Suchergebnisse

Résumé Outre les questions politiques et économiques, il faut également prendre en compte dans le processus de transformation et d'intégration à l'Union européenne les aspects socioculturels et socio-psychologiques. L'héritage du passé communiste, l'histoire, la culture, l'identité nationale et la prise de décision politique font partie des facteurs qui ont établi dans les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale différents modèles d'européanisation. Les élites ont été divisées sur les questions européennes, en raison d'une pensée politique à court terme et du manque de consensus national sur les politiques de réformes, ce qui a affecté les politiques de gestion de la crise et a conduit à des changements politiques intérieurs significatifs dans certains de pays. D'un autre côté, les élites ne pouvaient pas assurer la gestion de la crise sociale issue d'une rapide transformation économique au début des années quatre-vingt-dix. Les sociétés avaient adopté une vision de la vie généralement sceptique. Au-delà de la crise économique, le scepticisme actuel de l'opinion domine toujours les attitudes sociales envers l'Union européenne.

L'objet de cet article est de présenter des éléments du renforcement du populisme de type radical de droite en Europe centrale et orientale. Le populisme est un concept large qui se prête à des définitions différentes et qui comprend des phénomènes et des mouvements divers historiquement et dans les différents espaces géopolitiques. Le terme est banalisé par ses usages par les hommes politiques qui s'accusent mutuellement en populisme pour se discréditer les uns les autres. Il y a plusieurs types de populismes et ils ne sont pas tous radicaux de droite ou de la droite extrême. ; This article describes some of the traits of the current surge in radical right-wing populism in central and eastern Europe. Populism is a broad concept that can be defined in different ways and which encompasses historically diverse phenomena and movements occurring in different geopolitical spaces. The term is being trivialised by politicians using it indiscriminately as they seek to discredit accuse each other with accusations of populism. Populism comes in different guises and not all are of the radical or extreme right.

The paper is a transcription of the speech given by the author in acceptance of the title of doctor honoris causa of the University of Bucharest. The discourse is at the same time a personal statement of commitment to the study of Central and Eastern European politics and society, and an appraisal of the problématique of the researches conducted in and on the area. The assertion is that, despite a relative decline of the intellectual interest in the region of mainstream political science, Central and Eastern Europe might still provide valuable insights into the core issue of the discipline: the nature and predicament of democracy, the production of political regimes, how do cleavages appear and how they can be observed, how does politics affect the make-up of societies.

The article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies. The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Poland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former East Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defence. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation.[.].

The article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies. The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Poland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former East Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defence. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation.[.].

The article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies. The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Poland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former East Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defence. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation.[.].

Résumé Les références au « syndrome méditerranéen », décrivant un non-respect flagrant des normes européennes, ont pris une importance croissante après l'adhésion d'États d'Europe du Sud à l'Union européenne, dans les années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix. Les explications de ce syndrome se concentrent sur un « décalage » entre l'Europe du Sud et les politiques de l'Union européenne, sur les faibles capacités administratives des Etats, et sur la piètre nature de la société civile dans ces pays. Parmi les plus importantes réserves contre l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, on s'est référé à des considérations similaires sur la capacité des pays candidats d'Europe centrale et orientale à appliquer l'acquis communautaire après l'adhésion. Cependant, il semble que l'Union européenne ait appris de son expérience avec les États membres du Sud de l'Europe, et elle a institutionnalisé un système d'une haute complexité pour gérer l'adhésion, quand les dix nouveaux candidats à l'Union ont frappé à sa porte. En se concentrant sur le rôle de l'administration publique, cet article s'interroge si une approche fondée sur la conditionnalité européenne a conduit à une mise en conformité soutenable après l'adhésion. Cet article démontre que, plutôt que de considérer les nouveaux États membres comme un groupe cohérent, on trouve de nombreux signes de divergences concernant la performance après l'accession.