Suchergebnisse

Recent developments in the composition of the Supreme Court have fueled academic and journalistic speculation about the future of one of the foundational cases in modern administrative law, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Thirty-five years ago, Chevron established the current legal foundation for judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. This Article contains an empirical study of the manner in which courts of appeals have applied Chevron in one specific area of administrative law: immigration law. Immigration law provides a unique case study because it implicates a number of legal and constitutional considerations related to national security, foreign relations, civil rights, international human rights, and criminal law. In contrast to other areas of administrative law, the jurisprudential underpinnings of the modern deference regime--expertise, political accountability, and delegation--apply with varying force within immigration law, depending on the particular nature of the statutory interpretation at issue, and with inconsistent results. Despite these variables, or perhaps because of them, the judiciary has developed inconsistent practices in its application of Chevron in immigration cases. This Article presents an empirical study of 473 instances of statutory interpretation where federal circuit courts considered the application of Chevron deference in immigration cases during an eleven-year period from 2003 to 2013. The study considers the factors and elements within immigration cases that produce distinct results in the courts' precedent. This study finds that three categories of variables shape the manner and frequency with which courts of appeals apply Chevron. First, the nature of *180 the immigration case may lead to strikingly different rates of application and agency success. Of the categories of immigration cases studied by this paper, courts apply Chevron at starkly lower rates when the legal issue concerns the government's authority to detain the noncitizen or the immigration consequences of criminal convictions ("crimmigration"). In contrast, courts apply Chevron at rates consistent with other areas of administrative law in cases where a noncitizen has affirmatively initiated the litigation or is in removal proceedings regardless of the relief sought. Second, the formality of the agency's underlying interpretation also affects the frequency with which courts apply Chevron. This variable, however, does not appear to influence the court differently in immigration cases than it does in administrative law cases, generally. Finally, geography matters when considering court's willingness or hesitation in applying Chevron in immigration cases. There exists significant disparities in circuits' application of Chevron in immigration cases. These findings illustrate invisible trends in the appellate courts' jurisprudence and informs ongoing debates about Chevron's role in immigration cases, as well as in administrative law.

This Article takes a fresh approach to Chevron deference. Chevron requires judges to defer to agency interpretations of statutes and justifies this on a theory of statutory authorization for agencies. This Article, however, points to a pair of constitutional questions about the role of judges – questions that have not yet been adequately asked, let alone answered. One question concerns independent judgment. Judges have a constitutional office or duty of independent judgment, under which they must exercise their own independent judgment about what the law is. Accordingly, when they defer to agency interpretations of the law, it must be asked whether they are violating their duty to exercise their own independent judgment. A second question concerns systematic bias. Under the Fifth Amendment right to the due process of law, judges cannot engage in systematic bias. Therefore, when they defer to agency interpretations of the law, it must be asked whether they are engaging in systematic bias in favor of the government and against Americans, thus denying them the due process of law. These constitutional questions require judges to reconsider Chevron. Rather than dwell on the usual statutory question about authorization, judges (including lower court judges) need to focus on the constitutional questions about their own role.

This Article takes a more functional approach to reconciling preemption doctrine with Chevron when Congress has not expressly delegated preemptive authority to an agency, an approach that considers a variety of concerns, including political accountability, institutional competence, and related concerns. The Article assumes that federalism values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority and autonomy, are important and can be protected through political processes." It argues that although Congress's "regional structure" might hint at great sensitivity to state concerns, it actually may lead Congress to undervalue some federalism benefits that are more national in nature. Meanwhile, executive agencies generally have significant incentives to take state concerns seriously. Agencies are politically accountable through the President and also may wish to maintain cooperative relationships with states.