Suchergebnisse

Politika Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca prema krajevima koji su prethodno bili u sastavu Austro-Ugarske Monarhije bila je politika pokoravanja i iskorištavanja. Proces centralizacije nastojao je svu moć odlučivanja i raspolaganja novcem poreznih obveznika skoncentrirati u Beograd. Tu je politiku provodila vodeća politička snaga, Narodna radikalna stranka. Osijek je bio jedan od gradova čiji je razvoj stradao zbog takve politike. Kako radikali nisu imali dovoljno političke moći u Osijeku, silom su namentnuli svoju vlast kroz instituciju komesarijata. Ta je privremena institucija pod pritiskom središnje vlasti postala dugotrajna te se održala godinu i pol (od listopada 1926. do travnja 1928.). Za vrijeme komesarijata u Osijeku gradska je blagajna bila na raspolaganju radikalima. Oni su u potpunosti zanemarili razvojni plan grada Osijeka te osmislili izvlačenje općinskoga novca ulaganjem u investicije koje gradu nisu donosile ništa osim troškova. ; Te policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to areas that had previously been part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a policy of subjugation and exploitation. Te process of centralization sought the full power of decision-making and management of taxpayers' money to concentrate in Belgrade. Such a policy was carried out by the leading political force, the People's Radical Party. Osijek was one of the cities whose development suffered as a result of such a policy. As Radicals did not have enough political power in Osijek, they forced their power through the institution of Commissioner. Tis was to be a temporary institution, and under pressure from the central government became a long-term, maintaining a year and a half (October 1926 - April 1928). During the commissariat in Osijek city's treasury was available to the Radicals. Tey completely neglected the development plan of the city of Osijek and created extracting municipal money by investing in investments that the city did not bring anything to the city but cost.

The concept of "bureaucracy" covered the field of negative stances in postrevolutionary Yugoslavia. Its fuzziness allowed different, though ostensibly all anti-Stalinist, interpretations by the Party-State discourse (mainly Kardelj and Bakaric) vs. the discourse of the "loyal opposition" (Branko Horvat and the Praxis group). The first group wanted to dismantle State centralization but insisted there was no ruling class. The second group could not, for various reasons, insist on a ruling class but discussed its power and effect. The term "bureaucracy" grew from a useful start of public discussion finally into sterile talmudism. But it's very limits indicate a crucial, though absent, concept and state of power. Adapted from the source document.

The concept of "bureaucracy" covered the field of negative stances in post-revolutionary Yugoslavia. Its fuzziness allowed different, though ostensibly all anti-Stalinist, interpretations by the Party-State discourse (mainly Kardelj and Bakaric) vs. the discourse of the "loyal opposition" (Branko Horvat and the Praxis group). The first group wanted to dismantle State centralization but insisted there was no ruling class. The second group could not, for various reasons, insist on a ruling class but discussed its power and effect. The term "bureaucracy" grew from a useful start of public discussion finally into sterile talmudism. But its very limits indicate a crucial, though absent, concept and state of power. Adapted from the source document.

U radu se problematizira izborni uspjeh regionalističkih stranaka u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji. Članak ističe specifičnost regionalističkih stranaka i potrebu njihove zasebne klasifikacije u odnosu na etnoregionalističke i etničke stranke. Ova komparativna analiza prati nastanak i izborni uspjeh regionalističkih stranaka u hrvatskom i srpskom stranačkom sustavu tijekom četvrt stoljeća. Pri analizi razlika u uspjehu hrvatskih i srbijanskih regionalističkih stranaka, stavlja se naglasak na kontekstualni okvir (narav stranačkog natjecanja, izborni model), kao i na društvene čimbenike (etnički i vjerski sastav) te povijesne faktore (naslijeđe centralizacije, odnosno autonomije). Članak tvrdi kako je kombinacija kontekstualnih, društvenih i povijesnih čimbenika stvorila bolje preduvjete za razvoj regionalizma u hrvatskom slučaju te omogućila snažniji izborni uspjeh negoli u Srbiji. ; This article discusses the electoral success of regional parties in Croatia and Serbia. The article emphasizes the specificity of regional parties and the need for a separate classification in relation to ethno-regional and ethnic parties. This comparative analysis follows the emergence and electoral success of regional parties in the Croatian and Serbian party system over a quarter century. By analyzing the difference in the success of Croatian and Serbian regional parties, the emphasis is put on contextual framework (the nature of party competition, electoral model), as well as social factors (ethnic and religious composition) and historical factors (the legacy of centralization or autonomy). Article argues that the combination of contextual, social and historical factors created better conditions for the development of regionalism in the Croatian case and allowed electoral success stronger than in Serbia.

