Suchergebnisse

After China bid for Olympic Games of 2008 successfully, State Council has promulgated "the Olympics sign protects regulation", Beijing has also promulgated and implemented for the protection of Olympic intellectual property rights of local regulations "Beijing Olympic intellectual property protection," indicating the determination of the government to protect Olympics intellectual property rights. But to implement the Olympic intellectual property protection, the Chinese government is still facing a difficult task. The government should not only make full use of administrative and judicial means to protect Olympic intellectual property right, moreover must carry on the legal system propaganda, the legal education to the entire society, and establish the legal protection of Olympic intellectual property awareness. However the most fundamental approach is to construct a legal shield to strengthen Olympic intellectual property protection.

China's growth strategy as set out in the 11th 5-year plan in 2005 called for upgrading of product quality, the development of an innovation society, and reduced reliance on foreign intellectual property with high license fees. Consistent with this policy, China has been involved in recent years with the development of a Chinese standard in third generation (3G) mobile phone technology, both in negotiating the standard and seeing it through to commercialization. This is the first case of a developing country both originating and successfully negotiating a telecommunications standard and this experience raises issues for China's future development strategy based on product and process upgrading in manufacturing. We argue that while precedent setting from an international negotiating point of view, the experience has thus far is unproven commercially. But the lessons learned will benefit future related efforts in follow-on technologies if similar Chinese efforts are made. This paper documents Chinese standard-setting efforts from proposal submission to ITU to the current large-scale trial network deployment in China and overseas trial networks deployment. We discuss the underlying objectives for this initiative, evaluate its effectiveness, and assess its broader implications for Chinese development policy.;

The informed perspective presented here may rouse a sensitivity to the differences in reading Marxist philosophy from the perspective of the Inseparability of One and Many worldview and philosophy (a doctrine of internal, constitutive, relations––"intimacy") on the part of Chinese intellectuals, particularly Mao Zedong, a great campaigner for philosophic and discursive Sinicization of Marxism. Marxism has provided an opportunity for a philosophical conversation with Chinese tradition, and this conversation was not launched by a government or official campaign, but instead by the efforts made on the part of countless grassroots intellectuals. It is argued that the reason for this was perhaps due to the fact that certain of Marx's cosmological assumptions, in contrast to those of the main Western categories, are more capable of being understood and Sinicized in terms of particular philosophical currents in the Chinese tradition. This was particularly so for the two decades of the 1950s and 1960s, and until the end of the 1970s when Deng Xiaoping came to power and openly declared the start of his "Economic Reform" with the slogan "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." ; Perspektiva informiranosti, ki je predstavljena v tem članku, lahko pripomore k večji dojemljivosti za različne možnosti branja marksistične filozofije z vidika svetovnega nazora neločljivosti enosti in mnogoterosti ter filozofije (oziroma doktrine) interne, konstitutivne relacije – »intimnosti«, ki so jo razvijali kitajski izobraženci pod vodstvom Mao Zedonga, ki si je zelo prizadeval za filozofsko in diskurzivno sinizacijo marksizma. Marksizem je nudil možnost za filozofski dialog s kitajsko tradicijo, ki pa ni bil vedno vladna ali uradna kampanja, temveč je temeljil na prizadevanjih številnih nevladnih intelektualcev kot posameznikov. Članek izhaja iz predpostavke, da razlog za to tiči v dejstvu, da so bili določeni marksistični kozmološki elementi Kitajcem bolj razumljivi in zato primernejši za sinizacijo v smislu razvijanja posamičnih filozofskih tokov kitajske tradicije kot preostale prevladujoče zahodne kategorije. To je še posebej veljalo za obdobje 50. in 60. let 20. stoletja in je trajalo vse do konca 70. let, ko je prišel na oblast Deng Xiaoping, ki je javno objavil pričetek kapitalistične »ekonomske reforme« pod imenom Socializem s kitajskimi posebnostmi.

External PhDs are those who are not employed by the university and may be self-funded or funded through scholarships – usually by foreign governments, funding agencies, or employers. In the Netherlands, empirical knowledge about the employment status, academic experiences, career path development and career choices of external doctoral candidates are hardly researched even though they make up almost 50% of the doctoral population, with Chinese being the largest group of external foreign PhDs from outside of Europe. Given their substantial contribution to the Dutch knowledge economy, understanding their doctoral experiences will be useful for the recruitment of, and full utilization of intellectual overseas Chinese. This qualitative study focuses on the doctoral experiences of external Chinese doctoral candidates funded by the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) in various disciplines through 10 narrative interviews. Results show that nine participants experienced positive doctoral supervision and increased intellectual confidence over time. However, the external PhD status inevitably excludes CSC-funded doctoral candidates from developing the institutional and networking strands in the Dutch habitus. The only link between the PhD candidates and the universities is their doctoral supervisors. The lack of institutional engagement is detrimental to the individual's formation of academic identity and led to an isolated doctoral education experience.

