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Jordan Branch on Google
Maps, State Formation, and the International Politics of Cartography







The territorial
underpinnings of international politics are as familiar as they are contested
within the discipline of International Relations. While the presumed 'territorial
trap' of the discipline has been attacked from many sides (see, for instance, Theory Talk #4),
Jordan Branch is more interested in turning the question around. 

His work has
carefully addressed the historical constitutive effects of mapping practices
and technologies on the subsequent transformation of practices of, and ideas about,
rule and the international system. In this fascinating Talk, Branch,
amongst others, discusses the significance of cartography for international
politics, explores the effects that contemporary digital mapping might have on political
spaces, and illustrates how innovations in mapping impacted on rule with the historical
example of France.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)





What is according to your view the most
important challenge facing global politics and what is/should be the central
debate in the discipline of International Relations (IR)?



While
there are many different debates going on at the same time within the discipline,
the one that has interested me most is the relationship between ideas and
practical or material factors. There is a very simplistic version of this
dichotomy that has been debated to death in the constructivist versus
rationalists debates, particularly in the American field of IR—an over-drawn
distinction, as many have pointed out. I am more interested in actual
explanations for the process, outcome, or phenomenon we're looking at. Rather
than separating them out, I am interested in how the ideational and material
relate to one another, how they fit together.



This
relationship poses questions for my specific interest in technological change. We
are experiencing fast-paced technological changes—for example, the information
technology revolution—which can yield a natural yet incorrect assumption, namely,
that this change will inevitably have some kind of major effect on, or
interaction with, politics and, specifically, with international relations.
This may be true, but it is too often assumed. Indeed, this raises another
problem. Even if there is such an effect, is it something we'll be able to
observe, let alone predict or explain, as it is happening? From my historical
work on the role of maps in state formation, for example, it is quite evident that
for people at the time, there was no way to see the impact maps had on the
political/spatial/ideational constitution of the state.



The information
technology (IT) revolution is the most obvious current example of dramatic technological
change. Although it has been playing out for the last 20 or 30 years, it only
continues to accelerate. Over the past couple of years, a lot of discussion has
focused on 'big data' and what it implies for business, financial analysis, and
the like. Of course, it also presents possibilities as a new tool for social
science. But there is a danger here. There is a tendency of seeing new
technological phenomena only in their material contexts, specifically focusing
on possibilities for measurement, for example, thereby neglecting to think
about the ideational. How do ideas about collecting and using data actually
play into the collection and analysis itself? So while they are in practice
always entangled, analytically, I find the distinction between the ideational
and the material a very fruitful one, not so much as a debate between opposing
fields, but as way to think about technological change.





How
did you arrive where you currently are in your thinking about these issues?



It is
funny—people often ask this sort of question, and I did not necessarily see a
natural trajectory for my thinking or work until I began to look and think
back. This interest in connecting technological and political change goes as
far back as my undergraduate time at Stanford University, where I initially
majored in mechanical engineering, and later switched to International
Relations. While technology remained an important preoccupation, I became more
interested in politics, history, and theory. So the interest formed into
questions about the political implications of phenomena like technology. But
this didn't happen instantly. Just before beginning my PhD at the University of
California, Berkeley, I was planning to do comparative work on regime change
and democratization. Then my older brother (Adam Branch), who is also a
political scientist, gave me a copy of Hendrik Spruyt's The Sovereign State and its Competitors (1994), and he said: 'Hey
you might like this!' So, I literally read that on a beach the summer before
starting grad school—which may sound funny, but I sat down, read it, and found
it fascinating. Yet I didn't immediately start thinking about these questions
then. It took a year or two, when I started really thinking about what I wanted
to work on. I came back to this work and realised these were the kind of
questions I was interested in: the origins of the territorial state and its
characteristics.



The
interest in the state as a concept had been with me for slightly longer. As an
undergrad my first introductory course to IR was taught by Stephen Krasner (Theory Talk #21).
Krasner has strong views, and the class was very rigorous. A lot of his work
focuses on the state and I think his framings influenced me early on. I don't entirely
agree with some of Krasner's arguments about sovereignty, but these
disagreements are more about the specifics of salient time periods or cases.
Other work which influenced me early on was that of John Ruggie on
territoriality. Indeed his approach became central as I was developing these
questions myself. I also discovered a host of literature in political geography
that turned out to be very interesting and useful. 



So,
one could say that my trajectory was really more focused on understanding the
historical outcome of the territorial state than on what role technology,
specifically maps, played in this process. The focus on technology, while
existent from my engineering days, really began to materialize as a link missing
from existing explanations of state formation. I was thinking about how we might
be able to find some additional traction on these questions by including
technology more prominently. It has certainly been part of some scholarship on
state formation, as in Charles Tilly's work or William McNeill's on
technological change and warfare. Surely, technology has always been in there,
but the discussion has been centered on war fighting technology and maybe on
transport, and only to a lesser degree on communication technology in the
broader sense.



Another
piece of work which triggered my focus on the relationship between the
ideational and the material was Ron Deibert's book Parchment, Printing and Hypermedia (1997, read the 1995 PhD thesis
that became the book here, pdf). He talks about internet
communication technology but also about the printing press and the impact it
has on the global distribution of power. Yet, only when I read this book for
the second or third time just as I was finishing up my dissertation did I realize
how much his framing had shaped how I formulated my thesis. He does touch on
the role of mapping, but it is his elaboration on the way in which media
informs how people think about the world which was spot on for me. For me, maps
as a medium very importantly framed how people thought about and imagined the
world in the past—but of course these questions about technology and its role
in constituting the international political system, states, territorial
boundaries, and so on are still relevant today.





What would a student need to become a
specialist in global studies or understand the world in a global way?



I
think it is important to be really excited and interested in your topic and
what you want to do. The key thing is to enter a grad program that fits you in
terms of your interests and to be willing to do whatever methodological training
ends up being needed for your research project.



I
think there's a tendency to look for a 'one size fits all' graduate training
model, which does make sense at the initial level. Everyone should get a
certain amount of background in a variety of methods, whether they'll end up
using those or not. For example, I have not used quantitative methods in my own
research, but I'm glad that I had to take classes on those methods in grad school.
They give you the ability to understand work which may connect to your own but
comes at it from a different angle. And you should always be open to a variety
of methods. The key is to be able to understand a broad array of approaches, otherwise
you won't be able to engage in broad conversations.



I
also feel I gained a lot from exploring, and reading widely, from other
disciplines such as history and sociology. I already mentioned political
geography, which is really not too distant but, nonetheless, in the U.S. it
sits in a different department. You might think that some work is 'on the other
side of the fence' but it is important to be able to bring that work into your
thinking.



The
final thing is to be open and ready to change your mind, whether it is about
the answer you're expecting to get to your question, or even changing the
question itself. Obviously there is a certain point when you're almost done
with a project where that might not be a good idea…. but if it is early on and
it works and you can do it logistically, I think it is important to be willing
to do that. Five years later you're going to be a lot better off.





So far, your work has been mainly
historical. Can you explain the importance of 'looking back' for understanding
contemporary international relations?



I
think it is extraordinarily important and useful. A lot of us in this and other
fields do see strong connections between today's politics and past events,
institutions, and ideas. There is an important notion that we cannot engage
meaningfully with the present if we do not understand its genealogy. That is
certainly a driver for me in thinking about the origins of the state and
territorial boundaries. It may help us to observe patterns we might see
replicated or appear in some kind of altered yet recognizable form today.
Indeed, it can help us think about where were might be headed.



Although
I also hesitate here slightly: always looking to the past for the answers can
be problematic. History can help us to observe patterns, dynamics, and maybe
relationships that might tell us something about other periods or about contemporary
international relations. But we should never do so thinking that the patterns
are definitely going to be the same or are deterministic. I think one can look
for patterns or relationships without automatically assuming that they have to
apply everywhere.



Historical
analysis can be problematic in its own right, because there is no way to
discover or absorb the past 'as it really was.' All history is some kind of
construction, whether it is based on contemporary or historical sources. Additionally,
in the social sciences we often have to rely on secondary sources. That is not
inherently a problem; this fact just introduces more variables to think about.
Pure narrative purporting to capture 'what really happened' can be very
problematic.



Given these disclaimers, it is useful to consider
the past. I think what should be emphasized is that, specifically at the grad
school level, students should be encouraged to dig a little deeper
historically. They shouldn't hesitate to do that excavation work.





IR, it has been argued, rests firmly on
a spatial or territorial understanding of politics. What constitutive role does
territorial space play in IR and is that role based on historical fact or is it
myth?



I
like that question. I think it is actually both—sort of a myth and sort of a
fact.  In one sense, territory informs at
least the state ideal (i.e., states as we think of them): it informs what the
state is, the interests of states, and of course how we distinguish one state
from another. And yet, while this is all inherently territorial, we also know
that this is far from an accurate description of a lot of regions and places in
the world. There are many different spatial ideas, practices, and organizations
with political agency that are non-state or non-territorial.



But
regarding the myth of state territoriality: I think it is important to point
out there is a lot of detail in the 'conventional narrative' of the state, such
as timing of when territoriality came about as pinpointed in Westphalia, that
has been quite effectively debunked by a number of scholars in the last 10 or
20 years (scholars like Andreas Osiander or Benno Teschke, from different
theoretical perspectives). This is a strongly supported finding. But it really
hasn't penetrated the mainstream narrative very well. While we can gradually see
a little more nuanced discussion in IR textbooks in the U.S., they more often
than not will still start with 1648 and Westphalia.



We
can now confidently say that states—states as we think of them now—did not
appear in 1648, let alone earlier. This is especially true if we look at the
specifically territorial or spatial aspects of statehood, which again are so
central to how we think about the state internationally. The focus on defending
cleanly demarcated linear boundaries and the idea of asserting absolute
sovereign authority within those lines; this is really not consolidated until at
least the 19th century. So, part of the myth is the timing and the
how and why we have states.



But
there still is a factual quality to territoriality in this story we tell
ourselves about the foundation of the international system and the supposed
creation of sovereign states. In a certain setting and for a certain period I
think this describes the ideas and practices of international politics quite
well. The most obvious example of this is 19th century Europe. While
there are still ways in which it diverges from the ideals of the typical state system,
in a lot of ways it actually did fit that. This happened at the same time as
the development of modern Western historiography, and it was the setting for some
of the traditional foundation of political science and IR. So we can see how
one shaped the other: history-making and state-making. The singular territorial
ideal of statehood from the 19th century has subsequently been
applied to other issues, actors, and areas. Even if it does not fit exactly, it
is applied today still and it is made to fit retrospectively much earlier
periods, where it applied less well.



Ultimately,
it is a powerful myth which has informed how we think about international
relations to such a degree that we shouldn't just throw it out. Instead, we
should think about exactly how it actually informs the way that international
relations is understood and practiced.
Practitioners and officials don't exactly read IR journals and base their
decision-making on our knowledge production, but the basic ideas of states, boundaries,
and territory which inform the practice of international relations—as well as
the study of it—should be our concern.





You have looked specifically at how
mapping has contributed to imagining and formation of the modern state system. Could
you elaborate more on how something as technical as cartography matters for
international politics?



I've
argued in my recent work that early modern mapping technologies were really
essential to the consolidation of the territorial state, particularly the
specific territorial features of states today. Maps, which have been a popular
medium over the past few centuries, really do shape how people understand the
world and their place in it. This gets us back to the connection between the
material and the ideational.



In early
modern Europe a revolution took place, first in mapmaking technologies and,
slightly later, in the ideas and practices of political rule, especially as it
relates to territory. I argue this was really not a coincidence. How rulers and
subjects conceived of rule and how rulers conceived of their realms was really
altered as they increasingly used maps that depicted the world in this one
particular way. The key characteristics of modern statehood – at least of the
ideal of modern statehood – such as linear boundaries between homogenous territorial
claims, really appeared first in maps and only subsequently in political practices
on the ground. Of course, there were existing authority structures, but these were
not particularly spatial or were not spatial in this linear demarcated way. Subsequently,
however, these authority structures were ignored or sometimes even actively
renounced in favor of the kind of authority which could be literally shown and
drawn on a map.



It is
interesting because initially, maps were not predominantly produced by rulers, states,
or officials. They were certainly involved in sponsoring some mapping projects,
buying maps, and using them, but mapmaking was more of a commercial private
scientific enterprise, if we can apply the label 'scientific' in the 16th
and 17th centuries. These map-makers certainly didn't have any articulated
goal of changing politics, at least not on this broad level. They were really
concerned with making money, maybe creating art, and advancing what they
thought was a growing science of cartography.



We
can however see that the map, as a technological artifact—maps as actual things—had
an impact on the practices of rule both between rulers and between rulers and
their subjects. I argue that this process occurred quite broadly across the
European development of the international system at that time. And you can see
this sequence really clearly in a case like France.



Let
me illustrate that. Here are three maps of 'France' ranging from the 1400s to
the 1700s—the quotation marks are necessary because the notion of there being
one entity called France across this whole period is more a matter of us labeling
it as such rather than it being one recognizable entity.









The
first map is from a 15th century manuscript about royal and noble
genealogy in France. The image is purported to represent 'all the realm of
France' and shows the country as a collection of what I would call places
rather than a single linearly demarcated space. You do have the notion of spatial
boundaries here, in terms of rivers as means for demarcation. Yet, very
clearly, the visual language of this map focuses on towns. And this is how rule
was practiced and operationalized as well: negotiations would be over places, or
maybe collections of people based on identity, jurisdiction, or where they were
allowed to reside, but not in term of linear demarcations between claims.









Now
look at the second map, which is just from about 150 years later, from the
1590s. It is from an atlas by a follower of Mercator, and its label Gallia is
the Roman designation for France. From our modern perspective we can recognize
something that looks a lot like a modern map of France. Maybe even a state, although
the boundaries are not exactly like we would expect them to be. But this is the
visual language of mapping that we are familiar with: longitude, latitude,
spatial expanses colored in, homogenous territorial claims—there is something
about the space depicted that argues that it is all the same, that is all
France.



And
despite this familiarity, it was actually far from an accurate depiction of
French rule. Not just in the actual placement of the boundaries, which are
contestable, but in the discrete nature of the boundaries themselves. Along
these frontiers, so clearly demarcated on this image, the claims of the French
king were often unclear and overlapped with those of other rulers. This was
even true for the interior of France during this period.









The
third map is another 150 years later, from the 1740s. This is from a map
showing the triangulation of the realm, undertaken by a group of geographers, known
as the Cassini survey, as several generations of the Cassini family headed up
this effort. The realm is being mapped explicitly using geometric tools with
the important emphasis that the image is actually meant to represent reality.
It is understood that way: it's supposed to measure reality, in order to enable
the French king to better understand what he rules. Moreover, this mapping took
place at the same time that rule was being implemented in practice on the
ground in terms of spatial expanses as we think of them, in the form of
demarcating boundaries with neighbors which had previously been unclear,
overlapping jurisdictions.



Although
maps of the second generation (i.e., the map from the 1590s) were 'inaccurate,'
they were extremely influential. They were widely distributed and purchased by
the elite, both inside and outside of government. Using these maps provided
rulers with this particularly new territorial meaning to their centralizing and
bureaucratizing efforts. As a consequence, the use of these maps as material
tools of governing and negotiation really changed the language of rule. Rule becomes
cartographic, at least in part. When two opposing sides come to the negotiation
table, for example, they at the very least have already agreed, implicitly, that
the division should be a linear boundary—it is just a question of where.



By
the time the third map is produced, the government is much more directly
involved in map production using accurate geometrical measurement. Yet the very
desire for this mapping was shaped by the earlier use of those commercial maps
that built up the visual grammar of geometric space. The French case is useful
because it is very well documented, but we do see the same sort of process
repeated either simultaneously or later throughout Europe and also elsewhere. In
fact, there is a lot of interesting scholarship on the introduction of mapping
and modern geographic thinking into regions outside the West. Siam Mapped (1994), a book by Thongchai Winichakul,
is a fantastic study that I found really useful for my thinking about Europe,
even though it deals with Siam (Thailand) in the late 19th and early
20th centuries.



This
is my story about mapping and territory, but I think there is a broader frame
to your question: do we want to bring in these sort of technical factors into explanations
in International Relations? And while we don't want to be technologically
determinist, there is some useful thinking around technology and its effects we
should consider. The impact of maps has been so strong, and yet they are such
common artifacts that they are largely conceived of as 'unremarkable' outside
of geographic-oriented disciplines.





So can we juxtapose this insight that mapping practices precede the
practice of rule and state formation to the anthropological present, that is,
what do the contemporary, some say radical, shifts in mapping techniques entail
for international politics?



Absolutely.
When I initially present my work, there is often an assumption that I use GIS
in my study. Instead, my work focuses on analyzing mapping itself—maps as
historical artifacts, their effects and their interaction with political
identities, interests, and organizations. But I think the ways in which methodology
and the subject of study overlap on subjects like technology could potentially
contribute to stretching the boundaries of IR. The big data question is both a
question of studying what big data means for politics but also how we can use
big data to study politics. The way in which new technologies can simultaneously
play into our methods and into our answers or questions is a pressing and
fascinating issue.



For
instance, there has been a lot of back and forth on the question of whether
more open-access mapping techniques entail some sort of democratization. While
I think we have seen that more participatory forms of mapping are possible, we
shouldn't think that this type of mapping is completely open, as no
technological system is completely open to anyone and everyone at all times.
But, indeed, there is a democratization of mapping under way. Authorship in a
whole host of domains, including mapping, is opening up where there used to be
a single authoritative voice or at least a single type of authoritative voice. So
maps are an example of this opening up and collective authorship. At the same
time, accommodating more voices also means that a lot of information is being
shared without authority or attribution or what we think of as a legitimate
source… When you open a map from Rand McNally or National Geographic, you know
that specific cartographers thought this was accurate and you can blame or
praise them. But when you open up a layer of Google Earth that has been
crowd-sourced you don't know who put that pin there, and you don't know why.



It's
really interesting to explore a bit further how this is different from the
recent past. In the 19th and first half of the 20th
century, mapmaking was essentially state-led. The U.S. geological survey, the
Ordnance Survey in Britain, or large mapmaking geographical institutions such
as National Geographic represented the owners and producers. Mapping was so
technical, so obviously technical that the everyday person would not be able to
make a map to Rand McNally's standards. This has changed, and quite importantly
so. Not only do we have the technology to do this, people are aware that they
can use it as easily as opening a smartphone app, thereby incorporating more
points of view. This is not necessarily good or bad. Politically, it does open
up new possibilities. Maps have always been political, both implicitly and
explicitly. It certainly opens up the possibility of some kind of broader shift
in ideas about territory. Let me illustrate with an example. I haven't
necessarily come across specific maps that present some completely novel visual
grammar potentially reshaping the way we think about the world. But, an
interesting example I like to bring to my students: there was a September 2011blog post on Google's Lat-Long blog (which is the company's blog about Google Maps and Google Earth). Its headline
read: 'South Sudan is now official on Google Maps,' and it displayed a
screenshot of the new boundary. 







They changed their base layer by adding a boundary between South Sudan and
Sudan. This of course followed the referendum and the UN's recognition, and all
the traditional precursors to official statehood. South
Sudan became a recognizable entity on that blog. Google Earth, a
non-governmental actor, indeed a huge corporate actor—and thus not necessarily
democratizing—becomes part of the discourse of declaring South Sudan's official
existence.



This
is an example of how things might be going. Interestingly, the whole enterprise
of mapping today actually resembles more closely that of the 16th
and early 17th centuries then that of the 19th or early
20th century, not technologically but organizationally. The
state-centric view of the world was enforced by the state-authored mappings of
the 19th and 20th centuries. Now, by contrast, there is a
kind of shared or unclear authorship, there is crowdsourcing, there are multiple
sources of conflicting and quite openly unreliable or uncertain information.
This environment of rapidly increasing distribution and use also describes the
creation of the early atlases in the late 16th century and early 17th
centuries, which involved the collation of all kinds of information from multiple
sources.



And
of course it was in the 16th and 17th century when this
sort of non-state-controlled mapping presented innovative images of the world—those
images that ended up shaping and consolidating the state form of territory. And
so it was these new tools for understanding and acting on the world which gave
the state its territorial shape. As key information-producing activities are
being opened up, some forms of power are being redistributed. This certainly
means that we need to widen our scope in terms of whom we consider to be a
stakeholder or what sort of actors we want to study. We know that the dichotomy
of state versus non-state is not sufficient. We need to be subtler in our
inquiries. In IR, of course, the stereotypical over-emphasis on states is being
questioned, and this is really just one more sign that a piece of the power of
the state, in this case map-production and distribution, is shifting elsewhere.




I
recently had a conversation with students in my undergrad seminar on technology
and international politics. I went into it saying: 'Hey, all this mobile
mapping and GPS and Google Earth is totally revolutionary. This may change how
we think about the world.' And they were all completely unconvinced, since they
use these technologies all the time—to a bunch of twenty-year-olds these tools seem
unremarkable. And maybe that is actually a more accurate analysis. But it is
interesting how it is such a different analysis from that of my generation and anyone
older, all of us who have spent a lot of time, for example, driving around
without GPS. It is partly this perception and the 'unthinking usage' which make
the relationship between technologies and social and political outcomes so difficult
to observe. Our ideas may be changed, and especially the ideas of younger
generations may be changed, without anyone particularly noticing how dramatic
the changes might be. This also means that the connections, because they are
'unthinking,' can be quite foundational to people's ideas of social identities
or political practices. They are tacit and embodied. That makes it both hard to
observe but also an interesting puzzle. But it is worthwhile mentioning that
the images presented by Google Maps and other digital mapping tools,
particularly satellite imagery, might carry a greater legitimacy in terms of
depicting 'the truth'. It looks like a picture of the world and therefore
whatever is on it, even layered on data (like a new international boundary),
must be true. It represents another apex of the scientific trajectory of
mapping.





If it is just about adding a data layer on a base map that remains the
same, does that then mean that ontologically this kind of mapping technology
actually doesn't challenge territoriality?



That
gets to an interesting point, which entangles with a lot of the more careful
discussions of globalization and the state. One version of that is that the
state is not dying, is not being destroyed. It is just that other things are
being layered on top of it, and the state and its boundaries still remain and
still matter for certain things. In this case, maps are perfectly capable of
showing state boundaries—they look very fixed, very strong—but one can layer on
top other types of information, maybe transactional flows or particular places
that are connected in different ways.



