Recent fighting between three rebel groups and the Chadian army calls into question the deployment and purpose of Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR, which the Council of the European Union launched on 15 October 2007. The escalation of violence and open French political and military support for the authoritarian regime of President Idriss Déby have fundamentally changed the political circumstances under which the EU operation will be deployed. Therefore, the EU should re-examine EUFOR's underlying purposes. It should also consider abandoning the entire operation
Doing business 2020 is the 17th in a series of annual studies investigating the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 190 economies - from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe - and over time. Regulations affecting 12 areas of the life of a business are covered: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, employing workers, and contracting with the government. The employing workers and contracting with the government indicator sets are not included in this year's ranking on the ease of doing business. Data in doing business 2020 are current as of May 1, 2019. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms of business regulation have worked, where, and why. This economy profile presents indicators for Chad; for 2020, Chad ranks 182.
This report contains an assessment of the approach that the Republic of Chad has adopted or plans to adopt to enhance the benefits generated by the exploitation of its petroleum resources, and to manage the economic and social impact of such exploitation in a sustainable and equitable manner. Its objective is to inform the extent and prioritization of petroleum sector reforms, which might be the object of technical assistance to be provided by the World Bank and other development partners. The report focuses on the upstream part of the petroleum sector (exploration and production), where the largest fiscal and governance gains can be achieved. The report is necessarily a high-level review of geological potential, laws and regulations, and institutional capacity and organization pertaining to the petroleum sector. As such, it is not a guide on how to secure private sector investment or implement reforms. It was prepared in a short period of time combining desk research and in-country stakeholders' consultation with the accumulated knowledge from several World Bank economic and sector studies and technical assistance operations and reflects the openness of the dialogue with the Government. Its findings are intended as background for discussion with the Authorities with the aim to identify a shared assessment of needs and priorities.
This study provides a background of the socio-political situation in Chad and the oil project, and analyses how the two will develop and interact in the future. A key feature is an analysis of the incentives in the oil project and their possible future changes. Chad is currently undergoing two processes of significant importance for its future development - political democratisation and transformation into an oil economy. For a country plagued with civil war for decades until 1990, and known as one of the poorest and most corrupt states in the world, this is a real challenge. The oil export started in late 2003, and boosted the economy in 2004. To avoid the disastrous experiences of most poor African oil states, unique oil management, control mechanisms and other conditionalities have been imposed by the World Bank - much thanks to pressure from the civil society and the international community. If implemented well, Chad may become a model for how a poor resource-rich country is able to promote socio-economic development and poverty reduction. However, this demands a close and coordinated cooperation between the Chadian government and the civil society, based on accountability and good governance, and with continuous support of the World Bank and the international community. The situation is fragile and progress is uncertain. If a broader economic development is achieved, conditions for an improved democratisation can be created in the long term.The Chadian oil project deserves continued close attention and monitoring. ; CONTENT -- Introduction -- Conceptual Framework -- State and Politics in Africa: Chad's Democratisation Process -- Natural Resources: The Chad-Cameroon Oil Project -- Conclusion -- References
The Country Opinion Survey in Chad assists the World Bank Group (WBG) in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in Chad perceive the WBG. It provides the WBG with systematic feedback from national and local governments, multilateral/bilateral agencies, media, academia, the private sector, and civil society in Chad on 1) their views regarding the general environment in Chad; 2) their overall attitudes toward the WBG in Chad; 3) overall impressions of the WBG's effectiveness and results, knowledge work and activities, and communication and information sharing in Chad; and 4) their perceptions of the WBG's future role in Chad.
The Country Opinion Survey in Chad assists the World Bank Group (WBG) in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in Chad perceive the WBG. It provides the WBG with systematic feedback from national and local governments, multilateral/bilateral agencies, media, academia, the private sector, and civil society in Chad on 1) their views regarding the general environment in Chad; 2) their overall attitudes toward the WBG in Chad; 3) overall impressions of the WBG's effectiveness and results, knowledge work and activities, and communication and information sharing in Chad; and 4) their perceptions of the WBG's future role in Chad.
