Članci 34. i 35. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije zabranjuju količinska ograničenja i mjere s istovrsnim učinkom na uvoz i izvoz između država članica. Države članice nisu u mogućnosti favorizirati ili na bilo koji drugi način staviti u prednost domaće proizvode u odnosu na proizvode drugih država članica. Ipak, ako postoji prijetnja javnom interesu, država članica može opravdano ograničiti slobodno kretanje robe. Svaka takva nacionalna mjera mora biti istovremeno nužna i proporcionalna cilju koji se želi postići. U radu se daje poseban naglasak na predmet Keck koji je podijelio sve propise na dvije skupine: na uvjete prodaje i na propise koji se odnose isključivo na proizvode. Europski sud je smatrao kako nediskriminatorni uvjeti prodaje nemaju razloga potpasti pod opseg članka 34. UFEU-a. Uvjeti prodaje su, kako je u sudskoj praksi nakon Kecka utvrđeno, propisi koji uređuju kada roba može biti prodavana, na kojem mjestu i tko tu robu može prodavati, propisi koji se tiču reklamiranja te kontrole cijena. Ova presuda bila je predmetom mnogih kritika. Sudska praksa koja je uslijedila donekle je iskristalizirala i riješila nejasnoće. Unatoč tome, nisu sva pitanja u potpunosti razjašnjena iako su vidljivi mali koraci k realističnijem pristupu mjerama s istovrsnim učinkom kao količinsko ograničenje. ; Articles 34 and 35 of the TFEU prohibit import and export restrictions between all Member States. Member States are not allowed to favour or in any other way put its domestic products at an advantage against imported products. However, if there is a threat to publich interest, such as (for example) public health or the environment, Member States may restrict the free movement of goods. Any national measure imposed must be shown to be both necessary and proportional. The article gives special emphasis to the Keck case which divided regulations into two parts: selling arrangements and product-bound measures. ECJ held that non-discriminatory national measures restricting or prohibiting selling arrangements were ...
This article aims to examine the importance of an often overlooked argument when it comes to explaining why great powers go to war against a weaker actor. This argument involves great power status considerations. The article argues that states care deeply about their status, especially states which are current and former great powers, and would opt to go to war to preserve this status even if the political and military consequences of such intervention are negligible to objective observers. To illustrate this argument, I will be looking at why the British decided to reestablish their sovereignty over the Falklands in 1982. The empirical part of the analysis is based on formerly secret documents declassified by the British government. This qualitative primary analysis of British documents provides new insights about the crisis and suggests that status considerations played a large role in the British decision to re-conquer the Falklands. ; This article aims to examine the importance of an often overlooked argument when it comes to explaining why great powers go to war against a weaker actor. This argument involves great power status considerations. The article argues that states care deeply about their status, especially states which are current and former great powers, and would opt to go to war to preserve this status even if the political and military consequences of such intervention are negligible to objective observers. To illustrate this argument, I will be looking at why the British decided to reestablish their sovereignty over the Falklands in 1982. The empirical part of the analysis is based on formerly secret documents declassified by the British government. This qualitative primary analysis of British documents provides new insights about the crisis and suggests that status considerations played a large role in the British decision to re-conquer the Falklands.
Autor analizira transformaciju Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ) u tip prezidencijalizirane stranke, koja se kao novi obrazac stranačke organizacije pojavljuje u sklopu šireg procesa prezidencijalizacije politike. Prezidencijalizacija političkih stranaka zamjećuje se u svim oblicima stranačke organizacije: u stranačkoj središnjici, stranci u Vladi i u parlamentarnoj stranačkoj frakciji. Autor najprije daje kratak pregled nastanka i razvoja HDZ-a do 2000. godine i dolaska Ive Sanadera na čelo stranke, određujući tu godinu kao demarkacijsku točku demokratske transformacije u Hrvatskoj i argumentirajući zašto istraživanjem neće obuhvatiti razvoj stranačke organizacije HDZ-a prije 2000. Zatim rastvara kontingentne i strukturne promjene u stranci i obrazlaže ih teorijskim i metodološkim alatima koncepta prezidencijalizacije. Promatrajući procese na sve tri razine demokratske politike, pokušava utvrditi uklapa li se HDZ u obrazac prezidencijalizirane stranke. Analiza je pokazala da se HDZ može svrstati u tip predsjedničke stranke koja je nastala kao rezultat tendencijske prezidencijalizacije stranačke strukture. Primijenjeni empirijski indikatori otkrivaju kako se HDZ oblikovao u tip prezidencijalizirane stranke na sve tri razine demokratske politike: stranačke organizacije, izbornog procesa i izvršne vlasti. ; The author analyses the transformation of the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica; HDZ) into a type of a presidentialised party, which has arisen as a new pattern of party organisation within the broader process of the presidentialisation of politics. The presidentialisation of political parties can be observed in all forms of party organisation: party head offices, the party in the government, and in a parliamentary party faction. In the first place, the author gives an outline of the emergence and development of the CDU up to 2000 and Ivo Sanader taking the leadership of the party, identifying this year as a demarcation point of democratic transformation in Croatia and arguing why he ...
