The objective of the work was to analyze integration theories such as federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, the multilevel governance model and the interstate concept. Using the systemic-integral method, we analyze the main interpretations of modern integration models. The study also used special methods typical of international relations theory. The interstate concept is the most effective, because without denying the importance of integration, it focuses on the preservation of cultural and economic diversity. The experience of Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic States, in particular Latvia, is a valuable integrating example for Ukraine. The results summarize that the countries analyzed received several advantages for the economic and military spheres through integration processes. It is concluded that in the experience of integration of the Balkans and the central-eastern countries, the importance of European integration processes is evident. The comparison of Ukraine and Latvia showed the importance of being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance for security guarantees and political consolidation. At the same time, the Czech Republic's accession to NATO has contributed to the reform and modernization of military affairs.
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the economic and political changes that since then have been taking place in Central and Eastern Europe have had a great influence on the European migration movements. The opening of borders, the economic crisis, the political instability and the ethnic conflicts have accelerated the migratory currents. The great number of immigrants registered in the first years caused that Western countries feared a possible avalanche of persons fleeing from misery and hunger. Nevertheless, it has been verified that the flow has been modest and it has also been noticed there have been notable changes in recent dates. Thus, the permanent emigration diminishes and the temporary and short-tem displacements increase at the same time that Central and Eastern Europe receives emigrants from very diverse origins, many of them moving towards Western Europe and North America. The European Union has required from the future associates the adoption of norms that comply with the migratory policies in force in Western Countries. ; La caída del muro de Berlín en 1989 y los cambios políticos y económicos que desde entonces se han sucedido en Europa central y oriental han tenido una gran incidencia en las migraciones europeas. La apertura de fronteras, la crisis económica, la inestabilidad política y los conflictos étnicos han acelerado las corrientes migratorias. El gran número de inmigrantes registrado en los primeros años hizo temer a Occidente una avalancha de personas huyendo de la miseria y el hambre. Sin embargo, se ha comprobado que el flujo ha sido modesto y que ha experimentado cambios notables en fecha reciente. Así, disminuye la emigración permanente y aumentan los desplazamientos temporales y de corta duración, al tiempo que Europa central y oriental recibe emigrantes de muy diversa procedencia, muchos de ellos en tránsito hacia Europa Occidental y América del Norte. La Unión Europea ha exigido a los futuros socios la adopción de normas acordes con las políticas migratorias vigentes en Occidente.
Review of the book from Mario Munta, EU Socio-economic Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: The European Semester and National Employment Policies, Routledge, 2021, 261 pp. ; Recensión del libro de Mario Munta, EU Socio-economic Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: The European Semester and National Employment Policies, Routledge, 2021, 261 pp.
The fall of the Iron Curtain liberated the great migratory potential of Central and and became the main factor for a profound transformation of the patterns of geographical mobility. In addition, those migratory patterns were also affected since 2004 by the accession to the European Union of eight former socialist countries. This article describes the evolution of the international mobility of the population of Central and Eastern Europe, in the economic and political context of defined by the two above-mentioned historical events. ; La caída del Telón de Acero liberó un gran potencial migratorio de las poblaciones de Europa Central y Oriental y fue el principal factor de una profunda transformación de las pautas de movilidad geográfica. Otro hecho histórico que ha tenido una importancia fundamental en la configuración de las nuevas tendencias migratorias en Central y Oriental fue la adhesión de los ocho antiguos países socialistas a la Unión Europea en 2004. El propósito de este artículo es describir la evolución de las pautas de movilidad internacional de las poblaciones de Europa Central y situándolas en el contexto político y económico marcado por los dos sucesos mencionados.