Pojam "centralizacije" počeo se koristiti u Francuskoj krajem 18. stoljeća kada je nakon revolucije stvorena nova struktura vlade. Pojam "decentralizacije" u upotrebu je ušao početkom 19. stoljeća. Ideje slobode i decentralizacije provodili su tijekom 19. i 20. stoljeća protudrţavni politički aktivisti koji su sebe nazivali "anarhistima", "libertarijancima", pa čak i decentralistima. Tocqueville, jedan od zagovornika decentralizacije je istaknuo da decentralizacija ima ne samo administrativnu vrijednost već i graĎansku dimenziju, jer povećava mogućnosti za graĎane da se zainteresiraju za javne poslove. I od akumulacije tih lokalnih, aktivnih, pronicljivih sloboda, raĎa se najučinkovitija protuteţa središnjoj vladi, čak i ako bi bila podrţavana od neosobne, kolektivne volje. Veliki broj zemalja u razvoju i tranzicijskih zemalja započeo je neki oblik programa decentralizacije. Taj je trend povezan sa sve većim zanimanjem za ulogu civilnog društva i privatnog sektora kao partnera vladama u traţenju novih načina pruţanja usluga. Decentralizacija upravljanja i jačanje kapaciteta lokalne uprave dijelom je i funkcija širih društvenih trendova, što uključuje, na primjer, općenito rastuće nepovjerenje u vladu, propast nekih od najcentraliziranijih reţima na svijetu (npr. Sovjetskog Saveza) i novonastale separatističke zahtjeve koji se rutinski pojavljuju u pojedinim dijelovima svijeta. Pokret prema lokalnoj odgovornosti i većoj kontroli nad nečijom sudbinom nije, meĎutim, rezultat samo negativnog stava prema središnjoj vladi. Umjesto toga, ovaj razvoj dogaĎaja uglavnom je potaknut snaţnom ţeljom za većim sudjelovanjem graĎana i organizacije privatnog sektora u funkciji upravljanja. ; The term "centralization" began to be used in France in the late 18th century when, after the revolution, a new government structure was created. The term "decentralization" came into use in the early 19th century. The ideas of freedom and decentralization were implemented during the 19th and 20th centuries by anti-state political activists ...

U ovom radu nastojim ispitati osnovnu tezu o nastanku prezidencijaliziranih stranaka koje se pojavljuju kao poseban historijsko-empirijski model stranačke organizacije. Model prezidencijaliziranih stranaka ne predstavlja sljedeću fazu u postojećoj razvojnoj teoriji političkih stranaka koja bi označila kretanje prema još jednomu novom tipu stranke, niti mu se mogu pridodati značenja i vrijednosti novoga razvojnog tipa. Valjan je samo kao analitički model kojim se na historijskoj i empirijskoj razini može pratiti prilagodba suvremenih političkih stranaka zahtjevima socijalnih i političkih čimbenika za sve većom individualizacijom političkog života. Ono što prezidencijalizirane stranke čini specifičnim modelom upravo su ključne karakteristike snažne koncentracije moći u rukama stranačkog vođe i centralizacije procesa političkog odlučivanja, iz čega proizlaze njegova autonomija u formuliranju stranačkih politika, programa i izbornih strategija, neupitna dominacija nad svim razinama stranačke organizacije te rigidna hijerarhijska stranačka struktura. Komparativna analiza britanske Laburističke stranke, Španjolske socijalističke radničke stranke i Hrvatske demokratske zajednice nedvosmisleno je potvrdila glavnu hipotezu kojom je uspostavljena uzročna veza između složene kombinacije strukturnih i kontekstualnih čimbenika, koji su identificirani kao glavni pokretači prezidencijalizacijskih procesa, i nastanka prezidencijaliziranih stranaka koje se organizacijski prilagođavaju izazovima suvremenih demokracija. ; In this dissertation I test the hypothesis on the origin of presidentialized parties that appear as the specific historical and empirical model of party organization. The model of presidentialized parties does not represent the next phase in the existing developmental theory of political parties, which would indicate movement towards another new type of party organization, nor can it be attributed with the meaning and value of a new developmental type. It is valid only as an analytical model which follows the adaptation of modern political parties to the challenges of social and political factors for the increasing individualization of political life on the historical and empirical level. What makes presidentialized parties a specific model are the key characteristics of the strong concentration of power in the hands of party leader and the centralization of decision-making process, from which derive his autonomy in the formulation of party policies, programs and electoral strategies, unquestioned supremacy over all levels of the party organization and the rigid hierarchical party structure. A comparative analysis of the British Labour party, the Spanish socialist