Glavni je cilj rada utvrditi u kojoj je mjeri novu političku opciju u Hrvatskoj, Most, opravdano nazivati populističkom. Na to pitanje autori nastoje odgovoriti korištenjem recentnih teorijskih, metodoloških i empirijskih uvida politološke literature o populizmu. Analizu temelje na inkluzivnom pristupu populizmu i iz njega izvedenoj istraživačkoj matrici na temelju koje je provedena analiza sadržaja. Analiza samo djelomice potvrđuje teze o Mostu kao populističkoj opciji. Autori smatraju kako je tu opciju najprikladnije kategorizirati kao kombinaciju centrističkog populizma i antiestablišmentske reformske stranke. Tvrde da bi istraživanja populizma trebala razlikovati antielitizam od antiestablišmentske pozicije stranaka i političara. Zanimljivost Mosta vide i u njegovu čudnom i paradoksalnom odnosu prema hrvatskoj političkoj eliti: mostovci kritiziraju političku elitu kao nekompetentnu i korumpiranu, a istodobno zagovaraju politički savez s tom istom elitom kako bi se provele reforme i donio prosperitet hrvatskom društvu. ; The main goal of the paper is to establish to which extent it is justified to label a newly established Croatian party The Bridge (Most) a populist party. In order to answer this question, the paper relies on theoretical, methodological and empirical insights from contemporary literature on populism. The study is based on inclusive approach to populism and accordingly developed categories for content analysis. The analysis only partially confirms the assumption that Most is a populist option. The authors suggest that Most is best described as a combination of centrist populism and an anti-establishment reform party. They suggest that populism research would benefit from distinguishing between anti-elitist and anti-establishment position of parties and politicians. Finally, they argue that the 'curiosity' of Most stems primarily from their awkward and paradoxical relationship towards Croatian political elite: Most's politicians criticise political elite for being incompetent and corrupt, while at the same time advocating alliance with this same elite in order to implement reforms and bring prosperity to Croatian society.
U radu se prikazuje razvoj kaznene politike u Engleskoj i Walesu, kao posebnoj kaznenopolitičkoj jedinici unutar Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Koristi se politologijski koncept transfera javnih politika koji opisuje mehanizme prijenosa javnih politika između različitih političkih sustava. Rad nastoji pokazati kako se reforme kaznene politike devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu mogu u određenoj mjeri objasniti kao slučaj ideologijski motiviranog uvoza kaznene politike iz SAD-a. Analizom slučaja nastoji se ukazati na širu pojavu putovanja različitih kaznenih tehnologija, retoričkih obrazaca i javnopolitičkih rješenja koja obilježavaju suvremeno stvaranje kaznene politike – važnu s obzirom na i dalje postojeće ambicije harmonizacije javnih politika u okvirima europskih integracija. ; This paper presents the development of penal policy in England and Wales, as a distinct unit of penal policy making within the United Kingdom. The paper uses the political science concept of policy transfer that describes the mechanisms of transmission of policy between different political systems. The work aims to show how the penal policy reforms of the 1990s in the United Kingdom can be explained as a case of ideologically motivated import of penal policy from the United States. Within the framework of a case study, the aim is to point to a general phenomenon of the traveling of various penal technologies, rhetorical patterns and policy solutions that characterize modern penal policy making. This is relevant given the still existing ambition of policy harmonization within the framework of European integrations.