Intellectual property owners often face difficulties when trying to enforce their rights in cross-border and multi-jurisdictional disputes. Enforcement processes usually need to be litigated jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, which can be prohibitively complicated and expensive. Chinese investors can find themselves facing unpredictable outcomes if they try to enforce their intellectual property rights abroad, and outcomes may vary dramatically although similar facts are presented in each dispute in different jurisdictions. Similarly, foreign intellectual property holders may face quite diverse litigation environments and outcomes if they wish to enforce their rights in different jurisdictions, e.g. in the European Union (EU), the United States of America (US) and the People's Republic of China (China). This article examines international steps being taken towards addressing these issues, and it discusses ongoing concerns. Categorizing developments as "cooperative" or "harmonizing", the article first examines cross-border cooperation in intellectual property enforcement and dispute resolution that is found in international treaties. Some agreements are specific to intellectual property law, while others have broader applicability but nonetheless affect the adjudication of intellectual property disputes by domestic courts. Initiatives with respect to the intersection of public international law and intellectual property may resolve many cross-border enforcement difficulties, and the article also considers the use of arbitration to side-step existing problems. The second half of the article examines harmonization. Horizontal and vertical harmonization are being used to streamline laws and administrative processes concerning the acquisition of intellectual property worldwide. This lays foundations from which harmonized enforcement mechanisms may evolve. The article concludes that, in due course, it would not be surprising to see groups of nations develop unitary patents, trademarks and/or designs, and international intellectual property courts through which to enforce them. It would also be unsurprising if – as its own intellectual property system matures, and it becomes increasingly dominant in world trade – China were gradually to take a more leading role in shaping the future of cross-border cooperation and harmonization in intellectual property enforcement and dispute resolution.

Frustrated with the "white imperialism" of the League of Nations and the "red imperialism" of the Third Communist International, a number of Chinese intellectuals began discussing possibilities for a third option during the interwar years. Turning away from liberalism and Marxism, they examined Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and began working to promote his Principle of Nationalism as a concept that focused on the ruoxiao (weak and small nations) and could liberate people around the world that were suffering under imperialism. This discourse often centered on the possibility of creating a new form of "International," the International of Nations, which would unite the oppressed nations of the world in opposition to the imperialist nations, rather than divide nations along class lines, as Chinese critics perceived the Comintern to do. This article examines Chinese intellectual discussions of a China-centered "International" by a variety of writers, including Dai Jitao and Hu Hanmin, from 1925 to 1937. The author shows that, although this discourse on a China-centered "International of Nations" influenced intellectuals' perceptions of China's position and responsibility in the world, it was consumed and invalidated by Japanese imperialism, as the Japanese Empire employed a similar discourse of pan-Asianism to justify militarism in the 1930s and 1940s. Keywords: Asianism, International of Nations, New Asia, intellectual history

This article examines how recent books by academics and public intellectuals are reshaping the discourse of the rise of China. While earlier trends argued that China was being socialized into the norms of international society, many texts now proclaim that due to its unique civilization, China will follow its own path to modernity. Such books thus look to the past - China's imperial history - for clues to not only China's future, but also the world's future. This discourse, which could be called "Sino-speak," presents an essentialized Chinese civilization that is culturally determined to rule Asia, if not the world. The article notes that nuanced readings of China's historical relations with its East Asian neighbors provide a critical entry into a more sophisticated analysis of popular declarations of "Chinese exceptionalism." But it concludes that this critical analysis is largely overwhelmed by the wave of Sino-speak. © Copyright The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 2012.

