Suchergebnisse

The author analyses the role of religion in the formation of national identities in Central and Eastern Europe on the example of the Catholic Church in Poland in the 2Oth century. In Poland, like in most Central-European and Eastern-European societies, national identity developed against the state and was founded on certain elements of ethnic culture and tradition, the central position belonging to the Church. During communism, the Polish Catholic Church had the leading position in defending national identity, which identified Polishness with Catholicism. The Church also had a crucial role in the destruction of the communist system. However, it has found increasingly difficult to adapt to the new political conditions. As has been shown through the debates on abortion and religious education in state schools, the attempt by the Church to achieve the status of moral arbiter, above all democratic institutions, has resulted in new divisions. (SOI : PM: S. 143)

The author thinks that the American political and military initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has stopped the four year war and enhanced the American influence in the region. European Union has reacted to the latest developments by adopting a new regional approach towards the countries of southeastern Europe. This approach has been employed in relation to other European and Mediterranean regions outside EU as well (central and eastern Europe, the Baltic states, the Mediterranean countries, the Union of Independent States). EU's policy towards Croatia is extremely reserved. It has insisted on a set of preconditions being fulfilled by Croatia before the negotiations about Croatia's membership in this organization may even commence. Croatia wants to forge links with the EU and is willing to comply with its demands, but is highly sceptical of regional associations. (SOI: PM: S. 161)

Mediterranean cooperation is dealt with in the context of the creation of the Euromediterranean zone. The European Union has been developing various modes of cooperation with non-member Mediterranean countries by signing association agreements or cooperation agreements. The new European states, created after the disintegration of former socialist federations demonstrate interest for the Mediterranean cooperation, though they tend to have different attitudes towards it. Their interest is solely based on the fact that the Mediterranean cooperation has not been standardized and that it has a poorly developed institutional framework. To these countries this enables and facilitates to tune in from time to time, when it suits their purposes. Regarding the role of the new states, the author distinguishes between two types of cooperation: (a) autonomous regional cooperation, which is not beneficial for the new states (e.g. those on the Balkans) and (b) occasional, specialized and dispersed cooperation which might attract the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. (SOI : PM: S. 176)

The changes in the social position of women in transitional countries is the consequence of the latest economic and political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Croatians think that the social position of women today is worse than in the former regime; in this, women are more critical than men, particularly the well-educated women, working outside the home (modernists). Those who nevertheless do believe that the position of women today is better than it used to be, make a smaller group; hey believe that a woman's place is primarily in the home, that the Church should have a decisive say in the position of women, that women are not born for politics, and that pro-choice attitudes should not be tolerated. Women should resolve their dissatisfaction with their lives and social position by choosing either the modern or the traditional variant, or a middle path, which has been suggested by the logic of the newly-created living conditions. (SOI : PM: S. 168)

In his first interview to Croatian media after a long period of silence, in October 1989 the leader of the newly formed Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Franjo Tudjman, described himself as 'a Croat man, Marxist, Revolutionary and Historian'. Why did he use concepts such as 'Marxist' and 'Revolutionary' at the time when elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe these concepts became politically incorrect and unpopular? In this article we argue that Tudjman's views on self-determination and secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia were driven by life-long commitment to Leninism and (especially when it comes to the 'national question') Stalinism. When he reappeared in Croatian politics in 1989, Tudjman used the Leninist - not Wilsonian - concept of 'self-determination', which in Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation includes the 'right to secession'. This position enabled him to form an unusual - but logical - coalition with former Communists who were at the same time also nationalists, as well as with anti-Communist separatists. The author analyses the link between Tudjman's politics in the 1990s and Leninist-Stalinist principles of the 'right to self-determination' and 'right to secession'. Adapted from the source document.