The article analyses the state and development of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe as basic determinants of its development, using integrative indices of civil society sustainability. The external and internal logic of these indices for 2019 is studied. The research uses methods of cluster analysis, linear correlation, and multiple regression analysis to model the interaction of the determinants of civil society development in the region. The results of the analysis in the Central and Eastern European region reveal interesting links not only between the status of civil society and the state, but also in the relationship of factors that reflect the analytical triangle of relationships. People's satisfaction with government is not a simple consequence of the economic situation: the relationship between social wealth and economic progress. The status of civil society also turns out to be a factor in this system of relationships, along with the quality of social relations and the existing sociopsychological characteristics of the population. The numerical values of the civil society situation and development indices obtained in this way can be used in statistical models.
Los romá o gitanos constituyen la minoría étnica más numerosa, más pobre y con mayor crecimiento de todas las que viven en la Unión Europea, especialmente en los países de reciente incorporación. En este artículo estudiamos el carácter de la inmigración romá/gitana de Europa oriental a España y los perííodos analííticamente distintos de este proceso migratorio. Nos hemos basado en una revisión de noticias publicadas en la prensa escrita utilizando la metodologíía de análisis de eventos históricos tal como ha sido desarrollada por historiadores de la accióón colectiva (ver Franzosi 1995; Olzak 1992). También, a partir de los datosde una investigación etnográfica en curso, describimos y analizamos la situacióón de los inmigrantes romá de Rumania en España atendiendo sobre todo a la organización social de sus comunidades o asentamientos, sus estrategias de búsqueda de recursos y las diferencias cruciales con las otras poblaciones de emigrantes. Esta emigracióón estáá generando también, sobre todo en las nuevas generaciones criadas en España, una nueva identidad donde convergen, se entrelazan y entran en conflicto varias influencias nacionales, étnico-culturales y morales y, en suma, una nueva forma de ser "gitanos" y romá en España que, por primera vez en siglos, se expresa en romaní y se diferencia notablemente de la cultura gitana española. ; In Spain, as in other European countries, there is a type of immigration that politicians and researchers have dismissed in spite of its visibility and its long-standing presence: that of Roma/Gypsies from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Romania, who have been living here since 1991. Although their number is not as important as that of Moroccans or South Americans, they presence creates a series of challenges against which there is little policy experience, nor trained personnel, not even culturally and linguistically capable intermediaries. Moreover, the Roma/Gypsies tend to be one of the migrant communities that cause the greatest rejection and prejudice among their neighbors. The Roma/Sinti/Gypsies are the largest, poorest and fastest-growing ethnic minority in the European Union -specially within recently adhered countries. In this paper we have established the patterns of Roma/Gypsy migration to Spain from Eastern Europe since 1990, and the main periods of this process. We have relied on a review of news in the printed press, using methods of historical event analysis, as have been developed by historians of collective action (see Franzosi 1995; Olzak 1992). Moreover, based on data from an on-going ethnographic research project, we describe and analyze the situation of Romanian Roma immigrants in Spain, highlighting the social organization of their settlements and communities, their strategies for securing resources, and their crucial differences from other immigrant populations such as Moroccans, South Americans, and even non-Roma Romanians. This emigration is also creating, especially among the newer generations being raised in Spain, a new identity where various national, moral and cultural influences clash, interact and mix. Thus we are contemplating the appearance of a new Roma/Gypsy culture in Spain that speaks Romani and contrast notably with local Gitano (Spanish Gypsy) life ways. ; Grupo de Investigación Antropología y Filosofía (SEJ-126). Universidad de Granada
Desde hace dos décadas largas, los sistemas políticos de Europa Central y del Este nos han brindado un campo de investigación sumamente complejo y atractivo. Se buscaba un sistema de compartición del poder entre partidos contrarrestado por el rol moderador de un dirigente altamente representativo. Rumanía, Lituania y Polonia optaron por un jefe de Estado reforzado con competencias significativas que no se quedara aparte de los acontecimientos políticos y que actuara como mediador entre el Gobierno y la oposición. Desafortunadamente, sobre todo al inicio del proceso de transformación, los Presidentes abusaron de sus competencias provocando —y no solucionando— serios conflictos políticos. A medida que se implementaron otros cambios institucionales, los jefes de Estado han actuado como árbitros moderados. ; For two long decades, the politics of Central and Eastern Europe have been providing us a field of investigation that is extraordinarily complex and attractive. What was sought it was a system of sharing of power between the parties countered by the moderating role of a highly representative leader. Romania, Lithuania and Poland opted for a strengthened head of State with significant powers, who was not apart from the political events and often acted as a mediator between the Government and the opposition. Unfortunately, especially at the beginning of the process of transformation, Presidents abused their powers provoking —rather than resolving— serious political conflicts. To the extent that other institutional changes have been implemented, have the heads of State ended up acting more as moderate arbiters.