Iako je demokracija u Izraelu održiva i stabilna, ne odgovara ni jednoj od postojećih zapadnih vrsta demokracije. Izrael je tipično podijeljeno društvo čiji su politički sustav i društvena struktura ostatku svijeta često slabo razumljivi. Ovaj rad predstavlja kratku analizu, utemeljenu na teorijskim okvirima i tipološkome smještaju demokracije koja je u uskoj svezi s društvenim rascjepima izraelskoga društva. U radu se ispituje je li se demokracija u Izraelu razvijala tako da olakša upravljanje društvenim podjelama te jesu li se njome ublažili ili ojačali društveni rascjepi. ; Although democracy in Israel is sustainable and stable, it does not match any of the western types of democracy. Israel is a typical divided society whose political system and social structure do not often make a great deal of sense for the rest of the world. This paper represents a brief analysis, based on theoretical frameworks and typological placement of democracy which is closely connected to social rifts of the Israeli society. The paper investigates if democracy in Israel was being developed in order to facilitates the social divisions management and if it alleviated or strengthened social rifts.
Ovaj rad temelji se na analizi studije slučaja Republike Cipra o pokušajima rješavanja problema i europeizaciji samog otoka. Ciparski problem predstavlja jedan od dugovječnijih pokušaja provedbe mirovnog sporazuma između dvije etničke zajednice – ciparskih Grka i ciparskih Turaka. Od turske invazije na otok 1974. godine zaoštrili su se dodatno odnosi između sukobljenih strana. Velika Britanija, Turska i Grčka postale su jamci mira i sigurnosti te glavni pregovarači u rješavanju problema. Početkom pristupnih pregovora s Europskom unijom i ona službeno postaje umiješana u situaciju na otoku te provođenje europeizacije je označilo novu fazu razvoja otoka. Iako postoje brojna rješenja problema niti jedna strana ne pristaje na uvjete koji ne idu njima u korist. Najuspješnije rješenje do sada je održavanje statusa quo koje jamči mir i sigurnost objema stranama. Analizom dokumenata i literature nastoji se objasniti interes velikih svjetskih sila i Europske unije na Republiku Cipar te kakav je to utjecaj ostavilo u međunarodnoj zajednici i propalim diplomatskim pokušajima. ; This paper is based on an analysis of Cyprus as a case study on attempts to solve problems and the Europeanization of the island. Cyprus problem is one of the long-standing attempts of implementation of the peace agreement between two ethnic communities – Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Since the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974, relations between the conflict parties have intensified. The United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece have become guarantors of peace and security and have been the main negotiators in solving the problem. With the start of accession negotiations with the European Union, it officially becomes involved in the situation on the island and the implementation of Europeanization marks a new phase of island development. Although there are numerous solutions, neither side has agreed to the terms that will benefit them. The most successful solution so far is to maintain the status quo that guarantees peace and security for both ...
Gdje su izvori i koji su razlozi procesa povijesnog revizionizma koji se od devedesetih sve jače i češće pojavljuje u raznim europskih zemljama i koje bi mogle biti njegove posljedice na odnose između zemalja članica Europske unije? Kako spriječiti sukob oko interpretacije povijesti koji utječe na samu srž pojma europske konfederacije? Članak pokušava dati odgovor na ta pitanja polazeći od analize razloga krize antifašizma, kao i drugih političkih i kulturnih faktora koji su ukorijenjeni u događajima iz devedesetih te s kraja Hladnog rata i rušenja komunističkih režima u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi. Konkretno istraživanje odnosi se na slučaj Italije, gdje se "bitka sjećanja" i revizionizma vodi oko tzv. fojbi, istarskih kraških jama u kojima je stradalo nekoliko stotina Talijana za vrijeme ustanka u jesen 1943. godine. Tijekom zadnjih dvadeset godina taj povijesni događaj, o kojem skoro nitko ništa nije znao i koji je imao marginalnu ulogu u širem kontekstu talijanskog sudjelovanja u Drugom svjetskom ratu, postao je povijesni mit sa svojim službenim "danom sjećanja", uzdignutim na razinu Dana sjećanja na Holokaust. Budući da je 2007. godine upravo oko sjećanja na fojbe došlo do diplomatskog sukoba između predsjednikâ Italije i Hrvatske, Giorgia Napolitana i Stjepana Mesića, sukoba koji je kasnije riješen potpisivanjem sporazuma o povijesnom pomirenju između Italije, Hrvatske i Slovenije u Trstu 2010. godine, fojbe su predstavljale izvrstan primjer analize "rata" na području interpretacije povijesti koji se nedavno pojavio u više krajeva Europe i koji ugrožava međunarodne odnose, ali i stanja