I
think that could be an interesting argument: these new mapping tools can really
show so much, and it is matter of selecting what you want to show and
unselecting things you don't want to show. Thus they don't do anything to
undermine one particular view of the world. Now that is not necessarily a good
or bad thing. If we look at the history of mapping and the origins of state
territoriality, a key part of that was that it was really hard to depict
medieval jurisdictional and personal notions of rule on early modern maps. Printing
technology and mapping tools prescribed depiction in a certain way—drawing
lines and coloring in spaces. Maps made it harder to show and thus think about
the other forms of rule. If digital maps are still perfectly capable of showing
states and their boundaries, they may do very little to undermine that notion
of territory.





Finally, if we are interested in the politics of maps, to what extent do
we need to study not only the maps as political artifacts but the mapmakers as
political actors as well?



I
think it is extremely useful to do both, and obviously if we study mapping
today, we can do both. In terms of
historical work, we can only rely on very limited sources, such as what mapmakers
themselves wrote about what they were doing. We don't know a lot about their
goals or ideas about politics. I would have loved to have been able to read
exhaustive memoirs by mapmakers such as Ortelius and Mercator. Of course, they might
not have said anything about the questions we are interested in. On the other
hand, a lot of map-makers today are involved in mapping for explicit political
reasons: for example, Ushahidi-type collaborative mapping (www.ushahidi.com), or humanitarian and
relief mapping. Here we can dig into the question of how the maps produced relate
to specific objectives. That is a great way to get more analytical leverage on
a lot of these questions.



Jordan Branch joined the Political Science
department at Brown as an Assistant Professor in summer 2012. He received his
PhD in Political Science at UC-Berkeley in 2011, and spent 2011-2012 as the
Hayward R. Alker Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Studies at
the University of Southern California. His interests include international
relations theory, the history of the sovereign state system, contemporary
challenges to statehood, and the intersection of technological and political
change. In 2014, Cambridge University Press published his book, The
Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty. His
research has also appeared in International Organization and
the European Journal of International Relations.







Related links





Faculty profile at Brown University
Read
Branch's Mapping the Sovereign State:
Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change (International Organization 2011) here (pdf) 
Read
Branch's Colonial Reflection' and
Territoriality: The Peripheral Origins of Sovereign Statehood (European Journal of International Relations,
2012) here (pdf) 








Print version of this Talk (pdf)




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Nach einer externen Evaluation mit erschreckendem Ergebnis beschließen die Kultusministerinnen und -minister der 16 Länder Eckpunkte für eine Reform der Kultusministerkonferenz. Hat der Beschluss das Zeug, aus der KMK eine agile Organisation zu machen, die in der Lage ist, auf aktuelle Herausforderungen zu reagieren?






Bild: Gerd Altmann /
Pixabay.






ALS DIE KULTUSMINISTERKONFERENZ (KMK) im Herbst 2022 beschloss, sich selbst von einer Unternehmensberatung durchleuchten zu lassen, war die Skepsis groß. "Es gibt genügend
Expertise, die seit Jahrzehnten Lösungen vorschlägt", die aber "überhört, ignoriert wird", meinte etwa der bekannte Rostocker Schulpädagogik-Professor Falk Radisch. "Nun ja, dann jetzt also
neoliberale Ökonomisierung des Bildungssektors auf dieser Ebene. Traurig."



 



Als ein Jahr später die Evaluationsergebnisse an die Öffentlichkeit durchsickerten, redete freilich kaum noch einer davon, dass sie von einem Schweizer Wirtschaftsforschungsunternehmen stammten. Zu
atemberaubend las sich, was "Prognos" da in seiner schonungslosen Analyse präsentierte: 177 Gremien unter dem Dach der KMK, die 2022 insgesamt fast 600 Mal im Jahr konferierten unter Beteiligung
von 1.300 Einzelpersonen. 



 



Doch führte diese Vielzahl kaum zu Synergieeffekten, denn die allermeisten saßen jeweils in nur einem einzigen Gremium, wie "Prognos" außerdem feststellte. Man tagte also nebeneinander her, noch
dazu meist ohne Beschlussmacht: 434 der 595 Sitzungen fanden 2022 in den 123 sogenannten AGs statt, die irgendwann einmal zu irgendeinem Zweck eingesetzt wurden. 



 



Für politisch-akute Themen nicht geeignet



 



Und die Minderzahl der KMK-Gremien, die konkrete Beschlusskompetenzen hatten, brauchten extrem lang dafür. Die "strukturbedingt langen Entscheidungszyklen" führten dazu, dass die
Beschlussvorlagen sich vom Beratungsbeginn bis zu ihrer Verabschiedung zwischen den Gremien im Kreis bewegten, worüber üblicherweise mindestens neun Monate vergingen. "Für politisch-akute Themen
nicht geeignet", befanden die Evaluatoren.



 



Es ging allerdings noch krasser: Weitere 59 Sitzungen, mehr als eine pro Woche, entfielen auf 29 weitere AGs, die sich sogar ohne Einsetzungsbeschluss von oben einfach selbst gebildet hatten. Und
als sei das nicht genug, kamen neue Gremien beständig hinzu: Allein im Jahr 2022 ein Dutzend.



 



Ausgerechnet in einem dieser in jüngster Zeit hinzugekommenen Gremien dürften sie angesichts des "Prognos"-Leaks nicht nur unglücklich gewesen sein: die Mitglieder der eigens eingesetzten
Strukturkommission II zur "Weiterentwicklung der Kultusministerkonferenz sowie des Sekretariats". Hatten sie doch genau deshalb für die Beauftragung einer externen Unternehmensberatung plädiert:
um den nötigen Veränderungsdruck zu erzeugen, den man von innen heraus so meist nicht hinbekommt. 



 



Kultusministerien ziehen Konsequenzen



 



Ein Beben mit Folgen: Vergangene Woche, bei ihrem Treffen in Berlin, haben die Kultusministerinnen und Kultusminister aller 16 Länder die Konsequenz gezogen. Sie einigten sich nach langen,
teilweise hitzigen Diskussionen auf den Einstieg in einen Reformprozess, der, wenn man den Beteiligten glauben darf, einer grundlegenden Neuaufstellung einer Institution gleichkommen würde, die
nächstes Jahr ihren 76. Geburtstag feiert und damit älter ist als die Bundesrepublik. 



 



Zeit würde es: In den vergangenen Jahren hat die KMK zwar schon vieles, was lange unmöglich erschien, geschafft. Sie hat ein neues Länderabkommen für eine verbindlichere Zusammenarbeit verabschiedet, sie hat
sich mit der "Ständigen Wissenschaftlichen Kommission" ein unabhängiges wissenschaftliches Beratungsgremium gegeben, sie hat für die Kulturpolitik eine weitgehend eigenständige Kulturministerkonferenz geschaffen. Doch abgesehen von ein bisschen Kosmetik hat sich die KMK dabei an sich selbst, an ihre eigene Verfasstheit und Prozesse,
nicht herangetraut. 



 



Bis vergangene Woche. Aus den zwölf im Abschlussbericht der "Prognos"-Berater enthaltenen Empfehlungen hat die
Strukturkommission sieben Eckpunkten abgeleitet, die die Kultusminister jetzt wiederum per Beschluss zu ihrem Reformbekenntnis gemacht haben.  



 



Die Kultusministerinnen und -minister hätten "jetzt die Chance, die notwendigen politischen und strukturellen Veränderungen vorzunehmen, um eine funktionsfähige Kultusministerkonferenz für die
Zukunft zu entwickeln", sagte KMK-Präsidentin Katharina Günther-Wünsch, im Hauptberuf CDU-Bildungssenatorin von Berlin. 



 



Zu wenig systematische Steuerung



 



Tatsächlich waren sich nämlich auch die Kultusministerien sehr bewusst, was sie mit der Beauftragung von "Prognos" lostreten würden. Denn obgleich die Unternehmensberater die
KMK-Organisationsmängel selten prägnant auf den Punkt brachte, neu waren sie den meisten Kennern des real existierenden Bildungsföderalismus kaum. 



 



Etwa dass der KMK bei all ihrer Gremienvielfalt die strategische Steuerung fast völlig abgeht. Das Präsidium trifft sich in Normalzeiten nur einmal im Monat, während die Verwaltung der
Kultusministerkonferenz, das KMK-Sekretariat, personell auf dem Kopf steht: Von den gut 414 Vollzeit-Planstellen entfallen laut "Prognos"-Zählung überhaupt nur 78 auf die drei Abteilungen, die
für die gesamte föderale Koordination in Schule, Hochschule Wissenschaft, Kultur, Qualitätssicherung, Internationales und Statistik verantwortlich sind. Und nur 4,7 Stellen davon sind für
führende und übergreifende Aufgaben vorgesehen. 



 



Das bedeutet keineswegs, dass die übrigen über 300 KMK-Mitarbeiter nicht gebraucht würden, leisten sie doch in der Zentralstelle für ausländisches Bildungswesen (ZAB) grundlegende Arbeit bei der
Bewertung von im Ausland erworbenen Qualifikationen, oder sie gehören zum Pädagogischen Austauschdienst (PAD). Doch überdeckt die vermeintlich große Gesamtmitarbeiterzahl der KMK ihre dramatische
strukturelle Schwäche genau an der Stelle, wofür sie in der Öffentlichkeit steht: bei der Gestaltung einer länderübergreifenden Bildungspolitik.



 



"Versäult" sei das KMK-Sekretariat, kritisierten die Berater, "mit wenig horizontaler Zusammenarbeit und Informationsaustausch", die kleinteilige Aufgabenzuordnung und der Zuschnitt der
Organisationseinheiten böten "wenig Flexibilität und Steuerungsmöglichkeit", das Wissensmanagement sei dezentral und konzentriere sich auf Fachwissen. Und dann mangele es in den Kernprozessen
auch noch an technischer Unterstützung. 



 



Auf die wichtigen Themen konzentrieren



 



All das hat weitreichende Folgen für die Entscheidungsprozesse. Die Tagesordnung der Kultusministerkonferenz entstehe zum großen Teil "Bottom Up", resümieren die "Prognos"-Berater nach einer
Vielzahl von Gesprächen, die sie in den Landesministerien, im KMK-Sekretariat und drumherum geführt haben. Es gebe "wenig systematische Steuerung oder Priorisierung von Beratungsgegenständen".
Anders gesagt: Die Arbeitsebene spült zur Entscheidung nach oben, was sie für relevant hält, und die Chefs sollen sich dann damit beschäftigen. 



 



Entsprechend betonte der Hamburger Bildungssenator Ties Rabe, der die Bildungspolitik der SPD-regierten Länder koordiniert, nach dem KMK-Reformbeschluss vergangene Woche: "Ziel muss es sein, dass
wir uns stärker auf die wichtigen Themen konzentrieren und nicht im Kleinkram ersticken." Deshalb müsse die Vielzahl der Arbeitsgruppen reduziert werden, und auch die Zahl der Projekte und Themen
müsse verringert werden.



 



Und in noch eine organisatorische Wunde der KMK legten die "Prognos"-Berater ihren Finger: in das unausgegorene Nebeneinander der Bereiche Schule, Hochschule und Wissenschaft. Der Bereich Schule
dominiere die KMK-Beratungen, es gebe unklare Prioritäten für Beratungen zu Hochschulen. Die gegenwärtige Teiltrennung zwischen Schule und Hochschule werde als "nicht funktional beschrieben",
berichtet "Prognos". 



 



Einrichtung einer eigenen Wissenschaftskonferenz



 



Aus einer ähnlichen Schieflage heraus hatten sich die für Kultur zuständigen Minister in der KMK bereits 2019 ihre eigene Konferenz mit weitgehender Eigenständigkeit gesichert. Entsprechend waren
jetzt die Wissenschaftsminister mit die ersten, die bei dem in Berlin beschlossenen Reformprozess Nägel mit Köpfen machen wollen. Überwiegend begeistert griffen sie den zweiten der sieben
Eckpunkte der Strukturkommission auf: die Einrichtung einer eigenen Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz "mit eigenem (nicht notwendigerweise jährlich wechselndem) Vorsitz und Präsidium und separaten
Beratungsstrukturen, deren Zeitplan mit den Teilnahmeverpflichtungen von Wissenschaftsministerinnen und -ministern an anderen Konferenzen (GWK, Wissenschaftsrat) abgestimmt ist".



 



Entweder analog zur bestehenden Kulturministerkonferenz unter dem Dach der KMK "mit dem Sekretariat als zentraler Unterstützungseinheit (aber mit einer separaten Unterstützungsstruktur Hochschule
und Wissenschaft)". Oder aber, was die Extremlösung wäre, völlig losgelöst von der KMK. 



 



So weit wird es aller Voraussicht nach nicht kommen, aber schon die Tatsache, dass dies diskutiert wurde, zeigt die Radikalität, die inzwischen eingezogen ist in die Reformdebatte: Die Loslösung
der Wissenschaft würde faktisch das Ende der bisherigen KMK bedeuten. Von einer "Revolution statt Evolution in der KMK", sprach schon einmal Bayerns CSU-Wissenschaftsminister Markus Blume, dessen
Ministerium zusammen mit Hamburg den Vorsitz in der Strukturkommission führt. "Wir müssen schneller, agiler und politischer werden. Gerade die Einrichtung einer eigenen
Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz ist ein wichtiger Schritt, um den wissenschafts- und hochschulpolitischen Themen eine deutlich höhere Eigenständigkeit und Sichtbarkeit zu geben."



 



KMK-Präsidentschaft über mehrere Jahre?



 



Dem "Prognos"-Gutachten folgend beschlossen die Kultusminister außerdem unter anderem eine Verschlankung der Gremienstruktur, ein Monitoring für KMK-Beschlüsse und "ein adäquat aufgestelltes
Sekretariat", das zum zentralen "Wissens-Hub", "der für die Länder Fach- und Prozesswissen vorhält", weiterentwickelt werden soll.



 



Ein besonders heißes Eisen fassen die Eckpunkte unter Punkt 3, "Strategiefähigkeit erhöhen", an: Für die Einführung einer strategischen Arbeitsplanung, heißt es da, erscheine "eine
Weiterentwicklung der Präsidiums- /Vorsitzstrukturen notwendig. Diese sollen eine längerfristige Ausrichtung und ein politisches Controlling der Vorhaben ermöglichen." Eine KMK-Präsidentschaft,
die über mehrere Jahre reicht und sich politischer definiert – so lautet eine der wichtigsten von KMK-Kritikern immer wieder vorgetragene Forderung. Offenbar ist man auch dafür in der KMK endlich
offen – oder noch nicht alle Kultusministerinnen und Kultusminister haben die Sprengkraft des von ihnen beschlossenen Absatzes erkannt.



 



Keine Aussage findet sich indes zu einer Aufweichung oder Abschaffung des Einstimmigkeitsprinzips in finanzwirksame und vielen Grundsatzfragen, das in der Vergangenheit oft zu wenig
ambitionierten Beschlüssen führte. Weil dies, wie Skeptiker sagen, mindestens einen Staatsvertrag, womöglich aber eine Grundgesetzänderung erfolgen würde? Nein, ist aus der Strukturkommission zu
hören – weil, wenn die Gremienstrukturen erstmal umgebaut sind, die Abstimmungsprinzipien automatisch drankämen. Genau wie sich mit der Neustrukturierung des KMK-Sekretariat zwangsläufig nach
Rolle, Auswahl und Amtszeit künftiger Generalsekretäre stelle.



 



Und auch wenn die Eckpunkte in Teilen noch abstrakt klingen mögen, vor allem unter 7, beim weiteren Vorgehen, sind sie außerordentlich konkret: Im März bereits soll ein erstes Umsetzungskonzept
das KMK-Ministerplenum passieren, so dass "jedenfalls" die Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz schon zum 1. Juli 2024 kommen könne. 



 



Dass es sich dabei um ein Mindestziel handelt, lässt sich auch daran erkennen, dass die KMK bei der Struktur- und Organisationsveränderung in Gremien und Sekretariat inklusive
"Umsetzungscontrolling und -begleitung" plant. Womit offenbar erneut die Beauftragung einer externen Agentur gemeint ist. Man ist, so scheint es, auf den Geschmack gekommen.



 



Dieser Artikel erschien heute zuerst im Deutschen Schulportal.


Ein Resolution zu PISA, ein Aktionsplan gegen Antisemitismus und eine realistischere Lehrkräfte-Prognose


In Reaktion auf die mauen deutschen PISA-Ergebnisse sprachen sich die Kultusminister in einem Beschluss für neun Maßnahmen aus, darunter der
Vorrang für die Vermittlung der Bildungssprache Deutsch "für alle Fächer und Lernbereiche", Sprachstandsfeststellungen vor dem Schulbesuch "und bei entsprechendem Bedarf
verbindliche Sprachförderung vor der Einschulung".  Außerdem müssten die Konzepte zum Unterricht Deutsch als Zweitsprache auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden, eine
entsprechende Expertenanhörung befinde sich bereits in Vorbereitung. Die Kernfächer und die basalen Kompetenzen müssten in der Schule insgesamt gestärkt werden. Die Digitalisierung des Systems
Schule sei prioritär und beschleunigt umzusetzen, weshalb die Länder von der Bundesregierung "schnellstmöglich verbindliche Finanzierungszusagen" zur Fortsetzung des Digitalpakts
erwarteten. 



 



Schließlich bekannten sich die Kultusminister einmal mehr zu einer "kohärenten Gesamtstrategie Bildungsmonitoring" inklusive der Beteiligung an
internationalen und nationalen Vergleichsstudien und Durchführung von Tests und Lernstandserhebungen als "notwendige Grundlage für eine evidenzbasierte Schul- und Unterrichtsentwicklung"
(wissend, dass viele von ihnen in den vergangenen Jahren und vor allem in der Corona-Pandemie genau beim Monitoring vieles haben schleifen lassen). Bei der Neugestaltung der
Lehrkräftebildung müsse die Vermittlung von Konzepten der sprachlichen Bildung und Sprachförderung "Bestandteil aller Phasen der Lehrkräftebildung sein" und weiterentwickelt werden. Um
Risikoschüler gezielt zu erreichen, müsse das von Bund und Ländern geplante Startchancen-Programm als ein Baustein für Schulen in besonders herausfordernden Lagen
schnellstmöglich umgesetzt wird.



 



Mit reichlich Verspätung beschloss die KMK zudem die – eigentlich jährliche – Modellrechnung zur voraussichtlichen Entwicklung des Lehrkräftebedarfs und
–angebots. In der Summe der Berechnungen der einzelnen Länder stehen demzufolge einem Einstellungsbedarf von 463.000 in den Jahren 2023 bis 2035 lediglich 395.000 fertige Lehrer
gegenüber, folglich ergebe sich eine rechnerische Differenz in Höhe von 68.000 Lehrkräften. Wobei die KMK sofort betont, eine derartige Differenz lasse "keine Rückschlüsse auf die
tatsächliche Lehrkräfteversorgung – insbesondere




auch auf den tatsächlichen Lehrkräftemangel zu". Erst ab Beginn der 2030er Jahre wird jetzt eine spürbare Entspannung erwartet. Bei ihrer Modellrechnung im März
2022 war die KMK noch von einer Unterversorgung von 23.400 ausgegangen – für den Zeitraum 2021 bis 2035.



 



Mit der auf 68.000 hochgeschnellten rechnerischen Lücke nähert sich die KMK nun erstmals den Prognosen des Essener Bildungsforschers Klaus Klemm
an, dessen Vorhersagen in den vergangenen Jahren deutlich näher an der dann jeweils eingetroffenen Realitäten gelegen hatten. In seiner jüngsten Vorausberechnung 2022 hatte Klemm die Lücke bis
2035 mit 85.000 Lehrkräften beziffert. Der Prognosezeitraum der KMK sei nicht ganz identisch, doch sehe er mit Genugtuung, sagt Klemm, dass viele Kultusministerien nun realistischer und präziser
in ihren Annahmen würden. "Aber nicht alle. Es fällt auf, dass einige Länder es sich immer noch zu einfach machen. Nordrhein-Westfalen und Schleswig-Holstein zum Beispiel sagen für das Angebot an
Berufseinsteigern im Sekundarbereich I jedes Jahr zwischen 2023 und 2025 dieselbe Zahl vorher. Das ist aus der Luft gegriffen."



 



Wie bei der außerordentlichen Sitzung der Gemeinsamen Wissenschaftskonferenz (GWK) Ende November angekündigt verabschiedeten die Landeswissenschaftsminister einen
zehn Punkte umfassenden Aktionsplan gegen Antisemitismus und Israelfeindlichkeit, dem sich auch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) anschloss. Darin
bekräftigen sie unter anderem ein Nein zu Antisemitismus in jeder Form, jüdische und israelische Studierende und Mitarbeitende müssten sich an den Hochschulen sicher fühlen
können. Die Hochschulen werden ermuntert, die Antisemitimus-Definiton der Internationalen Allianz zum Holocaustgedenken als Grundkonsens zu übernehmen, außerdem seien sie aufgerufen,
Foren zur interkulturellen und interreligiösen Begegnung sowie kritisch-friedlicher Reflexion zu etablieren, wo diese noch nicht bestünden. Die Lehre und Forschung zu
Israel, Judaistik und Antisemitismus sollten ausgebaut werden, und: "Wir ermutigen die Hochschulen, den Austausch mit jüdischen Gemeinden und Studierendenvereinigungen zu vertiefen und
bestehende Kooperationen mit israelischen Hochschulen und Wissenschaftseinrichtungen zu fördern."










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Die "Professorenmehrheit" gehört zu den vermeintlich unverrückbaren Grundgesetzen deutscher Hochschulgovernance. Das Urteil, das sie begründete, ist jetzt genau ein halbes Jahrhundert alt. Was bedeutet das für Hochschulreformen heute und in Zukunft? Ein Gastbeitrag von Hans-Gerhard Husung.






Hans-Gerhard Husung (SPD) war Staatssekretär für Wissenschaft und Forschung in  Berlin und von 2011 bis 2016 Generalsekretär der Gemeinsamen
Wissenschaftskonferenz (GWK). Foto: privat.






AM 29. MAI 1973 fällte das Bundesverfassungsgericht sein "Hochschulurteil" (BVerfGE 35, 79) über die Klage von 398 Professorinnen und Professoren. Sie hatten sich gegen einzelne
Bestimmungen des "Niedersächsischen Vorschaltgesetzes" von 1971 gewehrt, das zu einem späteren Gesamthochschulgesetz hinführen sollte. 600 Beigeladene aus anderen Bundesländern und 70
Prozessvertreter unterstrichen die Bedeutung des Verfahrens als Kulminationspunkt des historischen Ringens um die Gestaltung der Machtverhältnisse in den Hochschulen. Wie war es dazu gekommen? Und warum ist das Urteil heute immer noch so wichtig?



