Suchergebnisse

BackgroundIdentification of recent HIV infection is crucial for estimating HIV incidence and transmitted drug resistance (TDR) prevalence. Due to limited availability of diagnostic assays, WHO TDR surveys use age <25 yrs and/or CD4 >500 cells/mm3 at HIV diagnosis as epidemiological criteria to maximize inclusion of recently infected (within 3 yrs) and ARV‐naïve individuals. Accuracy of these criteria and variation by geographical region is unknown.MethodsA literature review of studies on HIV seroconverters (SC) published through March 2012 was performed. Age at SC and CD4 decline in absence of treatment were abstracted. Accuracy of alternative TDR survey criteria was explored.Results11 studies provided age at SC: 7 in Africa, 2 in Latin America, 2 in Asia. Median age at SC ranged between 24 and 33 years in studies in Kenya and Zambia, respectively and was 29 [interquantile range (IQR) 24, 34] in a large cohort study from Africa. Median age at SC was 29 years in studies on MSM in Brazil and China. 7 studies reported CD4 count decline: 5 in Africa, 1 in Latin America and 1 in Asia. Studies used ordinary least square regression or mixed models. None described median CD4 count 3 yrs after SC. The estimated mean CD4 count 3 yrs after SC ranged from 350–420 cells/mm3 in Africa and was 237 and 282 cells/mm3 in Asia and Latin America, respectively.ConclusionHIV SC occurs at all ages (median 29 yrs) in the assessed geographical regions. Enhancing feasibility of TDR survey implementation by including individuals >25 yrs decreases specificity, particularly in low HIV prevalence settings (Table).Use of age <25 yrs can maximized specificity to detect recent infection, but misses almost 75% of recent infections thus limiting feasibility of TDR survey implementation, particularly in low HIV prevalence settings. Lower mean CD4 count 3 yrs after SC was observed in Asia and Latin America compared to Africa. Regional differences may be explained by heterogeneity in eligibility criteria and statistical methods as well as contextual factors such as HIV subtypes or co‐morbidities. Confirmed CD4 >500 cells/mm3 would maximize specificity but greatly reduce the number of individuals included in TDR surveys. This review highlights the limitations of using age and CD4 count at HIV diagnosis as criteria to identify recent infections. These criteria should be revised when results of well‐designed studies to calibrate misclassification errors become available.









Transmitted Drug Resistance Survery Criteria
Evidence of Recent Infection
Feasibility in Low‐Prevalence Settings
Feasibility in High‐Prevalence Settings




Age < 22 years
STRONG
POOR
FAIR


Age < 25 years
INTERMEDIATE
FAIR
FAIR


Age < 30 years
WEAK
GOOD
GOOD


Confirmed* CD4 > 500 cells/mm3
STRONG
VERY POOR
VERY POOR


Confirmed* CD4 > 350 cells/mm3
INTERMEDIATE
POOR
POOR


CD4 > 500 cells/mm3
INTERMEDIATE
FAIR
FAIR


CD4 > 350 cells/mm3
WEAK
GOOD
GOOD





Confirmed = At least two consecutive CD4 counts

To what extent do Chinese nonprofit organisations, through advocacy activities, engage citizens in influencing public policies and contribute to the development of a participatory policy process in China? Based on data collected through a mail survey of 203 registered nonprofit organisations, this study examines the advocacy activities of Chinese nonprofits and their contributions to a responsive government. We find that the intensity of advocacy activities by Chinese nonprofits is relatively low and varies by organizational type, by degree of professionalisation, and by dependence on government funding. We find no association between advocacy intensity and the extent to which Chinese nonprofits engage citizens at the organisational level prior to their advocacy efforts. The ineffective marshalling and integration of citizens' interests within Chinese nonprofit organisations might be attributable to the corporatist structure of the institutional and resource environments in which Chinese nonprofit organisations operate.中国的非营利组织通过其倡导性活动,究竟在多大的程度上能发动引导公民参与和影响公共政策,进而又能在多大程度上推动中国参与式政策过程或反应式政府的发展?基于对203个注册了的非营利组织邮寄调查所获得的数据,本研究考察了中国非营利组织的倡导性活动及其对中国反应式政府的影响。研究发现表明,中国非营利组织倡导性活动的强度相对来说较弱,而其对反应式政府的影响也相当有限。这一有限性与中国非营利组织在从事倡导性活动之前,难以有效地引导公民参与组织内部的治理与运作有关。换句话说,中国的非营利组织在政治与社会体系中倡导公民的权益之前,未能有效地在组织内部先行整合与回应公民的权益和诉求。这种组织内部对公民权益与诉求整合和回应的低效可以进一步归结于中国非营利组织所处的法团主义结构的制度与资源宏观外部环境。

