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For many years, advocates of a Scottish Parliament hoped that its eventual arrival would mark a new phase in local government: an increase in local autonomy and a redressing of the creeping centralization of the Conservative years. This article addresses the question: to what extent, if any, has there been a shift in the balance of power between centre and local government since the advent of a Scottish Parliament in 1999? It examines the pre- and post-1999 periods in this area of Scottish governance, focusing particularly on the legal/constitutional, financial and policy parameters set by the centre. It argues that continuity has been more important than change, and that reasons for the continued domination of the centre lie particularly with (a) the pervasive influence of the UK Union (b) a relative continuity in political actors and (c) the ongoing self-interest of the 'centre'.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface to the 1981 Publication -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- PART I: CONTROL AND POWER IN CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS -- 1 Introduction -- The context of intergovernmental relations: some theoretical issues -- Summary of Part I -- 2 Some Myths in Central-Local Relations -- The 'conventional wisdom' -- The 'conventional critique' -- The 'conventional critique' revisited -- Some recent developments -- The 'forgotten dimensions' of central-local relations -- Conclusions: the rationality of ambiguous confusion? -- 3 Interorganizational Analysis -- Introduction -- The nature of the environment -- The unit of analysis -- Organizational goals -- Power and exchange -- Consequences -- Conclusions -- 4 Intergovernmental Relations -- Introduction -- From federalism to intergovernmental relations -- Bargaining, diplomacy and 'topocrats' -- Conclusions -- 5 A Framework for Analysis -- Introduction -- Figure: the analysis of interactions -- Ground: the distribution of power, rules, interests and values -- Concluding discussion: the rationality of ambiguous confusion -- PART II: FROM INSTITUTIONS, TO POLICY, TO INDIVIDUALS -- 6 'Power-Dependence' Theories of Central-Local Relations: a Critical Assessment -- Introduction -- A critical appraisal -- Towards a theoretical reconstruction -- Conclusions: what has been achieved? -- 7 New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks -- Introduction -- A typology of policy networks -- Key issues -- Conclusions: new directions -- 8 Analysing Networks: from Typologies of Institutions to Narratives of Beliefs -- Introduction -- Developments in the study of policy networks -- Deconstructing networks -- Reconstructing networks -- Conclusions -- References -- Subject Index -- Also by R.A.W. Rhodes

As prefectoral systems are generally regarded to be systems that underpin and serve as the basis for centralization, this article examines how they have developed and how they work, and why they are still considered necessary in decentralized Scandinavia. The article finds that the prefect's authority towards the municipalities varies in Scandinavia. The Norwegian and Swedish prefectures hold rather powerful roles, while the Danish ones do not. The article suggests that this may have something to do with the need for an institution that brings about cohesion and coordination. Prefectoral systems are basically pragmatic solutions to the problem of enforcing national standards and common values across regions and municipalities, but their role may vary with institutional conditions created by local government reforms. The article further suggests that the authority of the prefecture varies with the character of central-local relations, and that it is vulnerable to changes in dominant political goals and values. en. References. Adapted from the source document.

Sustainable and inclusive growth in emerging Asian economies requires continued high levels of public sector investment in areas such as infrastructure, education, health, and social services. These responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure investment, need to be devolved increasingly to the regional government level. However, growth of sources of revenue and financing for local governments has not necessarily kept pace, forcing them, in some cases, to increase borrowing or cut spending below needed levels. This paper reviews alternative models of the relationship between central and local governments, and provides an overview and assessment of different financing mechanisms for local governments, including tax revenues, central government transfers, bank loans, and bond issuance, with a focus on the context of emerging Asian economies. The paper also reviews financing mechanisms for local governments and mechanisms for maintaining fiscal stability and sustainability at both the central and local government levels. Based upon the evidence on the decentralization process in Asia, it proposes some policy implications for improving central-local government relations and fiscal sustainability.

Theory suggests that relations between authorities affect implementation. This article studies the link between central and local government agencies in the Swedish labour market sector. The analysis is based on new quantitative data. The results indicate that central and local government agencies have very different priorities, but they nonetheless cooperate to a considerable extent. However, cooperation and 'good' implementation only coincide under certain conditions. If the collaborative endeavours are explicitly designed to lead to implementation of a specific and demanding task, cooperation is positively related to implementation performance. Agencies that collaborate to a considerable extent at a general level do not, however, perform better than others. Thus, I argue that theories should be developed and tested to indicate when cooperation between public authorities will promote implementation, instead of assuming that cooperation, in general, is a 'good thing'.

In recent decades, many countries have experienced decentralization and neoliberal processes. The literature usually refers to decentralization as an outcome of growing neoliberalism, but are these two processes analytically connected? This study answers the question by examining the relationship between central and local government in Israel in the context of housing policy. It focuses on a housing policy called Heskem Gag ("umbrella agreement"), an agreement between the government and local authorities to rapidly increase the supply of housing units. Whereas Heskem Gag might seem an act of decentralization, in-depth analysis paints a mixed picture: although some terms of the agreement promote fiscal and administrative autonomy, others curb it and have a strong centralizing effect. The study discusses the possibility of a hybrid model of neoliberal centralism, and its problematic ramifications for the interests of local residents, especially the disadvantaged. Although the findings are based on the Israeli case, they are relevant to many countries with a neoliberal economy that have undergone decentralization in recent decades, especially at times of national crises.

