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This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

Europe attracts and divides. It makes us dream, but it also has a reality with boundaries that shape our lives. What are the dynamics of integration? Whom does Europe sweep off their feet? Does European integration create community or does it lead to exclusion?

A current ambition in welfare states across Europe and in the US is for political decision-making to be based on rigorous research (Bason 2010; Cartwright et al 2009; Mulgan 2009; Nilsson et al. 2008). Promoted as 'evidence-based policy-making', 'good analysis, or 'better governance' (Nilsson et.al. 2008) the aspiration finds its roots in the governance paradigm generally referred to as 'new public management' (Hartley 2005) and the central concern for developing a cost-effective and agile public sector (Rod 2010). . Sound as this ambition may seem, it has nevertheless been problematized from within the civil services and from the research community (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Cartwright et al. 2009; Elliott & Popay 2000; House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008; Whitty 2006; Rod 2010, Vohnsen 2011). Some warn that the term 'evidence-based' is used too lightly, and often in cases where 'evidence' has not fed into the policy processes but rather has been invoked after the fact to support already agreed upon policy (House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008); others warn that politics and science are – if not incompatible – then at odds with one another (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Whitty 2006). The article pin-points the friction points between science and policy-making and discuss why it is that evidence rarely feeds into policy-making and how the evidence-based paradigm effectively challenges the traditional craftsmanship of the civil service.

This article discusses the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. The article recounts Streeck's analysis of the financial crisis, the transformation of the tax state into the debt state, and the development of the EU towards an international consolidation state, which informs Streeck's call for a retreat from Europe to the nation-state as the last line of defense against neoliberal capitalism. The article proceeds to sketch Habermas's criticism of Streeck's argument, and it illustrates how Habermas' proposal for a reconstitution of the EU as a supranational democracy is motivated by foundational concerns in his critical theory of society. Finally, the article argues that the debate results in an unresolved dilemma: while only a democratized EU can reestablish the supremacy of politics over globalized markets, the EU is more likely to become further entrenched as an international consolidation state.

Ansettelsen i 2020 av ny sjef for Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) har igjen skapt debatt om skatteparadiser som har vært et økende internasjonalt tema siden finanskrisen i 2008. Artikkelen analyserer Norges Banks tilnærming til skatteparadiser slik den fremkom gjennom ansettelsesprosessen, og illustrerer tradisjonelle skillelinjer i debatten om skatteparadiser. Artikkelen har derfor relevans ut over å klargjøre Norges Banks tilnærming. Analysen bygger på offentlig tilgjengelige muntlige og skriftlige uttalelser knyttet til ansettelsen, og relevante dokumenter som opplyser bakgrunnen for at skatt ble innlemmet i NBIMs etikkarbeid fra 2017. Vi argumenterer for at sentralbanken posisjonerer seg tydelig på en forsvarslinje som utfordrer en anmodning fra Stortinget om å innlemme selskapers skatteposisjon i etiske retningslinjer. Det begrunnes med fire aspekter ved sentralbankens tilnærming til skatteparadiser: en snevrest mulig definisjon av skatteparadiser som fenomen; en uklar holdning til aggressiv skatteplanlegging; en nedtoning av skatteparadisenes negative konsekvenser; en snever tolkning av eget ansvar. Diskusjonen illustrerer et behov for en avklaring av innholdet i norsk politikk på skatt og åpenhet, herunder skatteparadiser.
Abstract in English:In the Central Bank's Blind SpotThe appointment in 2020 of a new head of the Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), has actualized a debate on tax havens, a growing concern following the international financial crisis of 2008. The article analyses the Norwegian central bank's approach to tax havens as it unfolded throughout the appointment process and illustrates traditional divisions in tax haven debates. The analysis builds on publicly available oral and written statements following the appointment, and relevant documents that inform the background of how tax and transparency became integrated in NBIM's work on ethics from 2017. The central argument put forward here is that the central bank position represents a traditional defense of tax haven use, in which challenges a request by the Norwegian Parliament to subordinate companies' tax strategies to ethical guidelines. We show that this is justified with four identified aspects of the central bank's tax haven approach: a narrow definition of the tax haven phenomenon; an unclear attitude to aggressive tax planning; a downplay of negative consequences of tax havens; a narrow interpretation of its own responsibilities. The discussions illustrate the need to clarify the content and practical management of the Norwegian policy on tax and transparency, including tax havens.