worker's party and the Croatian democratic union unambiguously confirmed the main hypothesis which established a causal relationship between the complex combination of structural and contextual factors that are identified as the main drivers of the process of presidentialization, on one hand, and the emergence of the presidentialized parties which organizationally adapt to the challenges of modern democracies, on the other. In this dissertation I test the hypothesis on the origin of presidentialized parties that appear as the specific historical and empirical model of party organization. The model of presidentialized parties does not represent the next phase in the existing developmental theory of political parties, which would indicate movement towards another new type of party organization, nor can it be attributed with the meaning and value of a new developmental type. It is valid only as an analytical model which follows the adaptation of modern political parties to the challenges of social and political factors for the increasing individualization of political life on the historical and empirical level. What makes presidentialized parties a specific model are the key characteristics of the strong concentration of power in the hands of party leader and the centralization of decision-making process, from which derive his autonomy in the formulation of party policies, programs and electoral strategies, unquestioned supremacy over all levels of the party organization and the rigid hierarchical party structure. A comparative analysis of the British Labour party, the Spanish socialist worker's party and the Croatian democratic union unambiguously confirmed the main hypothesis which established a causal relationship between the complex combination of structural and contextual factors that are identified as the main drivers of the process of presidentialization, on one hand, and the emergence of the presidentialized parties which organizationally adapt to the challenges of modern democracies, on the other.

Pojam "centralizacije" počeo se koristiti u Francuskoj krajem 18. stoljeća kada je nakon revolucije stvorena nova struktura vlade. Pojam "decentralizacije" u upotrebu je ušao početkom 19. stoljeća. Ideje slobode i decentralizacije provodili su tijekom 19. i 20. stoljeća protudrţavni politički aktivisti koji su sebe nazivali "anarhistima", "libertarijancima", pa čak i decentralistima. Tocqueville, jedan od zagovornika decentralizacije je istaknuo da decentralizacija ima ne samo administrativnu vrijednost već i graĎansku dimenziju, jer povećava mogućnosti za graĎane da se zainteresiraju za javne poslove. I od akumulacije tih lokalnih, aktivnih, pronicljivih sloboda, raĎa se najučinkovitija protuteţa središnjoj vladi, čak i ako bi bila podrţavana od neosobne, kolektivne volje. Veliki broj zemalja u razvoju i tranzicijskih zemalja započeo je neki oblik programa decentralizacije. Taj je trend povezan sa sve većim zanimanjem za ulogu civilnog društva i privatnog sektora kao partnera vladama u traţenju novih načina pruţanja usluga. Decentralizacija upravljanja i jačanje kapaciteta lokalne uprave dijelom je i funkcija širih društvenih trendova, što uključuje, na primjer, općenito rastuće nepovjerenje u vladu, propast nekih od najcentraliziranijih reţima na svijetu (npr. Sovjetskog Saveza) i novonastale separatističke zahtjeve koji se rutinski pojavljuju u pojedinim dijelovima svijeta. Pokret prema lokalnoj odgovornosti i većoj kontroli nad nečijom sudbinom nije, meĎutim, rezultat samo negativnog stava prema središnjoj vladi. Umjesto toga, ovaj razvoj dogaĎaja uglavnom je potaknut snaţnom ţeljom za većim sudjelovanjem graĎana i organizacije privatnog sektora u funkciji upravljanja. ; The term "centralization" began to be used in France in the late 18th century when, after the revolution, a new government structure was created. The term "decentralization" came into use in the early 19th century. The ideas of freedom and decentralization were implemented during the 19th and 20th centuries by anti-state political activists who called themselves "anarchists," "libertarians," and even decentralizers. Tocqueville, one of the proponents of decentralization, pointed out that decentralization has not only an administrative value but also a civic dimension, as it increases opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs. And from the accumulation of these local, active, insightful freedoms, the most effective counterbalance to central government is born, even if it were supported by an impersonal, collective will. A large number of developing and transition countries have embarked on some form of decentralization program. This trend is linked to the growing interest in the role of civil