Las memorias del comunismo en Europa central y oriental están en el centro del artículo de Bruno Groppo, quien presenta un panorama general de las políticas de la memoria desarrolladas después del fin de los sistemas políticos comunistas. Diferentes de un país a otros, éstos siguen presentando, sin embargo, características comunes, que evocan, en ciertos aspectos, a las memorias elaboradas en muchos países europeos después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Se construye, como entonces, el mito de una sociedad víctima inocente, por un lado, y resistente, por el otro. El pasado comunista es visto enteramente en términos negativos, como un periodo de violencia y de terror, y el comunismo se encuentra, en cierto modo, externalizado, es decir presentado como un sistema político carente de raíces en la sociedad, impuesto desde el exterior y sostenido en el poder, exclusivamente, por la fuerza. La responsabilidad de todo es atribuida por completo a la Unión Soviética, así como en 1945 la Alemania nazi era, unánimemente, considerada la responsable exclusiva de todos los males de la guerra mundial recién terminada. Al mito de la víctima inocente se une el de una sociedad casi, totalmente, resistente, que desde el inicio luchó tenaz y heroicamente en contra del comunismo. En las interpretaciones del pasado que están en la base de las políticas de la memoria postcomunista no encuentran lugar aquellos aspectos que contradicen o no están plenamente conformes con la imagen que éstas intentan transmitir. Por ejemplo, el tema del consenso, más o menos amplio, de cual se beneficiaron los regímenes comunistas, es raramente evocado. Lo mismo sucede con otros temas embarazosos, como la participación de sectores de la población, en algunos países, en la persecución y exterminio de los judíos. En suma, las memorias públicas del comunismo son a menudo construidas sobre una distorsión de la realidad histórica. ; The memories of communism in Central and Eastern Europe are in the center of the article by Bruno Groppo, who presents an overview of the politics of memory developed after the end of Communist political systems. Different from one country to another, they still present, however, common characteristics, evoking, in certain aspects, the memories produced in many European countries after the Second World War. Is built, as then, the myth of a society victim innocent, on the one hand, and resistant, on the other. The communist past is seen entirely in negative terms, as a period of violence and terror, and communism, in a way, externalized, that is, presented as a political system lacking roots in society, imposed from outside and held in power, exclusively, by force. The responsibility for everything is entirely to the Soviet Union; just as in 1945 Nazi Germany was unanimously considered the exclusive responsible for all the ills of the recently ended world war. The myth of the innocent victim joins that of a society almost, totally, resistant, that from the beginning fought tenaciously and heroically against communism. In the interpretations of the past that are at the base of the politics of memory post-Communist memory do not find those aspects that contradict or are not fully in accordance with the image that they are trying to convey. For example, the issue of consensus, more or less broad, which benefited the Communist regimes, is rarely evoked. The same happens with other embarrassing topics, such as the participation of sectors of the population, in some countries, in the persecution and extermination of Jews. In sum, the public memories of communism are often built on a distortion of historical reality.