 



Die zu Beginn der 1960er Jahre einsetzende Bildungsexpansion erreichte bald auch die Universitäten. Die überkommene "Ordinarienuniversität" geriet durch das rapide Wachstum der Studierendenzahlen
und damit einhergehend der Professuren und anderer akademischer Personalkategorien zunehmend unter Druck. Die "Integrierte Gesamthochschule", eine Verbindung von Universität, Pädagogischer
Hochschule und Fachhochschule, wurde je nach politischer Couleur als Königs- oder Holzweg propagiert. Willy Brandts Losung 1969 "Mehr Demokratie wagen" beschrieb eine breite Grundstimmung an den
Hochschulen nur zu gut. 



 



Wie die Professoren sich gegen Forderungen
nach einer "Drittelparität" organisierten



 



"Drittelparität" zwischen den Gruppen der Professoren, Wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter und Studierenden war als Forderung ebenso populär wie umstritten, also eine Stimmengleichheit in allen
wichtigen Hochschulgremien und vor allem im Senat. Der "Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaften" entstand in der Professorenschaft zunächst aus der Sorge um die Funktionsfähigkeit der Universitäten,
radikalisierte sich aber zunehmend. Konservative Professoren fanden auch im damaligen Deutschen Hochschullehrerverband ein hochschulpolitisches Sprachrohr.



 



Als bundesweiter Gegenspieler profilierte sich die "Bundesassistentenkonferenz". Die Studierenden organisierten sich in durchweg linken Gruppen. Auch die großen Parteien positionierten sich in
dieser Frage konträr, SPD und FDP einerseits und CDU/CSU andererseits. 



Beginnend 1966 mit Hessen betraten die Länder in diesem hochschulpolitisch aufgeheizten Klima mit ihren ersten Hochschulgesetzen juristisches Neuland. Zugleich versuchten sie, Reformdruck auf die
Bundesebene abzuleiten, und eröffneten noch zu Zeiten der Großen Koalition aus CDU und SPD mit ihrer Zustimmung zur Grundgesetzreforn von 1969 dem Bund die neue Möglichkeit der Rahmengesetzgebung
für den Hochschulbereich. 



 



Nach der Bundestagswahl 1969 lag diese Kompetenz nun in den Händen der sozialliberalen Koalition aus SPD und FDP, die grundsätzlich in der Frage der Gruppenuniversität mit paritätischer
Mitbestimmung ebenso aufgeschlossen waren wie bei der Reformzielsetzung "Gesamthochschule". Die CDU/CSU hingegen sorgte sich vor allem um die Funktionsfähigkeit der Universitäten, die sie
insbesondere durch die politisierten Studierenden in Gefahr sah, und trat dafür ein, in allen Gremien den Hochschullehrern unbedingt die Mehrheit zu sichern.



 



In diesen Kontext gehörte das Niedersächsische Vorschaltgesetz von 1971 aus der Feder des sozialdemokratischen Kultusministers Professor Peter von Oertzen, der für viele seiner Standeskollegen
ein "rotes Tuch" war. Er hatte an einer empfindlichen Stelle den Hebel angesetzt: Zur Gruppe der Professoren sollten nun auch Nichthabilitierte bis hin zu Studienräten im Hochschuldienst sowie
Lektoren und Studienleiter gehören. Zudem führte das Gesetz in den Selbstverwaltungsgremien die Viertelparität aus Hochschullehrern, "Wissenschaftlichen Assistenten", Studierenden und sonstigen
Mitarbeitern ein – faktisch also eine doppelte Entmachtung der "Ordinarien".



 



Richterkritik an der Ordinarienuniversität, Unterstützung von Reformen – und ein großes Aber



 



Der Erste Senat des Bundesverfassungsgerichts unter seinem Vorsitzenden Professor Ernst Benda, zuvor kurze Zeit CDU-Innenminister in der Großen Koalition, kam nach  einer prägnanten Analyse
der historischen, funktionalen und sozialen Entwicklungen der Universitäten in Deutschland seit Humboldt zu seiner Lagebeurteilung, dass in mehrfacher Hinsicht Reformbedarf bestehe: "Die
bisherige Ordinarienuniversität, in der die Selbstverwaltung im Wesentlichen den Lehrstuhlinhabern vorbehalten blieb, war organisatorisch weder auf den sprunghaften Anstieg der Studentenzahl noch
auf die vermehrte Übernahme von Aufgaben und Funktionen durch Nichtordinarien, insbesondere durch wissenschaftliche Assistenten vorbereitet. Die Vergrößerung des akademischen 'Mittelbaus' und
seine zunehmende Bedeutung für den Gesamtprozeß der Wissenschaft standen in einem Mißverhältnis zu seinen geringen Kompetenzen in der Selbstverwaltung. Bei den Studenten verstärkte das Ausbleiben
einer der wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung Rechnung tragenden Studienreform das Begehren, Einfluß auf die Wissenschaftsverwaltung zu nehmen."



 



Durchgreifende Reformen seien seit langem verzögert worden, woran "auch die Ordinarienuniversität Mitverantwortung trägt". Die Interessengegensätze zwischen der Gruppe der Hochschullehrer und den
anderen oft als "unterprivilegiert" bezeichneten Gruppen in der Realität des Hochschullebens seien sehr stark hervorgetreten. Die "Gruppenuniversität" mache diese Interessengegensätze durch ihre
"Gruppentypik" noch deutlicher und könne sie unter Umständen sogar verfestigen. Dieses Modell sei gleichwohl "mit der Wertentscheidung des Art. 5 Abs. 3 GG vereinbar".



 



Da die Garantie der Wissenschaftsfreiheit nicht an eine bestimmte Organisationsform des Wissenschaftsbetriebs gebunden sei und der Gesetzgeber dabei erhebliche Ermessensspielräume habe, sei es
vertretbar, die Gruppenuniversität als ein Instrument zur Lösung der Gruppenkonflikte in der Universität und ein Mittel zur Mobilisierung des Sachverstandes der einzelnen Gruppen zu nutzen, um
auf diese Weise eine bessere Entscheidungsfindung bei der Verwaltung der Universität zu fördern – also bis hierher 1:0 für die Reformer. 



 



In der weiteren verfassungsrechtlichen Rechtfertigung wurde dieser Grundsatz jedoch schrittweise ausgehöhlt, da das Gericht mehrheitlich von einem unmittelbaren kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen
organisatorischen Normen und möglichen Beeinträchtigungen der freien Ausübung von Forschung und Lehre ausging. Es seien nicht die Beschlüsse kollegialer Organe, die die Wissenschaftsfreiheit
faktisch beschränken könnten – also die Praxis der Organe, die im Einzelfall verfassungswidrig sein könnte –, sondern die Organisationsformen der Hochschule selbst, die die Möglichkeiten des
Einzelnen zur Verwirklichung des Grundrechts bestimmten. "Ein effektiver Grundrechtsschutz erfordert daher adäquate organisationsrechtliche Vorkehrungen."



 



Die Prozentrechnung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts



 



Solche Vorkehrungen wollte die Kammer allerdings nicht dem Gesetzgeber überlassen, sondern sie waren Gegenstand ausführlicher Erörterungen des Gerichts, ausgehend von dem einmütig im Ersten Senat
geteilten Grundsatz, "daß zwischen den einzelnen Gruppen der Hochschulangehörigen gewichtige rechtserhebliche Unterschiede bestehen, deren Nivellierung nach dem Schema 'one man one vote' zu Recht
von niemand befürwortet wird." Ins Zentrum rückte die Frage nach der besonderen Stellung der "Hochschullehrer": Aufgrund ihrer herausgehobenen Qualifikation, Funktion und Verantwortung sowie der
Dauer ihrer Zugehörigkeit zur Universität und ihrer Betroffenheit habe der Gesetzgeber zu gewährleisten, dass dieser Gruppe "ein über ihr zahlenmäßiges Gewicht wesentlich hinausgehender Einfluß
auf die Willensbildung in den Organen" eingeräumt werde. 



 



Damit noch nicht genug: Das "Wie" wurde keineswegs dem Gesetzgeber überlassen, sondern präventiv vom Bundesverfassungsgericht weiter konkretisiert. Bei allen Entscheidungen, die unmittelbar die
Lehre betreffen, müssen die Hochschullehrer seitdem über 50 Prozent der Stimmen verfügen. "Bei Entscheidungen, die unmittelbar Fragen der Forschung oder die Berufung der Hochschullehrer
betreffen, muß der Gruppe der Hochschullehrer ein weitergehender, ausschlaggebender Einfluß vorbehalten bleiben", bestimmten die Richter zudem – also mindestens 51 Prozent.



 



Außerdem wurde das Postulat der "homogenen" Zusammensetzung der Gruppe der "Hochschullehrer" entwickelt. Die Position der Hochschullehrer sollte nicht durch Aufnahme anderer Wissenschaftlicher
Hochschulmitglieder verwässert werden, die die Qualifikation nicht erfüllten: Habilitation oder ein sonstiger Qualifikationsbeweis und selbständige Vertretung eines wissenschaftlichen Faches in
Forschung und Lehre . 



 



Damit habe das Gericht seine Funktion überschritten und sich an die Stelle des Gesetzgebers gesetzt, kritisierten zwei Mitglieder des Ersten Senats in ihrem abweichenden Votum. Solange die Grenze
des "Unabstimmbaren" als Kern der Wissenschaftsfreiheit beachtet werde, argumentierten sie, unterliege die weitere Konkretisierung der nur bedingt nachprüfbaren Eigenverantwortung des
Gesetzgebers. Ob der Gesetzgeber dabei sachwidrig oder willkürlich verfahren sei, könne das Bundesverfassungsgericht nachprüfen. Zudem: Ein "ständisches Gruppenprivileg" der "Hochschullehrer" sei
keineswegs unmittelbar aus der Wertentscheidung des Grundgesetz-Artikels 5, Absatz 3 ableitbar. Vielmehr sei eine solche "verfassungskräftige Institutionalisierung" charakteristisch für
"oligarchische Strukturen".



 



Als an den Beratungen Beteiligte verwiesen die beiden Abweichler darauf, dass sowohl bei den Klägern als auch bei der Mehrheit des Senats die aufgewühlte hochschulpolitische Situation eine
bedeutende Rolle gespielt habe. "Bei einer grundlegenden Änderung dieser Situation – etwa bei der Auflösung des derzeitigen Gruppenkonflikts, einer stärkeren Annäherung des Mittelbaus an die
Hochschullehrer oder anderen wesentlichen Veränderungen in der Grundeinstellung der Hochschulangehörigen zueinander" –,  bestehe die Gefahr, dass die Vorgaben des Urteils ein "unerwünschtes
Eigenleben" entwickelten. 



 



Österreich: Gleiche Ausgangslage, 



andere Schlussfolgerungen



 



Wäre ein anderes Urteil mit guten Gründen möglichgewesen? Ein Blick ins Nachbarland Österreich zeigt, dass ein Verfassungsgericht nur wenige Jahre später bei vergleichbarer historischer Ausgangs-
und Verfassungslage in der entscheidenden Frage zu einer anderen Beurteilung kommen konnte. Nachdem die Vorinstanz zunächst ähnlich wie das deutsche Bundesverfassungsgericht argumentiert und
geurteilt hatte, entwickelte  der Österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof 1977 eine deutliche Gegenposition, die bisweilen auch als verklausulierte Kritik am Hochschulurteil des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts verstanden wurde.



 



Mit Blick auf Artikel 17, Absatz 1 der Österreichischen Verfassung ("Die Wissenschaft und ihre Lehre ist frei") kam das Gericht zu der grundsätzlichen Einschätzung, dass auch unter Einbeziehung
der historischen Universitätsentwicklung aus dem "Jedermannsrecht" der Wissenschaftsfreiheit keine Verpflichtung für den Gesetzgeber erwachse, besondere organisatorische Vorkehrungen zugunsten
der Gruppe der Hochschullehrer zu treffen. Denn: "Eine Unterscheidung zwischen einer durch positive Vorkehrungen besonders zu schützenden Wissenschaftsfreiheit der Hochschullehrer und einer
solche zusätzliche Vorkehrungen nicht erfordernden Wissenschaftsfreiheit aller anderen Träger dieses Rechtes aber findet im Wortlaut des Art. 17 Abs. 1 StGG ganz offensichtlich keine Grundlage."
(VfGH 3.10.1977, G 13/76, G 7/77)



 



Das "Hochschulurteil" des Bundesverfassungsgerichts entfaltete indes in Deutschland unmittelbar Wirkung. Im sozialdemokratisch geführten Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft unter
Minister Klaus von Dohnanyi, der die Reformanliegen beim Thema "Gruppenuniversität und Drittelparität" durchaus berücksichtigen wollte, musste der für Herbst 1973 vorgesehene Entwurf
umgeschrieben werden. Die parlamentarischen Beratungen waren kontrovers und langwierig; die Länder im Bundesrat waren gespalten. Erst nach einem ungewöhnlich lange (neun Monate) dauernden
Verfahren im Vermittlungsausschuss zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat konnte das Hochschulrahmengesetz 1976 verabschiedet werden. 



 



Während im Entwurf 1973 lediglich bei Berufungen eine zusätzliche Mehrheit in der Professorengruppe vorgesehen war, ist schließlich nach dem Vermittlungsverfahren die doppelte Mehrheit der
Professoren bei allen Grundsatzfragen von Forschung und bei Berufung von Professoren verankert: Solche Entscheidungen "bedürfen außer der Mehrheit des Gremiums auch der Mehrheit der dem Gremium
angehörenden Professoren.(" HRG 1976, § 38,5 ) 



 



Damit hatte sich die CDU/CSU mit ihrem Fraktionsantrag von 1974 durchgesetzt, und das Hochschulrahmengesetz ging über die einschlägigen Vorgaben des Bundesverfassungsgerichts deutlich hinaus.
Erst in der HRG-Novelle von 1998, mit der die Grundsätze des New Public Management ins Gesetz eingeführt wurden, fand ein Einschwenken auf das "Hochschulurteil" statt. 



 



Obwohl die Länder seit der Grundgesetznovellierung von 2006 ihre eigenen Regelungen treffen können, zeigt ein Blick in die 16 aktuellen Hochschulgesetze, dass in einigen Ländern immer noch auf
die Ur-Fassung des Hochschulrahmengesetzes von 1976 rekurriert wird mit der doppelten Mehrheit der Professoren bei grundsätzlichen Angelegenheiten von Forschung und Lehre. In den meisten
Ländergesetzen finden sich zwei Varianten:Eentweder sind bei Forschung und Berufungen sowie Lehre differenzierte Mehrheiten vorgesehen, oder die Zusammensetzung des Entscheidungsorgans
gewährleistet die absolute Mehrheit der Professoren. Ebenso sorgfältig wird das Homogenitätsgebot beachtet; lediglich die Juniorprofessur hat die Integration in die Professorengruppe geschafft,
obwohl diese Stellen ausdrücklich der Qualifizierung für eine spätere Professur gewidmet sind und zudem das Kriterium der dauerhaften Zugehörigkeit (noch) nicht erfüllt ist. 



 



Es bräuchte schon einen
mutigen Landesgesetzgeber



 



Aufhorchen ließ Thüringen, das mit der viertelparitätischen Zusammensetzung des Senats ein Ausrufezeichen gesetzt hat. Doch die "Revolution" wird im selben Paragraphen wieder
Bundesverfassungsgerichtkonform eingefangen: Bei Entscheidungen zu Forschung, Lehre und Berufungen wird die Professorengruppe zahlenmäßig so aufgestockt, dass ihre absolute Mehrheit gesichert
ist. In Nordrhein-Westfalen wird die zahlenmäßige Zusammensetzung des Senats der jeweiligen Grundordnung überlassen; unabhängig von der Anzahl der Sitze der Professorinnen und Professoren in
diesem Gremium verfügen sie über die Mehrheit der Stimmen, die beispielsweise bei viertelparitätischer Sitzverteilung durch entsprechende Gewichtung der Stimmen gewährleistet wird.



 



In der aktuellen Verfassungsrechtsprechung wird die klassische Paritätenfrage durch neuartige Herausforderungen in Zusammenhang mit dem Neuen Steuerungsmodell überlagert, das den Weg von der
staatlichen Detailsteuerung in die Welt der autonomen, eigenverantwortlichen Hochschule beinhaltet. Mit der Übertragung vormals staatlicher Befugnisse  und damit Veränderungen in der
hochschulischen Organisationsstruktur sind Konstellationen entstanden, die zu Klagen führten. Vom sogenannten Brandenburg-Urteil von 2004 über die Urteile zum Hamburgischen Hochschulgesetz 2010
und die Entscheidung zur Zuweisung von wissenschaftsrelevanten Entscheidungsbefugnissen an Leitungsorgane der Medizinischen Hochschule Hannover 2014 bis hin zum Urteil des Verfassungsgerichtshofs
Baden-Württemberg von 2016 hat sich der Akzent der Rechtsprechung in diese Richtung verschoben.



 



Gestützt auf das "Hochschulurteil" von 1973 wurde vier Jahrzehnte später offensiv der "wissenschaftsrelevante" Bereich jenseits der unmittelbaren Wirkungen auf Forschung und Lehre kritisch
ausgeleuchtet: "Je mehr, je grundlegender und je substantieller wissenschaftsrelevante personelle und sachliche Entscheidungsbefugnisse dem Vertretungsorgan der akademischen Selbstverwaltung
entzogen und einem Leitungsorgan zugewiesen werden, desto stärker muss die Mitwirkung des Vertretungsorgans an der Bestellung und Abberufung und an den Entscheidungen des Leitungsorgans
ausgestaltet sein", heißt es 2014 im Urteil zur Medizinischen Hochschule Hannover (BVerfGE 136,338-385). In der Folge wurden in Hochschulgesetzen in unterschiedlicher Weise  die
Initiativmöglichkeiten der Hochschullehrer zur Abwahl von Hochschulleitungen deutlich gestärkt, die seither im Schatten der professoralen Abwahl agieren.



 



Gibt es Aussicht oder gar erkennbare Ansätze auf eine grundsätzliche Überprüfung des "Hochschulurteils" und eine Anpassung an veränderte Umstände?  Eher nicht – es sei denn, ein mutiger
Landesgesetzgeber, begleitet von breiter bundesweiter hochschulpolitischer Aufbruchstimmung,  traut sich, das Risiko, erneut schmerzlich an das Urteil von 1973 erinnert zu werden, einzugehen
und einen überzeugenden Aufschlag zu machen. Und zu zeigen, dass die Wissenschaftsfreiheit in Hochschulen auf anderen Wegen als durch Mehrheit der Gruppe der Professoren in Organen gesichert
werden könnte. 