Peace and security are basic conditions for economic and social development. Conflict, on the other hand, can reverse years of economic growth and induce long-term harm on almost all aspects of development. For the past decade, the Lake Chad region has been the setting of conflicts between government forces and armed groups, most notably the Boko Haram. Although the intensity of fighting has petered off in recent years, the conflict has spread from Northern Nigeria and now affects all four countries of the region. Due to the paramount importance of avoiding armed conflict, a large economic literature exists that seeks to find explanations for the onset and prevalence of conflict in developing countries. Blattman and Miguel [2010] list some of the most common theories of conflict including competition for resources, economic grievances, and the possibility of looting. This paper attempts to shed light on the geographical distribution of conflict and its climatic determinants in the Lake Chad region following a sub-national approach where readily available spatial data is employed at two different units of aggregation: Firstly, 90 second level administrative areas, and secondly, around 5,318 grid cells covering the same region. Exposure to conflict is here defined as the intensity (for districts) or incidence (for cells) of conflict in a given unit each year. Parts of the population may not be directly exposed by this definition, but since the units of analysis are relatively small, most will be affected in some ways, for instance by safety concerns when visiting the nearest towns to trade or by the general economic consequences.
Este ARI estudia la dimensión petrolera del conflicto que vive el Chad desde finales de 2005. El conflicto interno que vive el Chad desde finales de 2005 se suele asociar al faccionalismo presente en la política chadiana desde la independencia, pero –para tener una panorámica más completa– hay que añadir que éste se ha visto alimentado por el inicio de la explotación de petróleo a finales de 2003. En este ARI se estudia la conexión entre la explotación petrolera, la mala gobernanza y el actual conflicto entre el gobierno chadiano y las fuerzas rebeldes establecidas en el este del país.
Memories of slavery affect contemporary political life in many Sahelian countries, but how do stigmatised groups use those memories as a tool for integration?
The Country Opinion Survey in Chad assists the World Bank Group (WBG) in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in Chad perceive the WBG. It provides the WBG with systematic feedback from national and local governments, multilateral/bilateral agencies, media, academia, the private sector, and civil society in Chad on 1) their views regarding the general environment in Chad; 2) their overall attitudes toward the WBG in Chad; 3) overall impressions of the WBG's effectiveness and results, knowledge work and activities, and communication and information sharing in Chad; and 4) their perceptions of the WBG's future role in Chad.
The Lake Chad Region (LCR) is an economically interdependent area that encompasses parts of Cameroon (Extrême-Nord), Chad (Chari Baguirmi, Hadjer Lamis, Kenam, and Lac), Niger (Diffa and Zinder), and Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe). The region is characterized by strong historical, ethnic, cultural, and political ties, as well as commercial linkages that extend across its porous borders. Indeed, many if not most of the cross-border exchanges are not recorded in official import and export statistics. Informal trade is widespread throughout Africa (Bouet, Pace, and Glauber 2018; World Bank 2020), particularly if formal state institutions are under stress. Traders try to avoid import or export declarations as well as border taxes, and customs and other border agencies often tolerate the cross-border trade of small consignments without the need to comply with formal procedures. This does not necessarily mean that these trade flows go untaxed, though. Border officials might levy fees that do not have a legal basis, and state or local authorities often ask for informal payments at roadblocks or in marketplaces. The LCR is far from a seaport and, hence, heavily landlocked. This condition means that the cost of connecting to international markets is high. As a result, consumers in the LCR pay a high price for imports from global markets, whereas producers in the region get a low price for their exports to international clients. The region faces other challenges that stress its production base and depress economic development. These challenges include erratic weather patterns with frequent periods of drought, as well as environmental degradation of the lake. The most important threat to the well-being and the livelihood of the population in recent years has been the deteriorating security situation, though.