Based on the experience of former rightist and communist dictatorships in Europe regarding different forms of opposition - both open and hidden within these regimes' structures - the author analyzes the role of the opposition in the process of the sweeping democratic change that has taken place the "new democracies" of Central and Eastern Europe in the direction of the state of law and civil society. His conclusion is, that in today's Central European countries political multi-party pluralism which includes viable parliamentary opposition was given a smooth start and has since taken root. However in the countries with only superficial democracy and an obvious "democratic deficit" - for example Croatia (and Slovakia) - parliamentary opposition plays the second fiddle. The prime movers of the change - and of the democratization as well - are still the ruling parties (not unlike during the communist single-party regimes). Changes occur only when the ruling party or its major fraction opt for them considering them the lesser of two evils, either because they are no longer satisfied with the distribution of power and goods within the existing status quo or because they are aware that it cannot be maintained in its present form. This happened in the Soviet Union , first under Nikita Khruschev and then again under Mihail Gorbachev. Changes, however, when imposed from above get out of hand and backfire against those who have set them off (remember Gorbachev); what emerges is usually a compromise between tbe vestige of the old and the emerging regime. (SOI : PM: S. 92)

More than a decade has passed since the momentous events of 1989 that changed the world order and redefined the geopolitics of Central Europe. This is just the right moment to assess the results of these changes and discuss the future of that region. Based on the past comparative studies or those currently going on, we may say that Central Europe differs from the post-communist East (the former Soviet Union) and the South-East (the former Yugoslavia with the exception of Slovenia) and Albania. First, Central-European states overthrew their communist regimes earlier and in a more decisive manner than the USSR; second, the economic transformation of Central Europe, though not completely smooth, is nevertheless much smoother than the transformation of the member countries of the CIS; third, the post-communist societies differ in the pattern by which their systems of social stratification have changed after the collapse of their communist regimes; fourth, there are big differences between the Central-European post-communist states, including the Baltic states on the one hand, and the CIS members and Serbia/Montenegro-Yugoslavia on the other regarding their international orientation. The author highlights three significant events that are going to leave their trace on the regional geostrategic situation: NATO's eastern expansion, NATO's campaign against SKY and the election of Vladimir Putin for president of Russia. The regional geopolitical picture may become more stable with closer ties between the states of Central Europe and Germany. (SOI : PM: S. 11)

The maintenance of peace and stability in the post-cold-war world in the circumstances of cooperation and partnership requires an appropriate approach and manner of resolving the crises triggered off by the collapse of communist federations. Imperial policies and regimes must be eliminated while the process of the geopolitical consolidation and the creation of independent and sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe (and in Euro-Asia on the whole), built around the democratic and market principles, must be wrapped up. The new political leaders (mostly leftist) in the countries that for over fifty years (and now through the Kosovo crisis) have been developing the trans-Atlantic alliance within the military-political framework of NATO (based on the same values, principles, and goals), are now developing appropriate strategies for the post-cold-war hotspots (based on the accumulated experiences). (SOI : S. 89) + The author analyses the process of democratisation of international relations and the future configuration of international order following the end of the era of bipolar confrontation and the establishment of cooperation in the world which has witnessed the change in the key actors' roles regarding their approach to the resolution of the post-cold-war crises which jeopardise the world's peace and stability. First, the author provides a short outline of the genesis of the evolution of the US foreign policy, from the end of World War II to the beginning of the cold war and the formation of NATO. He points out that today's agenda of the international order, its structures, interventionism, and use of force in achieving political objectives, were already shaped at that time. The suggestions put forward constituted the framework and the foundation for the world politics until the late 80s; the cumulative effect of these responses on today's attempts at solving post- cold-war crises enables us to evaluate the roles and behaviour of individual actors in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis

Germany's security dilemma is to fulfill the larger role in Europe and global security that is expected after reunification, while not rekindling a sense of threat particularly among neighbors to the east. Opinion surveys of Germans and Central/East Europeans reveal substantial difficulties were Germany to become more assertive. Changes in German behavior and constitutional interpretation suggest a maturation or "normalization" of German foreign policy. Thus far, th changes have emphasized traditional forms of diplomacy and alliance behavior focused on using the enlarged capacities of a reunited Germany that more direc pursue German interests. An alternative way by which to perform a larger security role are discussed, particularly in light of data regarding the mutual perceptions of Germans among neighboring peoples and leaders. (SOI : PM: S. 62)