society and the private sector as partners to governments in seeking new ways of providing services. Decentralization of governance and strengthening the capacity of local government is partly a function of broader social trends, which include, for example, growing distrust of government, the collapse of some of the world's most centralized regimes (eg the Soviet Union) and emerging separatist demands that routinely emerge in some parts of the world. The movement towards local responsibility and greater control over one's destiny is not, however, the result of only a negative attitude towards the central government. Instead, this development is largely driven by a strong desire for greater citizen participation and private sector organization in the governance function.

The history of the Order of Saint Augustine in Rijeka links the city and its region with Central Europe – more particularly to Bavaria, Bohemia, Austria, Slovenia and Italy. Unfortunately, the past of the Augustinian convent of St. Jerome is mostly unknown. The Order of St. Augustine was in fact the first religious community in Rijeka. The monastery, founded by the noble families of Devin and Walsee, existed from the 14th century till 1788, when it was dissolved by Joseph II. The archive suffered two main disasters: in 1509, when the Venetians partially destroyed it, and in 1788, the year of its closure. The Augustinian archive remained partially in the State Archives in Rijeka, but the largest part of its precious holdings was displaced. However, part of the archive disappeared. Cimiotti-Steimberg, a historian from Rijeka, speaks of that fact as incuria et vandalismus (negligence and vandalism). Part of the convent's archive returned to Croatia during the 19th century, but the Hungarian politics of centralization, led by Khuen-Héderváry, displaced again the Augustinian documents to Budapest. Finally, the 1958 restitution replaced the holdings back to Croatia. We can only partially assess the content of the archival holdings because many sources mention inventories, registries and urbaria that the convent in Rijeka once possessed. After its dissolution, the documents of a number of Augustinian fraternities disappeared. The most important of them was the Fraternity of Immaculate Conception, that convened in the Augustinian chapel and whose members were some of the most important citizens from Rijeka. The most important contribution to the archive of the Augustinian convent took place in 1958, when the Augustinian books and documents were restituted from Budapest. They have been kept in the State Archives in Rijeka ever since. The most important source preserved in Rijeka is Protocollum conventus Fluminensis Ordinis eremitarum s. patri Augustini ad s. Hieronymum. It was made by the Austrian Augustinian provincial Joseph Achinger, who in 1704 made an inventory of the archive of the Convent of St. Jerome. A smaller part of the archival holdings is preserved in the State Archives in Zagreb. It is not clear how the 16th century cartulary from the Augustinian Convent in Rijeka ended up in the University Library in Vienna. This Diplomatarium monasterii sancti Hieronimi ordinis eremitarum sancti Augustini in terra Fluminis sancti Viti is a source that still needs to be researched. During the last hundred years of its existence, the Augustinian convent makes part of the Austrian Province that preserved well the archives during the 18th century. It had nominated historians for every convent and documented local history. The historical research of the Convent of St. Jerome in Rijeka requires the knowledge of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine. They are grouped in provinces that are under the authority of the general prior with a seat in Rome. The Central Archives of the Order in Rome preserve the major part of the correspondence between generals and the provinces. The Austrian National Library in Vienna hosts the archives of the Augustinian Province of Austria since the Augustinians of St. Jerome were part of it from 1669 to 1788. There are manuscripts from Vienna Augustinian convent of St. Sebastian and St. Rocco, mostly records and excerpts from various sources from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. An important source for the Rijeka Convent is the Codex latinus monacensis 8423 from the Bavarian State Library, which is related to the period from 14th to 16th century, when the convent was part of the Augustinian Province of Bavaria. The work of Rijeka Augustinians can be reconstructed only through historical sources of those provinces, the central Order structures in Rome and the remains of once rich convent archive, parts of which are preserved today in Rijeka, Zagreb and Vienna.

