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Sustainable and inclusive growth in emerging Asian economies requires continued high levels of public sector investment in areas such as infrastructure, education, health, and social services. These responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure investment, need to be devolved increasingly to the regional government level. However, growth of sources of revenue and financing for local governments has not necessarily kept pace, forcing them, in some cases, to increase borrowing or cut spending below needed levels. This paper reviews alternative models of the relationship between central and local governments, and provides an overview and assessment of different financing mechanisms for local governments, including tax revenues, central government transfers, bank loans, and bond issuance, with a focus on the context of emerging Asian economies. The paper also reviews financing mechanisms for local governments and mechanisms for maintaining fiscal stability and sustainability at both the central and local government levels. Based upon the evidence on the decentralization process in Asia, it proposes some policy implications for improving central-local government relations and fiscal sustainability.

Theory suggests that relations between authorities affect implementation. This article studies the link between central and local government agencies in the Swedish labour market sector. The analysis is based on new quantitative data. The results indicate that central and local government agencies have very different priorities, but they nonetheless cooperate to a considerable extent. However, cooperation and 'good' implementation only coincide under certain conditions. If the collaborative endeavours are explicitly designed to lead to implementation of a specific and demanding task, cooperation is positively related to implementation performance. Agencies that collaborate to a considerable extent at a general level do not, however, perform better than others. Thus, I argue that theories should be developed and tested to indicate when cooperation between public authorities will promote implementation, instead of assuming that cooperation, in general, is a 'good thing'.

Local governance and decentralization is an ever growing topic in politics and public administration studies. This is better achieved by a good relationship between the local and central governments. A coordinated relation between these two important institutions provides prosperity and stability for a country.This paper aims to describe the notion of central-local governments relations, based on decentralization. It begins by briefly presenting the theoretical aspects of the abovementioned concepts of central-local relations and decentralization.The paper first gives an overview of these concepts in the Republic of Albania, by describing the situation in different periods and different regimes. The aim of this study is to show how the central-local relations have evolved during the years in Albania and how much this relation has been concerned with decentralization and local self-governance.This study provides different competencies and budget capacity of both levels ofgovernment and gives examples from different developed countries in order to show how the system works in reality in Albania and how they should function in order to be more effective and efficient.Finally this study presents some of the problems that the local government institutions are facing in Albania, with the main issue being corruption in all levels of public administration and possible solutions for these problems will be suggested.Keywords: Albania, Central-local relations, Decentralization, Local government,Corruption

Dissertation (D.P.A.)--National Institute of Development Administration, 2015 ; This study has the following four objectives: 1) to examine the nature of intervention on local government organization through public policy; 2) to determine the implications of central government intervention with regards to contents and execution of the local government development plans; 3) to investigate the patterns of local government adaptation in response to central government intervention; and 4) to study local government organizations' problems and obstacles, and identify recommendations that may be useful to management of municipalities' affairs. The time frame of this research is from the fiscal year 2011-2013. The researcher focuses on two forms of qualitative research: 1) documentary research such as theoretical concepts, legal framework, and academic documents in foreign countries and Thailand and 2) in-depth interviews of elected administrators such as mayors, chief government officials and municipal assembly members, including the president of the municipal assembly. The researcher's findings lead to the following response to the four objectives. ; Regarding the first objective, the research reveals that the public policy during Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's premiership is consistent with the directive principles of fundamental state policies in accordance to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. Despite the fact that such public policy is beneficial to the state, official mandates issued by the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Local Administration to local government organizations can be considered a drawback and regarded as intervention on the administrative rights of local government organizations. Such practice contradicts the principle of local governance, which states "local administrative organizations should have the liberty to manage its own region in accordance to the law," and goes against various legal documents such as the State Administration Act, B. E. 2534, the Municipality ...

Tanzania in embarking the decentralization by devolution policy (D by D) as a mechanism of facilitating quick development process through the involvement of people from grass root levels has been carried out through the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs). Throughout its implementation there had been a supportive structural set up, including a constitutional mandate for local governments. Also, there has been an increased recognition of LGAs by central and sector ministries as partners rather than subordinate structures. However, the lack of a clear and effective institutional framework to govern the implementation of D by D and the lack of a shared understanding of D by D across ministries and other governmental institutions has made led to structural confusion between the Central government and the Local Government Authorities. Thus, this paper explores the undertakings of the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs) in order to forge a way forward for a inclusive and responsive governance in the country.

