Gegenüber der Vorauflage von 2001 aktualisierte und um insgesamt 20 Seiten umfangreichere Neuauflage. Die Erweiterungen kommen hauptsächlich durch die Verwendung weiterer Beispiele, einiger Fotos und von ein paar Zeichnungen zustande, das Literaturverzeichnis ist ebenfalls auf den neuesten Stand gebracht. Der Autorin geht es darum, die interkulturelle Verständigung zwischen Chinesen und Menschen aus dem Westen zu fördern. "Das Buch befasst sich anhand vieler Beispiele mit den kulturspezifischen Kommuniaktionsregeln als Voraussetzung zu erfolgreichem Kommunizieren. Fundiert und umfassend, gründlich in der Anlage, ausführlich in Details, dabei flüssig geschrieben und stellenweise recht erheiternd zu lesen, dient es zwar in 1. Linie Politikern, Geschäftsleuten, Lehrpersonen, Gaststudenten, Touristen. Doch auch der allgemein kulturgeschichtlich interessierte Leser wird viel über die kulturellen Ausprägungen und kommunikativen Verhaltensnormen lernen" (so J. Tacke in BA 5/02). Wer bereits die Auflage von 2001 angeschafft hat, braucht diese nicht zu ersetzen, ansonsten aber zur Neuanschaffung empfohlen. (2)
Terms can be transferred to various national contexts thereby acquiring specific political, ideological, social, and cultural factors and so obtain new connotations and significance. This article deals with the perception of the term "public intellectuals" in China. By means of some recent contributions about the discussion of "public intellectuals" in China the author analyzes the various stations of the concept and its perception in a political and academic context in the People's Republic of China.
'There is a growing obsession with university rankings around the world' - so begins Ellen Hazel grain (2011: 4), one of the most influential education scholars of our day, her groundbreaking study on university rankings. Although rankings have existed for about 100 years, but only since the 1980s, they receive increasing attention. National rankings for measuring quality of universities are now available in more than 30 countries (spring wedge 2013: 34), since the early 2000s, international rankings are developed. In 2003, the Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the 'Academic Ranking of World Universities' (ARWU) ago with the aim to determine the location of Chinese Universities; Since then, numerous other rankings emerged (see Hazel grain 2011:. 32-38). Adapted from the source document.
Volksrepublik (VR). Profiles major interest groups, regrouping them into four categories: the political elite, intellectuals, working class and agricultural labor, and private sector entrepreneurs; China.
Rez.: Since the 1980s Chinese foreign policy and international relations have been changed remarkably. Many different actors influence China's foreign relations. What is more, parallel to the economic success story, Chinaś relevance in international relations increased considerably. It seems obvious that in various global challenges like climate change, financial crises or international conflicts, cooperation with China is needed in order to achieve results. The paper takes up several actual issues of international concern and presents China's international involvement and relevance with the view to contribute to an assessment of China's international behaviour. -- Chinese foreign policy ; foreign relations ; international norms ; intellectual property rights ; UNO, peacekeeping ; negotiations on climate change ; financial crisis ; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) ; Xinjiang
7 chief points touching on the ideological contradictions between Moscow & Peking deserve attention, though some are less important than others. The USSR achieved its revolution by depending on the workers, the Chinese by depending on the peasants. Moscow spoke of a dictatorship, Peking of a hegemony of the proletariat (but some agreement has lessened the contrast). So far as the intellectuals are concerned, Chinese `toleration' exists in words only. By contrast, the Chinese allowed articles to be published since the Hungarian crisis which reproached the USSR for its `chauvinism'; articles whose effectiveness was destroyed by the overt accepting by Peking of Moscow's 'intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary & Poland.' Minor diff's also exist concerning the right to strike. So far as the dialectic is concerned, if China & the USSR are in accord in their distinguishing `antagonistic from non-antagonistic contradictions', it would seem that China maintains, as opposed to the USSR, on one side the persistence of antagonistic contradictions, & on the other side the persistence of contradictions between the governed & the governors in a socialsit nation. Tr. By J. A. Broussard.
Die Konzeption des von der deutschen IB mehrheitlich als Axiom akzeptierten governance turn ist an ihren fehlerhaften Grundannahmen gescheitert. Warum? Weil sich bei der Neuverhandlung der politischen Grundlagen der Weltordnung vorschnell als uberholt geglaubte Machtfragen, Fragen zur Rolle von Machtungleichgewichten sowie zu normativen Aspekten bei der Steuerung der Ordnung unabhangig vom Governance-Paradigma ihren Weg gebahnt haben. Damit geht eine Ara zu Ende, die den deutschen IB-Diskurs gegenwartig noch bestimmt, aber als regressives Theorem im Sinne von Lakatos fortschrittshinderlich geworden ist. Eine konzeptionelle Kritik des Governance-Axioms belegt dies. Nach der Rekapitulierung der Kernthesen durch die reprasentativen Arbeiten Risses und Zurns wurden drei unproblematisierte Grundannahmen offengelegt: die Gemeinwohlorientierung, die Rolle von Grossmachten im policy cycle sowie Fuhrung in Global Governance-Theorien. Chinesische Sichtweisen wurden inkorporiert. Im dritten Teil wurden zwei deutsche Theorietraditionen identifiziert, die die Reformfahigkeit der Disziplin retardieren (Regime-Theorie, Habermas' Kommunikationstheorie). Abschliessend wurde der Forschungsbereich 'Globale Ordnung' angerissen. Ihm muss sich das Fach stellen, will es sich nicht mit seinen vor 20 Jahren entworfenen, heute aber konzeptionell begrenzenden Theorieparametern zufriedengeben The so-called governance turn has been widely accepted by German IR. The concept's underlying assumptions, however, have turned out to be misleading. Why? Because questions both in regard to balance-of-power and normative aspects of managing the global order have prematurely been disregarded during the ongoing re-negotiations of the foundations of the order. Ironically, all of this has occurred despite the widely believed predominance of the governance paradigm, which is why the era of the governance turn may now come to an end. In fact, it might already have turned into a Lakatosian obstacle to progress in research. A conceptual analysis of the governance turn powerfully confirms this. Following a brief discussion of the key contributions of distinguished scholars (e.g. Risse, Zurn), three assumptions underlying (and connecting) their research agendas on governance have been identified that need to be problematized: its social purpose, the role of great powers in it and leadership in global governance. In line with the diffusion of global power, Chinese perspectives were integrated in the analysis. The third section addressed two influential German research traditions that might further hinder any developments towards reforming existing schools of thinking in IR (e.g. regime theory, Habermasian theory of communication). The conclusion briefly hints at the notion of 'global order', which might require much more attention in the years to come. Otherwise, German IR will remain trapped in a constraining set of assumptions introduced some 20 years ago. Adapted from the source document.
