Suchergebnisse

Confronted with acute SE problems, the Socialist & the Christian Democratic trade unions in 1976 strengthened their "Common Trade Unions" Front' (with about 2 million members out of a total of 2,300,000 wage- & salary-earners in Belgium) in view of negotiating with employers & with the government, for which the trade unions have submitted a common platform. This common front has antecedents on the local, regional, & professional levels, but has never been & never will be of a permanent nature. This is due as much to historical, as to ideological causes. The principle of class struggle is basic to the socialist union, & christian doctrine is basic to the Christian Democrat concept. The two unions are imbalanced in their linguistic division. Socialists dominate the French-speaking South, while the Christians dominate the Flemish-speaking North. Each confederation wants to maintain its identity. From the employer's view (& to some extent completely independent from the trade union's common front) representatives of employer's organizations have launched the idea that a new & comprehensive "social contract" should be negotiated. The Christian Democratic Union favors such a pact, but since the socialist trade union rejects this idea--which would lead to a further integration in the capitalist system--the probability for such a pact to be realized at present is rather low. Modified HA.

UNTIL 1971, THE BELGIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (BSP) WAS THE ONLY POLITICAL PARTY THAT CLOSELY & SYSTEMATICALLY INVOLVED ITS MEMBERS IN THE DESIGNATION OF SOCIALIST CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THIS WAS ACHIEVED THROUGH A SYSTEM OF PREELECTIONS WITHIN THE PARTY ('POLLING'). THE TREND AWAY FROM 'POLLING' ALREADY PERCEPTIBLE IN 1971, HAS ASSERTED ITSELF IN 1974. ABOUT 56% OF THE ELECTED MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT OWE THEIR SEAT TO THEIR PLACE ON THE CANDIDATE- LIST AT THE 'POLL'. MORE THAN 40% OF THEM WERE DESIGNATED BY A PARTY-CONGRESS. THIS CHANGE IS NOTICEABLY TRUE IN FLANDERS. THE CHOICE BETWEEN A 'POLL' & A CONGRESS AS A DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUE IS NOT RELEVANT AS TO THE RENEWAL OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS. THIS RENEWAL IS MAINLY DUE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF AN AGE-LIMIT (65) & OF A GAIN IN SEATS. A GROWING LACK OF INTEREST IN PARTY MEMBERS IS EVIDENT, IN THE COMPOSITION OF CANDIDATE-LISTS: PARTICIPATION HAS AGAIN SLIGHTLY DECLINED. 8 TABLES. MODIFIED HA.

Analysis is made of the way in which the Peruvian military government has achieved institutional control over the program of structural reforms that has been put into effect since 1968. This process has emphasized the instrumental function of the government apparatus; it was directed toward a proper execution of the government program, & it assured a firm control over the course of the revolutionary process. The changes that took place in Peru are reviewed: (1) the remodeling of the formal structure of the state apparatus, a redefinition of the function of various units; (2) the regulation of general appointment procedures, promotions, dismissals etc; & (3) direct appointment to key positions within the state apparatus on the basis of a more general assumed loyalty, especially involving members of the so called Inca military group. 5 Tables. Modified HA.

Using data on fathers & parental grandfathers from a largescale survey held among all members of either House of the Dutch Parliament sitting in 1968, the soc background of members of Parliament is traced both re occup & soc stratification. The data show very little stability over 3 generations in occup'al background, & considerable verticle mobility. For the larger parties & for the 2 Houses as a whole, an index is constructed showing the average ranking of fathers & grandfathers on a prestige status scale. It appears that members of the Lower House come from higher soc milieus as measured by the ranking of fathers than members of the Upper House. This is particularly true of socialist members in the Lower House who score higher than either socialist Upper House members, or Lower House members of the 2 larger religious parties. Extensive data on the denomination of parents, grandparents & husbands or wives of members allow some insight into the extent to which traditional religious cleavage lines continue to determine pol'al recruitment. A diagram is presented to show the degree of traditional congruence between pol'al choice & religious denomination (or sub-denomination) & the extent to which 2 new anti-system parties (Democrats '66 & Farmer's Party) have successfully challenged the traditional divisions. On the whole, the close alignment between religious adherence & pol'al choice persists, both when measured by formal church association & actual church attendance. But liberals come from circles which are more traditionally identified with secular poi than members of the socialist party. In the latter case, the pot of 'breaking through' traditional religious boundaries materialized in some deliberate recruitment of orthodox-Protestant & Catholic members. But the traditional left-right division remains evident even when measured by the faith of parents & grandparents; a process of secularization is more characteristic for members of the non-confessional parties than a deliberate crossing of traditional pol'al boundaries by Catholics or orthodox-Protestants. IPSA.