Australia and China share a strong and rapidly growing trade and economic relationship. They share strong trade complementarities and have a well established trade framework. Expanding and building upon this relationship ensures long-term economic sustainability and regional security and is a priority of both nations. China is one of the world's largest and fastest growing economies providing unprecedented commercial opportunities for Australian organisations. A preferential trading agreement in the form of FT A with China, gives Australia the chance to secure a competitive edge over the rest of the world via increased access to the massive potential of the growing Chinese economy. Deeper integration of both economies resulting in the export of more sophisticated technologies is however, not without its associated risks. Companies that invest in China run the risk of exposing their valuable I P assets to unauthorised use and duplication via piracy and counterfeiting. This has serious implications for the viability of Australian businesses investing in China and impacts upon the long-term sustainability of the Chinese economy. Improving the protection afforded to IPR has been one of the main challenges faced by the Chinese government. Ascension to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and consequently the agreement on Trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) has resulted in the formation of a world-class legal framework. China has a multifaceted approach to enforcement of IPR utilising the overlapping and complementary methods of the courts, customs officials, and administrative authorities who each have the power to invoke varying levels of administrative, judicial penalties for IPR violations. Despite this counterfeiting and piracy remain very real problems. The examples of patent of copyright law demonstrate several overlapping issues affect the practical application of IPR enforcement in China. Relatively low penalties for IP violations, the inconsistent award of damages, unauthorised duplication, local protectionism and corruption , high thresholds for criminal prosecution and lack of training and coordination continue to affect the operation of China's IPR system influencing Australian businesses to approach China with caution . Increasing the effectiveness of the operation of the Chinese IPR enforcement framework is achievable and should be a priority of both Australia and China in FTA negotiations. Australia, with its long history of IP protection and enforcement, is well positioned to assist China in developing appropriate responses to the problem of effective IPR enforcement. China should be encouraged to make the administrative and judicial authorities more effective. Simple measures such as publishing judicial reasons and clarifying legal thresholds in addition to increasing penalties for IPR infringement and delegating all responsibility for the management of IPR and supervision of local and provincial bodies to the State authorities will assist in combating local protectionism and further deter counterfeiters resulting in more effective IPR enforcement Additionally Australia and China should jointly encourage increased collaboration between business, industry and Government to ensure that appropriate resources and funding are allocated to enforcing IPR and education programs and awareness campaigns are pursed . Working together to voluntarily exchange information and provide additional training on enforcement issues will enable both nations to better understand the unique problems that confront I PR enforcement in China and enable them develop appropriate responses that are more likely to provide long-term satisfaction. The combination of Australia's comprehensive IP law and associated experience makes it a suitable choice to assist China in further improving the development, administration and enforcement of IPR creating a win-win situation for the future long term economic growth of both Australia and China.

Prof. Potter examines the implications of the Charter 08 manifesto issued by leading Chinese intellectuals. The Communist Party is faced with a challenge that, in time, offers it a way around the governance roadblocks that threaten China's further development. Politics, Memory, and Dissent: May Fourth, June Fourth & Beyond ; Law, Faculty of ; Asian Research, Institute of ; Unreviewed ; Faculty

Interviews Professor Wang, a political philosopher at Beijing University about the political reforms in China. Explanation on a democratic political system with Chinese characteristics; Confucian tradition of respect for a ruling intellectual elite; Relevance of Confucian scholar Huang Zongxi's proposal for reform. ; published_or_final_version

Conflict between religion and state politics is a persistent phenomenon in human history. Hence it is not surprising that the propagation of Christianity often faces the challenge of &ldquo ; political theology&rdquo ; . When the Church of the East monk Aluoben reached China in 635 during the reign of Emperor Tang Taizong, he received the favorable invitation of the emperor to translate Christian sacred texts for the collections of Tang Imperial Library. This marks the beginning of Jingjiao (景教) mission in China. In historiographical sense, China has always been a political domineering society where the role of religion is subservient and secondary. A school of scholarship in Jingjiao studies holds that the fall of Jingjiao in China is the obvious result of its over-involvement in local politics. The flaw of such an assumption is the overlooking of the fact that in the Tang context, it is impossible for any religious establishments to avoid getting in touch with the Tang government. In the light of this notion, this article attempts to approach this issue from the perspective of &ldquo ; political theology&rdquo ; and argues that instead of over-involvement, it is rather the clashing of &ldquo ; ideologies&rdquo ; between the Jingjiao establishment and the ever-changing Tang court&rsquo ; s policies towards foreigners and religious bodies that caused the downfall of Jingjiao Christianity in China. This article will posit its argument based on the analysis of the Chinese Jingjiao canonical texts, especially the Xian Stele, and takes this as a point of departure to observe the political dynamics between Jingjiao and Tang court. The finding of this paper does show that the intellectual history of Chinese Christianity is in a sense a comprehensive history of &ldquo ; political theology&rdquo ; .