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Theory Talk #75: Tarak Barkawi on IR after the West, and why the best work in IR is often found at its marginsIn this Talk, Tarak Barkawi discusses the importance of the archive and real-world experiences, at a time of growing institutional constraints. He reflects on the growing rationalization and "schoolification" of the academy, a disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized within a university audit culture, and the future of IR in a post-COVID world. He also discusses IR's contorted relationship to the archive, and explore future sites of critical innovation and inquiry, including the value of knowledge production outside of the academy. PDF version of this TalkSo what is, or should be, according to you, the biggest challenge, or principal debate in critical social sciences and history?Right now, despite thinking about it, I don't have an answer to that question. Had you asked me five years ago, I would have said, without hesitation, Eurocentrism. There's a line in Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe where he remarks that Europe has already been provincialized by history, but we still needed to provincialize it intellectually in the social sciences. Both sides of this equation have intensified in recent years. Amid a pandemic, in the wreckage of neoliberalism, in the wake of financial crisis, the defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the events of the Trump Presidency, and the return of the far right, the West feels fundamentally reduced in stature. The academy, meanwhile, has moved on from the postcolonial to the decolonial with its focus on alternative epistemologies, about which I am more ambivalent intellectually and politically. Western states and societies are powerful and rich, their freedoms attractive, and most of them will rebound. But what does it mean for the social sciences and other Western intellectual traditions which trace their heritage to the European Enlightenments that the West may no longer be 'the West', no longer the metropole of a global order more or less controlled by its leading states? What kind of implications does the disassembling of the West in world history have for social and political inquiry? I don't have an answer to that. Speaking more specifically about IR, we are dealing now with conservative appropriations of Eurocentrism, with the rise of other civilizational IRs (Chinese, European, Indian). These kinds of moves, like the decolonial one, foreground ultimately incommensurable systems of knowing and valuing, at best, and at worst are Eurocentrism with the signs reversed, usually to China. I do not think what we should be doing right now in the academy is having Chinese social sciences, Islamic social sciences, Indian social sciences, and so on. But that's definitely one way in which the collapse of the West is playing out intellectually. How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?By the time you get to my age you have a lot of debt, mostly to students, to old teachers and supervisors, and to colleagues and friends. University scholars tend not to have very exciting lives, so I don't have much to offer in the way of events. But I can give you an experience that I do keep revisiting when I reflect on the directions I've taken and the things I've been interested in. When I was in high school, I took a university course taught by Daniel Ellsberg, of the Pentagon Papers. As many will know, before he became involved in the Vietnam War, and later in opposing it, he worked on game theory and nuclear strategy. I grew up in Southern California, in Orange County, and there was a program that let you take courses at the University of California, Irvine. I took one on the history of the Roman Empire and then a pair of courses on nuclear weapons that culminated with one taught by Ellsberg himself. I actually had no idea who he was but the topic interested me. Nuclear war was in the air in the early 1980s. Activist graduate students taught the preparatory course. They were good teachers and I learned all about the history and politics of nuclear weapons. But I also came to realize that these teachers were trying to shape (what I would now call) my political subjectivity. Sometimes they were ham handed, like the old ball bearings in the tin can trick: turn the lights out in the room, and put one ball bearing in the can for each nuclear warhead in the world, in 1945 this many; in 1955 this many; and so on. In retrospect, that's where I got hooked on the idea of graduate school. I was aware that Ellsberg was regarded as an important personage. He taught in a large lecture hall. At every session, a kind of loyal corps of new and old activists turned out, many in some version of '60s attire. The father of a high school friend was desperate to get Ellsberg's autograph, and sent his son along with me to the lecture one night to get it. It was political instruction of the first order to figure out that this suburban dad had been a physics PhD at Berkley in the late '60s and early '70s, demonstrating against the Vietnam War. But now he worked for a major aerospace defense contractor. He had a hot tub in his backyard. Meanwhile, Ellsberg cancelled class one week because he'd been arrested demonstrating at a major arms fair in Los Angeles. "We stopped the arms race for a few hours," he told the class after. I schooled myself on who Ellsberg was and Vietnam, the Cold War, and much else came into view. Meanwhile, he gave a master class in nuclear weapons and foreign policy, cheekily naming his course after Kissinger's book, I later came to appreciate. I learned about RAND, the utility of madness for making nuclear threats, and how close we'd come to nuclear war since 1945. My high school had actually been built to double as a fallout shelter, at a time when civil defense was taken seriously as an aspect of a credible threat of second strike. It was low slung, stoutly built, with high iron fences that could be closed to create a cantonment. We were not far from Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station and a range of other likely targets. All of this sank in as I progressed in these courses. Then one day at a strip mall bookstore, I discovered Noam Chomsky's US foreign policy books and never looked back. At Cambridge, I caught the tail end of the old Centre of International Studies, originally started by an intelligence historian and explicitly multi-disciplinary. It had, in my time, historians, lawyers, area studies, development studies, political theory and history of thought, and IR scholars and political scientists. Boundaries certainly existed out there in the disciplines. But there weren't substantial institutional obstacles to thinking across them, while interdisciplinary environments gave you lots of local resources (i.e. colleagues and students) for thinking and reading creatively. What would a student need to become a kind of specialist in your kind of area or field or to understand the world in a global way? Lots of history, especially other peoples' histories; to experience what it's like to see the world from a different place than where you grew up, so that the foreign is not an abstraction to you. I think another route that can create very interesting scholars is to have a practitioner career first, in development, the military, a diplomatic corps, NGOs, whatever. Even only five years doing something like that not only teaches people how the world works, it is intellectually fecund, creative. People just out of operational posts are often full of ideas, and can access interesting resources for research, like professional networks. How, in your view, should IR responding to the shifting geopolitical landscape?  The fate I think we want to avoid is carrying on with what Stanley Hoffmann called the "American social science": the IR invented out of imperial crisis and world war by Anglo-American officials, foundations and thinkers. Very broadly speaking, and with variations, this was a new world combination of realism and positivism. This discipline was intended as the intellectual counterpart to the American-centered world order, designed, among other things, to disappear the question of race in the century of the global color line. The way it conceived the national/international world obscured how US world power worked in practice. That power operated in and through formally sovereign, independent states—an empire by invitation, in the somewhat rosy view of Geir Lundestad—trialed in Latin America and well suited to a decolonizing world. It was an anti-colonial imperium. Political science divided up this world between IR and comparative politics. This kind of IR is cortically connected to the American-centered world fading away before our eyes. It is a kind of zombie discipline where we teach students about world politics as if we were still sitting with the great power peacemakers of 1919 and 1944-45. It is still studying how to make states cooperate under a hegemon or how to make credible deterrence threats in various circumstances. Interestingly, I think one of the ways the collapse of US power is shaping the discipline was identified by Walt and Mearsheimer in their 2013 article on the decline of theory in IR. In the US especially but not only, IR is increasingly indistinguishable from political science as a universal positivist enterprise mostly interested in applying highly evolved, quantitative or experimental approaches to more or less minor questions. Go too far down this road and IR disappears as a distinct disciplinary space, it becomes just a subject matter, a site of empiricist inquiry. Instead, the best work in IR mostly occurs on the edges of the discipline. IR often serves as cover for diverse and interdisciplinary work on transboundary relations. Those relations fall outside the core objects of analysis of the main social science and humanities disciplines but are IR's distinctive focus. The mainstream, inter-paradigm discipline, for me, has never been a convincing social science of the international and is not something I teach or think much about these days. But the classical inheritances of the discipline help IR retain significant historical, philosophical and normative dimensions. Add in a pluralist disposition towards methodology, and IR can be a unique intellectual space capable of producing scholars and scholarship that operate across disciplines. The new materialism, or political ecology, is one area in which this is really happening right now. IR is also a receptive home for debating the questions thrown up by the decolonial turn. These are two big themes in contemporary intellectual life, in and beyond the academy. IR potentially offers distinct perspectives on them which can push debates forward in unexpected ways, in part because we retain a focus on the political and the state, which too easily drop out of sight in global turns in other disciplines. In exchange, topics like the new materialism and the decolonial offer IR the chance to connect with world politics in these new times, after the American century. In my view, and it is not one that I think is widely shared, IR should become the "studies" discipline that centers on the transboundary. How do we re-imagine IR as the interdisciplinary site for the study of transboundary relations as a distinct social and political space? That's a question of general interest in a global world, but one which few traditions of thought are as well-equipped to reflect on and push forward as we are.That's an interesting and forceful critique which also brings us back to a common thread throughout your work: questions of power and knowledge and specifically the relation between power and knowledge in IR and social science. I'm interested in exploring this point further, because so much of your critique has been centered on how profoundly Eurocentric IR is and as a product of Western power. Well, IR's development as a discipline has been closely tied to Western state power. It would seem that it has to change, given the shifts underway in the world. It's like Wile E. Coyote in the Road Runner cartoons - he's run off the cliff. His legs are still moving, but he hasn't dropped, yet. That said, there's no singularly determinate relation between power and the historical development of intellectual traditions. Who knows what kind of new ideas and re-imagining of IR's concepts we might see? As I say, I think one reflection of these changes is that we're already seeing North American IR start to fade into universal quantitative social science. As Hoffmann observed, part of IR's appeal was that the Americans were running the world, that's why you started a social science concerned with things like bipolarity and deterrence, and with analyzing the foreign policy of a great power and its interests and conflicts around the world. Nowadays the Americans are at a late Roman stage of imperial decline. Thinking from the command posts of US foreign policy doesn't look so attractive or convincing when Emperor Nero is running the show, or something altogether darker is waiting in the wings. IR is supposed to be in command of world politics, analyzing them from on high. But what I've seen over the course of my education and career is the way world politics commands IR. The end of the Cold War torpedoed many careers and projects; the 1990s created corps of scholars concerned with development, civil war and humanitarian intervention; in the 2000s, we produced terrorism experts (and critical terrorism studies) and counterinsurgency specialists and critics, along with many scholars concerned in one way or another with Islam. What I have always found fascinating, and deeply indicative, about IR is the relative absence until relatively recently of serious inquiry into power/knowledge relations or the sociology of knowledge. In 1998 when Ole Waever goes to look at some of these questions, he notes how little there was to work from then, before Oren, Vitalis, Guilhot and others published. It's an astounding observation. In area studies, in anthropology, in the history of science, in development studies, in all of these areas of inquiry so closely entangled with imperial and state power, there are long-running, well developed traditions of inquiry into power/knowledge relations. It's a well-recognized area of inquiry, not some fringe activity, and it's heavily empirical, primary sourced based, as well as interesting conceptually. In recent decades you've seen really significant work come out about the role of the Second World War in the development of game theory, and its continuing entwinement with the nuclear contest of the Cold War. I'm thinking here of S.M. Amadae, Paul Erickson, and Philip Mirowski among others. The knowledge forms the American social science used to study world politics were part and parcel of world politics, they were internal to histories of geopolitics rather than in command of them. Of course, for a social science that models itself on natural science, with methodologies that produce so-called objective knowledge, the idea that scientific knowledge itself is historical and power-ridden, well, you can't really make sense of that. You'd be put in the incoherent position of studying it objectively, as it were, with the same tools. IR arises from the terminal crisis of the British Empire; its political presuppositions and much else were fundamentally shaped by the worldwide anti-communist project of the US Cold War state; and it removed race as a term of inquiry into world politics during the century of the global color line. All this, and but for Hoffmann's essay, IR has no tradition of power/knowledge inquiry into its own house until recently? It's not credible intellectually. Anthropologists should be brought in to teach us how to do this kind of thing. You've been at the forefront of the notion of historical IR, and in investigating the relationship between history and theory – why is history important for IR?Well, I think I'd start with the question of what do we mean when we say history? For mainstream social science, it means facts in the past against which to test theories and explanations. For critical IR scholars, it usually means historicism, as that term is understood in social theory: social phenomena are historical, shaped by time and place. Class, state, race, nation, empire, war, these are all different in different contexts. While I think this is a very significant insight and one that I agree with, on its own it tends to imply that historical knowledge is available, that it can be found by reading historians. In fact, for both empiricism and historicism there is a presumption that you can pretty reliably find out what happened in the past. For me, this ignores a second kind of historicism, the historicism of history writing itself, the historiographical. The questions historians ask, how they inquire into them, the particular archives they use, the ways in which they construct meaning and significance in their narratives, the questions they don't ask, that about which they are silent, all of these, shape history writing, the history that we know about. The upshot is that the past is not stable; it keeps changing as these two meanings of historicism intertwine. We understand the Haitian revolution now, or the indigenous peoples of the Americas, entirely differently than we did just a few decades ago.That raises another twist to this problem. Many IR scholars access history through reading historians or through synthetic accounts; they encounter history by and large through secondary sources. One consequence is that they are often a generation or more behind university historians. Think of how Gaddis, for instance, remains a go to authority on the history of the Cold War in IR. In other disciplines, from the 1980s on, there was a historical turn that took scholars into the archives. Anthropologists and literary scholars used historians' tools to answers their own questions. The result was not just a bunch of history books, but entirely new readings of core questions. The classic example is the historical Shakespeare that Stephen Greenblatt found in the archives, rather than the one whose texts had been read by generations of students in English departments. My point here is that working in archives was conceptually, theoretically significant for these disciplines and the subjects they studied. For example, historical anthropology has given us new perspectives on imperialism. While there is some archival work in IR of course, especially in disciplinary history, it is not central to disciplinary debates and the purpose is usually theory testing in which the past appears as merely a bag of facts. In sum, when I say history and theory, I don't just mean thinking historically. I mean actually doing history, being an historian—which means archives—and in so doing becoming a better theorist. Could you expand on these points by telling us about your recent work on military history? I think that military history is particularly interesting because it is a site where war is reproduced and shaped. Military history participates in that which it purports only to study. Popular military histories shape the identities of publics. Staff college versions are about learning lessons and fighting war better the next time. People who grow up wanting to be soldiers often read about them in history books. So our historical knowledge of war, and war as a social and historical process, are wrapped up together. I hope some sense of the promise of power/knowledge studies for larger questions comes through here. I'm saying that part of what war is as a social phenomenon is history writing about it. It's in this kind of context that the fact that a great deal of military history is actually written by veterans, often of the very campaigns of which they write, becomes interesting. Battle produces its own historians. This is a tradition that goes back to European antiquity, soldiers and commanders returning to write histories, the histories, of the wars they fought in. So this question of veterans' history writing is in constitutive relations with warfare, and with the West and its nations and armies. My shorthand for the particular area of this I want to look into is what I call "White men's military histories". That is, Western military history in the modern era is racialized, not just about enemies but about the White identities constructed in and through it. And I want to look at the way this is done in campaigns against racialized others, particularly situations where defeats and reverses were inflicted on the Westerners. How were such events and experiences made sense of historically? How were they mediated in and through military history? I think defeats are particularly productive, incitements to discourse and sense making. To think about these questions, I want to look at the place of veterans in the production of military histories, as authors, sources, communities of interpretation. My sandbox is the tumultuous first year of the Korean War, where US forces suffered publically-evident reverses and risked being pushed into the sea. In a variety of ways, veterans shape military history, through their questions, their grievances, their struggles over reputation, their memories. This happens at many different sites and scales, including official and popular histories, and the networks of veterans behind them as well as other, independently published works. Over the course of veterans' lives, their war throws up questions and issues that become the subject of sometimes dueling and contradictory accounts. Through their history writing, they connect their war experience to Western traditions of battle historiography. They make their war speak to other wars. This is what military history is, and how it can come to produce and reproduce practices of war-making, at least in Anglo-American context. Of course, much of this history writing, like narrations of experience generally, reflects dominant ideologies, in this case discourses of the US Cold War in Asia. But counter-historians are also to be found among soldiers. The shocks and tragic absurdities of any given war produce research questions of their own. At risk of mixing metaphors, the veterans know where the skeletons are buried. They bear resentments and grievances about how their war was conducted that become research topics, and they often have the networks and wherewithal to produce informed and systematic accounts. So as well as reproducing hegemonic discourses, soldier historians are also interesting as a new critical resource for understanding war.This shouldn't be that surprising. In other areas of inquiry, amateur and practitioner scholars have often been a source of critical innovation. LGBTQ history starts outside the academy, among activists who turned their apartments into archives. Much of what we now call postcolonial scholarship also began outside the academy, among colonized intellectuals involved in anti-imperial struggles. Let me close this off by going back to the archive. There are really rich sources for this kind of project. Military historians of all kinds leave behind papers full of their research materials and correspondence. The commanders and others they wrote about often waged extended epistolary campaigns concerned with correcting and shaping the historical record. But more than this, by situating archival sources alongside what later became researched and published histories, what drops out and what goes in to military history comes into view. What is silenced, and what is given voice? We can then see how the violent and forlorn episodes of war are turned into narrated events with military meaning. What is the process by which war experience becomes military history?Given the interdisciplinary nature of your work, what field you place yourself in? And are there any problems have you encountered when writing and thinking across scholarly boundaries?In my head I live in a kind of idealized interdisciplinary war studies, and my field is the intersection of war and empire. Sort of Michael Howard meets Critical Theory and Frantz Fanon. This has given me a particular voice in critical IR broadly conceived, and a distinctive place from which to engage the discipline. The mostly UK departments I've been in have been broadly hospitable places in practice for interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, so long as you published rather than perished. Of course, interdisciplinary is a complicated word. It is one thing to be multi-disciplinary, to publish in the core journals of more than one discipline and to be recognized and read by scholars in more than one discipline. But work that falls between disciplinary centers, which takes up questions and offers answers recognized centrally by no discipline, that's something harder to deal with. I thought after Soldiers of Empire won prizes in two disciplines that I'd have an easier time getting funding for the project I described earlier in the interview. But I've gotten nowhere, despite years of applications to a variety of US, UK, and European funders. Of course, this may be because it is a bad project! My point, though, is that disciplines necessarily, and even rightly, privilege work that speaks to central questions; that's the work that naturally takes on significance in disciplinary contexts, as in many grant or scholarship panels. I think another point here is the nature of the times. Understandably, no one is particularly interested right now in White men's military histories. What I think has really empowered disciplines during my time in the UK academy has been the intersection with audit culture and university management. Repeated waves of rationalization have washed over the UK academy, which have emphasized discipline as a unit of measurement and management even as departments themselves were often "schoolified" into more or less odd combinations of disciplines. Schoolification helped to break down old solidarities and identities, while audit culture needed something on which to base its measures. The great victory of neoliberalism over the academy is evident in the way it is just accepted now that performance has to be assessed by various public criteria. This is where top disciplinary journals enter the picture, as unquestionable (and quantifiable) indicators of excellence. Interdisciplinary journals don't have the same recognition, constituency, or obvious significance. To put it in IR terms, Environment and Planning D or Comparative Studies in Society and History, to take two top journals that interdisciplinary IR types publish in, will never have the same weight as, say, ISQ or APSR. That that seems natural is an indicator of change—when I started, RIS—traditionally welcoming of interdisciplinary scholarship—was seen as just as good a place to publish as any US journal. Now RIS is perceived as merely a "national" journal while ISQ and APSR are "international" or world-class. This kind of thing has consequences for careers and the make-up of departments. What I'm drawing attention to is not so much an intellectual or academic debate; scholars always disagree on what good scholarship is, which is how it is supposed to be. It is rather the combination of discipline with the suffocating culture of petty management that pervades so much of British life. Get your disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized in an audit culture environment, and you can really expand. For example, the professionalization of methods training in the UK has worked as a kind of Trojan Horse for quantitative and positivist approaches within disciplines. In IR, in the potted geographic lingo we use, that has meant more US style work. Disappearing is the idea of IR as an "inter-discipline," where departments have multi-disciplinary identities like I described above. The US idea that IR is part of political science is much more the common sense now than it was in the UK. Another dimension of the eclipse of interdisciplinary IR has been the rise of quantitative European political science, boosted by large, multiyear grants from the ERC and national research councils. It's pretty crazy, strategically speaking, for the UK to establish a civilizational scale where you're always behind the US or its European counterparts. You'll never do North American IR as well as the North Americans do, especially given the disparity in resources. You'll always be trending second or third tier. The British do like to beat themselves up. Meanwhile, making US political science journals the practical standard for "international excellence" threatens to make the environment toxic for the very scholarship that has made British IR distinctive and attractive globally. The upshot of that will be another wave of émigré scholars, which the British academy's crises and reform initiatives produce from time to time. Think of the generation of UK IR scholars who decamped to Australia, an academy poised to prosper in the post-covid world (if the government there can get its vaccination program on track) and a major site right now of really innovative IR scholarship. To return to what you mentioned earlier regarding the hesitancy to go to the archives, this is also mirrored in a hesitancy to do serious ethnography, I think as well. Or there's this "doing ethnography" that involves a three-day field trip. This kind of sweet-shop 'pick and mix' has come to characterize some methodologies, because of these constraints that you highlight…A lot of what I'm talking about has happened within universities, it's not externally imposed or a direct consequence of the various government-run assessment exercises. Academics, eagerly assisted by university managers, have done a lot of this to themselves and their students. The implications can be far reaching for the kind of scholarship that departments foster, from PhDs on up. More and more of the UK PhD is taken up with research methods courses, largely oriented around positivism even if they have critical components. Already this gives a directionality to ideas. The advantage of the traditional UK PhD—working on your own with a supervisor to produce a piece of research—has been intellectual freedom, even when the supervisor wasn't doing their job properly. It's not great, but the possibility for creative, innovative, even field changing scholarship was retained. PhD students weren't disciplined, so to speak. What happens now is that PhD students are subject to a very strict four year deadline, often only partially funded, their universities caring mainly about timely completion not placement and preparation for a scholarly career, a classic case of the measurement displacing the substantive value. The formal coursework they get is methods driven. You can supervise interdisciplinary PhD research in this kind of environment, but it's not easy and poses real risks and creates myriad obstacles for the student. A strange consequence of this, as many of my master's students will tell you, is that I often advise them to consider US PhDs, just in other disciplines. That way, they get the benefit of rigorous PhD level coursework beyond methods. They can do so in disciplines like history or anthropology that are currently receptive both to the critical and the transnational/transboundary. That is not a great outcome for UK IR, even if it may be for critically-minded students. Outside of a very few institutions and scattered individuals, US political science, of course, has largely cleansed itself of the critical and alternative approaches that had started to flower in the glasnost era of the 1990s. That is not something we should be seeking to emulate in the UK.So yes, there's much to say here, about how the four year PhD has materially shaped scholarship in the UK. There is generally very little funding for field work. Universities worried about liability have put all kinds of obstacles in the way of students trying to get to field work sites. Requirements like insisting that students be in residence for their fourth year in order to write up and submit on time further limit the possibilities for field work. The upshot is to make the PhD dissertation more a library exercise or to favor the kind of quantitative, data science work that fits more easily into these time constraints and structures. Again, quite obviously, power sculpts knowledge. It becomes simply impossible, within the PhD, to do the kinds of things associated with serious qualitative scholarship, like learn languages, spend long time periods in field sites and to visit them more than once, to develop real networks there. Over time this shapes the academy, often in unintended ways. I think this is one of the reasons that IR in the UK has been so theoretic in character—what else can people do but read books, think and write in this kind of environment? As I say, the other kind of thing they can do is quantitative work, which takes us right back to the fate Walt and Mearsheimer sensed befalling IR as political science. Watch for IR and Data Science joint degrees as the next step in this evolution. Political Science in the US starts teaching methods at the freshman level. They get them young. We have discussed the rather grim state of affairs for the future of critical social science scholarship, at least in the UK and US. To conclude – what prospects for hope in the future are there?Well, if I had a public relations consultant pack, this is the point at which it would advise talking about children and the power of science to save us. I think the environment for universities, political, financial, and otherwise may get considerably more difficult. Little is untouchable in Western public life right now, it is only a question of when and in what ways they will come for us. The nationalist and far-right turns in Western politics feed off transgressing boundaries. There's no reason to suspect universities will be immune from this, and they haven't been. In the UK, as a consequence of Brexit, we are having to nationalise, and de-European-ise our scholarships and admissions processes. We are administratively enacting the surrender of cosmopolitan achievements in world politics and in academic life. This is not a plot but in no small measure the outcome of democratic will, registered in the large majority Boris Johnson's Conservatives won at the last general election. It will have far reaching consequences for UK university life. This is all pretty scary if you think, as I do, that we are nearer the beginning then the end of the rise of the right. Covid will supercharge some of these processes of de-globalization. I can already see an unholy alliance forming of university managers and introvert academics who will want to keep in place various dimensions of the online academic life that has taken shape since spring 2020. Often this will be justified by reference to environmental concerns and by the increased, if degraded, access that online events make possible. We are going to have a serious fight on our hands to retain our travel budgets at anywhere near pre-pandemic levels. I'm hoping that this generation of students, subjected to online education, will become warriors for in-person teaching. All of this said, it's hard to imagine a more interesting time to be teaching, thinking and writing about world politics. Politics quite evidently retains its capacity to turn the world upside down. Had you told US citizens where they would be on January 6th, 2021 in 2016, they would have called you alarmist if not outlandish. I think we're in for more moments like that. Tarak Barkawi is a professor of International Relations at LSE. He uses interdisciplinary approaches to imperial and military archives to re-imagine relations between war, armed forces and society in modern times. He has written on the pivotal place of armed force in globalization, imperialism, and modernization, and on the neglected significance of war in social and political theory and in histories of empire. His most recent book, Soldiers of Empire, examined the multicultural armies of British Asia in the Second World War, reconceiving Indian and British soldiers in cosmopolitan rather than national terms. Currently, he is working on the Korean War and the American experience of military defeat at the hands of those regarded as racially inferior. This new project explores soldiers' history writing as a site for war's constitutive presence in society and politics.PDF version of this Talk