Las memorias del comunismo en Europa central y oriental están en el centro del artículo de Bruno Groppo, quien presenta un panorama general de las políticas de la memoria desarrolladas después del fin de los sistemas políticos comunistas. Diferentes de un país a otros, éstos siguen presentando, sin embargo, características comunes, que evocan, en ciertos aspectos, a las memorias elaboradas en muchos países europeos después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Se construye, como entonces, el mito de una sociedad víctima inocente, por un lado, y resistente, por el otro. El pasado comunista es visto enteramente en términos negativos, como un periodo de violencia y de terror, y el comunismo se encuentra, en cierto modo, externalizado, es decir presentado como un sistema político carente de raíces en la sociedad, impuesto desde el exterior y sostenido en el poder, exclusivamente, por la fuerza. La responsabilidad de todo es atribuida por completo a la Unión Soviética, así como en 1945 la Alemania nazi era, unánimemente, considerada la responsable exclusiva de todos los males de la guerra mundial recién terminada. Al mito de la víctima inocente se une el de una sociedad casi, totalmente, resistente, que desde el inicio luchó tenaz y heroicamente en contra del comunismo. En las interpretaciones del pasado que están en la base de las políticas de la memoria postcomunista no encuentran lugar aquellos aspectos que contradicen o no están plenamente conformes con la imagen que éstas intentan transmitir. Por ejemplo, el tema del consenso, más o menos amplio, de cual se beneficiaron los regímenes comunistas, es raramente evocado. Lo mismo sucede con otros temas embarazosos, como la participación de sectores de la población, en algunos países, en la persecución y exterminio de los judíos. En suma, las memorias públicas del comunismo son a menudo construidas sobre una distorsión de la realidad histórica. ; The memories of communism in Central and Eastern Europe are in the center of the article by Bruno Groppo, who presents an overview of the politics of memory developed after the end of Communist political systems. Different from one country to another, they still present, however, common characteristics, evoking, in certain aspects, the memories produced in many European countries after the Second World War. Is built, as then, the myth of a society victim innocent, on the one hand, and resistant, on the other. The communist past is seen entirely in negative terms, as a period of violence and terror, and communism, in a way, externalized, that is, presented as a political system lacking roots in society, imposed from outside and held in power, exclusively, by force. The responsibility for everything is entirely to the Soviet Union; just as in 1945 Nazi Germany was unanimously considered the exclusive responsible for all the ills of the recently ended world war. The myth of the innocent victim joins that of a society almost, totally, resistant, that from the beginning fought tenaciously and heroically against communism. In the interpretations of the past that are at the base of the politics of memory post-Communist memory do not find those aspects that contradict or are not fully in accordance with the image that they are trying to convey. For example, the issue of consensus, more or less broad, which benefited the Communist regimes, is rarely evoked. The same happens with other embarrassing topics, such as the participation of sectors of the population, in some countries, in the persecution and extermination of Jews. In sum, the public memories of communism are often built on a distortion of historical reality.