Many states around the world have increasingly turned to the law in addressing and formulating their national security policies. Whether it is the assassination of Osama bin Laden or American action in Libya, much discussion and debate have focused on the legality of such uses of force. Which side is right in such debates is less important than the legal character such discussions have assumed. This is a significant development, especially given the common assumption that because the law constrains, political leaders eschew the law in strategic contexts. So why are states increasingly turning to law in addressing and formulating their national security policies?From an interdisciplinary perspective, this project argues that the interplay of two main factors has promoted the legalization of national security: the concentration of executive authority and the strength of social movement organizations. First, the growing centralization of executive power, as witnessed through the burgeoning national security bureaucracies and administrative state, has prompted a turn to the law since it is seen as both a valuable instrument in policy promotion in a world of complex threats, as well as an important source of legitimacy. Second, social movement organizations have sought influence in national security through sophisticated litigation strategies that challenge the executive to justify policies through legal argumentation. Therefore, paradoxically, both the expansion of executive authority and pressures against it from below contribute to legalization. These factors represent what this study posits as the growing structural contradiction between the values of statism (sovereignty) and individualism (human rights) in the international system. This fundamental logic of contradiction operates as an important engine for legal and political change and can manifest in different ways, such as competition, conflict, confusion, and contravention. Both the executive and social movements turn to the law because the inherent indeterminacy of law provides both with resources for justification, and such law-based argumentation has reinforced itself and promoted legalization. This project examines variations in both factors through cases studies involving the U.S., China, Japan, and South Korea.The implications of the legalization of national security are significant. First, the approach taken in this study opens up the field to examine not only international law, which has predominated questions on the use of force, but also to seriously examine domestic legal developments. By encompassing domestic law, it offers a more holistic and empirically relevant perspective on a research program that has been overly normative in scope and tone. Second, the focus on domestic law challenges the traditional emphasis on compliance in international legal scholarship. Rather than normatively dismissing non-compliance as simply bad, it is necessary to model and empirically test how violations of certain international rules can promote greater legalization. Executives have used domestic legal arguments and interpretations to try and skirt international obligations, but such non-compliance can have the counter-intuitive result of actually promoting greater legalization and limiting executive use of force.

The situation of the 49 countries of sub-Saharan Africa has become even more varied in the past few years. The changes are highly relevant to aid (official development assistance / ODA) and other forms of development financing. The question is what contribution aid can make in the future in an environment undergoing such manifest change. The following structural changes are currently taking place: (1) By and large, sub-Saharan Africa's economic situation has developed positively in the past twenty years, not least because the various countries have pursued better policies. While the majority were characterised in the 1990s by enormous budget deficits, high rates of inflation, government intervention, capital flight and black markets, the countries of the region generally have more room for manoeuvre today, not least with regard to their own budgets. In the last decade a group of some 10 to 20 countries in the region managed to achieve significant growth rates; the international financial and economic crisis did little to alter this. At the same time, there are still a number of countries where economic dynamism is still unsatisfactory or where, despite growth, there has been less than adequate improvement in living conditions. (2) The quality of governance has improved in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Public financial management is, on average, better today than it was in the past. Nonetheless, clientelist and neo-patrimonial systems, which have considerable influence on the use of resources, continue to leave their mark in many countries. Reforms aimed at improving the political environment (political openness, etc.) have yet to be undertaken in many countries of the region. (3) International financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa have grown sixfold since 2000. This steep rise has been accompanied by major changes to financial structures, the proportion of private inflows having increased significantly. Aid continues to play an important role, although the scene is increasingly dominated by foreign direct investment and foreign workers' remittances. Such "new cooperation partners" as China, India and Arab countries are also triggering major changes; the importance of South-South relations for sub-Saharan Africa is growing. (4) For oil-exporting countries in particular and for the middle-income countries aid has already become far less important. In the low-income countries and the fragile states, on the other hand, it often continues to play a major role, although even poor countries have stepped up their efforts to become less dependent on it. In fragile countries it frequently plays the role of counteracting state disintegration. Given the dynamic developments in sub-Saharan Africa, it is very important to know precisely what effects internal and external resources have on development processes. A better understanding of relevant internal and external resources and policies will be vital for development research in the coming years.