unutar pojedinih država. ; Where are the sources and what are the reasons for the process of historical revisionism that emerged in many European countries in the beginning of the nineties? Is it possible to avoid conflicts around different interpretations of history that affect the core of the concept of European integration? The article is focused on the crisis of antifascist interpretation of the past in Italy, which is rooted in the events of the nineties. In particular, two events and processes have shaken the dominant discourses: the end of the Cold war and the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The focus of the research is on the Italian case, where the war of memories mainly revolved around the so-called foibe, the Istrian carsic caves in which hundreds of Italians perished in the Autumn of 1943. In the span of twenty years a historic event that only a few knew about and which played a marginal role in the bigger picture of the Italian engagement in WWII has been transformed into a historic myth with its official "Remembrance day" and put at the same level of importance as the memory of the Shoah. The new official politics of remembering the victims of the foibe has triggered a diplomatic crisis between Italy and Croatia, which has later been solved with the signing of a memorandum on historic reconciliation in Trieste in 2010 (jointly with Slovenia). The foibe case is here placed into a wider context of revisionism in interpretation of history of the Second World War and of immediate post-War events, which is currently happening in many parts of Europe – not only former Eastern Europe – and which may complicate bilateral relations between various countries, but also wider international relations.
Istraživanje je poduzeto radi svrhe prikazivanja odnosa moći između različitih aktera koji su sudjelovali u formulaciji dopunskog osiguranja. Cilj je utvrditi tko su bili najutjecajniji/najmoćniji akteri u tom procesu kako bi se unaprijedilo znanje o akterima hrvatske zdravstvene politike i pokazalo tko su jedni od najvažnijih aktera u toj hrvatskoj politici. U radu autor se vodio pretpostavkom pluralizma kako je moć široko distribuirana među različitim akterima te da im se na temelju toga omogućava sudjelovanje, zastupanje interesa i utjecaj na spomenuti proces. U skladu s time autor je razvio mrežu interakcije između aktera, a moć se mjerila pomoću 4 indikatora: javne ovlasti, uloga u procesu, medijska zastupljenost te percepcija aktera o distribuciji moći. Svi indikatori upućuju na to da su najutjecajniji akteri bili formalni, odnosno državni te da moć nije bila široko distribuirana. Nadalje, iako su akteri razvili svojevrsnu mrežu odnosa, ona se ne može u potpunosti objasniti pristupom mreža javnih politika jer je kao prvo, postojao jedan centar moći oko kojeg se strukturirala interakcija i kao drugo, civilno društvo je bilo nedovoljno zastupljeno. ; Research was conducted for purposes of explaining the relations of power between various actors which have participated in the formulation of supplementary health insurance. The goal was to determine who were the most inflental/powerful actors in that process in order to advance knowledge about Croatian health policy actors and to show which actors are the most relevant in that policy. In this paper the author took the assumption of pluralism as a theory which holds that power is widely distributed among different actors and thus enables them to take part in the policy process, representing their interests and influencing policy. Accordingly, the author developed a network of interaction between actors, and power was measured by four indicators: public authority, role in the policy process, media representation, and actors perception of power distribution. All ...
Članak je usredotočen na djelovanje međunarodnih organizacija u postkonfliktnim i nestabilnim državama s posebnim prikazom njihove uloge u BiH. Od sredine 1990-ih međunarodne organizacije – kao što su UN, NATO, EU i OESS – angažirane su u BiH u procesu izgradnje države i transformiranja podijeljenoga društva u gospodarski i politički održivu državu. Iako su, uz podršku svih istaknutijih europskih država i SAD-a, međunarodne organizacije postale važan činitelj u slaboj i nefunkcionalnoj državi, njihovo uplitanje nije proizvelo očekivane rezultate. ; The paper is focused on activities of international organizations in postconflict and unstable countries with a special overview of their role in BiH. Since 1990 international organizations – such as UN, NATO, EU and OESS – have been engaged in BiH in the process of building the country and transforming a divided society into economically and politically sustainable country. Although international organizations became an important factor in the weak and non-functional country with the support of all eminent European countries and the USA, their interference has not produced expected results.