If you have not been paying attention, our government has decided that all electric vehicles are the solution to the climate problem. At least as long as they are made in the US with union labor and benefits. California has committed to banning the sale of anything else. In today's post, a few tidbits from my daily WSJ reading on the subject. From Holman Jenkins on electric cars:  If the goal were to reduce emissions, the world would impose a carbon tax. Then what kind of EVs would we get? Not Teslas but hybrids like Toyota's Prius. "A wheelbarrow full of rare earths and lithium can power either one [battery-powered car] or over 90 hybrids, but, uh, that fact seems to be lost on policymakers," a California dealer recently emailed me.[Note: that wheelbarrow of rare earths comes from multiple truckloads of actual rocks. Also see original for links.] ...The same battery minerals in one Tesla can theoretically supply 37 times as much emissions reduction when distributed over a fleet of Priuses.This is a shock only to those who weren't paying attention. It certainly isn't lost on government. Chris Atkinson, the Ohio State University sustainable transportation guru whose slogan I've cited before—"the best use of a battery is in a hybrid"—was a key official in the Obama Energy Department.Our policies don't exist to incentivize carbon reduction, they exist to lure affluent Americans to make space in their garages for oversized, luxurious EVs so Tesla can report a profit and so other automakers can rack up smaller losses on the "compliance" vehicles they create in obedience to government mandates.Actually, I vote GMC's 9,000 lb, 1,000 hp. 0-60 in 3 seconds $110,000 electric Hummer the prize for most conspicuous mis-use of Chinese lithium and its associated carbon emissions.  Tesla's new "cyber truck" comes close. I can't wait to see those driving around Palo Alto. Mining the required minerals produces emissions. Keeping the battery charged produces emissions. Jenkins is a pretty good economist. There is supply and demand:  Only if a great deal of gasoline-based driving is displaced would there be net reduction in CO2. But who says any gasoline-based driving is being displaced? When government ladles out tax breaks for EVs, when wealthy consumers splurge on a car that burns electrons instead of gasoline, they simply leave more gasoline available for someone else to consume at a lower price.Stop just a minute and digest this one, if you have not already. If you use less gas, someone else uses more. EV subsidies just shift who uses the gas. The same supply just goes somewhere else. One has to subsidize electrics so much that the price of gas goes down, permanently, so that it's not worth bringing out of the ground. And the price and demand are global. Lower prices encourage Indians and Africans to finally get cheap gas powered cars.  This may be a secret to you, the public. It's not to economists.Well, some economists. Alas my beloved profession is as open to virtue signaling as everyone else so I don't see a loud "stop subsidizing battery only EVs and banning everything else" from economists. The problem here is the problem with any plan to subsidize our way to emissions reduction. Humans are perfectly capable of consuming both renewable and dirty energy in ever-growing quantities if the price is right. The emissions data prove as much....By incorporating carbon taxes into its tax systems, global society might at least slow the rate of CO2 emissions while simultaneously improving the efficiency of its tax codes. It still seemed unlikely, but it wasn't clear why. After all, politicians enact plenty of taxes. Governments have been advised for decades to adopt consumption taxes as a way to fund their welfare states without destroying the possibility of growth. Cramming a lot into one delicious column, Jenkins wonders at human nature: How to explain, along the way, the coevolution of the climate empty gesture with climate rhetoric that increasingly shouts the unfounded claim that climate change threatens human survival? I explain it this way: When it became clear nobody was going to do anything about climate change, it became safe to engage in hysterical rhetoric about climate change....As David Burge put it (thanks to an anonymous colleague for this delicious tidbit)"To help poor children, I am going to launch flaming accordions into the Grand Canyon.""That's stupid.""WHY DO YOU HATE POOR CHILDREN?"Climate change is real. Climate change matters. Addressing it is expensive. Other environmental problems clamor for resources too. Europe has stopped growing, and the US is headed the same way. We don't have trillions to waste. California as always leads the way on the beau geste: ... in California, ... drayage trucks, which carry containerized cargo to and from ports and rail centers, face a looming deadline. The state will require any new drayage trucks added to fleets starting next year to run on electric batteries or hydrogen fuel cells. California also plans to phase out sales of new gasoline-powered passenger cars, pickup trucks and SUVs by 2035 and require all new medium- and heavy-duty truck sales be zero-emissions by 2036. ... Trucks represent 6% of the vehicles on California's roads, but a quarter of the state's on-road greenhouse-gas emissions,.... California plans to spend $1.7 billion for medium- and heavy-duty infrastructure for zero-emission vehicles by 2026.$1.7 billion, for state-provided "infrastructure," on top of the costs to industries... for a benefit of...?  The central problem: How are they going to recharge those trucks? [Truck operators] They position trucks near highways, rail or ports, not available power. As fleets add trucks they may need to draw an additional 6 to 8 megawatts of power or more. "That's about 1,000 homes," said Steve Powell, chief executive of utility Southern California Edison. "We may need a new substation or something like that and a line to be built." It has not been built, and the truck deadline is now. So what do operators do?  A mobile charging system in California runs on natural gas. PHOTO: PROLOGIS MOBILITY, from Wall Street JournalSouthern California Edison has come across some fleets powering chargers using diesel generators...so that new EV trucks don't sit unused. Another solution: more batteries. [Pacific Drayage Services President] Gillis is installing a system of chargers paired with battery storage. It can discharge power to trucks even during times of grid stress. The battery storage itself can recharge at a time of day when electricity prices are the cheapest. There is an important point here on just how many batteries are needed for the "transition."  Don't just count the batteries in the trucks. Count the batteries in the charging stations too. And the utility. Even California knows that it does no good to electrify and then power the grid with coal and natural gas. The plan is for solar and wind electricity, but that needs utility scale battery backup. A week or more of power. The sources of my last post only added up the batteries needed for the cars. That's too low by many multiples.  He is also hedging—Gillis tripled his usual order of new diesel trucks from 30 to 100, which will arrive by year-end, just beating the deadline before California phases them out.I get the idea. Build it and they will come. Put the trucks in place now, so what if at huge cost, and so what if we burn coal to power them. Then when solar and wind and utility scale storage arrive, the users will be there. But trucks don't last that long. By 20 years when all that infrastructure finally has its permits, today's electric trucks will be long gone. Covering Kerry's trip to China, a reminder that climate is all about how China and India develop, not which car San Franciscans use to drive up to Tahoe. The Climate Action Tracker says that between 2015 and 2022 China's greenhouse gas emissions increased nearly 12%, while U.S. emissions declined some 5%. China's methane emissions rose about 3% from 2015 to 2021, the latest year with good data, while the U.S. cut them by 5%.... China's "coal production reached record levels in 2022 for the second year running," and "coal is set to remain the backbone" of China's energy system. No kidding: Between 2020 and 2022, China added some 113 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. The entire world managed to retire some 187 gigawatts of coal plants between 2017 and 2022.As of January China had some 306 coal-fired power stations proposed, permitted or under construction, according to Global Energy Monitor, a nonprofit that tracks worldwide coal-fired power projects of 30 megawatts or more. When finished those plants would generate some 366 gigawatts, or about 68% of the world's total coal capacity under development.As of April China also had 180 new coal mines or mine expansions proposed, permitted or under construction, the nonprofit reported.In a lovely article  Aatish Taseer reminds us there are 1.3 billion people in India (as well as 1.4 billion in China). It's hot, just like it is in Texas. When they reach middle income, they will want air conditioning, just like in Texas. This doesn't make the virtue-signaling tour because there is no easy answer. If China and India don't think they can grow based on solar, wind, and nuclear, just what can we do about it? Send more diplomats? It does not help that the US is now deciding to "disengage" and fight some sort of battle for economic supremacy via industrial policy trade restrictions and tariffs. Even Taiwan on a silver platter isn't going to get China to change. Even if the US shuts down, de-growths, and goes back to subsistence farming, China will spew CO2. I guess the argument is go first to establish a moral example. But if that moral example is obviously self-defeating, pointless, and just money down ratholes to entrenched interests, I doubt it will shame China to much action. A carbon tax, and a Manhattan project to drive down the cost of nuclear would make a whole lot more sense.  (Half the Manhattan project is technical, the other half is to rewrite the regulatory rule book on a wartime schedule.) Think what you could do with the trillion or so dollars going to various subsidies and mandates. Update Read "Old Eagle Eye" excellent July 19 comment below. Boiling it all down to a nutshell, our policy path now is going to produce energy with a lot more materials -- rocks, steel, concrete, batteries, aluminum, carbon fibre -- and energy to produce those materials, relative to fossil fuels or nuclear. Producing those materials also produces more carbon now, with a hoped for savings later.  That the 1970s environmental movement ends up with a huge increase in making stuff from rocks, rather than a service-oriented economy with small impact power, first natural gas and then nuclear, and a light touch upon the earth, is a bit of a paradox.   Also, in addition to spending our trillion dollars and industrial policy wonks on making nuclear cheap and abundant, if a warming climate really is an economic and environmental problem, and given the current policy path is both ineffective and hugely expensive, why should we not even speak or research geoengineering? It's not ideal, but nothing is ideal. 

 Like so many I was saddened to learn of the death of Toni Negri. I never really knew him as a person, only very awkwardly meeting him once, but he was someone who fundamentally shaped and transformed philosophy for me. I wrote my first published paper on Negri, a paper that, as is the case with most seminar papers, was an attempt to make sense of the two books I had read, The Savage Anomaly and Marx Beyond Marx.  That it was published is not the important part, really a product of grad school hubris, the important part was that I am not sure if I would have stayed in grad school had I not written it, or found someone willing to read and discuss it with me, shoutout here to Bill Haver. Negri made it possible for me to conjoin doing philosophy and engaging the world politically, to see these as two sides of the same process, the same practice of philosophy. I should mention that this was before Empire, but just barely. I am not saying that to claim that I was into Negri before he was cool, but just that my first encounter with Negri was in some sense with an outsider. He was rarely talked about in classes, and his books were more associated with the para-academic presses of Autonomedia and Semiotexte than the presses that were translating and publishing the big names of theory, Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan, etc.With the news of his death I started to think about Negri again for the first time in awhile. I had not read anything by Negri in years (the little book on Spinoza was probably the last), nor really engaged with his writings in a long time. Philosophers still have their effects, still shape our thought long after we stop directly reading and writing about them. It just so happened the day that I learned of Negri's death was the day that we met for the Spinoza and Marx seminar. We spent part of the time talking about the importance of Negri's reading. He was not the first Marxist/Spinozist, but Marx-Spinozism would be fundamentally different without him. This is because Negri puts the intersection of metaphysics and politics, ontology and history at the center of his reading of Spinoza  It is well known that Spinoza interrupted his writing of the Ethics, a book he had worked on for years, to write and publish anonymously the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, as political intervention. For Negri this interruption is also a fundamental transformation: Spinoza's engagement with politics and history, with the historical force of the imagination, with the politics of affects, and the reality of power, transforms his understanding of imagination, affects, and power in the Ethics. As Negri writes in a passage that I have cited more than once, and returned to again and again. "After the development of such a radical pars destruens, after the identification of a solid point of support by which the metaphysical perspective re-opens, the elaboration of the pars construens requires a practical moment. The ethics could not be constituted in a project, in the metaphysics of the mode and of reality, if it were not inserted into history, into politics, into the phenomenology of a single and collective life: if it were not to derive new nourishment from that engagement."Negri effectively inverted our image of Spinoza, and with it our image of philosophy, it was no longer a matter of detaching oneself from history and politics in order to contemplate the world, of thinking sub specie aeternitas, but of plunging oneself into the historical moment in order to transform philosophy.In a piece I wrote on Negri that was recently republished in The Production of Subjectivity: Marx and Philosophy I described this transformation as follows:"While the Theologico-Political Treatise constitutes a fundamental displacement of the problems of the Ethics, from order as metaphysical problem to the historicity of the organization of human desires and beliefs, it does not complete this process. The Theologico-Political Treatise does not supplant the Ethics. Negri argues that the Treatise does not follow through on its most radical insights. It begins with the materiality of the imagination, with the power of constitutive praxis, but it ultimately crashes upon the universals of 'natural right' and the 'natural light of religion', universals which undermine the constitutive process. The contract subordinates the powers of society to a transcendent order and a pre-constituted end, thereby limiting the constitutive process. However, the results of the Treatise are fundamentally ambiguous: as much as the contract is introduced as an ordering structure of society, it is modified by the idea of power. As Spinoza writes, 'Nature's right is co-extensive with her power'. This redefinition of right as power fundamentally undermines two of the constitutive dimensions of natural right that philosophy exemplified by the contract, 'the absolute conception of the individual foundation and the absolute conception of the contractual passage'. In place of the absolutely individualistic foundation that paves the way for the absolute authority of the sovereign, Spinoza introduces a new theoretical object, the 'passions of the body social'. Right is coextensive with power: there is no natural state of power nor a final goal, only the historicity of its various organizations. There is thus no transfer of power, no actual passage from potentia to potestas, there is just the organization of potentia, of the striving (conatus), desire (cupiditas), and affects of the multitude. It is precisely this organization that is examined and developed in what Negri calls the 'second foundation' of the Ethics, Parts III and IV which develop the logic and sociability of the passions. This second foundation does not only develop the idea of conatus as the essence of each individual (EIIIP7), it also develops the logic of the affects as the determination of this desire. The affects begin with the most immediate, and simple, determinations – pain, pleasure, love and hate – and gradually unfold to encompass the constitutive conditions and constitutive power of subjectivity, which is not an autonomous starting point but is immersed in the power of affects. 'The nexus of composition, complexity, conflictiveness, and dynamism is a continual nexus of successive dislocations that are neither dialectical nor linear but, rather, discontinuous'. Thus, as much as the Theologico-Political Treatise disrupts the remnants of a metaphysical order, its provocation that the historicity of desire and affects are constitutive of the world, it demands a renewed ontological speculation. It is not the Theologico-Political Treatise or the Ethics that makes up the foundational book of constitutive power, but rather the movement, the displacement, from the one to the other. In Negri's book on Spinoza this movement continues to a reading of the Political Treatise, thus passing from metaphysics (the Ethics) to politics (the Theological Political Treatise) only to return to politics (Political Treatise) which in turn informs a new metaphysics (the 'multitude' as a concept produced in the interstices of the Ethics and the Political Treatise), while at the same time stating that 'Spinoza's true politics is his metaphysics'. This statement should be read not as a choice, placing Spinoza's metaphysical works over his political writings, but as a slogan of displacement. Constitutive power as praxis is developed through a practice of philosophy as a continual displacement that moves from metaphysics to politics and back, and this movement continues beyond a reading of Spinoza."One can find a similar trajectory of movement in Negri's thought in his reading of Marx in which it is the same concepts, most specifically "living labor" that traverse a line from economics, to ontology, and then to politics. Negri reading of Marx, especially in the book known in the US as Insurgencies, but in the rest of the world as Constituent Power, reads the early Marx's idea of democracy back into the latter Marx. Marx's politics is his metaphysics, is labor as the constitution of the world. As Negri writes, "As long as we follow the political Marx, political revolution and social emancipation are two historical matrices that intersect on the same terrain—the constitutional terrain—but still in an external manner, without a metaphysical logic of this intersection being given…This necessity resides at the core of Marx's theory of capital, where living labor appears as the foundation, and the motor of all production, development, and innovation. This essential source also animates the center of our investigation. Living labor against dead labor, constituent power against constituted power: this single polarity runs through the whole schema of Marxist analysis and resolves it in an entirely original theoretical practical totality."What I have tried to focus on here is what I have called, following Althusser and Balibar, is Negri's practice of philosophy, his way of doing philosophy (this was also the focus of the essay cited above). It is a trajectory which constantly moves from history and politics into ontology and from ontology into politics and history without ever, it seems to me, using a historical moment to criticize an ontology or developing an ontology that would ground a politics. It is a trajectory of displacement and transformation in which history, politics, and economics transform philosophical speculation, ontology and metaphysics, while at the same time philosophical speculation transform and reimagine the possibility of political practice. It would seem to me that this is the fundamental orientation that defines Negri's thought, and it is this orientation which is eternal, which continues to live, even after the concepts produced by that trajectory pass away, as they would have to being products of a given historical moment. (Here I have to recommend Roberto Nigro's little book Antonio Negri: Une Philosophie de la Subversion, which I read in the week since Negri's death. Nigro reminds us that the question of the historical relevance of particular concepts, was in some sense the central political and philosophical trajectory of not just Negri's thought but of what is called autonomist thought or post-autonomist thought. Concepts like the mass worker, the social worker, general intellect, and multitude are not just different theoretical positions, but also attempts to make sense of the shifting and changing nature of capitalism itself.) What Negri proposed for philosophy is not easy, and I would even argue that not even Negri always did it well. (In some sense this is a specific version of the general problem of doing philosophy after Marx). It is easy to err on both sides, to simply let a historical, economic, or political transformation stand in for a philosophical analysis, or, on the other side, to dissolve the specificity of a historical moment into a general ontological concept. However, as Spinoza wrote, "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare." When it is done well such a method of displacement, of pars destruens/pars construens, promises a transformation of both philosophy and politics. (I would say that Negri's Savage Anomaly, Marx Beyond Marx, and the book on constituent power to name a few are nothing less than models of this method). What Negri proposed in his readings of Spinoza and Marx (among others) was nothing less than a transformation of philosophy, to borrow Althusser's formulation, a transformation that would make philosophy radical and materialist--a transformation that is still ongoing, still striving to produce its effects. It is that aspect of Negri's thought which transformed, and continues to transform my approach to philosophy. 

Seeing Nope at the Bridgton Twin Drive In Movie critics, even amateur ones, love puns, love working the title into their reviews in some sort of play on words. So it takes a certain amount of confidence to call a film "Nope". It just invites too many titles for negative reviews, say "Nope to nope" and so on. In the case of Peele that confidence is earned. It is the third movie by a director who is developing his own vision in an era where such things as vision or style, even directors as auteurs, are increasingly obsolete. The title of Nope recalls the title of Peele's first film, Get Out  which was an homage to Eddie Murphy's bit about how a haunted house movie would never work with a black family, they would Get Out at the first warning.  Just as Get Out was about a man, Chris who ignored all the warnings and did not "get out" until it was almost too late, Nope is a film about about saying yes, about going towards the horror rather than away from it. It seems to me that any attempt to understand the film has to begin with that, why do the characters not just say "nope" and walk away. That question seems central to the film.Nope is about  OJ or Otis Jr. (Daniel Kaluuya.) and Emerald "Em" Haywood (Keke Palmer) who, at the beginning of the film, inherit Haywood Hollywood Horses a horse ranch that trains and supplies horses for films, television, and commercials when their father is mysteriously struck and killed by nickel falling from the sky. Metal objects falling from the sky is the first hint that things are amiss in their little valley, but it is not the beginning of the Haywood family problems. Their family business, as the trailer below indicates, has been in Hollywood since before there was a Hollywood. Their great great great grandfather was the unidentified jockey in Muybridge's famous footage of a horse galloping.  It is a secret legacy, one obscured by the official history which remembers Muybridge but forgets the jockey. The Haywood's have no official claim to any real legacy, OJ and Em still have to work for every job.. He handles the horses and she handles the people, he is the craftsman and she is the salesperson. However, when a horse almost injures an actor on the set of a commercial all of their skills are quickly replaced with a CGI prop horse. What does a legacy, a connection to the past mean in an industry, and in a country, that is constantly retelling its story, reinventing itself. What do skills mean in an economy that is constantly deskilling, replacing knowledge with technology?
This same question burdens the Haywood's neighbor, Ricky "Jupe" Park (Steven Yeun) a former child star who now runs a wild west show capitalizing on his role as "Kid Sheriff". Jupe was also the star of a short lived but popular show called Gordy's Home that ended after one season when its chimpanzee star went on a rampage on set and killed and mutilated several of its cast members. Jupe works with one version of the past, a western theme park, one myth, but hidden behind his office is a museum to the tragic history of the show which might be a more lucrative attraction. A Dutch couple once paid thousands just to sleep in the museum.Television, or memories of television, play a central part in all of Peele's films from the commercial for the United Negro College Fun that pops up in Get Out to "Hands Across America" that underlies Us.  This is because Peele understands that our memories, collective and individual, are made as much by what happens on screens than in the so-called real world.  Peele's three films, Get Out, Us, and Nope, can be placed in a progression in terms of these video memories. In the first, Get Out, we hear the United Negro College Funds' slogan, "A mind is a terrible thing to waste" in a commercial in the background just as Chris is about to have his mind wasted; in Us the image of hands across America is Adelaide/Red's primary memory and the structure of the tethered's revolution; and in Nope Jupe's traumatic memory of Gordy proves to be central to the whole film. Peele weaves together the audience's and characters memories of old commercials, media events, and cheesy sitcoms because these things make up our world as much as the clouds and desert of the valley. OJ, Em, and Jupe are all linked by the way that they deal with a legacy, with a past. In the case of OJ and Em this legacy was recorded but never credited, no one knows the name of the jockey in the famous pictures that created cinema, they are in some sense erased from history. They need to create their reputation anew, selling their business and their skills to clients without a legacy to claim. Jupe on the other hand seems tied to a traumatic past that he can neither escape nor entirely live off of. His niche fame or infamy does not provide enough to live on, but it is what people remember.

Jordan Peele posted the opening credits to his fictional show within the film on this twitter pageWhen what appears to be an alien spaceship appears in the valley OJ, Em, and Jupe all see it as an opportunity to change their condition. Em and OJ decide to photograph the alien spaceship, to get proof of alien life so incontrovertible that it cannot be contested. Proof of alien life will pay off enough to save the ranch and set them up for life. As they are trying to capture the elusive craft on film it turns out that Jupe has already started to profit off of the visitors, incorporating them into his wild west show. He has been buying horses from OJ and offering them to the alien ship. Jupe makes his offerings in front of a paying audience, exchanging the alien's mysterious desire for horses for a spectacle of an otherworldly being. It appears to be a fair trade, horses for a glimpse at the ship, but how can one understand what an alien understands or wants? Nope approaches this question by way of another question, how can we know what a non-human animal understands or wants? Understanding how we would communicate with alien minds is answered by asking how do we communicate with minds that are already other, with animals.This question is approached from two angles. First, there is the traumatic event of Jupe's past, the day that a seemingly trained chimpanzee was startled by a balloon popping and went on a rampage, killing and mutilating the cast. Jupe hid under the table and was not only spared in the rampage, but Gordy the Chimp was even about to give him his trademark fist bump before he was shot and killed. From his survival Jupe thinks he understands something about human animal communication, and thus, by proxy, how to communicate with aliens, give them what they want in exchange for something you want. In this case horses for a show. Second, there is OJ who does not presume to understand what horses want, but works from the premise that the first thing you need to understand about animals, and thus aliens, is that you do not see or understand how they do. A horse sees things differently, and to tame the horse, to work with it safely on a set, you have to understand that. To this basic principle OJ adds a second caveat he learned from his father, that some animals don't want to be tamed, a warning that OJ applies specifically to predators. As he argues you cannot tame a predator, the best you can do is collaborate with it, entering into an uneasy partnership. SPOILER ALERT: It turns out that the alien spacecraft is not a space craft at all but an alien monster. It is not sucking people and horses up to probe them or capture them for an alien zoo, but sucking them up to eat them. It is a predator. This is why it was not satisfied with the offer of a horse when it could gobble up the whole audience. It cannot be bargained with, but it can be appeased. OJ figures out that the only way to avoid the alien is to avoid looking at it--to not appear to be a threat. Incidentally this, and not the fist bump, may have been what actually saved Jupe when Gordy went on a rampage. Hiding under the table he avoided making eye contact with Gordy.  Gordy did not spare him because they were friends, but because he did not look Gordy in the eye.OJ's strategy to photograph the alien creature without looking at it is a strategy that ties together the two themes of the film. First, and most immediately what could be considered the problem of different minds. In order to understand a different creature you have to understand how it sees things differently. A balloon is just a balloon to us, but a different creature might see it as a threat (or as potential food). Second, the difference between legacy and history is the difference of seeing. A legacy unseen, or unidentified is not a legacy at all. The characters of Nope have all been cast out from the spectacle, Jupe is former child star, OJ and Em have a connection with Hollywood history that was never recognized, even Angel, the tech support staff who helps OJ and Em instal their cameras, has been discarded in a way, it turns out his girlfriend  broke up with him when she got cast in a show on the CW. Hollywood, the spectacle eats people and spits them out, not unlike the way a space monster eats people and spits out the undigestible bits of metal like coins and keys. The spectacle of Hollywood doesn't need to hunt its prey. They are all desperate to get their legacy back, to get back into the spectacle, to capture what Em refers to as the Oprah shot, the money shot. However, the spectacle is a monster, it eats people and spits them out. To look at it is to be drawn in, to be eaten up. The only way to capture the spectacle, to get a picture of the creature, is ultimately not to look at it. Years ago I remember reading that Jordan Peele planned to make five films about social issues. The first was Get Out which is generally recognized to be about race, the second was Us, which I argue can be about class. I am not sure if Nope can be said to be about something in the same way in which the horror is an allegory for some social issue, but at the same time its story of how people cast out by Hollywood, not a part of its official history, trying to avoid being literally eaten alive by a spectacle. No wonder Peele considers it his most personal film. Peele has managed to somehow create a spectacle, this is his most blockbuster film, without being sucked into its maw. 