This Ph.D. submission deals with contemporary demonstration culture and political activism, seen as performance through performance. It consists of both a practical and a theoretical part. These are intertwined on various levels of the project. My submission, however, is made up of the two following parts: 1: A textual part, divided into 8 parts. Each part contains a script, an analysis and a number of commentaries. In these, 8 moments in the recent history of activism in Scandinavia and beyond, are reflected. The 8 research performances at the core of this project are reflected here as well. 2: An exhibition based on visual and sonic footage from the 8 performances, here transformed into an installation that present an aesthetic introduction to the project as a whole. The exhibition will be an attempt at re-staging the visual and sonic material as a new sense-event. The claim of 'Aesthetics of Resistance' is that in recent examples of Direct Activism, politics are constituted by the aesthetic; as performance, form and style. This assumption is argued for by selecting 8 specific moments where this seems to be the case. These moments are chosen from 5 sequences of events, from a small incident in Gothenburg, Sweden in 2006 to the Egyptian uprising that gained global significance in 2011. The core part of the project is two sequences of confrontations between activists and authorities that both took place in Copenhagen, Denmark –The Youth House Movement 2007/08 and the large scale actions surrounding the UN Climate Summit COP15 in 2009 respectively. Central to the project is an idea of 'thinking with the senses'. In order to facilitate this, an experimental set-up was created, where a sensorial reflection could be compared with an analytical interpretation of the topic in question. This experimental set-up was constituted by the two figures: The artist/researcher and the sense-event. These two figures intertwine and in various ways stage the gap between discursive and nondiscursive thinking that lies at the core of this project. The use of performance is three-fold: A: The specific moments chosen are interpreted as performance. B: The 'thinking with the senses' takes place as performance C: As a kind of meta-reflection, the project is performing art-research by using an artistic medium as the research tool to investigate the chosen topics. The 8 research experiments were set up as performances. These 8 performances took place at various locations in Denmark, Sweden and China in the period 2009 to 2012. The aesthetic reflection at the core of this project evolved in these senseevents. Video documentation of the performances is included here in the Appendix, but it is important to understand that neither this video documentation nor the texts in this part of my submission can give a full account of the sense-events. These accounts will per definition only be approximations. It is in this gap – or drama – between two levels of understanding this project revolves.

Global politics were recently graced with a new, influential steering committee. Since the global financial crisis, the leaders of the 19 most important industrial and emerging countries, as well as the EU, have been striving to stabilize the world economy. Nevertheless, there are many questions about their endeavours: What authorises the G20 to take a leadership role? What influence do emerging countries have on overall concepts regarding development policy? Are the members of this new group of states primarily interested in advancing their national goals, or are they also acting for the global common good? Because the G20 represents only part of the world's population and a good 173 countries are not members, ways should be found to include the latter's concerns. On a positive note, it should be mentioned that the G20 is increasingly seeking to dialogue with developing countries. This occurs through invitations of regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union to G20 summits and individual members' advisory processes with neighbouring states. But the G20 is still just beginning to open itself to the concerns of civil society forces and non-governmental organisations. Thusfar, the results of the G20's development policy have been very mixed. On one hand, the equal participation of up-and-coming powers of the Global South such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa ensures that issues of global development are coming into focus. On the other hand, there is a danger that emerging countries will not be ready to make any adjustments to their development paths in the name of future viability. The decisions at the G20 summit in South Korea in November 2010 point in this direction. In principle, the G20's adoption of a development policy programme that focuses on the development friendly design of global economic parameters is to be welcomed. But the Seoul Development Consensus's one-sided emphasis on growth portends regression for the international development agenda because issues of environmental sustainability are not addressed. In preparation for the Rio+20 summit in 2012, it would be wise for the G20 to reorient itself and campaign for the climate- and environmentally-safe transformation of the world economy, instead of backing resource-intensive production and consumption patterns that already unduly strain global ecosystems. On the international level, another challenge for the G20 is the coordination of national economic policies in order to create global conditions for sustainable economic development. Because of differing interests, economic structures and economic situations among the individual G20 countries, a coordination of economic policies will be difficult to achieve, as shown by the experiences in the areas of global macreconomic imbalances and currency policy. However, the G20 should address the global economy's big challenges, in order to jointly solve at least some of its problems.