NEXT TO THE PARTY ELITE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THERE ARE SEVERAL POLICY ELITES IN THE USSR. THEY CONSIST OF OFFICIALS IN EVERY FIELD OF POLICY & HAVE THEIR BASIS OF POWER IN THE RESOURCES THAT ARE ALLOCATED IN THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET. MOST RESOURCES FLOW TO THE ECONOMY, THE SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL SECTOR, THE MILITARY, & THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS. ELITES IN THESE SECTORS CAN BE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. THE PARTY ELITE MAKES ALL LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS, IT CAN REGULATE THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THESE POLICY ELITES & IT CAN CALL THE ELITES TO ACCOUNT BY PERMITTING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF POLICY DECISIONS. POLICY ELITES HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN POLICY-MAKING WHEN THEY HAVE MORE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POLITBURO & THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEIR REPRESENTATION HAS GROWN SINCE 1953--IRREGULARLY--BUT THE PARTY ELITE STILL HAS THE MAJORITY IN THESE PARTY ORGANS. POLICY ELITES HAVE INFLUENCE AS THERE IS A CONSTANT FLOW OF THEIR MEMBERS INTO THE PARTY ELITE. THIS MAKES THE PARTY ELITE LESS COHERENT & CAUSES MORE INTERNAL DISPUTES. YET THE POLICY ELITES ARE NOT CONTENT WITH POSSIBILITIES TO INFLUENCE POLICY MAKING; THEY ARE IN OPPOSITION TO THE PARTY ELITE THAT DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THEM MORE INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS. HA.

Changes in the post-WWII organization & structure of the Belgian political party system are discussed, focusing on the emergence of the welfare state. The prevalent trend of subcontracting social services to private firms, under the general direction of the sponsoring parties, is noted. The linguistic fractionalization of the major parties, the dynamics among the Catholic majority concentrated in Flanders, the socialist opposition centered chiefly in Wallonia, & the "balance" liberal parties are examined. Shifts in party identification & function, eg, toward clientelism & a dominant role in public policy formulation, are detailed, along with the role of TV in disseminating party propaganda. The declining role of party volunteers & grassroots activism is also discussed. Modified HA.

From the outset, the Belgian press has been a political press. The evolution of each opinion trend in Belgian newspapers since 1950 is analyzed. 5 main trends can be distinguished: the catholic, the liberal, the socialist, the communist, & the 'neutral' trend. Each of these is examined & newspapers which reflect the various trends are reviewed. The sales history of these newspapers is considered. It is almost impossible to verify the total circulation of the French newspapers & the circulation figures of the Flemish newspapers were exaggerated. The relationship between the number of readers of political newspapers & the number of voters for the corresponding political parties was examined & the disproportion between these is noted. 15 Tables. I. Verluyten.

Examined is the voting behavior of the three major Belgian parties -- CVP (Christian Democrats), BSP (Socialists), & PVV (Liberals) -- during three legislatures in which all three parties were twice in government & once in the opposition. The cohesion between the government parties & within each party was very high: cohesion within the government was 99.97% in 1958-1961. Deviations from the "party line" were minimal, especially within the BSP: 0.32% of BSP members voted against the party line in 1954-1958; the highest deviation (2.51%) was found among CVP members in 1961-1965. In the final votes two voting patterns dominate: government vs opposition & unanimity. All amendments except those introduced by the government were rejected. It is concluded that the role of the public session of the House of Representatives is reduced to a mere registration function. 5 Tables. Modified HA.

The listing of candidates proposed by the parties for the Belgian general elections is quite determinative. Due to electoral code arrangements & despite a growing number of preference votes, only candidates placed within the lists' "necessary sequence" (ie, the number of seats a party gains in a particular district) actually get elected. Thus the Belgian voter does not elect the mandataries but only determines the number of mandates due each of the several parties. While the statutes of the three major Belgian parties (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals) provide opportunities for wide member participation through the "general member polls," in which all party members are franchised to select the candidates for their party lists, an examination of elections reveals a growing tendency to deviate from the system: in 1958, 89% of all representatives were placed on their party list by general member polls; in 1978, only 10%. (The procedure was abandoned by the CVP-PSC in 1968 & by the PVV-PLP in 1971.) Thus the final phase of the party list composition has, since 1958, become increasingly a matter decided only by the national & federal party executives & councils. Whether the trend toward oligarchization will spread to decision making in other matters (party organ composition, party programs, etc) is not clear. 8 Tables, 1 Figure. Modified HA.

The welfare state is analyzed through positive economic science & positive political theory. The axiomatic theory of consistent choice, leading to the idea of Pareto optimality, provides more rigorous analysis than the theory of the firm & of industrial organization; however, the latter theory more fully merges theory with the empirical testing of hypotheses. Theories of political phenomena can profit more from theories of the latter kind than from theories of the former kind. The central point is production of falsifiable theories of hypotheses & predictions, & the avoidance of confusions of description with prescription in dealing with political life. The debate over whether a socialist economy can coordinate decisions on the use of scarce resources, & the resulting questions over the social & economic role of the state, remain unresolved on theoretical grounds. Thus, economics cannot prescribe the proper role of the state. Attention must be given to the process & meaning of law making, the intended effects of laws & their compatibility with one another. There is thus a need for scientific & parliamentary scrutiny of their implementation in a democratic state under pressure from interest groups. There is a great need for analysis of the processes going on in the crumbling welfare state, rather than propaganda; providing this analysis is part of the vocation of academic leaders. Modified HA.