"Of course, a little bit of force is needed when doing push-backs."Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, ehemalige kroatische PräsidentinKroatien, ein Staat, der gemeinsam mit Slowenien am 25. Juni 1991 seine Unabhängigkeit vom jugoslawischen Bundesstaat erklärte und damit einer der Akteure der schwersten Kriege in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wurde, ist seit 2013 Mitglied der Europäischen Union, die vor allem als Friedens- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft gegründet wurde. Doch viele Stimmen äußern sich kritisch gegenüber dem Beitritt des Staates und sind der Meinung, dass Kroatien besonders im gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Kontext noch nicht bereit dazu wäre, Mitglied der Gemeinschaft zu sein.Die Europäische Kommission sieht das allerdings anders und ist der Meinung, dass die kroatische Politik große Fortschritte macht. Sie äußert sich bereits zuversichtlich über den kommenden Beitritt in den Schengen-Raum, der Bürger*innen der EU die Freiheit gibt, ohne ein Visum in viele Länder der Welt reisen zu dürfen. Doch an den kroatischen Grenzen gibt es Berichten zufolge immer wieder Fälle von Gewalt und Rechtswidrigkeiten von Seiten der Polizei gegenüber Asylsuchenden. Die ehemalige kroatische Präsidentin Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović äußert sich in einem Interview mit dem oben aufgeführten Zitat zu den Menschenrechtsverletzungen.Wenn die kroatische Wirtschaft betrachtet wird, können einige Problematiken beobachtet werden, vor denen kroatische Politiker*innen stehen, wie beispielsweise die Arbeitsmigration von kroatischen Jugendlichen aufgrund von Umständen wie niedrigen Löhnen.Der folgende Beitrag soll auf diese und weitere Aspekte der kroatischen Politik näher eingehen und damit eine Bilanz nach 8 Jahren EU-Mitgliedschaft Kroatiens ziehen. Wie kam es zum Beitritt Kroatiens in die EU und welche Kriterien mussten erfüllt werden? Vor welchen Hindernissen steht der Staat und wie geht die Europäische Union mit diesen um? Diese Fragen sollen im Anschluss geklärt werden, bevor die Frage gestellt werden kann: Ist Kroatien überhaupt bereit für die Europäische Union?EU-Beitritt2003 ging das Beitrittsgesuch Kroatiens nach Brüssel und 10 Jahre später wurde das Land schließlich Mitglied der Europäischen Union. 2011 unterschrieb die Regierungschefin Jadranka Kosor den Beitrittsvertrag und legte damit den Grundstein für den 2013 in Kraft getretenen Beitritt des Landes in die Europäische Union. In diesem langen Prozess kam es zu einigen Hindernissen, die die Beitrittsverhandlungen herauszögerten und nach wie vor die Problematiken innerhalb des Landes widerspiegeln. (vgl. BPB 2013)Die Bevölkerung Kroatiens wurde erst nach dem unterschriebenen Beitrittsvertrag zu der Thematik befragt. Dabei stimmten 67% für einen Beitritt in die Europäische Union. Die Wahlbeteiligung fiel allerdings sehr gering aus, was unter anderem daran liegen könnte, dass die Abstimmung nur sechs Wochen zuvor angekündigt wurde. (vgl. ebd)Der 2011 unterschriebene Beitrittsvertrag war mit einigen Bedingungen verbunden, die bis zum letztendlichen Beitritt im Jahr 2013 erfüllt werden sollten. Hierbei ging es darum, grundlegende Defizite innerhalb des Landes zu beseitigen. Beispielsweise musste der Justizapparat gestärkt werden. Außerdem sollte stärker gegen Korruption vorgegangen sowie eine effizientere Verwaltung gewährleistet werden. Der letzte Punkt umfasst die Privatisierung der Staatsbetriebe. (vgl. ebd)Im Großen und Ganzen möchte die Europäische Union durch die Eingliederung Kroatiens den Übergang zu Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie vorantreiben. Denn Kroatien war Teil des blockfreien, sozialistischen Jugoslawiens mit all den Folgewirkungen (vgl. Kušić 2013).Kopenhagener KriterienAuf dem EU-Gipfel in Kopenhagen wurden im Jahr 1993 Kriterien aufgestellt, anhand derer geprüft wird, ob ein Land dazu bereit ist, in die Europäische Union aufgenommen zu werden. Zusammengefasst sind das folgende Faktoren:Die Gesamtlage innerhalb des Landes muss stabil sein. Das heißt, politische Institutionen, der Rechtsstaat und die Demokratie muss gesichert sein. Außerdem müssen Menschen- und Minderheitsrechte gewahrt werden. (vgl. Grosse-Hüttmann 2004, S. 7)Zudem muss eine funktionierende Marktwirtschaft vorhanden sein, die auf Wettbewerb und Privateigentum beruht. Dadurch sollen die Staaten in der Lage sein, dem Konkurrenzdruck im Binnenmarkt standhalten zu können. (vgl. ebd., S. 7)Der Aquis Communautaire, also alle Verträge der Europäischen Gemeinschaft sowie alle europäischen Gesetze, müssen in nationales Recht übernommen werden. Alle Pflichten und Regeln müssen von dem jeweiligen Staat akzeptiert und eingehalten werden. (vgl. ebd., S. 7 f.)Der Staat muss mit den weitreichenden Zielen der EU sowie der Währungs- und Wirtschaftsunion einverstanden sein, wie sie im Vertrag von Maastricht estgelegt wurden. Dadurch soll verhindert werden, dass neue Mitglieder einen anderen Weg einschlagen als die Europäische Union. (vgl. ebd., S. 8)Da Kroatien nun seit 8 Jahren Mitglied der Europäischen Union ist, scheinen diese Kriterien aus Sicht der Institutionen der Europäischen Union erfüllt zu sein. Dennoch musste der Staat zunächst an einigen Stellen arbeiten, um dieses Ziel erreichen zu können.Flüchtlingsrückkehr und KriegsverbrecherprozesseEine wichtige Bedingung, die im Jahr 2005 gestellt wurde und ein großes Hindernis für den Beitritt darstellte, war der Umgang mit kroatischen Kriegsverbrechern, die in den Unabhängigkeitskriegen Verbrechen begangen haben und zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch nicht ausreichend sanktioniert wurden. Die Europäische Union forderte volle Kooperation mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof. Vor allem ging es dabei um die Auslieferung von Ante Gotovina, der in der kroatischen Offensive Operation "Oluja" Kriegsverbrechen begangen hat. (vgl. Kušić 2021)Gerade wenn es um die Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechern sowie um die Flüchtlingspolitik geht, kann bisher nur ein eher mäßiger Erfolg verzeichnet werden. Die Problematik kann darauf zurückgeführt werden, dass die Staatswerdung Kroatiens mit kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen erfolgt ist, so dass sich nationalistische Strukturen innerhalb der Gesellschaft und der Politik verfestigt haben. (vgl. Richter 2009, S. 7) Trotz alledem gilt Kroatien als eines der stabilsten Länder auf dem Balkan, der sich derzeit innerhalb eines Prozesses der Wechselwirkung zwischen innenpolitischer Demokratisierung und Stabilisierung befindet. (vgl. Richter 2009, S. 19)Die Premierminister Ivica Račan (2000-2003) und Ivo Sanader (2003-2009) haben versucht, die Wünsche der Europäischen Union im Bereich Flüchtlingsrückkehrer und Kriegsverbrechen umzusetzen. Dabei ging es hauptsächlich um Aspekte wie den Koalitionsfrieden, einen parteiübergreifenden Konsens zugunsten der Union, Stabilisierung und Konsolidierung. Der Preis waren allerdings Reformdefizite im Justizsektor, die die EU ebenfalls zuvor bemängelte.Durch blockierte Anträge, nicht veröffentlichte Fristen oder nicht ausgeführte richterliche Anweisungen kam es schließlich zu Defiziten im Bereich der Rückkehrpolitik und Kriegsverbrechen. Diese Politik führte zwar zu mehr Stabilität und Kontinuität des innenpolitischen Reformprozesses, jedoch wurden die Kopenhagener Kriterien vernachlässigt, so dass sich Defizite im Justiz- und Verwaltungsprozess verfestigen konnten. (vgl. Richter 2009, S. 19)Die von der Europäischen Union anerkannte Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention soll Flüchtlingen auf der ganzen Welt Schutz bieten. Doch oftmals sieht die Realität, auch innerhalb der EU anders aus. Vor allem an der kroatischen Grenze zu Bosnien und Herzegowina berichten Menschen davon, über die grüne Grenze zurückgeschickt zu werden. Ihnen zufolge haben sie keinen Zugang zu Asyl und erfahren oftmals exzessive Gewalt von Seiten der kroatischen Polizei. (vgl. Strippel 2021)Dieses Phänomen wird auch Push-Back genannt und bedeutet, dass Menschen, die auf Asyl in Kroatien hoffen, wieder nach Bosnien und Herzegowina abgeschoben werden, wo sie ebenfalls nicht empfangen werden. Diese Verfahren sollten im Normalfall zur Kenntnis genommen und geprüft werden, doch die kroatische Regierung dementiert das Vorgehen der Polizei. Es wird lediglich betont, dass die kroatischen Außengrenzen geschützt werden.Dadurch, dass es keine Einigkeit über diese Vorfälle gibt, werden diese von der Europäischen Union nicht sanktioniert beziehungsweise zur Kenntnis genommen, obwohl es sich hierbei um die Verletzung von Menschenrechten und Missachtung der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention handeln würde. (vgl. Strippel 2021) Einen interessanten Podcast zu dieser Thematik wurde vom Bayerischen Rundfunk veröffentlicht, dieser ist unter diesem Link zu finden.Kroatien und der SchengenraumLänder, die Teil des Schengen-Raums der EU sein wollen, müssen sich einer Vielzahl von Evaluierungen unterziehen, die prüfen, ob alle für den Schengen-Raum erforderlichen Vorschriften erfüllt worden sind. Die Evaluierungen bewerten, ob das jeweilige Land in der Lage ist, Verantwortung für die Außengrenzen im Namen der anderen Mitglieder des Raumes zu übernehmen. (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2019)2016 wurde der Schengen-Evaluierungsprozess eingeleitet, der bewerten soll, ob Kroatien die Schengen-Vorschriften und Normen erfüllt. Die Europäische Kommission ist dabei der Auffassung, dass Kroatien Fortschritte bei der Erfüllung der Voraussetzungen gemacht hat, weiterhin aber an deren Erfüllung, insbesondere am Management der Außengrenzen, arbeiten muss. (vgl. ebd.) Der Kommissar Dimitris Avramopoulos, welcher für Migration, Bürgerschaft und Inneres zuständig ist, äußert sich im folgenden Zitat über den voraussichtlichen Beitritt Kroatiens zum Schengen-Raum:"Schengen ist eine der größten und greifbarsten Errungenschaften der europäischen Integration. Seine Stärke hängt jedoch von seiner Aufnahmebereitschaft ab. Kroatien hat nun die Maßnahmen zur Erfüllung der notwendigen Bedingungen ergriffen, und wir müssen dies anerkennen. Als vollwertiges Schengen-Mitglied wird das Land zu einer weiteren Stärkung des Schengen-Raums beitragen und dafür sorgen, dass die EU-Außengrenzen besser geschützt werden." (Dimitris Avramopoulos, Europäische Kommission 2019)Das gesamte Statement der Europäischen Kommission zu dieser Thematik wurde auf deren Internetseite veröffentlicht.Wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen im EU-KontextNach Weidenfeld und Wessels (2002) hat die Europäische Union zusammengefasst drei grundlegende Ziele, wenn es um die Struktur ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und vor allem um Regionen mit Entwicklungsrückstand geht. Zum einen sollen diese Regionen und Länder besonders gefördert werden. Nach Auffassung der Europäischen Union besteht dann ein Rückstand, wenn sich das BIP je Bürger*in auf weniger als 75% des EU-Durchschnitts beläuft. Dieses Ziel gilt als Priorität, weshalb mehr als zwei Drittel der Strukturfonds zur Beseitigung dieser Rückstände verwendet werden. (vgl. Weidenfeld/Wessels 2002)Als zweites Ziel gilt die soziale und wirtschaftliche Umstellung von Gebieten, deren Entwicklungsniveau über dem Durchschnitt liegt. Dennoch weisen diese Gebiete Strukturprobleme, wie beispielsweise Deindustrialisierung, eine hohe Arbeitslosenquote, Bevölkerungsrückgang oder Krisensituationen auf, die mit Hilfe der Mittel der Europäischen Union aufgefangen werden sollen. Das dritte Ziel ist die Anpassung und Modernisierung von Ländern und Regionen. (vgl. ebd.)Das EU-Förderprogramm für den Staat Kroatien beinhaltet 10,74 Milliarden Euro und soll die kroatische Wirtschaft unterstützen. Dabei gehen 40% in Fonds für regionale Entwicklung, 24% in Kohäsionsfonds, 19% in Landwirtschaftsfonds, 14% in Sozialfonds und der Rest in Meeres- und Fischereifonds sowie in eine Jugendbeschäftigungsinitiative. (vgl. Holzner/Vidovic 2018, S. 10)Ziel der Unterstützung ist es vor allem, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Kroatiens voranzutreiben, die Armut innerhalb der Gesellschaft zu bekämpfen und den Arbeitsmarkt zu verbessern. Die Inanspruchnahme ist im Vergleich zu anderen EU-Ländern allerdings gering, nimmt aber immer weiter zu. Das langsame Vorgehen könnte damit zusammenhängen, dass die Entwicklungsfähigkeit des Landes derzeit noch nicht so weit ausgeprägt ist, dass die Fonds angemessen verwaltet werden können. (vgl. ebd., S. 25)Ein wichtiges Infrastrukturprojekt, das sich derzeit in Baumaßnahmen befindet und von der kroatischen Regierung mithilfe der EU-Fonds gestartet wurde, ist der Bau der Pelješac-Brücke, welche das Festland mit der vorgelagerten Halbinsel verbinden soll. 357 Millionen von 550 Millionen Kosten werden von der EU getragen. Allerdings erhielt der chinesische Staatskonzern Communications Construction Company den Zuschlag für den Bau, was vielerorts für Erstaunen sorgte. (vgl. Mihm 2021)Weitere Ziele, die die EU-Mitgliedschaft mit sich bringen soll, sind die Ansiedlung einer EU-Einrichtung, die Einführung der goldenen Investitionsregel sowie vor allem der Eintritt in den Schengenraum. (vgl. Holzner, Vidovic 2018)Einfluss des BrexitDas Vereinigte Königreich selbst führte den Euro als Währung nicht ein und trotzdem hat der Austritt Großbritanniens aus der Europäischen Union einen großen Einfluss auf die Währungsintegration und somit auch auf die Währungspolitik Kroatiens und das Verhältnis zur Europäischen Union.Bei den acht Mitgliedsstaaten, die den Euro noch nicht eingeführt haben, den so genannten "Euro-Outs", kann zunehmend die Befürchtung beobachtet werden, dass ihr Einfluss auf den Willensbildungsprozess innerhalb der Union verringert wird. Als Folge dieser Sorge hat sich eine Art Koalition von Staaten entwickelt, die die Interessen einiger Mitglieder vereint. Der Brexit kann also als Auslöser für eine neue Dynamik und Treiber für die Ausdehnung der Eurozone gesehen werden. (vgl. Tokarski; Funk 2018, S. 1)Kroatien gehört zu der Gruppe der "Euro-Outs". Sie sind eine heterogene Gruppe von Staaten, die verschiedenen Wirtschaftsmodellen folgen und sich in unterschiedlichen Stadien ihrer Entwicklung befinden. Rumänien und Kroatien sind darunter die Staaten, die ein Wechselkursregime mit kontrolliertem, variablem Wechselkurs unterhalten. Die Problematik hinsichtlich der ungleichen ökonomischen Bedingungen ist, dass diese die Kooperation zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten erschweren. Allerdings gilt Kroatien als Spezialfall, denn auch wenn der Euro als Währung noch nicht eingeführt wurde, ist die Wirtschaft weitgehend "euroisiert", da 67% der Verbindlichkeiten und 75% der Anlagen auf dem Euro basieren. (vgl. ebd., S. 1 f.) Die Einführung der europäischen Währung ist also nur eine Frage der Zeit und eine Frage des politischen Fortschritts.ArbeitsmarktAufgrund der Überbewertung des realen Wechselkurses befand sich die Wirtschaft Kroatiens zwischen 2009 und 2014 in einer tiefen Rezession, was dazu führte, dass die Beschäftigungszahlen sanken und das BIP um fast 13% einbrach. Seit dieser Zeit sinken die Zahlen der Arbeitslosen, somit erreichte die Arbeitslosenquote innerhalb des Landes im Mai 2017 den niedrigsten Wert mit 11,7%. (vgl. Holzner, Vidovic 2018, S. 2 f.)Bis heute ist der kroatische Arbeitsmarkt gekennzeichnet durch geringe Erwerbstätigkeit und niedrige Beschäftigung, was ein massives Problem darstellt. Die Beschäftigtenrate ist niedriger als der EU-Durchschnitt. Neben Italien und Rumänien hat Kroatien den höchsten Anteil an inaktiven Bürger*innen innerhalb der Europäischen Union. (vgl. ebd., S. 4 f.)Besonders Jugendliche und Kroat*innen mit primären Ausbildungen sind von Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen. Personen mit Sekundärbildung können die geringste Arbeitslosigkeit aufweisen. Trotzdem wird oft der Mangel an Arbeitskräften vor allem in touristischen Gebieten bemängelt. (vgl. ebd., S. 5 f.)Zur Lösung dieser Problematik fordern Gewerkschaften höhere Löhne für Arbeiter*innen. Einige Vertreter*innen von Unternehmen fordern allerdings die Erhöhung der Quoten für Arbeitsplätze aus dem Ausland. (vgl. ebd., S. 6)ArbeitsmigrationBereits seit den 60er Jahren, in denen viele Gastarbeiter*innen vom Balkan in Länder wie Deutschland und Österreich immigrierten, um ihre Familien zu ernähren, spielt die Thematik Arbeitsmigration in Kroatien eine wichtige Rolle. Bis heute nutzen viele Kroat*innen die besseren Arbeitsumstände und Löhne in Ländern wie Deutschland, um ihren Familien ein besseres Leben ermöglichen zu können.Seit dem Beitritt Kroatiens zur Europäischen Union sind die Zahlen der Migrant*innen aus Kroatien um 38% gestiegen. Insbesondere war hierfür die Öffnung des kroatischen Arbeitsmarktes verantwortlich, der es kroatischen Staatsbürger*innen ermöglichte, in anderen Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Union ihren Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen. Die Mehrheit der Kroat*innen ist im Alter zwischen 25 und 54 Jahren und findet Beschäftigung in der Industrie sowie in der Bauwirtschaft. (vgl. Holzer, Vidovic 2018)Aufgrund von Faktoren wie der unterdurchschnittlichen Entlohnung hat Kroatien der Auswanderung dieser Bürger*innen wenig entgegenzusetzen. Dem Regierungsprogram 2016-2020 ist lediglich ein vages Statement zu der Auswanderung kroatischer Jugendliche und junger Erwachsenen zu entnehmen. Das Ziel ist es, mehr Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen und dadurch junge Leute dazu zu bewegen, in Kroatien zu bleiben. (vgl. ebd., S. 9)EuroskeptizismusSeit einiger Zeit befindet sich die gesamte Europäische Union in einer Krise, die mehrere Teilkrisen umfasst und deshalb auch Polykrise genannt wird. Dazu zählt unter anderem auch der Euroskeptizismus, der in allen Mitgliedsländern zunehmend wahrzunehmen ist. Dieser kann mit einzelnen Politiken oder dem Erhalt von Souveränitätsrechten begründet werden. (vgl. Weiss, S. 14)Auch wenn der Euroskeptizismus mittlerweile weit verbreitet ist, gibt es zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten Unterschiede in der Ausprägung. Besonders neue Mitgliedstaaten, wie auch Kroatien, empfinden die Thematik des Kompetenz- und Souveränitätstransfers an die Europäische Union problematisch. Dieser Machtverlust wird als sensibel, historisch abrufbar aber auch politisch instrumentalisierbar wahrgenommen. (vgl. ebd., S. 14)LegitimitäskriseDie Europäische Union leidet also derzeit unter einem Stimmungstief, das mehrere Ursachen hat. Vor allem aber hagelt es immer mehr Kritik zum Thema Demokratiedefizit, Handlungsunfähigkeit und mangelnder Bürgernähe. Viele Bürger*innen begegnen der EU misstrauisch, da sie für sie sehr intransparent und wenig demokratisch erscheint. (vgl. Höreth 2004, S. 41)Aufgrund dessen machte es sich die EU bereits im Jahr 2002 zum Ziel, verfassungsmäßige und institutionelle Voraussetzungen zu schaffen, die demokratische Grundsätze innerhalb der erweiterten EU sowie die Steuerungsfähigkeit nach innen und die Handlungsfähigkeit nach außen ermöglichen sollen. Dieses ambitionierte Ziel konnte allerdings bislang nicht erreicht werden, da einzelne Mitgliedsstaaten auf die Gewichtung ihrer Stimmen im Ministerrat nicht verzichten wollten. (vgl. ebd., S. 41) Nach Höreth (2004) basiert das Demokratiedefizit nicht nur auf technische Probleme des Politikmanagements, sondern auf grundlegende Legitimitätsprobleme, die die Anerkennungswürdigkeit der EU in Frage stellen.FazitWie auch die anderen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union hat Kroatien mit den Hindernissen der Polykrise zu kämpfen. Doch die Gesamtsituation des Staates zeigt, dass das Land sich vor allem mit Themen wie dem Umgang mit Flüchtlingen im Rückstand befindet, was damit zusammenhängen könnte, dass sich politische, soziale und ideologische Strukturen, die sich im Laufe der Geschichte, aber vor allem während der Unabhängigkeitskriege gebildet haben, verfestigt haben.Die geringe Wahlbeteiligung und die 67%ige Zustimmung zum Beitritt in die Europäische Union lässt relativ offen, wie die kroatische Gesellschaft zu der Europäischen Union steht. Zunächst konnte allerdings das Gefühl geweckt werden, dass eine gewisse EU-Euphorie in der Gesellschaft Kroatien zu beobachten war. Nun aber äußern sich, wie in der gesamten Europäischen Union erkennbar, immer mehr Menschen skeptisch gegenüber der EU. Es erscheint immer noch so, als ob die Gesellschaft den Entscheidungsprozessen der Europäischen Union nur schwer folgen kann und sie sich damit unsicher fühlen.Die kroatische Regierung hat einige Maßnahmen getroffen, um den EU-Beitritt des Staates zu ermöglichen. Trotzdem gibt es Kritiker*innen, die der Meinung sind, die EU habe es Kroatien zu einfach gemacht. Nach ihr wurden die Kopenhagener Kriterien erfüllt, sonst hätte das Land nicht zu einem offiziellen Mitglied der Europäischen Union werden können.Doch ein genauerer Blick in die Strukturen des Staates und vor allem auf die Grenze zu Bosnien und Herzegowina zeigen: das Land muss weiterhin an sich arbeiten, um den Kriterien gerecht werden zu können. Die Europäische Union darf die Augen nicht verschließen, wie es derzeit getan wird, indem zuversichtlich über den Beitritt in den Schengen-Raum diskutiert wird. Als Friedensgemeinschaft ist die Aufgabe der Europäischen Union, Menschenrechte zu wahren und dort genauer hinzuschauen, wo diese verletzt werden. Allerdings setzt der Beitritt Kroatiens in die Europäische Union gleichzeitig auch ein wichtiges Zeichen und bringt den Staat, als einer der stabilsten Länder auf dem Balkan, dazu, aktiv zu werden und als Vorbild für den restlichen Balkan zu fungieren.Auch wenn der Beitritt kritisch hinterfragt werden kann, sollte also gesagt werden, dass der Staat durchaus Schritte macht, die ohne die Europäische Union wahrscheinlich nicht stattgefunden hätten. Kroatien profitiert sowohl wirtschaftlich, als auch gesellschaftlich von den Vorteilen der EU. Allerdings verlangsamen Defizite innerhalb der Politik, wie beispielsweise lange Verwaltungsverfahren die Fortschritte, so dass die Europäische Union zum einen Geduld zeigen, aber zum anderen die Problematiken innerhalb des Landes nicht ignorieren sollte.LiteraturverzeichnisBundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2013): 1. Juli: Kroatien tritt der EU bei. Online verfügbar unter https://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/164274/1-juli-kroatien-tritt-der-eu-bei-28-06-2013, zuletzt geprüft am 14.09.2021.Europäische Kommission (2019): Schengen-Beitritt: Kroatien vor dem Beitritt zum Schengen-Raum. Online verfügbar unter https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/IP_19_6140, zuletzt geprüft am 30.09.2021.Holzner, Mario (2018): Wirtschaftliche Perspektiven für Kroatien. wiiw Forschungsbericht. Wien: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.Horeth, Marcus (2004): Die erweiterte EU in der Legitimitätskrise. In: Der Bürger im Staat 54 (1), S. 41–48.Kušić, Siniša (2021): Kroatiens Weg in die EU . Hg. v. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Online verfügbar unter https://www.bpb.de/apuz/158164/kroatiens-weg-in-die-eu, zuletzt geprüft am 14.09.2021.Mihm, Andreas (2021): Chinesen bauen Brücke in Kroatien, die EU zahlt. Hg. v. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Online verfügbar unter https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/kroatien-china-baut-peljesac-bruecke-und-die-eu-zahlt-17461739.html, zuletzt geprüft am 30.09.2021.Richter, Solveig (2009): Zielkonflikte der EU-Erweiterungspolitik? Kroatien und Makedonien zwischen Stabilität und Demokratie. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.Schrooten, Mechthild (2004): Ökonomische Perspektiven der EU-Osterweiterung. In: Der Bürger im Staat 54 (1), S. 17–20.Steindorf, Ludwig (2013): Ein kurzer Gang durch die Geschichte Kroatiens. Hg. v. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Online verfügbar unter https://www.bpb.de/apuz/158166/ein-kurzer-gang-durch-die-geschichte, zuletzt geprüft am 30.09.2021.Tokarski, P.; Funk, S. (2018): Die Nicht-Euro-Staaten in der EU nach dem Brexit. In: SWP-Aktuell (68), S. 1–8.Weidenfeld, W.; Wessels, W. (2002): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2002/2003. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag.Weiss, S. (2004): Die Erweiterung aus der Sicht der Beitrittskandidaten. In: Der Bürger im Staat 54 (1), S. 11–17.