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
Visoke i rastuće regionalne ekonomske nejednakosti u Hrvatskoj uz »parcijalnu decentralizaciju« sustava socijalne skrbi rezultirale su porastom socijalnih nejednakosti među hrvatskim građanima. Spomenuti procesi rezultirali su situacijom da se jedno od temeljnih načela socijalne države i socijalne politike kao što je načelo jednakosti sve više narušava. Navedeno ima za posljedicu da razina ostvarenja socijalnih prava građana u Hrvatskoj u sve većoj mjeri ovise o mjestu stanovanja i socioekonomskom statusu. Navedena tvrdnja je središnja hipoteza rada koja je eksplicirana analizom dostupnosti institucionalne skrbi za starije osobe po županijama u Hrvatskoj i lokalnih socijalnih programa izabrane četiri jedinice lokalne samouprave. Provedena analiza pokazala je značajnu razinu međužupanijskih nejednakosti u dostupnosti institucionalne skrbi za starije te isto tako analizom izdvajanja i strukture lokalnih socijalnih programa demonstrirala da je stupanj ostvarenja socijalnih prava građana Hrvatske u značajnoj mjeri neujednačen i ovisan o mjestu stanovanja i socioekonomskom statusu. Uzroci za navedenu situaciju nalaze se u neuspješnim politikama ujednačavanja regionalnog razvoja i parcijalno provedenoj decentralizaciji sustava socijalne skrbi. Zaključno poglavlje donosi određene preporuke za nositelje ekonomske i socijalne politike kojima bi se demonstrirane i rastuće socijalne nejednakosti hrvatskih građana potencijalno ublažile. ; High and increasing regional economic inequality with 'partial decentralization' of social welfare system in Croatia resulted in an increase of social inequality among Croatian citizens. The aforementioned processes resulted in a situation in which one of fundamental principles of social welfare and social policy, such as the principle of equality, is being seriously impaired. The result of that is that the realization of social rights of citizens in Croatia is increasingly dependent on the place of residence and socio-economic status. This claim is a central hypothesis of the paper which was demonstrated by analyzing the availability of institutional care for the elderly by county in Croatia and an analysis of local social programs of four selected units of local self-government. The analysis demonstrated a significant level of inter-county disparities in the availability of institutional care for the elderly and the analysis of local social programs has shown that the degree of realization of social rights of Croatian citizens is largely uneven and dependent on the place of residence and socio-economic status. The causes for that situation had come from the unsuccessful policies of harmonization of regional development and partial decentralization of the social welfare system. The final chapter provides specific recommendations for economic and social policy makers with potential positive effects which would decrease social inequality of Croatian citizens in the future.
The EU Marine Strategy Directive (2008/56/EC) proposes four marine regions as a political geographic framework for implementation of the Community's environmental policy. This study critically analyzes the state-based approach, which the Directive uses to outline the regions' boundaries. It suggests that environmental sustainability of marine odies strongly depends on the geographic congruence between their watersheds and the borders of the respective environmental management system, i.e., marine regions have to be environmentally managed within their watersheds. The proposed watershed-based approach also takes into consideration all elements – water, land, and air – of marine regions, which is a conditio sine qua non for their integrated and sustainable management. In the case of the Black Sea region in particular, the borders of a watershed-based environmental management system include a much wider set of stakeholder countries and enable a higher level of environmental cooperation among them. ; Direktiva marinske strategije Europske unije (2008/56/EC) predlaže četiri marinska područja kao političko geografski okvir za primjenu politike o zaštiti okoliša u Europskoj uniji. Ovaj rad kritički analizira pristup koji se temelji na državnim granicama, a kojim se Direktiva koristi za određivanje granica regija. Autor također smatra da održivost okoliša u marinskim područjima uvelike ovisi o geografskom podudaranju između pojedinih sljevova i granicama njihovih sustava upravljanja okolišem, tj. okolišem u marinskim područjima treba upravljati unutar njihovih sljevova. Predloženi pristup koji se temelji na granicama sljevova također u obzir uzima sve elemente marinskih sustava (voda, zemlja i zrak), koji su conditio sine qua non za integralno i održivo upravljanje. Crno more je dobar primjer u kojem sustav upravljanja okolišem koji je određen granicama slijeva uključuje puno veći broj zemalja dionika te omogućuje višu razinu suradnje među zemljama vezano uz upravljanje okolišem.