Denne artikel foretager en diskursanalyse af en række centrale tekster fra partierne Nye Borgerlige og Dansk Folkeparti med fokus på disses brug af den populistiske figur hjertelandet: Et narrativ om det altid allerede tabte eller truede harmoniske fællesskab, der skal forsvares imod folkets fjender. Det konkluder-es, at idéen om hjertelandet er stærkt til stede i partiernes respektive diskurser, og at det i Nye Borgerliges diskurs i lige høj grad trues af de fremmede og eliten, mens det i Dansk Folkepartis diskurs mest trues af de fremmede, og antagonismen til eliten er nedtonet. ; This paper analyzes a series of central texts from the Danish parties The New Right and the Danish People's Party with emphasis on their use of the populist figure of the heartland: A narrative about the always already lost or threatened harmonic community that needs to be protected against enemies of the people. The paper concludes that the idea of the heartland is strongly present in the discourses of both parties, and that in The New Right's discourse the heartland is equally threated by foreigners and the elite, while in the discourse of the Danish People's Party it is mostly threatened by immigrants whereas the antagonism to the elite is downplayed.

The Arctic is characterized by a well-functioning international governance regime. Arctic and non-Arctic states aim to solve the challenges following climate change in concert. However, certain challenges and processes may destabilize the intergovernmental order in the long run. This report distinguishes between global and regional dynamics. Future global struggles between the great powers may have repercussions in the high north. On the regional level itself, four questions may destabilize Arctic governance: the status of the North-East Passage, unresolved border disputes, the role of China, and the introduction of more military capabilities. The report offers two guidelines for the strategic approach of the Commonwealth of Denmark towards the Arctic. Firstly, the Commonwealth can play a constructive role for the future stability of the Arctic by aiming, to the extent possible, to solve the four regional challenges. Secondly, the approach of the Commonwealth towards the question of Arctic stability cannot be disentangled from Copenhagen's global priorities.

Iran is now subjected to the harshest economic sanctions ever imposed on any country in the world. This report discusses if and how these sanctions work, first by analysing their intended purposes and how the many phases and layers of sanctions imposed by the USA, the EU and the UN Security Council have created an almost impenetrable, escalating sanctions regime against Iran. Secondly, the report illustrates how the sanctions are experienced, debated and received in Iran, and what direct and indirect consequences the sanctions have on Iran's nuclear program, the country's financial crisis, social conditions and the upcoming presidential election in June 2013. The conclusion is that the sanctions do work, but not according to their intentions. The sanctions are contributing to changing Iran: The external pressure creates further tensions and fractions on the domestic political scene; the market moves from the West to the East, and people are subjected to a humanitarian crisis. But the sanctions have not limited Iran's nuclear program; it has only been further developed during the last seven years. Therefore, there is still a considerable risk that the increasing isolation of Iran in a worst case scenario can lead to a military confrontation.

Nesten to tiår etter den USA-ledete intervensjonen i Afghanistan, på tross av massiv innsats for å bygge en afghansk stat, så kollapset den afghanske regjeringsstrukturen i august 2021, og Taliban gjeninntok hovedstaden Kabul. Hvorfor mislyktes det internasjonale statsbyggingsprosjektet? Kunne ekstern statsbygging ha lykkes om tilnærmingen var en annen? Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i nyere litteratur (David Lake, Melissa Lee, Roland Paris, Timothy Sisk) og gjør en analyse av hvordan dilemmaer i ekstern statsbygging manifesterte seg i Afghanistan henholdsvis på det politiske, militære og økonomiske området. Historisk har stabilitet i Afghanistan hvilt på en balanse mellom en svak sentralmakt og et betydelig rom for tradisjonelle samfunnsstrukturer. USA, som ekstern statsbygger, var opptatt av lojalitet fra en sterk sentralmakt, og underminerte derfor en maktfordeling som kunne gitt større grad av legitimitet. Resultatet ble en stat som var helt avhengig av ekstern støtte, og idet USA inngikk en avtale direkte med den væpnede opposisjonen, Taliban, så går den afghanske staten i oppløsning.
Abstract in EnglishDoomed to Fail? The US and the Afghan State-building Project, 2001–2021Nearly two decades after the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, following a massive effort to build an Afghan state, the country's government structure collapsed in August 2021, and the Taliban took control of the capitol Kabul. Why did international state-building fail? Could external state-building have been successful if the approach had been a different one? This article takes recent contributions to the literature on the dilemmas of external state-building as its point of departure (David Lake, Melissa Lee, Roland Paris, Timothy Sisk), and presents an analysis if how these dilemmas came to the fore in the political, military, and economic domains. Historically, Afghan stability have rested on a balance between a weak central authority, with considerable influence resting with traditional societal actors. The US, as an external state-builder, was concerned with loyalty from a strong central power, and thereby undermined the division of power that could otherwise have gained a higher degree of legitimacy. The result is a state which was fully dependent on external support, and as the US entered a treaty with the armed opposition, the Taliban, the Afghan state apparatus collapses.