Panel 2: Representations ; Before the Asian economic crisis of 1997, the inferiority complex of the colonized Hong Kong male imagined a compensatory reverse colonial desire towards more impoverished regions in China and the West, which found relief through a blown-up sense of economic superiority and male chauvinism. This mainstream myth expressed in terms of capitalism and sexism boasted of out-doing the West and the Chinese colonizers in the capitalist game. These cultural politics were best exemplified by the kind of mainstream Hong Kong masculinity embodied by Stephen Chow and Mr. Smart. Since the return to Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong has experienced repeated financial crises and intensified neoliberalization of the market due to globalization. It is losing out against competition from Chinese cities and other emerging Asian economies on major fronts. Democratization of governance is constantly frustrated by Beijing and the local corporate class. Political and socio-economic reforms failed repeatedly in the hands of Hong Kong's default operational logic. Structural injustices remain unresolved and monopolization of wealth and power is increasing. Hong Kong's rich poor gap is widest among all OECD countries since 2010. Mainstream Hong Kong cultural myths and values have been shaken to the core, which is tellingly illustrated in the changing representations of mainstream Hong Kong masculinities in the media. Recently released popular Hong Kong films seem to converge in collective soul searching through shifts in the representations of mainstream masculinities and local identity politics. The gender and cultural sensitivity of the generation coming of age in this millennium are represented as different. Cocky boastfulness gives way to the recognition of internal inadequacies and injustices and the respect for hard-earned wisdom and mastery of traditional cultural strengths. Transcultural consumption (Sun Jung, Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption, 2011), the widened rich-poor gap, and the rise of the transnational corporate class also created new forms of hegemonic masculinities (Michael Kimmel, The Gender of Desire, 2005), resulting in plural strategies of redefining quotidian local masculinities in complicit or resistant forms (Sofia Aboim, Plural Masculinities: the remaking of the Self in Private Life, 2010). The rise of women's powers, the increasing clout of LGBTQ culture, and the loss of the material base for hegemonic masculinity in the lives of most men, also produced more relaxed and tolerant forms of hybrid, plural masculinities, however grudgingly. All these shifts in the libidinal-political economy of male desires and body politics and the resulting changing forms of masculinities are reflected in the overturning of film genres representative of the heyday of Hong Kong. Once a Gangster is an anti-gangster gangster film. La Comédie Humaine is an anti-heroic killer film. Gallants is a tribute to unsung kungfu masters past their prime and Break Up Club is about a very different kind of mainstream boyfriend. What can these shifts in representations of masculinities tell us about Hong Kong men's new sense of themselves in the world? ; published_or_final_version