Cilj je ovoga rada prikazati razvoj lokalne proračunske politike u smjeru veće proračunske transparentnosti. Provedena je studija slučaja Bjelovara u kojoj su korištene dvije kvalitativne metode prikupljanja podataka – intervju i selekcioniranje dokumenata. Prikupljena građa kodirana je prema pravilima kvalitativne analize sadržaja. Četiri su glavna elementa političkog odlučivanja o bjelovarskoj proračunskoj politici: transparentnost kao cilj, aplikacija Transparentno kao osnovni informacijski instrument, gradonačelnik zajedno sa svojim suradnicima kao ključni akter i građani kao glavna ciljana skupina. Analiza pokazuje kako su zajednička temeljna načela i lokalne proračunske politike i koncepta dobrog upravljanja transparentnost i odgovornost. Podaci navode i na zaključak kako su to nužni, ali ne i dovoljni uvjeti za ostvarenje dobrog upravljanja, s obzirom na to da njihovo uvođenje ne osigurava veću participaciju neformalnih aktera, posebice udruga civilnog društva. Ovaj rad predstavlja politološki pogled na ovu prvenstveno ekonomski analiziranu temu, te kroz uvide o empirijskom slučaju pokazuje važnost procesne dimenzije transparentnosti – važno je i koliko se transparentno odlučuje o proračunu, a ne isključivo transparentnost samog proračuna. ; This paper aims to describe the development of local budgetary policy towards increased budget transparency. A case study of Bjelovar was undertaken, for which the two qualitative data collecting methods were used – interviewing and document analysis. The collected data were coded in accordance with the rules of qualitative content analysis. There are four main elements of the decision-making process within Bjelovar's budgetary policy: the transparency as a main goal; the application "Transparent" as instrument of nodality, as central instrument; the mayor, along with his associates, as a leading actor; and the citizens as a principal target group. The analysis shows how common principles of the local budgetary policy and the concept of the good governance are transparency and accountability. Still, those seem to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for realization of good governance, as their introduction does not insure higher participation of unofficial actors, especially not of non-governmental organizations. This research paper offers a political science insight on an economic topic and it underlines the importance of the procedural aspect of the transparency; in other words – transparency of budgetary decision-making is important at least as much as transparency of budget itself.
In this paper the author analyzes certain solutions of the Amendment of the Civil Procedure Act from 2019 on the reimbursement of costs according to the principle of responsibility for success and responsibility for guilt or case. The paper outlines the most significant novelties, the novelties are analyzed in relation to the partial success of the parties to the litigation. When deciding on the costs of civil proceedings in the case of partial success of the party in the lawsuit, what should be taken into account, in principle, is both the prosecutor's and the defendant's success in the lawsuit, and the decision on which party will bear the obligation to reimburse the costs of the proceedings shall be brought through the application of the rule of procedural offsetting of the lawsuit costs. The objective of this rule is to avoid unwarranted lawsuit or filing of exaggerated claims without consequences. But, it can happen that the costs of the party that is less successful are significantly higher than the costs of their opponents. This party, although more successful, can be obliged to reimburse the amount of the difference, which may result in restriction of the right of access to court. ; U članku se analiziraju pojedina rješenja Novele Zakona o parničnom postuplu iz 2019. godine o naknadi troškova prema načelu odgovornosti za uspjeh te odgovornosti za krivnju odnosno slučaj. Analiziraju se novine u odnosu na djelomični uspjeh stranaka u parnici. Pritom se posebno problematizira i uspoređuje prije važeće zakonodavno uređenja instituta i stajališta zauzeta u dosadašnjoj sudskoj praksi i doktrini, sa novim normativnim uređenjem koje donosi Novela 2019.