Predmet je ovoga rada razvoj zakonodavstva nadležnoga za regulativu lijekova u Banskoj Hrvatskoj u razdoblju Austro-Ugarske i na istom području kasnije, između dva svjetska rata, u okviru nove države (Kraljevstvo/Kraljevina SHS, odnosno Kraljevina Jugoslavija). Na početku vremenskoga razdoblja samo su ljekarne po propisima farmakopeje izrađivale službene lijekove. Na kraju promatranoga razdoblja to je područje imalo farmaceutsku industriju, sposobnu pratiti dosege svjetske farmaceutske industrije. Rad je napravljen s namjerom prikazati kako je zakonodavstvo pratilo novosti u farmaciji i farmaceutskoj industriji te kako je također proaktivno uvodilo i činilo obvezatnim nova praćenja svojstava lijekova. ; The variety of human diseases and necessity for curing them resulted in the appearance of medicines and medical treatments. Traditional or people's medicines had been applied in the old times. Rulers realized over time the importance of getting medicines and medical treatments codified. Pharmacies, being in charge for the production of medicines, existed from 13th century. The Habsburg Monarchy proclaimed the General Sanitary Order (Das Generalsanitätsnormativum) in 1770, codifying that physicians should visit pharmacies and control their work once a year. The pharmaceutical industry has taken over medicines production in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century in Western Europe and North America, and new methods of medicines production has been occurring ever since.The Banal Croatia, which included today's Croatia without Međimurje, Baranja (Baranya), Istria and Dalmatia, had been relatively independent in the health policies in the period from 1869 to 1918, and passed the Law on Pharmacies in 1894. The Law stipulated the control of pharmacies rather than the control over the pharmaceutical industry. The traditional approach prevailed in healing of many different health issues at the times when modern medicines had not yet been developed. Pharmacists were barred from knowing the properties of medicines made by manufacturers, since manufacturers have kept ingredients and recipes of their sources of income secret. State was the only one privy to all of the properties of a medicine and such a medicine was usually known as "a secret remedy". The Banal Croatia witnessed the birth of a large-scale manufacturing of secret remedies by companies held by Adolphe Thierry de Chateauvieux and Eugen Viktor Feller.The interwar period saw the proliferation of the Croatian pharmaceutical industry. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in which the area of the Banal Croatia had been extended to Međimurje and Baranja, established the control of medicines made by the growing pharmaceutical industry. At first, the manufacturers were responsible for their products. In 1925 a state surveillance and control of medicines production and sale was established. It meant that the state had accepted the responsibility for the quality of medicines thereby making the state quality-proof assignments put on package inserts of medicines, as well as making the state registries and other documents regarding the medicines control. The Control of Biologics Act of 1930 made it clear that biological medicines are more important and that they treated efficiently the larger scope of health issues than chemical medicines had. The regulation related to the state control of medicines from the same year had been the biggest achievement of the interwar medicines state control. The regulation of medicines became an overall state affair, with the state comptrollers actively involved in the control of each and every batch of medicines. Banovina Hrvatska, which had included the former Banal Croatia, created the state institutes for production as well as control of medicines aimed at the centralization and co-ordination of production and control of medicines. The assessment of the properties of medicines improved as well, from the control of harmlessness to the controls of purity and potency. The control of efficiency was introduced later. The development of the production and regulation of medicines in the territory of Banal Croatia in the timeframe selected for this article moved in line with the development that occurred in the Western Europe and North America. When the Second World War broke out modern medicines regulation was already in existence.