Aktivisme bruges hyppigt blandt forskere og praktikere som en "overordnet etikette på dansk udenrigspolitik" (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017, s. 339). Der er ikke konsensus om, hvornår Danmark blev aktivistisk, eller om etiketten passer lige godt på alle områder af udenrigspolitikken. Ikke desto mindre er der bred enighed om, at Danmarks militære engagement i de seneste årtier, herunder særligt deltagelsen i Irak- og Afghanistan-krigene, udgør et højdepunkt i dansk aktivisme. Vores analyse diskuterer og nuancerer denne karakteristik ved at formulere en alternativ forståelse af politisk aktivisme inspireret af Hannah Arendts politiske teori. Med vores konceptualisering gentænker vi centrale begreber i litteraturen – initiativ, risiko og deltagelse – og sondrer mellem militært engagement og egentlig politisk aktivisme. Ud fra denne begrebslige ramme genbesøger vi Danmarks krigsdeltagelse i 2000'erne. Vi argumenterer for, at dansk udenrigspolitik, selv hvad angår krigsdeltagelsen, har været reaktiv, risikoavers og med begrænset folkelig forankring og derfor mindre aktivistisk, end litteraturen hidtil har antaget. Ved at fjerne den aktivistiske etikette forsøger vi at rejse nye spørgsmål om, hvad udenrigspolitisk aktivisme fremadrettet kan og bør være.
Abstract in English:Military Activism Without Political Action? Towards a New Conception of Activism in Danish Foreign and Security Policy Inspired by Hannah ArendtActivism is frequently used by researchers and practitioners alike as "a general label on Danish foreign policy" (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017, p. 339, authors' translation). There is no consensus as to when Denmark became activist or if the label is equally fitting to all foreign policy issue areas. However, there is broad agreement that the military engagements in recent decades, particularly the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, constitute a high point in Danish activism. Our analysis challenges and nuances this characterization by exploring an alternative understanding of political activism inspired by Hannah Arendt's political theory. Our alternative concept of activism revisits the central elements of activism; initiative, risk and participation, and distinguishes between military engagement and political activism. Drawing on this conceptual framework, we revisit Denmark's war engagements focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s. We argue that from a political perspective even Denmark's war engagements have been reactive, risk averse, and with limited popular anchorage, and are therefore, less activist than hitherto argued. By tearing off the activist label we aim to revitalize the discussion about what Danish Foreign and Security policy can and should be at a time when such questions have rarely had more relevance.

FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen er innlysende riktig. Forpliktelsene går neppe lenger enn Ikkespredningsavtalen, som Norge sluttet seg til allerede i 1970. Avskrekking med atomvåpen forutsetter at de må være klare til bruk for å bli umulige å bruke. Særlig i kriser blir en slik tankegang lett farlig fordi den kan utløse atomkrig ved misforståelser. Likevel er den norske regjeringens motstand mot FNs totalforbud rasjonell fordi hensikten er å forebygge en endring i oppfatning om maktbalanse som kunne undergrave Norges selvstendighet. Spørsmålet blir derfor om risiko for atomkrig kan reduseres uten å øke fare for press, og i verste fall angrep? Artikkelen presenterer egen forskning om hvordan konfrontasjonen i første halvdel av 1980-tallet mellom de to tyske stater førte til risiko for storkrig utløst av gjensidige misforståelser på begge sider av det daværende jernteppet. Teorier om tankeprosesser forklarer misforståelsene som universelle kognitive begrensninger. Forholdene i dag er på vesentlige punkter sammenliknbare med første halvdel av 1980-årene, da det på tross av spenninger likevel var rom for initiativ til felles sikkerhet. Artikkelen konkluderer derfor med at Norge bør slutte seg til FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen, og sammen med Sverige ta initiativ til en felleseuropeisk dialog med Russland om en europeisk sikkerhetsordning bygd på forestillinger om felles sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Norwegian Support for the UN's Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons?The article argues that while the UN ban on nuclear arms is obviously sensible, the Norwegian Government's objections are still rational. Rejecting the US nuclear arms umbrella undermines deterrence to the degree that is the perception. The article sets out how cognitive processes determine perceptions of deterrence and risks of war. Shifting nuclear strategies are attempts to cope with the contradiction between deterrence and the inherent impossible choice of nuclear war. The Cold War in the first half of the 1980s shows how nuclear arms, though intended as deterrence, in a confrontation may be misperceived as a looming attack. This misperception almost caused nuclear war by inadvertence, as it could again. The fear of attack may prompt a compelling sense of urgency for a preemptive strike. This is the only real risk of large-scale war in Europe. Therefore, the Norwegian Government should join the UN ban on nuclear arms to reduce tensions in Europe. In a joint initiative with Sweden, which has already endorsed the ban, Norway should persuade other European states to enable a political process with Russia towards a European common security without the looming threat of nuclear arms. Military force should not exceed the minimum required to block intimidation, coercion, and low-intensity aggression.