In recent years, China needs far more financing for transportation infrastructure than can be provided by the government alone. Meanwhile the capacity of the Chinese government to provide public services on its own in an effective and efficient way is being questioned and reassessed at various levels. Accordingly, the involvement of private investors in the development of Metropolitan Transportation Systems (MTS) has been promoted by the Chinese public sector by means of adopting the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model. However, China's dynamic and complex political, financial, legal and regulatory environment makes the private sector adjust to accommodate the existing regime by way of understanding the driving factors in PPP applications for improving the chances of project success. This paper presents two case studies in China's MTS. Based on a case study and comprehensive literature review, 15 driving factors associated with PPP projects from the perspective of the Chinese public sector have been identified. A structured questionnaire survey targeting the public sector has been conducted to seek, analyze and integrate its perception of the driving factors. Through statistical analysis of the relative significance of each of these driving factors, the writers determined five common major dimensions of the Chinese public sector's purpose in developing PPP schemes, and the key factors that quantify each purpose. The establishment of the measures for these objectives and the key factors that quantify each of these purposes will likely be useful in encouraging private participation in infrastructure management and directing/concentrating efforts of the private sector to deliver quality public services under mutually beneficial long‐term contractual arrangements. Santrauka Pastaruoju metu Kinijai reikia daug daugiau finansavimo transporto infrastruktūrai pletoti, nei gali suteikti vien šalies vyriausybe. Jos galimybes veiksmingai ir efektyviai teikti viešasias paslaugas tiriamos bei vertinamos ivairiais lygiais. Skatinamas privačiu investuotoju itraukimas i metropolijos transporto sistemu (MTS) pletra, taikant viešojo ir privataus bendradarbiavimo modeli. Tačiau Kinijos dinamiška ir kompleksine politine, finansine bei teisine aplinka priverčia privatu sektoriu derintis prie egzistuojančios tvarkos, atsižvelgiant i pagrindinius viešojo ir privataus bendradarbiavimo veiksnius, kurie padidintu projekto sekmes tikimybe. Straipsnyje pateikiami du Kinijos metropolijos transporto sistemu pletros pavyzdžiai. Remiantis nagrinejamais pavyzdžiais ir išsamia literatūros analize, iš Kinijos viešojo sektoriaus poziciju identifikuota 15 pagrindiniu veiksniu, susijusiu su viešojo ir privataus bendradarbiavimo projektais. Buvo atlikta apklausa, orientuota i viešaji sektoriu, išanalizuota, kaip pagrindiniai veiksniai suvokiami ir pritaikomi. Atliekant kiekvieno iš šiu veiksniu santykiniu reikšmingumu statistine analize, buvo apibrežti penki pagrindiniai Kinijos viešojo sektoriaus tikslu aspektai, pletojant viešojo ir privataus bendradarbiavimo schemas, ir pagrindiniai rodikliai, ivertinantys šiuos tikslus skaitine išraiška. Minetu tikslu nustatymas ir pagrindiniu skaitiniu rodikliu ivertinimas galetu būti naudingi, skatinant privatu sektoriu prisideti prie infrastruktūros valdymo, galetu padeti koncentruoti bei nukreipti privataus sektoriaus jegas kokybiškoms viešojo sektoriaus paslaugoms teikti, remiantis abipusiškai naudingomis ilgalaikemis sutartimis. First Published Online: 15 Oct 2010 Reikšminiai žodžiai: viešasis ir privatusis bendradarbiavimas,metropolijos transporto sistemos,sprendimo rodikliai,rodikliu analize,viešasis sektorius,infrastruktūros pletra

This dissertation presents five empirical papers dealing with innovation activities in climate change mitigation technologies and their international diffusion. We first construct a data set including all patents filed worldwide since 1978 in 13 technologies with high climate change mitigation potential. We use this data to provide a descriptive analysis of innovative activity in these technologies and of their international diffusion. The data suggest that the Kyoto Protocol has induced more innovation in low carbon technologies. Both innovation and technology transfer are concentrated in developed countries, although exports to emerging economies are growing rapidly. We then use the same data to analyze the determinants of the cross-border diffusion of climate-friendly technology. We focus on the influence of various policy variables, including tariff rates, intellectual property rights and barriers to foreign direct investment. In the third paper, we focus on four renewable energy technologies and examine the influence of domestic and foreign regulation on innovation activity. We find strong evidence that inventors respond to foreign environmental regulation by increasing their innovation effort. In the second part, we build a data set of 644 projects registered under the Kyoto protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). We use this data to provide an assessment of the technology transfers that take place through the CDM and to analyze the drivers of technology transfer by CDM projects. In the last paper, we focus on four countries gathering about 75% of the CDM projects (Brazil, China, India and Mexico) and explain inter-country differences in transferring technology. ; Cette thèse présente cinq analyses empiriques sur l'innovation et la diffusion internationale des technologies permettant de lutter contre le réchauffement climatique. Nous utilisons une base de données de tous les brevets déposés depuis 1978 dans 13 technologies à fort potentiel de réductions d'émissions pour décrire l'innovation dans ces technologies et leur diffusion internationale. Le protocole de Kyoto semble avoir accéléré l'innovation verte. L'innovation et les transferts de technologies sont concentrés dans les pays développés, mais les exportations vers les pays émergents augmentent rapidement. Nous utilisons ensuite ces données pour analyser les déterminants du transfert de technologie entre pays. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement aux effets des variables politiques, telles que les droits de douane, les droits de propriété intellectuelle et les barrières aux investissements étrangers. Dans le troisième article, nous examinons l'influence des politiques pro-environnementales sur l'innovation domestique et étrangère. Nous montrons que les innovateurs réagissent aux réglementations à l'étranger. Dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, nous construisons une base de données de 644 projets MDP (Mécanisme de Développement Propre). Nous analysons les transferts de technologies vers les pays du Sud via les projets MDP. Nous utilisons les données pour identifier les déterminants des transferts. Dans le dernier papier, nous analysons les différences dans la capacité des principaux pays du Sud (Brésil, Chine, Inde, Mexique) à attirer les technologies de l'étranger.