Update 9/15: The Biden Administration announced Thursday that it will only withhold $85 million of its committed military aid to Egypt, releasing $235 million of aid that had been conditioned on improving human rights in the country. The administration had withheld $130 million in 2021 and 2022.Today, the State Department must decide whether to withhold some of the $1.3 billion in military support that the U.S. gives to Egypt each year. Under normal circumstances, this would have been an easy decision. Washington has given Cairo more than $50 billion in weapons aid since 1978, a testament to the long and close relationship between the two countries.But the past few years have been more complicated. As President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi has increasingly cracked down on dissent in the country, a growing group of Democratic lawmakers has fought to reduce aid to his government. The Biden administration withheld $130 million each of the last two years in response to heavy congressional pressure, and the State Department announced on Monday that it would block at least $85 million in aid this year. But lawmakers are determined to go further."Over the last year, Egypt's human rights record has continued to deteriorate, despite the Egyptian government's claims to the contrary," wrote a group of leading Democratic senators in July. "Therefore, we urge you to withhold the full amount of $320 million.""[T]he bilateral security relationship can be effectively sustained at a reduced level of assistance while upholding our values," argued the lawmakers, which included prominent progressives like Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) as well as centrist leaders like Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).To better understand the factors influencing today's decision and the history of the relationship, RS spoke with retired Maj. Gen. F.C. "Pink" Williams, who served as the U.S. defense attaché to Egypt from 2008 to 2011. Williams recently wrote a chapter on the history of U.S.-Egypt military relations in an edited volume entitled "Security Aid in the Middle East." The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: The State Department is set to decide whether it will withhold up to $320 million in military aid to Egypt, citing human rights concerns. How should the Biden administration think about that decision?Williams: It's a mixed bag whether this does any good or not. Over the years, we've threatened to withhold aid. Sometimes we've carried through with that; sometimes we haven't. My personal opinion is that it hasn't had any broad effect on governance or the human rights situation in Egypt.There are those that would argue that it's somewhat effective around the edges, and I could probably support that. When Sisi releases a few political prisoners, some people will say, "well, that's in part because of the pressure we applied on the funds." I think that's hard to assess, but I do believe that withholding of funds is not going to make any substantive change in how Sisi acts.RS: Something you talked about in your chapter in this recent book is this idea that Egypt and the U.S. have pretty different views of the military relationship. Can you spell that out a little bit?Williams: Given that the whole relationship was initially built around the Camp David Accords, Egypt decided that the funding was basically a reward, or a bribe, if you want to put it that way. They've never really moved away from that. They're not trying to change the world here. They're trying to, frankly, get money for their regime and their government.Now, we, on the other hand, began to move away from the Camp David [approach] as we saw that it was unlikely that another conflict would occur between the Israelis and the Egyptians. We don't see the aid anymore as needed to get the Egyptians to keep the peace because it's clearly in their best interest to do so anyway. So then we started coming up with other reasons why we're giving the aid. As human rights and democracy became tied more and more to foreign aid, it was only natural that we would go down that road. So we started with some differences anyway, but then they widened quite a bit over time.RS: In the long sweep, how has U.S. military aid in particular affected the shape of politics and the political system in Egypt?Williams: I don't think it's had very much effect. We tend to forget that nations and regimes act in their perceived best interest. It's only natural that they would do so. Of course, we see support for democracy and human rights as not just an altruistic goal but also something that's in our best interest. However, when you push those themes in other countries with other cultures and other backgrounds, I think you have to be careful. From the Egyptian point of view, the regime's going to do what it thinks it needs to to strengthen itself and to ensure its longevity. Unfortunately, many authoritarian regimes see repression as a tool for staying in power. It's just that simple. So the idea that, for any amount of money, a dictator is going to do something that he thinks is going to weaken his position is pretty far-fetched.RS: What most surprised you about the relationship during your time in Cairo? Did Egypt's military and that relationship meet the expectations you had going in?Williams: I'm a fighter pilot by trade, and when we sold Egypt the F-16 back in 1980, I was part of that program. They sent two of us to Egypt as instructors for a year. When I returned many years later, I was not surprised at the state of the Egyptian military or their ability to effectively use the equipment that we had provided because I had the background from early on.What surprised me quite a bit was the shallowness of the relationship. We really didn't — and do not, as far as I know, to this day — have any significant knowledge of the Egyptian planning processes, their strategic plans. We're still just giving them money and equipment, and they're keeping the peace. They are doing other things for us too that I shouldn't give short shrift in terms of intelligence, but I was very surprised that we didn't have a deeper relationship after all those years.RS: Can you talk more about what the U.S. does get out of the relationship? It's kind of striking that you're saying that our influence appears limited.Williams: Some of that comes back to expectations. The idea of influence is that we'll give them this money, and we'll guide them. Again, you go back to differences in culture and differences in perceived interest. This idea that you're going to have all this influence because you give them money — which is a very widespread opinion in Washington in my experience — is unrealistic.However, on a practical level, the intelligence situation is not something we can go into in any depth, but obviously they are positioned and have resources that we don't have that can provide some decent information to us. And on the counterterrorism front, I think they've been quite helpful. And the Suez Canal priority and the overflight [permissions] that they provide us save us all kinds of time and money.RS: You were stationed in Egypt during the Arab Spring protests. How did that political turmoil affect your work and affect the country's ties with the US?Williams: Everything didn't come to a complete standstill, but it really ground down. All the non-essential personnel were evacuated from the embassy. There were roughly 400 embassy personnel on a normal day, and we were down a little bit below 100.We had various bases scattered about Egypt, where we had small contingents of American pilots and maintainers and other advisers. We pulled all those people in from those bases, and they were either subsequently evacuated or they worked work for me in the embassy. So all the interaction and advising at the outlying sites came to a halt. From the point of normal day-to-day interaction, it was pretty much nil.Now there was a lot of interaction because there was, of course, great concern in Washington about what the Egyptian military was going to do with all this. If you recall, they weren't doing anything initially. They were trying to stay out of it initially. When people wanted to talk to the Egyptians, they generally would come through my office because they knew that we could get contact with them and access to them, and we could set up phone calls. The way they were doing it was that they would have a counterpart call their counterpart. In other words, they would have Robert Gates, who was secretary of defense, and he would want to talk to the Egyptian defense minister [Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein] Tantawi.They were trying to maintain this contact and get some assurances from these guys that there's not going to be a bloodbath out there in Tahrir Square. The majority of those contacts were negotiated and coordinated by the Office of Military Cooperation because we had the access. So what do we get for all this money? Well, we at least got them to take our phone calls. And they were not taking [other calls]. There were ambassadors from other countries calling me saying, "What do you know? What is happening?"That is not the same thing as me claiming that we materially influenced the actions of the [Egyptian Armed Forces] in that time. They are sitting there assessing the situation and saying, "What is in our best interest? How do we get through this and still be an intact military and an intact regime on the other side?"RS: That's a really good example of an acute moment where there's an attempt to have an influence in favor of democracy, in favor of human rights. Do you think over the long term that U.S. aid to Egypt has had a positive effect on human rights in the country?Williams: It's probably had some good effect in individual cases. In other words, we're bringing pressure, and Sisi or [former President Hosni] Mubarak is looking to get us off his neck, so he releases some political prisoners. For those people, that's a big, big outcome. Not being in Egyptian prison is a really good thing.I would not ever claim that it has resulted in some philosophical shift in the outlook of either the Mubarak regime or the Sisi regime or the [Mohamed] Morsi regime for that matter. They view things differently, and they run governments differently than we do.I'll give you an example. During the revolt, of course, we were right there. We were very close to Tahrir square. I walked into work one morning, and I get a photo. My staff says, "Look at this." It's a photo taken from the embassy looking out, and there's an Egyptian tank with some soldiers, and they've got this guy strung up by his heels on the gun barrel there. I don't know what he did or what caused the situation, but there he was, and he's alive and everything. So I take this over to the Egyptians and say, "Hey, guys, this is exactly the kind of thing that you don't need to be doing. You don't need to hurt yourself with this." And that was a theme we were talking to them about. We were talking to them about these stories coming through of interior forces abusing people, and that's bad. Frankly, [we told them] "That's bad press. It hurts your cause, and you should not be doing this." Well, I show him this photo, and what are they interested in? They were taken at night, right? What they're interested in is "How did you get that photo? What is that technology?" They didn't even blink about this guy strung up from his heels on this tank. It just kind of shows you the mindset.RS: How should we handle the future of US aid to Egypt?Williams: First, we need to stay engaged. When people say, "Why are we doing all that for Egypt?" I say, "look at a map. You can't change geography." Same reason we have to put up with Turkey. You can't change geography. So we need to stay engaged. Russian influence building, Chinese influence building, the perception throughout the region that we can't be trusted — all these things only make it harder to try to engage and have any influence at all. Nevertheless, I think we have to try.To the money, we're not talking about a ton of money here. I would continue to fund it. You can tie it to human rights, but I wouldn't go through this exercise of conditioning the funds or taking away the funds once a year. They know we're interested in human rights. We can have those discussions. But I don't know that tying the funds has had any substantive effect.So I would stay engaged, I would be careful about tying the aid to their human rights performance, and I would try to assure them that, as we have been there through the years for the long haul, we're still going to be there for the long haul.

 I once contemplated getting my favorite Spinoza proposition as a Vanity Plate In the past few months, longer even, but before the recent wave of student occupations (more on that later), I have found myself in the grips of a kind of depression that stems in part from what can only be described as a gap between theory and practice. How this works is like this, all day, or at least part of it, I read books, and get into discussions understanding how the world works, and what could be done to change it and yet the world goes on unchanged, or, more to the point, it just seems to get worse and worse. (I will let the reader fill this in with whatever ecological, political, or economic calamity that comes to mind) The disconnect between the classroom and the world creates not just division but despair.This has brought me to think about the limitations of philosophy. Perhaps the most famous statement about the limitations of philosophy comes from Karl Marx. The eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach states, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." Philosophy, philosophical interpretation, and action, change are positioned on either sides of a great divide. Many have read Marx's own work across this divide, placing the early texts, 1844 Manuscripts, The German Ideology, etc., on one side, as interpretations, and The Communist Manifesto and Capital on the other, as attempts to change the world. The result of this is that Marx is not really Marx when he is philosophical, if you except the standard reading that Marx's early work is heavily influenced by Feuerbach and Hegel, and when he is Marx, he is no longer writing philosophy, but I digress. More to the point, Marx's formulation articulates a division between interpretation and action that is pervasive, shared by many who have never read Marx or care to. It is the divide between theory and practice, thinking and doing. At the same time Marx's formulation is easily critiqued, the very opposition it erects is unstable and seems to almost unravel itself. Is it not also an interpretation, of philosophy, the world, and what it means to transform something? Where does Marx's own formulation fall on the divide it erects between interpretation and transformation Moreover, can transformation take place without interpretation? As André Tosel writes, "It is not enough to transform the world. We still need to understand this transformation to prevent it from following its course blindly. A transformation of the world and of oneself without understanding this transformation is blind. An understanding of the world and of oneself without transformation is empty." Tosel corrects Marx by invoking, or parodying Kant (which explains but does not justify his use of the terms "blind"), it is not a matter of interpreting or changing, but of informing one by the other.Tosel's correction is framed in light of another element of Marx's thought, one more often associated with the second side of the divide, the historical or practical side. It is in Marx's writing on the history of capitalism that he puts forward the important idea that under capitalism not changing, staying the same, is not an option. Whereas previous societies, previous modes of production sought to stay the same, to reproduce themselves, capitalism is in the paradoxical position of reproducing itself while constantly revolutionizing everything else. I am referring of course to Marx's formulation that capitalism is defined by ruthless transformation of everything, as Marx puts it famously in the Manifesto, "Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind."Tosel has a lot to say about this formulation both in terms of its claim as theory, of the idea of capital as a transformation of social meaning, but also what this means for thinking about capitalism in practice, what this ruthless modernization has done to society. With respect to the latter, he often uses the term, from Gramsci, "passive revolution" to describe the way in which capital has remade the world, reduced every value to exchange value, and every relation to market relations. Capitalism is very much a "blind transformation" to use Tosel's formulation. This is something that Alain Badiou puts well in his little book The Century. The twentieth century was in part marked by grand utopian projects, by the idea of creating a "new man," these projects announced themselves as transformations that were also interpretations. In their wake we now have transformations without interpretations. To use Badiou's example, genetic engineering offers a massive change on what it means to be human but one that is without any utopian promise. As Badiou writes, "This is because such a change does not correspond to any kind of project. We learn of its possibility from newspapers; that we could have five limbs, or be immortal...In short, we are living through the revenge of what is most blind and objective in the economic appropriation of technics over what is most subjective and voluntary in politics."I am reading Badiou more for the polemic than the ontology here, and would argue that what he and Tosel offer to Marx's famous formulation is that the task of changing the world has to be understood in relation not to some static and fixed reality, but an ongoing transformation that is all the more pernicious in that it takes place without a plan or project. Seems like an appropriate clip: Dr. Malcolm as BadiouThis brings us to my second formulation of the limits of philosophy, one of my favorite propositions from the Ethics, IVP1. "Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true."What this means can be clarified (as is often the case) by the Scholium that follows. Spinoza begins by talking about the longstanding image of enlightenment and understanding, the sun, "For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. In this we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is known, the error isremoved, not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only so far as the body is affected by it. And so, although we come to know the true distance, we shall nevertheless imagine it as near us. For as we said in IIP35S, we do not imagine the sun to be so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the sun's size insofar as the body is affected by the sun. Thus, when the rays of the sun, falling on the surface of the water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine it as if it were in the water, even if we know its true place."It always seems strange to me that Spinoza does not mention another more important division between the sun as an object of knowledge and as an object of the imagination, namely the idea that the sun orbits the Earth, appearing to rise and set. This was not only the contested object of Spinoza's lifetime (shaping Descartes thought), but perhaps the best example of the persistence of an imagination past the knowledge that would dispell it. To this day we still talk about sunrise and sunset. (which is maybe why flat Earthers never went away. They are simply asserting what the imagination, the effect of the sun on the body tells them.) As Spinoza goes onto clarify: "And so it is with the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. It happens, of course, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil which is certain to come, that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in lIP 17."That imaginatry images and representations persist long after they have been intellectually unmasked is in some sense the central ethical problem of the Ethics, it is why "we see the better but do the worse." What we know or think is often not as powerful as what we imagine. The political problem of Spinoza could be understood as the question as to how do we make the true not just an object of contemplation, something we think but do not do, but make it as something actually lived, an ideal which is embodied in our practices and our institutions.  Spinoza's idea of the limited efficacy of the true, or the need for an idea to become something not just thought but lived, is not without its corollary in Marx. As Marx writes in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." This is a different understanding of the role and limitation of philosophy, less a stark divide between interpreting and changing than the beginning of a question of how do ideas become material, become effective.Our society does not much believe in ideas, let alone ideals. The modern university is in some sense an education in the ineffectivity of ideas. There is plenty of exposure to ideas, but the unwritten subtext of this exposure and education, is "do not take any of this seriously." Any teacher of philosophy is asked how will these ideas apply to real world, and every student in philosophy is asked what are you going to do with that? These questions are framed against a world in which what really matters, what really governs, is the ceaseless and unthinking transformation of capital, a transformation that takes place without ideas, or with only one, with the idea that anything makes a profit is good. All ideas that deviate from this are at best distractions and at worse harmful.Which brings me to perhaps the only thing to break me from this despair of the ineffectivity of thinking, the recent wave of actions and occupations in protest of the bombing and extermination of Palestinians in Gaza. Before the crackdowns on protests at Columbia, Emory, UT Austin, and elsewhere, there was USC's decision to cancel the graduate speech of Valedictorian Asna Tabassum. I remember learning that she minored in resistance to genocide. It seems absurd to expect students to study genocide and not speak out in the face of genocide. I wonder how many students at the occupations all over the nation are in some sense seeking the same thing, to translate what they have come to think into an action that is consistent with it, refusing the university's imperative "to argue, but obey the dictates of the endowment, donors, and corporate interests," an imperative that reduces all arguments and debates to bullshit because they are disconnected from any realization. Such an interpretation probably gives too much credit to the right's position that universities are dominated by critical race theory, Marxism, and other intellectual bogeymen. All those students at the occupations are probably not minoring in genocide studies. More importantly it overlooks an important aspect of occupations, a thread connection 2010 and 2011 to the current wave of occupations, the occupation library and teach in. The occupations are not just sites of practice, attempts to put theory into practice, but also attempts to understand the world, and most importantly to wrestle with ideas and histories excluded from the curriculum. I wonder how many people at the occupation are trying to just make sense of the images they have seen on various screens, namely, the destruction and death in Gaza that has gone on for months now, not just unhindered but aided by most of the world. It seems to me that the occupations are not some disruption of the university's normal function, but an attempt to fulfill what should be the mission of university: to think and live critically. At this moment in time, they are the university. 