Language change in 20th century written Chinese – The claim for Europeanization By Ruth Cordes The written Chinese language, object of all statements concerning the Europeanization of Chinese Grammar, changed considerably during the 20th century. This was mainly due to the replacement of the former written High variety, the old de-facto standard Literary Chinese, by a new standard. The new written standard Guoyu (and later Putonghua) on its part emerged from the former written Low variety incorporating further influences – the most discussed being those by European languages, supposedly resulting in a "Europeanized Chinese". Whether or not European languages, above all English, exerted a strong enough influence on written Chinese to change its morphology and syntax, is discussed quite controversially. Changes attributed to contact with English, French or German might instead originate from much earlier, long-term contact with other Chinese as well as non-Chinese languages – which would fit the traditional definition of language contact much better. The starting point of this discussion are two chapters on "Europeanized grammar" by Wang Li published in 1943 and 1944. After him, other authors repeatedly took up the topic, mostly following the same tenor – that the Chinese language has been changed considerably by the influence of European languages, above all English. The rare exception is Alain Peyraube with his article on "Westernization of Chinese grammar in the 20th century: myth or reality?" that challenges the prevailing view. Still, until 2008 neither the one nor the other standpoint had been tested by proper corpus analysis The Europeanization hypothesis is tested using methods of corpus linguistics. The results serve less to prove certain theses, than to remind us that unambiguous answers are very rare. Nevertheless, a certain pattern is repeated time and again: an increase of "Europeanized" structures in the middle and decrease towards the end of the 20th century. The degree of europeanization of the grammar of 20th century written Chinese was overestimated. This overestimation was due to both hopes and fears concerning the development of the Chinese language as the national language of China. The reasons for hoping for an Europeanization of Chinese grammar have to be seen against the background of 19th/20th century intellectual history and the need for modernization felt by Chinese intellectuals. In addition to a deliberately europeanized style in some writings, incompetent translations created another style taunted as "translationese". Later on, there was a conscious return to "Chineseness", combined with the fear of loss of uniqueness. Changes in the grammar depend not so much on the time of origin of a text than on text type and variety (e.g. written vs. colloquial or Literary Chinese vs. Baihua). A substantial number of phenomena attributed to Europeanization originate instead from earlier, colloquially influenced texts or from contact with e.g. other Chinese languages. At the same time, changes are prevalent in texts where the author experimented with stylistic innovations influenced by his or her own language competence in Chinese regiolects or foreign languages.

This dissertation presents an in-depth look at a pioneering Chinese film company, the Mingxing (Star) Motion Picture Company, and reveals the ways in which intellectual ideas were transformed into part of commercial films as well as the implications of this production in a time of drastic social change in China. This study based on a wide range of primary source materials revises the conventional history of early Chinese cinema in many respects. I challenge the conventional categorization of screenwriters and directors along political or ideological lines and argue that cultural production at the commercial film company facilitated the dissemination of intellectual ideas through a combination of commercial drives and joint efforts of many allegedly radically different groups of filmmakers. With the aim to look into the dynamic process of cultural production at Mingxing, this study is divided into three parts. Part One (Chapter 1) reconstructs the institutional and economic history of Mingxing. Part Two (Chapters 2-4) presents a revisionist analysis of film producers at Mingxing. By unfolding a network of interactions and entanglements between Mingxing?s film directors and screenwriters, I argue that these persons acted as an intermediary that bridged the intellectual world and the film industry. In Part Three (Chapters 5-7), I analyze the narrative and thematic motifs of Mingxing films and show that issues expressed in films generally resonated with the contemporary intellectual discourse on modernity and national salvation. In doing so, I demonstrate that cinema played a largely unrecognized role in China's modern transformation in its specific ways.

From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School's theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, "instant scalability", network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR "will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time."1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories' perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!

Political constitutionalism emerged on the Chinese academic scene in the mid-2000s as a countermovement to the rights-based, court-centered, and textual mainstream in Chinese constitutional scholarship. On the surface, it has launched a biting and sophisticated critique of academic and institutional Westernization and reasserted a sense of Chinese constitutional particularity. However, contrary to its intellectual self-representation as a genuinely Chinese phenomenon, the movement's academic formation, methodological agenda, and theoretical vocabulary are inseparable from global ideological trends and draw heavily on European and American precedents. Consequently, the movement is troubled by a set of performative contradictions. These include the contradiction between its transnational genealogy and nationalist agenda; its pluralist theoretical makeup and anti-pluralist political rhetoric; as well as its putatively value-neutral sociological methodology and the politically selective application of said methodology. These antinomies, I argue, speak to the recurring dilemmas of national self-assertion in a globalized world.