"In my entire life I did not produce a single painting that was uppermost in mind to create," the celebrated painter Dong Xiwen (1914–1973) reportedly lamented on his deathbed. Dong may not have produced the dream piece that he would truly cherish, but he did create, albeit unwillingly, a deeply controversial work of art in his 1953 oil painting The Founding Ceremony of the Nation (Kaiguo dadian) (Figures 1 and 2), for it epitomizes the tension between art and politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In this famous piece, Dong portrays Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949, with his senior associates in attendance—Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), Zhu De (1886–1976), Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), Gao Gang (1905–1954), Lin Boqu (1886–1960), and others. They are surrounded by huge lanterns, a Chinese symbol of prosperity, and a sea of red banners that declare the founding of a new nation. When first unveiled in 1953, the painting was widely hailed as one of the greatest oil paintings ever produced by a native artist. In just three months more than half-a-million reproductions of the painting were sold. But the fate of this work soon took an ominous turn, and the artist was requested to make three major revisions during his lifetime. In 1954 Dong was instructed to excise Gao Gang from the scene when Gao was purged by the Party for allegedly plotting to seize power and create an "independent kingdom" in Manchuria. During the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s Liu Shaoqi was accused of advocating a "bourgeois reactionary line" and subsequently was purged, and Dong was ordered in 1967 to redo his painting again and erased Liu from the inauguration scene. Then, in 1972, also during the Cultural Revolution, the radicals, commonly labeled the "Gang of Four," ordered a third revision, namely, that Lin Boqu be eliminated from the painting for allegedly opposing the marriage of Mao and Jiang Qing (1914–1991) during the Yan'an days. By this time Dong was dying of cancer and was too ill to pick up the brush, so his student Jin Shangyi (b. 1934), and another artist, Zhao Yu (1926–1980), were assigned the task. These two artists, afraid of doing further damage to the original piece, eventually produced a replica of the painting, with the ailing Dong brought from the hospital for consultation on his embattled work. Though Dong died the following year, the ill-fated story of The Founding Ceremony of the Nation did not end: in 1979, with the demise of the Gang of Four and the Party's official rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, the images of Liu, Gao Gang, and Lin Boqu were restored in the painting. Because Jin Shangyi was on a foreign tour, Yan Zhenduo (b. 1940), a graduate of the Department of Oil Painting at the Central Academy of Fine Arts (CAFA), was called upon to help reinstall the three leaders.

