Suchergebnisse

Der Autor setzt sich äußerst kritisch auseinander mit der Rolle der Kommunisten in der chinesischen Revolution, mit den Wesensmerkmalen der maoistischen Außenpolitik sowie der maoistischen Wirtschafts- und Entwicklungsstrategie nach 1949, mit der Repressionspolitik der Kulturrevolution und der Nach-Mao-Ära, mit der Modernisierungs- und Wirtschaftsreformpolitik der Deng-Ära sowie mit der Entwicklung des Rechtssystems und der politischen Repression der Demokratischen Bewegung seit 1978. (BIOst-Klk)

TAPE RECORDINGS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THIS ARTICLE IN WHICH SPOKESMEN OF SEVERAL SCHOOLS EXPLAIN HOW THERE HAS BEEN A CONSCIOUS EFFORT IN CHINESE EDUCATION TO DEVELOPE AND STRENGTHEN THE "SOCIALIST NEW THINGS" WHICH HAVE EMERGED OR FURTHER DEVELOPED SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE BOURGEOIS WORLD OUTLOOK AND THE PROLETARIAN WORLD OUTLOOK.

Chinese communism differs from the Soviet pattern of development in a number of signif respects. The Chinese Communists failed to win nat'l power when the Chinese Revolution reached its peak of natural extremism in 1927, but instead established a regional rdgime. Chinese Communism then evolved under Mao into a pragmatic, disciplined, & Stalinized post-revolutionary dictatorship. When the Communists won nationwide power in 1949, they were far ahead of the Bolsheviks of 1917 in their totalitarian org & practices, while they confronted a much more backward econ situation. Lacking any real proletarian base, they adhered dogmatically to Marxist doctrine as the determinant of pol'al virtue. Since 1949 Chinese Communism has become increasingly irrational & fanatic, particularly after the liberalizing interlude of 1956-57. The pol'al, econ & foreign-policy stiffening of 1957-58 parallels the change of line in Russia under Stalin in 1928-29, & points toward a likely econ crisis & purge. IPSA.

The position adopted by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) since the 1930's--that conditions in Greece were not ripe for a socialist revolution--contributed in large measure to the considerable military & pol'al defeats of the Greek Left. Because of theoretical inadequacies & a submission to the needs of Soviet pol'al leaders, the KKE has espoused a consistently non-revolutionary line. It has repeatedly called for a "bourgeois-democratic revolution" against "feudal remnants" & a "popular front against fascism." After successfully leading the resistance against German occupation in WWII, the KKE bargained away its military strength & surrendered its arms in order to participate in a gov of "nat'l unity" in pursuit of a "people's democracy" & "nat'l democratic change." Its strategies of "class colloboration" & the "peaceful road to socialism" through the growth of bur'tic state capitalism were soundly defeated during the civil war. By the 1950's, most of its remaining supporters were either refugees or prisoners. In the 1960's, the KKE allied with soc democratic elements in the legal United Democratic Left (EDA) party. Since the 1967 coup, an even broader alliance encompassing groups from the KKE on the left to monarchists & militarists on the right has formed to oppose the junta. But given the internat'l DofL in the world capitalist ecnomy, a proletarian socialist revolution in an underdeveloped country like Greece is a reasonable goal. A. Karmen.

The politics of texts in motion -- The geopoetics of land reform in Northeast Asia -- Fictionalizing the international working class -- Soviet spaceships in socialist China -- Sons and daughters of the Revolution -- Mapping the brave new world of literature