Augustinski samostan sv. Jeronima podignula je najstarija redovnička zajednica u Rijeci. Od početaka u 14. stoljeću, pa do ukidanja samostana 1788. godine, augustinci pustinjaci obilježili su grad i širu riječku okolicu u vjerskom, kulturnom i ekonomskom pogledu. Rad opisuje negativne posljedice jozefinističkoga zatvaranja samostana na augustinsko arhivsko gradivo, što se odrazilo i na nedovoljni historiografski interes prema povijesti te zajednice. Autor daje presjek sačuvanoga gradiva koncem pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća vraćena iz Budimpešte, od kojega je najvrjednije vrelo samostanski protokol. Navode se podatci i o arhivskom gradivu diljem Europe, iz svjetovnih i crkvenih ustanova, neophodnom za historiografsku prosudbu povijesti augustinaca pustinjaka u Rijeci.State Archives in Rijeka ; The history of the Order of Saint Augustine in Rijeka links the city and its region with Central Europe – more particularly to Bavaria, Bohemia, Austria, Slovenia and Italy. Unfortunately, the past of the Augustinian convent of St. Jerome is mostly unknown. The Order of St. Augustine was in fact the first religious community in Rijeka. The monastery, founded by the noble families of Devin and Walsee, existed from the 14th century till 1788, when it was dissolved by Joseph II. The archive suffered two main disasters: in 1509, when the Venetians partially destroyed it, and in 1788, the year of its closure. The Augustinian archive remained partially in the State Archives in Rijeka, but the largest part of its precious holdings was displaced. However, part of the archive disappeared. Cimiotti-Steimberg, a historian from Rijeka, speaks of that fact as incuria et vandalismus (negligence and vandalism). Part of the convent's archive returned to Croatia during the 19th century, but the Hungarian politics of centralization, led by Khuen-Héderváry, displaced again the Augustinian documents to Budapest. Finally, the 1958 restitution replaced the holdings back to Croatia. We can only partially assess the content of the archival holdings because many sources mention inventories, registries and urbaria that the convent in Rijeka once possessed. After its dissolution, the documents of a number of Augustinian fraternities disappeared. The most important of them was the Fraternity of Immaculate Conception, that convened in the Augustinian chapel and whose members were some of the most important citizens from Rijeka. The most important contribution to the archive of the Augustinian convent took place in 1958, when the Augustinian books and documents were restituted from Budapest. They have been kept in the State Archives in Rijeka ever since. The most important source preserved in Rijeka is Protocollum conventus Fluminensis Ordinis eremitarum s. patri Augustini ad s. Hieronymum. It was made by the Austrian Augustinian provincial Joseph Achinger, who in 1704 made an inventory of the archive of the Convent of St. Jerome. A smaller part of the archival holdings is preserved in the State Archives in Zagreb. It is not clear how the 16th century cartulary from the Augustinian Convent in Rijeka ended up in the University Library in Vienna. This Diplomatarium monasterii sancti Hieronimi ordinis eremitarum sancti Augustini in terra Fluminis sancti Viti is a source that still needs to be researched. During the last hundred years of its existence, the Augustinian convent makes part of the Austrian Province that preserved well the archives during the 18th century. It had nominated historians for every convent and documented local history. The historical research of the Convent of St. Jerome in Rijeka requires the knowledge of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine. They are grouped in provinces that are under the authority of the general prior with a seat in Rome. The Central Archives of the Order in Rome preserve the major part of the correspondence between generals and the provinces. The Austrian National Library in Vienna hosts the archives of the Augustinian Province of Austria since the Augustinians of St. Jerome were part of it from 1669 to 1788. There are manuscripts from Vienna Augustinian convent of St. Sebastian and St. Rocco, mostly records and excerpts from various sources from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. An important source for the Rijeka Convent is the Codex latinus monacensis 8423 from the Bavarian State Library, which is related to the period from 14th to 16th century, when the convent was part of the Augustinian Province of Bavaria. The work of Rijeka Augustinians can be reconstructed only through historical sources of those provinces, the central Order structures in Rome and the remains of once rich convent archive, parts of which are preserved today in Rijeka, Zagreb and Vienna.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.