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An important element in the debate on the hollowed State is the extent to which the subsidiary idea caused a decrease in dominance of the central State & led to a multifaceted process of decentralisation. A case in point is the recent regionalisation of the competency to organise local government in Belgium. Based on Page & Goldsmith's three dimensions in intergovernmental relations between central & local government (functions, discretion & access), we test the discourse of the reform of the local government in Flanders to its practice. It is argued that the principles of a subsidiary founded municipal autonomy, a growing fiscal & functional discretion & a personal disentanglement of local & central decision-makers was inspired by northern European models of government relations. These, however, are only partially being confirmed by the praxis of the reforms, as the main principles of the existing southern European models persist. Adapted from the source document.

THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONFLICT PRESUPPOSES LOCAL ISSUES OR CONTROVERSIES THAT CAN BE SETTLED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT CONFLICT BECAUSE RIOTS DO HAPPEN SOMEWHERE, VIZ ON THE TERRITORY OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT LOCAL ISSUES. THE OBJECTIVES OF ACTION HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFLICT IS A LOCAL ONE. THE OBJECTIONS OF AN ACTION CAN BE THE CHANGE OF LOCAL POWER HOLDERS OR A CHANGE OF THEIR POLICIES. REPLACEMENT OF LOCAL OFFICIALS BY LOCAL ACTION IN THE DUTCH SITUATION IS NOT SO OBVIOUS. IN MOST CASES A DECISION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED, EG THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW MAYOR. BY-ELECTIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS HAVE NEVER OCCURRED. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE PUTTING ASIDE OF A LOCAL COUNCIL & APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN MANY CASES LOCAL AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE COOPERATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO REALIZE PLANS OF IMPORTANCE, AT LEAST FINANCIALLY. EVEN WHERE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST, A LOCAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DEVIATE TOO MUCH FROM NATIONAL POLICIES. LOCAL REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT. LOCAL CONFLICT CANNOT CHANGE '1ST ORDER POLITICS' (POLICIES) OR '2ND ORDER POLITICS' (POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS) VERY FAR; THE LIMITS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM. RECENTLY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CHANGE THE WAY (PROPORTIONALLY TO THE STRENGTH OF ALL POSSIBLE PARTIES IN THE COUNCILS) THAT PROVINCIAL BOARDS OF ALDERMAN ARE TRADITIONALLY COMPOSED. THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE REASONED AS A POLITIZATION OF LOCAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, THE MAIN EFFECT WILL BE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN COMPETITION FOR SEATS. HA.

It is often suggested that the nationalization of local elections has increased. As a result, a hypothesis could be that the mutual differences between policy programs of local divisions of the same national party decrease. In this contribution, we focus on the local election of October 8th 2006 in order to analyze these mutual differences. The aim of this contribution is to measure the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the policy positions of the local divisions of national political parties, on a range of substantive issues on which they have the freedom to differ. Therefore, we compare the opinions of local party agents within the different party families. We use the results of a survey among the representatives of the local departments of the different political parties in the run-up to the local elections. Our research shows that, regarding to the selected questions, in general the local divisions speak with one voice. Our analysis does not indicate that there is a large mixture of visions between divisions of the same national party. Besides, this analysis shows that in general, the size of the municipality can seldom be used in indicating the relative disagreement within political families. This level of agreement is the largest within the green party & the smallest within the liberal family. Those are also the two parties of which the local agents say that the influence of supra-local party levels is small, compared to representatives of other political families. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

The article analyses the gender balance in local Belgian politics in the aftermath of the 2006 local elections. It offers a comparative perspective on the position of candidates, representatives elected & those holding office including data from the last three decades. The article also discusses the attitude of local party sections towards measures to foster a gender balance. The data show that local party sections more easily agree on parity at the level of candidates than that they support a real sharing of power at the level of the executive power. Local party sections do not support more than a guaranteed minimum presence of wo/men in the councils of eldermen. Furthermore, both at the level of candidates & at that of the executive the data reveal a final glass ceiling, Women have difficulties reaching the top positions on electoral lists as well as the top positions in the local executive power. Tables, Graphs. Adapted from the source document.

An analysis by all (7) Flemish universities of the 2006 Belgium municipal council elections, using the Mediargus database containing articles from all Flemish newspapers (no journals included). Elections for which Belgium counties had unprecedented authority to organize their local government & local elections, & which were marked by arguments within local political parties, belated legislative changes & belated campaigning. Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The number of preference votes for the candidates running in the October 2006 local elections in the thirteen main cities of Flanders is largely determined by the position on the list & the previous political mandate. A multivariate analysis shows that an executive function on the local level yields a comparable electoral bonus as a national mandate. The campaign expenditures also have a significant effect. There is a spending limit, but the candidates on average spend only 22% of what they are allowed to. Christian-democratic candidates generally spend the most, with the liberals ranked second. The gender, age & professional status of the candidates have at most a very marginal effect on their electoral score, controlling for the other relevant variables. Candidates with a foreign name obtain a somewhat better result on average, but this is particularly the case with candidates running for the socialist party. Tables, Graphs. Adapted from the source document.

Although the 2006 local elections can hardly be described as 'historical,' there is sufficient evidence to distinguish remarkable characteristics associated with this elections. For the first time in decades, turnout has been growing. This evolution can be explained by several factors. This article emphasizes besides the impact of changes in the electoral rules, transformations in demographic structure of the population & the stake of the elections the importance of the media campaign surrounding the elections. However, in spite of this (national) campaigns, there are more than enough indications that local politics keeps its local 'nature.' Secondly, the 2006 elections were the first ones organized after the transfer of the responsibility for municipality legislation from the federal state to the regions. This means that each region designed its own local government architecture & electoral rules. Yet, in practice, the consequences of this transformation seem to be very limited. Thirdly, & particular in the Flemish region, 'strong mayors' arose from the ballot stations (with the Antwerp mayor as the most spectacular case). The consequences of this trend will in the future be the issue of a new debate concerning the relations between council, board of alderman & mayor. Adapted from the source document.