PurposeThe purpose of this research is to describe how total cost concept with logistical based costing (LBC) is developed in detail and then used to build logistical models on the Microsoft Excel™ platform that are integrated from the customer's factory to the supplier's door.Design/methodology/approachThe models developed in this project are deterministic, event‐based algorithms to compare logistical conduits for bulk and containerized commodities. The demand chain approach is used to derive the pathways in reverse order from the customer to the supplier. The methodology is necessary to find all possible conduits from origin to destination, including points where product may cross over between various logistics systems. The approach is applied to the bulk and container system with disconnects (elevators, ports) serving as the demarcation points. The pathways from supplier to end‐user must be identified prior to application of classification and costing techniques. A goal of this research was to compare the per unit cost of two different logistical systems – bulk versus container – in two case studies. The first case study was for a miller in Northern China and the second was for a mill in Helsinki, Finland.FindingsThe spreadsheet models produced results that were within 3 percent of real world costs. Each demand chain was shown to be unique and required customized cost functions to properly configure algorithms.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper suggests that, while a core algorithm may exist for all supply/demand chains, no one particular algorithm configuration suffices. Each supply/demand chain is unique, in terms of both costs and performance. The use of modular cost functions provides the customization necessary to address this issue.Practical implicationsThis project verifies that successful implementation of a model is dependent on following a set of procedures that begins with a clear statement of what the model is to measure, along with what is to be included and what are the constraints imposed on the algorithm. Mapping the flow of the goods through logistical systems provides visibility as to where costs are incurred and how they are to be assigned to the supplier or customer. An improperly assigned variable in the early stages of a supply/demand chain reduces accuracy of subsequent calculations. LBC increases the precision of models by properly establishing the configuration of cost drivers for each stage of the supply/demand chain by avoiding the use of the cost averaging used in statistical analysis.Originality/valueThis paper provides a standardized approach for mapping, costing and building global supply/demand chain models. The ultimate customer, once thought of as the "end of the line", now dictates the cost and performance requirements of logistical conduits. While this paper encapsulates methods for building total cost models from the customer's perspective, other configurations can be readily constructed to examine physical and performance characteristics.

The conjunction of oil and Russia's economic recovery in 1999-2004 links many themes. On September 16, 1998, the Central Bank of Russia mandated repatriation of 50 percent of foreign exchange revenues. On December 31, 1998, it raised the mandated repatriation rate to 75 percent. This rule affected primarily fuels and metals exports. In the next several years, world oil prices started to climb. The Central Bank of Russia subsequently reduced the mandated repatriation rate from 50 to 30 to 25 percent of foreign exchange revenues. Rising oil prices both incited this reduction and compensated for it. Russia's economy shifted from the great contraction in 1992-98 to a partial recovery in 1999-2004. Tables 1 and 2 provide the background data. This chapter explains these developments1. It views Russia's economy as a new economic system which evolved from central planning after liberalization and privatization in 1992 and adapted to the policy shift in September-December 1998. We explore how, under this system, mandated repatriation of export revenues inadvertently became a quasi-fiscal policy, i.e. how it increased tax remittance and reduced subsidy extraction, which, in turn, shifted the economy from contraction to recovery. Oil and other tradeables, primarily natural resources, are important. Without their massive export, the issue of mandated repatriation of foreign exchange revenues would have been irrelevant. Oil on its own, however, was not the crucial factor. Many observers, including the IMF, attribute Russia's recovery to rising world oil prices. Figure 1 documents the heterogeneous economic performance of the six major petroleum-exporting countries around the world in 1992-2004. In Russia and across countries, it is uncorrelated with oil price fluctuations. Figure 2 illustrates how economic recovery synchronized in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet states, both net oil exporters (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) and importers (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova). The oil factor was neither necessary (viz., Ukraine) nor sufficient (viz., Venezuela) for economic recovery and growth in the early 2000s. The oil connection abstracted from the economic system and policy shifts is specious. Russia's economic recovery raises a more fundamental, and incendiary, issue than oil. Figure 3 illustrates it. In Russia and similar post-central plan economies, liberalization and privatization coincided with the great economic contraction in 1992-98. Partial deliberalization and de-privatization in Russia, starting with mandated repatriation of export revenues, coincided with economic recovery in 1999-2004. The principal idea of this chapter is that the impact of economic freedom is ambivalent. It depends on the economic system. The freedom to create new wealth it is eminently productive. However, the freedom for firms and some individuals to redistribute to themselves income from the government, other firms, and other households, suppresses productive incentives and economic growth. Government restriction of such freedom, e.g., in China or in Russia after 1998, fosters economic performance.

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 (http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change.Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the "high fertility" and "constant fertility" models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: "low fertility,""medium fertility," and "zero growth." Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables.Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.