Las memorias del comunismo en Europa central y oriental están en el centro del artículo de Bruno Groppo, quien presenta un panorama general de las políticas de la memoria desarrolladas después del fin de los sistemas políticos comunistas. Diferentes de un país a otros, éstos siguen presentando, sin embargo, características comunes, que evocan, en ciertos aspectos, a las memorias elaboradas en muchos países europeos después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Se construye, como entonces, el mito de una sociedad víctima inocente, por un lado, y resistente, por el otro. El pasado comunista es visto enteramente en términos negativos, como un periodo de violencia y de terror, y el comunismo se encuentra, en cierto modo, externalizado, es decir presentado como un sistema político carente de raíces en la sociedad, impuesto desde el exterior y sostenido en el poder, exclusivamente, por la fuerza. La responsabilidad de todo es atribuida por completo a la Unión Soviética, así como en 1945 la Alemania nazi era, unánimemente, considerada la responsable exclusiva de todos los males de la guerra mundial recién terminada. Al mito de la víctima inocente se une el de una sociedad casi, totalmente, resistente, que desde el inicio luchó tenaz y heroicamente en contra del comunismo. En las interpretaciones del pasado que están en la base de las políticas de la memoria postcomunista no encuentran lugar aquellos aspectos que contradicen o no están plenamente conformes con la imagen que éstas intentan transmitir. Por ejemplo, el tema del consenso, más o menos amplio, de cual se beneficiaron los regímenes comunistas, es raramente evocado. Lo mismo sucede con otros temas embarazosos, como la participación de sectores de la población, en algunos países, en la persecución y exterminio de los judíos. En suma, las memorias públicas del comunismo son a menudo construidas sobre una distorsión de la realidad histórica. ; The memories of communism in Central and Eastern Europe are in the center of the article by Bruno Groppo, who presents an overview of the politics of memory developed after the end of Communist political systems. Different from one country to another, they still present, however, common characteristics, evoking, in certain aspects, the memories produced in many European countries after the Second World War. Is built, as then, the myth of a society victim innocent, on the one hand, and resistant, on the other. The communist past is seen entirely in negative terms, as a period of violence and terror, and communism, in a way, externalized, that is, presented as a political system lacking roots in society, imposed from outside and held in power, exclusively, by force. The responsibility for everything is entirely to the Soviet Union; just as in 1945 Nazi Germany was unanimously considered the exclusive responsible for all the ills of the recently ended world war. The myth of the innocent victim joins that of a society almost, totally, resistant, that from the beginning fought tenaciously and heroically against communism. In the interpretations of the past that are at the base of the politics of memory post-Communist memory do not find those aspects that contradict or are not fully in accordance with the image that they are trying to convey. For example, the issue of consensus, more or less broad, which benefited the Communist regimes, is rarely evoked. The same happens with other embarrassing topics, such as the participation of sectors of the population, in some countries, in the persecution and extermination of Jews. In sum, the public memories of communism are often built on a distortion of historical reality. ; Dossier: La mundialización de las memorias: sus recorridos en la Europa del Este ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación (FAHCE)
The article presents a framework for comparing the policy-making rights of the parliamentary opposition in the parliamentary democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine). The right of the parliamentary opposition to oppose the government formed by the ruling majority is a fundamental feature of liberal democracy. The application of constitutional values (democracy and rule of law) in Central and Eastern European states demonstrates the actual level of fragmentation, polarization and cartelization of the opposition. The Rule of Law Index 2021 explicitly shows that, among the Central and Eastern European countries surveyed, Lithuania ranks 18th, the Czech Republic 22nd, Poland 36th, Hungary 69th and Ukraine 74th. The Rule of Law Index refers to limitations of government powers, absence of corruption, open government and other issues related to the mission of the parliamentary opposition. It is concluded that, the distance (not only ideological) between the ruling majority and the parliamentary opposition is based on the ability to form government, participation in policy making, scrutiny of strategy and (populist) government policy.