In Britain since the 1930s social assistance recipients have in certain circumstances been able to claim 'exceptional expenses' in addition to their weekly benefit income. From the 1940s these were administered by its central government. However, in April 2013 the then incarnation of such payments (the discretionary Social Fund) was partly replaced by locally administered Local Welfare Assistance. Drawing upon material held in files at Britain's National Archives and central government documents framing the development of Local Welfare Assistance, this paper examines how concerns raised in the 1980s meant it was not possible to then transfer responsibility for 'exceptional expenses' from central to local government. The paper explores those concerns and how in contemporary Britain they are no longer deemed to be problematic because of the Coalition government's emphasis upon localism and because of changing local government views on the possibility of delivering a mainstream social assistance function.

This paper has two main purposes: first, it measures the level and degree of decentralisation in contemporary Korea, and, second, it explains why decentralisation is slow or stagnant. To measure the level of decentralisation in Korea, this paper uses Page & Goldsmith's triple measures of function, discretion, and access, which were developed to examine the extent of centralisation and decentralisation in any given polity. The results suggest that Korea is both legally and politically centralised. In Korea, a centralised party system has combined with other factors to drive centralisation, overcoming the decentralising forces that focus mainly on local elected and appointed officials. Centralising forces include the bureaucratic elitism of national officials, cultural disdain for local governments, and local people's feeble affective attachment to local identities and communities.

How to explain the distortion of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is underexplored. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article proposes an institutional incentive-driven framework. Based on a case study of PPPs in China, this article finds that central–local government relationships play a crucial role in shaping PPP performance. Goal incongruence and information asymmetry lead to two types of distortion. First, PPPs become a political task for local governments to respond to higher-level governments' needs. Second, PPPs serve as financing tools to create political achievements. These opportunistic behaviors violate the goals of the central government's PPP policy and increase government debt risks.

Contents: Preface -- Part I Frameworks for central-local government relations -- 1. Frameworks for central-local government relations and fiscal sustainability / Peter J. Morgan and Long Q. Trinh -- 2. Looking beyond conventional intergovernmental fiscal frameworks: principles, realities, and neglected issues / Paul Smoke -- Part II Mechanisms for Promoting Fiscal Sustainability at the Local Government Level -- 3. Federalism, fiscal space, and public investment spending: do fiscal rules impose hard budget constraints? / Pinaki Chakraborty -- 4. Fiscal equalization schemes and subcentral government borrowing / Salvador Barrios and Diego Martínez-López -- 5. How well do subnational borrowing regulations work? / Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Violeta Vulovic -- Part III Country studies of central-local government relations -- 6. The fiscal risk of local government revenue in the People's Republic of China / Ziying Fan and Guanghua Wan -- 7. Key issues of central and local government finance in the People's Republic of China / Qichun Zhang and Shufang Li -- 8. Government decentralization program in Indonesia / Anwar Nasution -- 9. Case study of central and local government finance in Japan / Shun-ichiro Bessho -- 10. Fiscal decentralization and local budget deficits in Viet Nam: an empirical analysis / Peter J. Morgan and Long Q. Trinh -- Part IV Behavioral implications of central-local government relations -- 11. Debt dynamics, fiscal deficit, and stability in government borrowing in India: a dynamic panel analysis / Panchanan Das -- 12. Forms of government decentralization and institutional quality: evidence from a large sample of nations / Rajeev K. Goel and James W. Saunoris -- Index.

Local governance and decentralization is an ever growing topic in politics and public administration studies. This is better achieved by a good relationship between the local and central governments. A coordinated relation between these two important institutions provides prosperity and stability for a country.This paper aims to describe the notion of central-local governments relations, based on decentralization. It begins by briefly presenting the theoretical aspects of the abovementioned concepts of central-local relations and decentralization.The paper first gives an overview of these concepts in the Republic of Albania, by describing the situation in different periods and different regimes. The aim of this study is to show how the central-local relations have evolved during the years in Albania and how much this relation has been concerned with decentralization and local self-governance.This study provides different competencies and budget capacity of both levels ofgovernment and gives examples from different developed countries in order to show how the system works in reality in Albania and how they should function in order to be more effective and efficient.Finally this study presents some of the problems that the local government institutions are facing in Albania, with the main issue being corruption in all levels of public administration and possible solutions for these problems will be suggested.Keywords: Albania, Central-local relations, Decentralization, Local government,Corruption

1. Introduction : understanding central-local relations in China / John A. Donaldson -- 2. Central-provincial power relations in the fiscal realm of China, 1980-2014 / S. Philip Hsu -- 3.China's perforated investment control, 1978-2013 / Yukyung Yeo -- 4. China's regional development policy / Long Yang -- 5. China's administrative hierarchy : the balance of power and winners and losers within China's levels of government / John A. Donaldson -- 6. Implementation : changing norms, issue-variance, and unending tugs of war / Jae Ho Chung -- 7. China's culture policy and the central-local relationship / Tse-Kang Leng -- 8. Recentralization in China's social welfare regime / Xufeng Zhu -- 9. Central-local interactions in foreign affairs / Mingjiang Li.