This study estimates the impacts of different types of government expenditure on agricultural growth and rural poverty in Thailand. The results show that, despite Thailand's middle-income status, public investments in agricultural R&D, irrigation, rural education, and infrastructure (including roads and electricity), still have positive marginal impacts on agricultural productivity growth and rural poverty reduction. Additional government spending on agricultural research and development improves agricultural productivity the most and has the second largest impact on rural poverty reduction. Investments in rural electrification reduce poverty the most and have the second largest growth impact. These two investments dominate all others and are win-win for growth and poverty reduction. Road expenditure has the third largest impact on rural poverty reduction, but only a modest and statistically insignificant impact on agricultural productivity. Government spending on rural education has only the fourth largest impact on poverty, but a significant economic impact through improved agricultural productivity. Irrigation investment has the smallest impact on both rural poverty reduction and productivity growth in agriculture. Additional investments in the Northeast region contribute more to reducing poverty than investments in other regions. This is because most of the poor are now concentrated in the Northeast and it has suffered from under investment in the past. The poverty reducing impacts of infrastructure investments, such as electricity and roads, are particularly high in this region. The growth impacts of many investments are also greatest in the Northeast than in other regions, hence there is no evident tradeoff between investments for growth and investments for poverty reduction. Thailand is a middle-income country and it is insightful to compare these results with similar studies undertaken in low-income countries like India, China, and Uganda. Some of the results are similar, for example, the high returns to public investments in agricultural research and some kinds of rural infrastructure arise in most countries because of the inherent market failures associated with these types of public goods. But others results are different. For example, the returns to public investment in education in Thailand are quite low, partly because of increasing private investment but also the inappropriate composition of much public spending on education. Within infrastructure, results from low-income countries often show higher returns to road investments than telecommunications and electricity. But in the case of Thailand, it is investment in electricity that shows the highest return. Thailand has invested heavily in rural roads and a dense road network has already been built, suggesting that additional investment may yield diminishing returns. Also, there has been significant investment by the private sector in rural telecommunication, leading to a much-reduced role for the public sector. This situation differs from many low-income countries, especially in Africa, where the private sector is still embryonic and the public sector must play a dominant investment role for the foreseeable future. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP3; Theme 9; Public Policy and Investment ; DSGD

Factionalism is a dimension of informal politics that is hardly unique to China, but it has become well entrenched there for several reasons. We know from available survey data that Chinese political culture is relatively low in trust, and the faction provides a particularly useful refuge from the tiger world of politics, organized as it is around that culturally sanctioned dimension of trust known as guanxi (connections) (Shi 2001 and 1997; Pye 1981). From an individual perspective, although this has been changing more swiftly in society at large via marketization, the institutional landscape of elite politics is still dominated by the looming presence of a single monolithic party-state, to which all auxiliary organizations are subordinated in a corporatist hierarchy; any smaller and more personally useful organizations must be formed sub rosa on a self-help basis. From a structural-functional perspective, the faction serves several functions neglected by party-state corporatism: it services individual careers, in both a defensive and an offensive capacity (i.e., to protect against damaging criticism or purge, and to mobilize support for upward mobility); it provides a way of mobilizing minimal coalitions in policy conflicts; and it may even provide a microcosmic unit beyond the family for social identity and solidarity. Factions have always been rampant in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics, but precisely because of the universally acknowledged propensity for factionalism, they are formally proscribed by the Leninist rules of innerparty life and hence exist only semiclandestinely, looming more clearly when the central leadership weakens or is in dispute (as, for example, during a succession crisis). Factions are assembled on the basis of a combination of one's formal and informal "bases" (zhengzhi jichu), the formal consisting of trusted colleagues and subordinates in one's current work unit, the informal consisting of ties made during one's previous socialization or career and carefully cultivated thereafter. Factional activities may most easily be understood according to realist or realpolitik methodological assumptions, but as we shall see, they need not operate in an ideological vacuum. Inasmuch as factions exist tacitly and become politically operational opportunistically, the precise affiliation of a given political actor may change over time depending on the issue at stake and other circumstances; hence faction membership can never be tabulated with certainty, even by faction leaders. A given political actor may have at his or her disposal a range of connections that varies in chronological depth (i.e., spanning x generations) and institutional breadth (i.e., spanning x organizational hierarchies). At a given time and place, the actor may need these categories to define him- or herself factionally. On such occasions, a strong factional network (i.e., one that has been assiduously cultivated over time) is useful and perhaps even indispensable to the actor's survival and highly useful for the pursuit of future political ambitions.