The Lake Chad Climate resilience action plan outlines the concept that there is a need to turn Lake Chad into a rural hub for regional development in parallel to the restoration of peace and security. The Plan intends to contribute significantly to food security, employment, and the social inclusion of the youth by improving, in a sustainable way, the living conditions of populations settled on the Lake's banks and islands as well as the resilience of a system characterized by a strong demographic growth, high hydrological variability, and climate uncertainty. To achieve it, the Action Plan proposes actions in seven Priority Themes based on observations and knowledge currently available. The four riparian States plus the Central African Republic and Libya, local powers (local governments or customary authorities), Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), and the civil society will be responsible for implementing the proposed actions. The Plan includes enhancing the capacity of LCBC in terms of data collection, sharing of information, and carrying out analyses useful to governance of the basin`s shared natural resources. The success of this Plan requires continuing on-going efforts to strengthen the LCBC. The tentatively estimated cost of the Lake Chad Action Plan is about 916 million Euros.
International interventions in Chad, such as the European Eufor Chad, must address structural problems linked to governance and democracy by helping Chadian political actors to reform the country's social contract instead of focusing on preserving stability and, thus, becoming part of the problem and not of the solution. At the beginning of February 2008 a coalition of armed movements launched an attack on the Chadian capital N'Djamena from their Sudanese base and almost toppled the government of President Deby. The spectacular rebel offensive did not only take the Chadian government by surprise but also put the French military under enormous pressure. Their initial hesitation to support the Chadian army according to bilateral military agreements between the two countries was due to their concern not to jeopardise the neutrality of the Eufor, the European Force that, by that time, was supposed to be deployed in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. Finally, backed by strong international support, the French military provided the Chadian army with the necessary intelligence and logistic tools to repulse the rebel assault. With these new developments, Deby's grip on power seems consolidated for the next few years. But are the prospects for peace also consolidated in Chad?; will President Deby transform his military victory into a more participative and inclusive ruling style?; and are international interventions contributing to structural stability in a particularly turbulent region? These are some of the questions this ARI attempts to address with the aim of shedding some light on the complexities of Chad's political crisis. It argues that in order to avoid being part of the problem, international interventions should aim to address the challenges linked to a failed democratisation by helping Chadian political actors to reform the country's social contract. Otherwise, well-intentioned and expensive peacekeeping operations will not achieve more than symbolic goals.
This study examined the relationship between military outlay and economic growth in the Lake Chad Basin countries of Nigeria and the Republic of Chad respectively by testing the causal link between these two principal variables. The data ranges used for Nigeria and Chad were 1981-2019 and 1983-2019 respectively. The econometric method employed for this study was the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bounds approach to cointegration. The results revealed that Nigeria's military outlay exerted a positive and insignificant relationship with economic growth. However, the Republic of Chad's military outlay had a positive and significant link with economic growth. The results of the causality test showed that there was no causal relationship between real GDP per capita and military outlay in both Nigeria and the Republic of Chad. These findings for Nigeria and Chad imply that they can pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic growth independently. The study, thus, recommends that the policymakers of the governments of both countries should pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic growth independently. Furthermore, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), charged with the responsibility of fighting corruption should rise to the occasion and track down military officials that divert defence funds for individual gains in Nigeria.
Oil resources have enabled Chad to increase public financing for education and to achieve high economic growth rates. Regarding these policies to supporting the education sector, we assume that the standard of living of households does not explain the school attendance. We test empirically this hypothesis using data from the MICS conducted in 2010 and Education Statistical Yearbooks.Using a bivariate probit model, the results show that school attendance and child labor depend of households' standard of living after controlling for other relevant characteristics. In particular, a child from a non-poor household has a lower (higher) probability to be involved in the child labor (enrolled in school) compared to a child from a poor household. Although these results are classical in the economic literature, they are rather surprising in the case of Chad regarding the priority given to education by authorities. We identify four possible explanations, (i) the low level of these investments compared to international standards; (ii) the loss of public expenditures, caused by institutional factors; (iii) the misallocation of educational infrastructures and human resources by region and (iv) an inequity sharing of spin-offs of economic growth induced by oil resources. These results raise the issue of the sustainability of the Chadian economy after oil.