Sustainable and inclusive growth in emerging Asian economies requires continued high levels of public sector investment in areas such as infrastructure, education, health, and social services. These responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure investment, need to be devolved increasingly to the regional government level. However, growth of sources of revenue and financing for local governments has not necessarily kept pace, forcing them, in some cases, to rely on unorthodox funding measures such as shadow banking, or else cutting spending below needed levels. Even if adequate funding is available, there need to be safeguards to ensure that debt levels are sustainable.

Since the late 1990s, local governments in China have been relying heavily on land, which is a state-owned asset in urban area, to generate a significant amount of extra-budgetary revenue. Whilst this striking phenomenon has attracted numerous academic attentions, not many literatures shed the light on the process of central-local interactions. Adopting the procedural approach, this study examines the central-local fiscal and policy relations in the context of land finance. Taking the evidence from Guangdong province, this study understands the central-local relations as a process of policy interactions. After the central's attempt to recentralize the fiscal resources of local governments in the mid-1990s, localities have been facing fiscal stress, which led them to rely heavily on land conveyance income, an extra-budgetary revenue in order to complement the fiscal shortage in budgetary account. However, a series of socioeconomic consequences of local fervent land development have attracted frequent central interventions. The most noticeable example is the housing macro-regulations introduced in light of the soaring housing prices. The example of the housing macro-regulations rejected the classic centrist model of the central-local relations in China, which implies a zero-sum game. On the contrary, in face of an issue influencing the conflicting core interests of both actors, both the powers of central and local governments were intensified to the extent that no one single actor will totally win over another. The powers of the central and local governments were also mutually transformed in the course of the game. It is argued that local governments display a sense of resistance against the central interventions as they have strong interests in land and real estate industry after tax sharing reform. On the other hand, it is unlikely for the central government to give concession to local governments as the failure to alleviate the consequences of land finance may cause public discontent and even political crises. The possible outcome is either a "win-win" situation or loss for both actors. To avoid a negative-sum outcome, collaboration and compromise are recommended. The centre is urged to address the root problem of misalignment of revenue and expenditure and to institutionalize the relationship between the centre and subnational governments. ; published_or_final_version ; China Development Studies ; Master ; Master of Arts in China Development Studies

Pub. also as Studies in history, economics and public law, vol. 9, no. 1. ; Academic record. ; Thesis (PH. D.)--Columbia university. ; Bibliography: p. 279-287. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Since 2000 intergovernmental relations in New Zealand have been evolving rapidly as a result of a significant shift in government policy discourse towards a strong central-local government partnership. New statutory provisions empowering local government to promote social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing have significant implications for the range of activities in which local authorities are engaged. In turn, this has consequences for the relationship between local government and central government. The effectiveness of the new empowerment and the prospects for further strengthening of the role of local government are critically examined. Despite some on-going tensions, and an inevitable mismatch in the balance of power between central and local government, it is argued that there is a discernible rebalancing of intergovernmental relations as a result of new legislation and central government policy settings which reflect a 'localist turn'. On the basis of developments since 2000 it may be argued that the New Zealand system of local government is evolving away from the recognised 'Anglo' model. However, further consolidation is needed in the transformation of intergovernmental relations and mechanisms that will cement a more genuine central-local government partnership.

The Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996 vested local government with substantial powers. It uplifted local government from a subordinate level of government to a significant sphere within its own right with constitutionally entrenched functions, powers and finance. In a general overview of the South African local government reforms, it was suggested that the results of this decentralisation experiment are at best mixed, with increasing centralisation measures being undertaken by the national government (Cameron, 2001). This article focuses specifically on local government finance, which is undoubtedly the weak link in the new local government system. Prior to 1994, most local governments were elected by and served a small - predominantly white - base. There has been the transition to municipalities with many poor residents without any concomitant increase in the tax base. The first part of this article looks at a framework for decentralisation. It traces the evolution of local government finance in South Africa from the days of segregation and apartheid up to the current democratic era. The article examines the current local government finance system, with a focus on two different views in this regard. The one argument is that local government is inherently inefficient and poor financial management is the primary reason for financial problems. The other view is that the tax base of local government is too small for it to fulfil its constitutional service provision and development functions. An analysis is then undertaken of two recent local government financing controversies, namely, the local government boundary demarcation process and the Department of Finance-driven constitutional amendment.

"M-193." ; "September 1994." ; Shipping list no.: 94-0334-P. ; At head of title: An information report. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.