Verlagstext: EUROPEAN FOLK enthält Beispiele von Entwürfen von Textilien und Trachten, die überall in Europa für den Alltag verwendet werden mit einem Nachdruck auf Ländern und Regionen Zentraleuropas (Polen, die Ukraine, Transsylvanien, Mähren, Böhmen usw.). Zu den typischen Designelementen gehören auffällige Karos und Streifen, bunte Blumen und alle Arten von bildlichen Elementen, die mit dem ländlichen Leben und dem Wechsel der Jahreszeiten einhergehen. In diesem Buch sind ebenfalls Beispiele von Häkeleien, Spitzen und Stickereien enthalten
The end of the Cold produced migratory flows of an economic type in the direction East-West Although the exchange and movement of populations in Europe is nothing new, what was new was the change in the underlying philosophy. The change of paradigm from a world with two opposing poles to one with an hegemonic power, shattered all the schemes that until then were taken for granted. Since the fall of the Berlin wall the issue was no longer to take in political refugies coming from the soviet block, butrather to regulate the flows coming from those countries in more and more numbers. In this paper we try to reconstruct the history of the development of control of the migratory flows coming from Central and Easter Europe towards the European Union before,during and after the enlowgement processes which have taken place in 2004 and 2007. ; Desde el fin de la Guerra Fría se produjo un flujo migratorio de tipo económico con dirección Este-Oeste. A pesar de que el intercambio y movimiento de poblaciones en Europa no es nada nuevo, lo que sí representaba una novedad era el cambio de filosofía que subyacía. El cambio de paradigma, el paso de un mundo bipolar a uno de potencia hegemónica, rompía con todos los esquemas que hasta esa fecha de 1989 se daban por supuestos.Desde la caída del muro ya no se trataba de acoger a los exiliados políticos que procedían del bloque soviético, sino que había que comenzar a regular los flujos, cada vez más numerosos, procedentes de esos países. En este artículo se intenta reconstruir la historia de la evolución del control de los flujos migratorios procedentes desde la Europa Central y Oriental hacia la Unión Europea, antes, durante y tras los procesos de ampliación que han tenido lugar en 2004 y 2007.
Con autorización de la revista para autores CSIC ; This article focuses on the mobility patterns of Central and Eastern European immigrants within the context of the economic crisis. The objective is to explore differences in these patterns between two categories of migrants and their determinants. More specifically, the authors distinguish between migrants from Central and Eastern Europe whose countries are members of the EU and migrants whose countries do not belong to the union. The initial assumption is that Central and Eastern European migrants from EU member states would be more inclined to return to their countries of origin as opportunity costs of such a decision are smaller. Descriptive analysis based on data from Residential Variation Statistics is rather inconclusive. In absolute terms, the volume of out-migration increases among EU Central and Eastern European migrants. In the case of non-EU migrants from Eastern Europe, the increase in departures is more moderate. In relative terms, the out-migration rate of non-EU Eastern Europeans is only slightly larger than that of EU Eastern Europeans. Statistical analysis based on OLS regression models shows that migrant groups from countries that are members of the EU and belong to the area of free movement of labour force do not have significantly higher rates of out-migration. Instead, the rate of regularity significantly affects the intensity of exits from Spain. The authors conclude that the institutional factor that shapes return decisions is not EU citizenship, but rather the residency permit, which may itself be a value added to the mobility allowing for both return and the freedom to travel within the whole Schengen Area ; The research leading to these results received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research project TEMPER (Temporary versus Permanent Migration, under grant agreement no. 613468) ; Peer reviewed
Peer reviewed ; This article focuses on the mobility patterns of Central and Eastern European immigrants within the context of the economic crisis. The objective is to explore differences in these patterns between two categories of migrants and their determinants. More specifically, the authors distinguish between migrants from Central and Eastern Europe whose countries are members of the EU and migrants whose countries do not belong to the union. The initial assumption is that Central and Eastern European migrants from EU member states would be more inclined to return to their countries of origin as opportunity costs of such a decision are smaller. Descriptive analysis based on data from Residential Variation Statistics is rather inconclusive. In absolute terms, the volume of out-migration increases among EU Central and Eastern European migrants. In the case of non-EU migrants from Eastern Europe, the increase in departures is more moderate. In relative terms, the out-migration rate of non-EU Eastern Europeans is only slightly larger than that of EU Eastern Europeans. Statistical analysis based on OLS regression models shows that migrant groups from countries that are members of the EU and belong to the area of free movement of labour force do not have significantly higher rates of out-migration. Instead, the rate of regularity significantly affects the intensity of exits from Spain. The authors conclude that the institutional factor that shapes return decisions is not EU citizenship, but rather the residency permit, which may itself be a value added to the mobility allowing for both return and the freedom to travel within the whole Schengen Area The research leading to these results received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research project TEMPER (Temporary versus Permanent Migration, under grant agreement no. 613468) ; Con autorización de la revista para autores CSIC