, la Unión Europea (U.E.) inició el Reglamento (C.E.E.) Número 404/93 como su nueva política para gobernar la importación del banano. Este acto fue parte de su intento de crear un mercado común entre los quince países miembros. Como el mercado bananero más grande del mundo, la UE y sus políticas tienen un gran impacto sobre la producción y el intercambio de esta fruta, la fruta fresca del volumen más grande del intercambio mundial. Esta ponencia considera la nueva política y sus impactos desde tres perspectivas, las cuales representan las tres categorías mayores de productores de los bananos que consumen los residentes de los quince países. Estas categorías incluyen los países exportadores latinoamericanos, el grupo Mricano-CaribeñoPacífico (A.C.P.) de productores vinculados con la U.E. por medio del Convenio de Lomé, y la U.E. por sí misma. Este grupo de países tan diversos también indican las dimensiones Norte-Sur de la situación. La ponencia es basada en investigaciones realizadas en Costa Rica, en Dominica, y en Bruselas, sede de la Comisión Europea, rama ejecutiva de la U.E. Las perspectivas de las tres categorías de productores son muy distintas. En su análisis final, la ponencia sugerirá que una política forzada en Bruselas sirva como ejemplo de los procesos de globalización ya evidente en la economía mundial e intentará evaluar la justificación para el Reglamento (C.E.E.) 404/93 ofrecida por la U.E, considerando sus impactos en las tres regiones productoras. In July, 1993 the European Union (E.U.) implemented Council Regulation 404/93 as its governing policy for the importation of bananas. This was done as part of its larger Single European Market. As the world's largest market for bananas, E.U. policies have a great impact on the production and trade of this fruit, the world's largest trade fresh fruit commodity by volume. This paper examines the policy and its impacts from three perspectives, representing the three major categories of producers of the bananas consumed by E.U. residents. Those categories include Latin American exporting countries, African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) banana producers linked to the E.U. by the Lomé Convention, and the European Union itself. Such a grouping of countries indicates the North/South dimensions of the issue. The paper is based upon research done in Costa Rica, Dominica, and Brussels, headquarters of the European Commission, the executive branch of the E.U. The perspectives on the policy vary greatly, depending upon which source is considered. In its final analysis, the paper considers how a policy forged in Brussels exemplifies larger issues of globalization in the world economy and it attempts to evaluate the justification of Council Regulation 404/93 offered by the EU in view of its impacts in each of the three producing regions.

The reform of the sugar protocol between the European Union (EU) and the African Caribbean andPacific (ACP) countries affected the Mauritian agricultural sector tremendously: it spelt a decrease of 36 per centin the price of sugar for producers. In reaction, the Mauritian sugar industry has undertaken a massivediversification within sugar: production of other sugar cane products and by-products, as well as diversification invegetable production at an industrial level. The entry of large sugar cane producers from the corporate sector onthe vegetable market has had a number of repercussions on the vegetable supply chain, one of which being theemergence of institutional entrepreneurs. A qualitative study of the vegetable supply chain was conducted amongthe different actors concerned. It revealed the following findings: new entrants in the vegetable supply chain havecaused an institutional change. Institutional entrepreneurs have emerged and in turn established new institutionalrules and standards of practice that have changed the institutional structure of the vegetable supply chain. Thispaper identifies at a first stage, two main factors favouring the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs in anorganisational field. Firstly, a moderate degree of institutionalisation provides the adequate environment foractors to deliberately initiate changes through entrepreneurial processes. Secondly the multiplicity of institutionalreferents across organisational fields, in this case, the sugar cane and the fresh vegetable supply chains,provides the right environment for creative entrepreneurial action. At a second stage, this paper identifies theinnovative managerial and marketing practices brought about in vegetable production and distribution by theinstitutional entrepreneurs, and the impact of these new practices on incumbent actors. This study uses asociological neoinstitutional perspective and provides empirical evidence of the factors affecting actors' agencyand more specifically the conditions in an organisational field that favour strategic behaviour among actors. Thisresearch also helps to shed some light on how changes in the institutional structure of a field can drive theinnovation process. This paper can help in further research on innovation and institutional entrepreneurship.

Der Aufsatz befaßt sich mit den Auswirkungen des EG-Binnenmarktes von 1993 an und skizziert die Bedeutung der europäischen Handelspolitik gegenüber den Entwicklungsländern im Zeichen der Uruguay-Runde. Die wirtschaftliche Lage der AKP-Länder, ihre Erfahrungen mit Lome III, die Perspektiven im Rahmen des Lome IV-Abkommens, Strukturanpassungsprogramme und Verschuldungskrise sowie die finanzielle und technische Kooperation zwischen der EG und den AKP-Ländern werden untersucht

The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, commonly referred to as the Visegrad Four (V4) states, developed friendly relations with several African states both during and after the wave of independence. After the transition from Socialist to democratic systems at the beginning of the 1990s, the focus of the Visegrad countries had shifted to the West. The foreign policies of the V4 mainly focused on the accession to NATO and then to the EU, to the relative neglect of other aspects and regions, including Africa. As one of the conditions for acceding to the European Union (EU) in 2004, the members of the Visegrad group acceded to the EU-Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) Cotonou Partnership Agreement. They also became part of the regular Africa-EU Summits of Heads of State and Government, and became influential actors in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy that covers relations with North Africa as well as with the Central and East European region under the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Discussions on EU-Africa relations strongly emphasise the engagement and interests of certain (founding) EU member states who have traditionally been vocal in this sphere. On the other side, there is a widely spread perception of the V4's lack of interest in Africa. Nevertheless, while facing the recent turmoil induced by the migration crisis, the V4 governments often declare the intention of greater commitment to development cooperation and humanitarian aid, especially in African migrants' countries of origin. This paper discusses the recent engagement of the Visegrad countries in the EU-Africa relations, with a key focus on four main issues (the post-Cotonou mandate negotiations; the southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy; the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa; and the European Development Fund). Furthermore, it identifies prospects for the Group's future engagement. The Visegrad countries' foreign policy, as well as economic priorities, primarily lie somewhere else and not in Africa. Their focus on the EaP is one of the reasons why the V4 engagement in the shaping of EU-Africa relations has been limited. Since their interests are elsewhere, they try to balance the EU's focus within its external relations. Also, the V4 countries often point to their lack of interests and expertise in this region. Seemingly, there are too many technical and political limitations for a considerable increase of the V4 engagement in Africa in the near future. This paper's findings suggest that the migration crisis indeed reinforced the increasing interest of Visegrad countries in Africa, and to some extent accelerated their engagement – both in this region and in the EU arena. However, the tendency to (re)engage in Africa had been initiated before the migration crisis, and it was a result of higher interest stemming from security concerns and from the desire to diversify economic ties. The overall conclusion of this paper is that the V4 have not managed to effectively translate their joint positions on EU-Africa relations into collective action within the EU. In most of the cases they did not share interests and, in consequence, did not formulate joint positions. This could particularly be observed in the post-Cotonou mandate negotiations. Nevertheless, along with the emergence of the current migration and refugee crisis, a new field for joint engagement of the V4 appeared. Since joint efforts could help to overcome the lack of capacities for greater development cooperation and diplomatic representation, there is now potential for the Visegrad countries cooperation on the ground.