 This post is illustrated by some of the promo work I have done for the bookI have commented before, more than once even, that the intersection of Spinoza and Marx is less a position, something like Spinozist Marxism, than a field of intersecting problems and questions. In some sense it is possible to even map out the way in which different Marxists draw from different elements of Marx (and Spinoza) creating different articulations of the relations which intersect with different problems in the critique of capitalism. For Louis Althusser the important parts of Spinoza are the critique of the imagination (found in the Appendix to Part One of the Ethics), the theory of the different types of knowledge (IIP40Schol), as well as "God is the immanent, not the transitive cause of all things" (IIP18). Of course such a list begins to reflect divisions and tensions in Althusser's writing: the imagination is integral to his theory of ideology, immanent causality to his understanding of structure and the mode of production, while the different types of knowledge persists throughout Althusser's writing as a kind of philosophy of philosophical practice. While for Frédéric Lordon the central thesis of Spinoza is less epistemological or ontological than it is anthropological. It is the centrality of desire, "as the very essence of man, insofar as it is determined from any affection, to do something," coupled with the fundamental misrecognition of that desire, the fundamental illusion of a free choice which leads the infant to believe it freely wants milk, and more to the point, the worker to believe that he or she freely wants to work. For Etienne Balibar the central thesis is perhaps Proposition 37 of Part IV of the Ethics, and more importantly its two demonstrations which map out the constitution of a real, or rational, and imagined, or affective basis of sociality.  We could also flip this formulation, asking not what aspect, or proposition from Spinoza plays a central role, but what problem from Marx. Ideology can already be seen to be the answer in the case of Althusser (and a different way in Lordon and Balibar), while for Antonio Negri the connection passes through production, through the question of what does it mean to think of history and society as something that is produced and reproduced through our action and lives. A different focus on labor, or praxis can be found in André Tosel, whose work is an attempt to think through what it means to think of praxis as poeisis and poeisis as praxis, making as doing and doing as making. This Marxist problem if fundamentally informed by the Spinozist idea that every finite thing, every mode, acts, or rather operates in and through other modes.The list goes on, and one could map out a whole set of definitions of Spinozist Marxism which would be different intersections of propositions and problems from each.  The question I have been thinking about is given this field in which every position has already in some sense been occupied how is it possible to make a new intervention. Or put differently what particular proposition and what particular problem does The Double Shift: Spinoza and Marx on the Politics of Work articulate, or think together. If I had to pick one I would say that it is the famous, or infamous Proposition 7 from Part Two, "The the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." Of course this claim is something that every interpretation of Spinoza must ultimately wrestle with, and one could chart out the various neo-Spinozisms in terms of how they make sense of the identity and difference of things and ideas, bodies and minds. To be more specific I would say that it is a matter of thinking this as a formulation of ideology. As I write in the book,  "...Grasped in terms of a post-Spinozist social theory, it is possible to argue that Spinoza's formulation can productively paired with Marx's assertion of the identity of consciousness and life. Ideas and the imagination, like bodies and desires, must be grasped in terms of both of their internal striving, their consistency, and of their finitude, their determination. Contrary to a long-standing bias in the history of philosophy to treat ideas and things as two fundamentally different orders of reality, Spinoza posits a fundamental identity of thought and existence—, an identity that, paradoxically, makes it possible to grasp their points of divergence and intersection. Of course, as I have already argued, the very idea of ideology necessarily presupposes a difference as well as an identity; in order to be the ruling ideas, the concepts and narratives that rule ideas must be different from the experience and conditions they rule over in order to be the ruling ideas, but, at the same time, they must be produced by those conditions. There is a limited efficacy of true ideas insofar as they are true; ideas do not have effects on their own, but require conditions in order to exist and be disseminated. Spinoza's assertion regarding true ideas can be understood as a mirror image of Marx's claim regarding ideology. As Étienne Balibar describes the structure of ideology in The German Ideology,"The ideological mechanism, which can equally be read as a social process, will come to be seen as an astonishing conversion of impotence into domination: the abstraction of consciousness, which is an expression of consciousness's incapacity to act in reality … becomes the source of power precisely because it is "'autonomized." Contrary to his critical contemporaries, such as Feuerbach and Stirner, who believed in the power of ideas, and thus the weapon of criticism, Marx underscores that ideas only have power, only have effects, under particular material conditions that give some no time to think and others the means to spread and disseminate their ideas. Ideas have a causality that is not derived not from them as ideas, but from the social relations that produce and circulate them."First this has to be thought of in terms of identity, ideas are nothing other than the existing relation between things, the different material relations expressed differently. In other words, to quickly allude to something that the book develops over a few pages, the idea that there is ethical and moral worth to work, that have "grind" mindset, are the key to not only material success but spiritual worth as well, is nothing other than the material conditions, precarity, gig economy, and so on, rendered in ideal or conceptual forms. A person who feels that their self value and self worth can be measured in terms of how much they work is nothing other than the consciousness of labor power itself. In other words, the order and connection of ideology is the same as the order and connection of exploitation. Just as Spinoza argues that desire is nothing other than an idea of our appetite, the body's needs in mental form, our ideas about work, which make it the key to worth and self-value, are nothing other than our position within the economy in material form. (This is something central to another Marxist/Spinozist thinker, Franck Fischbach, who has argued that the conditions of intellectual life are the same as that of material life. As Fischbach writes, "If it is true that 'the production of ideas, of ideas, representations and consciousness (...) is the language of real life" then the production of ideologies, of inadequate representations, is the language of life incomplete, inadequate, and mutilated." Mind and body are two different ways of grasping the same thing. 

Such a formulation seems crude, deterministic, and in some sense more vulgar than the most vulgar of materialisms; it posits us all as spiritual automatons whose thoughts and ideas do nothing more than express, in a different attribute, what is already given in our material condition, in the relations of bodies. Things are complicated quite a bit by subsequent propositions which assert that only a body can affect or determine a body and only an idea can affect or determine an idea. The assertion of identity, ideas and things, mind and body, as two different ways of looking at the same thing, has as it paradoxical corollary the assertion of difference, mind and body as two fundamentally different ways of acting and reacting, each with their own causal orders and connections that are entirely independent. This is a particular dense metaphysical knot of identity and difference, but I am more interested in how it plays out practically, politically, as a way of thinking about ideas and bodies, base and superstructure Much could be said about the way this plays out in Spinoza's text, especially in Part IV of the Ethics, to underscore the limited efficacy of the true insofar as it is true, of the way in which ideas cannot change the world without becoming lived in bodies. As I argue in the book (following Tosel) Spinoza's formulation makes it possible to think of the particular double determination of ideas and bodies. That each are in some sense determined by being reflections of the same thing, the same relations, but are also determined in a particular manner by other ideas or other bodies. In other words, returning to the problem of the book, as much as the centrality of work as that which give people meaning and value can be understood to be just capitalism rendered into an idea it is also an effect of a long series of transformations within the realm of ideas from the protestant revolution onward. To put it bluntly the response to the long debate between Marx and Weber, between material determination and cultural history, is quite simply, "Why Not Both." Although to be honest I am more interested in the way this makes it possible to understand the present than debates in intellectual history. "via GIPHYTo quote The Double Shift again: "As I have argued, these two aspects are, in some sense, two different ways of looking at the same thing, the same social relation, grasped in terms of bodies and their coordination and minds and their automation. However, they also function in different ways of understanding the orientation of desire. In the first, it is imposed through necessity; as selling one's labor power becomes the only condition of survival, living is aligned with making a living through wage labor. Wage labor appears to be the only way to make a living because all other ways are effaced. The constraints of society appear less as particular institutions, regimes of accumulation, and social relations, but as the way things must be; their historicity and contingency are effaced in the present order. This structural condition is supplemented by an ideological dimension insisting that not only that one must one identify with their job, find their passion in their labor, but that such a condition is also to be actively desired. Having to work, to dedicate oneself entirely to work, is presented twice, as it were—once as a necessary condition for survival and the second time as aspiration integral to one's identity. To frame it according to the division of work and action, we could argue that work is defined as both production and action, both as the constraint of necessity tied to survival and something freely undertaken to identify and distinguish oneself. The particular double determination in capitalist society is one in which work vacillates between a necessary fact of life to an object of desire, from making a living to finding meaning. The often-asked question,  "What do you do for a living?" vacillates between these two senses; at once,, it indicates something of necessity, of one's economic situation, and freedom, one's supposedly chosen path in life. It is both what one has to do and who one is. Work as necessity and work as subjectivity, as body and as mind, do not just coexist as two different ways of grasping the same thing, but are subject to their own logic of alternation as material necessity and ideological meaning reinforce and also undermine each other." Double determination makes it possible to think at once of our particular "bondage," to use Spinoza's term, caught both in a set of material relations, namely capitalism, that reduce us to labor power, and intellectual traditions which express the same conditions through the ideological terms of morality, responsibility, and individuality. Transformation entails transforming each. There is a limited efficacy of criticism so long as it just remains criticism (of course the corollary is that there a limited efficacy of practice as practice). It is a matter of linking together the transformation of material conditions and intellectual concepts, or, what people used to call Praxis. 

 Anyone who has ever taken or taught a philosophy class is familiar with the claim "[Blank] is subjective" in which the [Blank] in question could be anything from literary interpretations to ethical norms. This response effectively ends any and all cultural and philosophical discussion, which is why it is so aggravating. One response is to argue against this claim, to point out that not every interpretation of a poem, novel, or film, is authorized, that there are better or worse interpretations, with respect to cultural version. With respect to the ethical or political arguments it is tempting to point out that the very existence of ethics, of society, presupposes norms that are shared as well as debated and challenged.What if we took a different perspective? Instead of arguing against this view, ask the question of its conditions. To offer a criticism in the Marxist sense. By Marxist sense I mean specifically the criticism that Marx offers of idealism, of philosophy, in The German Ideology. In that text Marx gives the conditions of how it is that the world appears so upside down that ideas and their criticism rather than material conditions drive and determine history. So we could ask a similar question, how has subjectivity, subjective opinion and perspective, has come to appear as so prevalent and powerful. How did we come to live under the reign of subjectivity?In a move that will surprise no one who has read this blog that I find a useful starting point for answering this question Frank Fischbach's book Marx with Spinoza. In that text Fischbach argues that rather than seen alienation as an alienation from subjectivity, a reduction of a subject to an object, it is subjectivity itself that is an alienation, an alienation from objectivity, a privation of the world.  As Fischbach argues:"The reduction of human beings, by this abstraction, from natural and living beings to the state of 'subjects' as owners of a socially average labour power indicates at the same time the completion of their reduction to a radical state of impotence: for the individual to be conceived and to conceive of itself as a subject it is necessary that it see itself withdrawn and subtracted from the objective conditions of its natural activity; in other words, it is necessary that 'the real conditions of living labour' (the material worked on, the instruments of labour and the means of subsistence which 'fan the flames of the power of living labour') become 'autonomous and alien existences'"And also: "This is why we interpret Marx's concept of alienation not as a new version of a loss of the subject in the object, but as a radically new thought, of the loss of the essential and vital objects for an existence that is itself essentially objective and vital....Alienation is not therefore the loss of the subject in the object it is the loss of object for a being that is itself objective. But the loss of proper objects and the objectivity of its proper being is also the loss of all possible inscription of one's activity in objectivity, it is the loss of all possible mastery of objectivity, as well as other effects: in brief, the becoming subject is essentially a reduction to impotence. The becoming subject or the subjectivation of humanity is thus inseparable according to Marx from what is absolutely indispensable for capitalism, the existence of a mass of "naked workers"—that is to say pure subjects possessors of a perfectly abstract capacity to work—individual agents of a purely subjective power of labor and constrained to sell its use to another to the same extent that they are totally dispossessed of the entirety of objective conditions (means and tools of production, matter to work on) to put to effective work their capacity to work."At the basis of subjectivity, of subjectivity understood as an abstract and indifferent capacity, there is the indifferent capacity of labor power. Behind the figure of the subject there is the worker. I have already argued elsewhere on this blog that this reading of the Marx/Spinoza connection could be understood as one which reflects and critically addressed our contemporary situation in which subjecitivity, a subjectivity understood as potential and capacity, is seen as the condition of our freedom rather than our subjection. What Fischbach suggests through a reading of Marx and Spinoza that such capacity, capacity abstracted and separated from the material conditions of its emergence and  activity, can only really be impotence. Just as a worker cut off from the conditions of labor is actually poverty, a subject cut off from the conditions of its actualization is impotence. What now I find provocative about this analysis is that if we think of it as a general schema in which an objective relation, a relation to objects but also others, is transformed into a subjective potential or capacity it is possible to argue that the constitution of subjectivity through labor power is only one such transformation, and that the current production of subjectivity is itself the product of several successive revolutions in which subjective potentials displace objective relations. One could also talk about the creation of subjectivity as buying power, as a pure capacity to purchase. I know that criticisms of consumer society from the fifties and sixties today seem moralistic and often passé. I am thinking here of Baudrillard, Debord, Lefebvre, and of course Horkheimer and Adorno. It is worth remembering, however, that some of the early critics were less interested in moralizing criticisms of materialism as they were in this kind of constitution of subjectivity. As Jean Baudrillard wrote in The Consumer Society, 'It is difficult to grasp the extent to which the
current training in systematic, organized consumption is the equivalent and extension, in
the twentieth century, of the great nineteenth-century long process of the training of rural
populations for industrial work.'One person who continued such an an analysis is Bernard Stiegler. Stiegler even uses the same word, "proletarianization" to describe both the loss of skills and knowledge by the worker and the loss of skills and knowledge by the consumer.  As I wrote in The Politics of Transindividuality:"At first glance, the use of the term proletarianisation to describe the transindividuation of the consumer would seem to be an analogy with the transformation of the labour process: if proletarianisation is the loss of skills, talents, and knowledge until the worker becomes simply interchangeable labour power, then the broader proletarianisation of daily life is the loss of skills, knowledge, and memory until the individual becomes simply purchasing power. Stiegler's use of proletarianisation is thus simultaneously broader and more restricted than Marx, broader in that it is extended beyond production to encompass relations of consumption and thus all of life, but more restricted in that it is primarily considered with respect to the question of knowledge. The transfer of knowledge from the worker to the machine is the primary case of proletarianisation for Stiegler, becoming the basis for understanding the transfer of knowledge of cooking to microwaveable meals and the knowledge of play from the child to the videogame. Stiegler does not include other dimensions of Marx's account of proletarianisation, specifically the loss of place, of stability, with its corollary affective dimension of insecurity and precariousness. On this point, it would be difficult to draw a strict parallel between worker and consumer, as the instability of the former is often compensated for by the desires and satisfactions of the latter. Consumption often functions as a compensation for the loss of security, stability, and satisfaction of work, which is not to say that it is not without its own insecurities especially as they are cultivated by advertising."For the most part Stiegler considers this deskilling to take place in the automation of the knowledge and skill that makes up daily life. Everything from cooking to knowing how to navigate one's own city is now more or less hardwired into precooked meals and the ubiquitous smartphone. Other cultural critics have pointed to the general deskilling of daily life through the decline of repair, tinkering, and mending. The effect of all this is to change the consumer from someone who buys things based on knowledge and familiarity to a pure expression of buying power, an abstract potential. Just as the worker is separated from the means of production, from the objective conditions of their labor to be the subjective capacity to work, the consumer is separated from the knowledge to consume to become a personification of buying power. As with work the conditions to realize this buying power are outside the control of the consumer. We do not decide what to buy based on our knowledge of our needs and desires but on what is advertised to us as a need or desire.As much as the worker and consumer are opposed, making up two sides of economic relations under capitalism, they are unified, connected in the tendency to transform work to abstract labor power and consumption into abstract buying power. While abstract subjectivity is how these two sides of the capitalist economic relation function it is not how they are lived. They are lived as profoundly individual, subjective in the conventional sense of the word. What one does for a living is in some sense considered to be one's identity: "What do you do?" is in some sense equivalent to "Who are You?" Being reduced to abstract labor power, to capacity for work, is lived as a concrete and highly individualized condition, as my particular job and career. If for any one of the myriad reasons what one does is inadequate to constitute an identity, remains just a day job, then consumption or the commodity form steps in to supply the necessary coordinates for an identity. From this perspective we can chart not only the historical progression of the two identities, but also the structural similarities. With respect to the first, consumer society, consumption, and the myriad possibilities to construct an identity through consumption, comes after the worker, after the formation of capitalism. Any attempt to read Marx's Capital for consumer society, for the common sense understanding of commodity fetishism as the overvaluing of commodities, is going to have a hard time navigating the dull world of linen, coats, corn and coal. The consumer comes after the worker. However, it is also possible to see a similarity of a structural condition. In both case subjectivity is abstracted from, or separated from, objectivity, from not just objects, but objective spirit, in Hegel's sense, institutions, norms, and structures. This abstraction is lived as a highly individualized identity, in some sense work and consumption form the basis of individuality as such. However, it only has effects, only functions in the aggregate. As a worker one only has effects, both in terms of the creation of value, and in terms of any disruption of exploitation, as part of a collective. The same could be said for consumerism, even though it is through consumerism that we are encouraged to believe that we can have ethical effects as individuals, green consumerism, cruelty free products, etc.  Consumers only matter as a mass, at an economy of scale, even in the age of niche marketing. This can be seen in the impotent attempts to bring back cancelled products, or to change corporate strategies through boycotts. The only demands that make sense to corporations are those that are already effective in terms of buying power. I am wondering if one can see a similar structure of abstract/individual subjectivity in other aspects of society. I am thinking of politics, in which individuals are abstracted from any real connection to their communities and societies only to be constituted as "voting power," an abstract aggregate that is lived as a highly individualized identity. I will have to think more about that one. My point here is to connect the often asserted claim "that everything is subjective" back to its material conditions, to the production of subjectivity in both work and the reproduction of everyday life, production and consumption. It is not just a matter of a bad reading of Nietzsche that is behind such claims, although it is often that as well, but an effect in the sphere of ideas and discussion of what is already at work in the sphere of production. Abstract subjectivity is a material condition before it is an intellectual interpretation. The thread running through both is connection between power and impotence. If everything is subjective then I can offer any interpretation, create my own moral code whole cloth, live as I prefer, but if everything is subjective then I can do very little, nothing at all to alter or change anything. This is the fundamental point of intersection between Marx and Spinoza, subjectivity, individual subjectivity, is not the zenith of our freedom and power, it is the nadir of our subjection. Updated 4/15/24I happened to be rereading Tiqqun's Introduction to Civil War which offers the following on this last point, on the political subject as a subject constituted in alienation. As they write:"In order to become a political subject in the modern State, each body must submit to the machinery that will make it such; it must begin by casting aside its passions (now inappropriate), its tastes (now laughable), its penchants (now contingent), endowing itself instead with interests, which are much more presentable and, even better, representable. In this way, in order to become a political subject each body must first carry out its own autocastration as an economic subject. Ideally, the political subject will be reduced to nothing more than a pure vote, a pure voice."Tiqqun offers an expression of this idea, and in doing so captures what I was starting to think about before. However, they also offer me some reservations, especially in their tendency towards deriving an ontological or existential situation from a social condition. As with work and consumption, the pure subjectivity, the pure labor, buying, or voting power, is presented as the zenith of a kind of power, a capacity, maximize your labor power, express your preferences with consumer choices, and, most absurdly, vote harder, but this power is entirely determined by the existing labor conditions, market relations, and political structures. 

Wissenschaftsministerin Petra Olschowski über den Gang der ETH Zürich nach Deutschland, den Umbau der Lehrerbildung, die Zukunft der Kultusministerkonferenz – und die Frage, ob Baden-Württemberg das neue Ruhrgebiet ist.






Petra Olschowski (Grüne) war 2010 bis 2016 Rektorin der Staatlichen Akademie der Bildenden Künste Stuttgart und 2016 bis 2022 Staatssekretärin.
Seit September 2022 ist sie baden-württembergische Ministerin für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst. Foto: Lena Lux Fotografie &
Bildjournalismus.






Frau Olschowski, die ETH Zürich hat neulich verkündet, dass sie eine Filiale in
Baden-Württemberg eröffnen wird – in Heilbronn, als Nachbarin der TU München. Auch für Sie eine Überraschung?



 



Die Dieter-Schwarz-Stiftung, die den Bildungscampus Heilbronn stark mit vorantreibt, kann ohne Rücksprache mit dem Land Entscheidungen treffen, hat uns aber einige Tage vor der Bekanntgabe der
Pläne informiert. Nach unserem Landeshochschulrecht muss das Wissenschaftsministerium der Ansiedlung zustimmen. Das prüfen wir jetzt. Grundsätzlich ist es erst mal ein starkes Zeichen für den
Wissenschaftsstandort Baden-Württemberg, wenn es eine international herausragende Universität wie die ETH Zürich hierherzieht und sie ein Lehr- und Forschungszentrum für digitale Transformation
errichten will. Das starke Netzwerk in der KI-Forschung, das wir im Land auch mit dem Cyber Valley aufbauen, wird dadurch noch stärker. 



 



Sind Sie nicht enttäuscht, dass die ETH lieber dem Ruf von Milliardär Dieter Schwarz folgt, anstatt für ihren Deutschland-Trip einen der Innovationscampi auszusuchen, von denen Ihr
Ministerium inzwischen fünf mit staatlichen Mitteln fördert, darunter das Cyber Valley in Tübingen?



 



Die ETH Zürich ist schon lange ein wichtiger Partner für das Cyber Valley, in das wir seit 2016 als Land investieren. Das Konzept vom Bildungscampus Heilbronn und unserer
Innovationscampus-Modelle folgen der sehr ähnlichen Idee einer Verdichtung von Expertise, der Idee des möglichst frühen Transfers von Forschungserkenntnissen in die Wirtschaft. Im Cyber Valley
sind das neben den Universitäten Stuttgart und Tübingen die Max-Planck-Gesellschaft und Unternehmen wie Amazon, Daimler oder Bosch. Dass die Dieter-Schwarz-Stiftung den Kooperationspartner ETH
jetzt über die Grenze holt, eröffnet natürlich nochmal zusätzliche Perspektiven für die Zusammenarbeit.  



 



"Ich kenne mich gut aus mit der Geschichte
des Strukturwandels im Ruhrgebiet."



 



Fest steht: Baden-Württemberg braucht solche Nachrichten dringend. Das einst erfolgsverwöhnte Vorzeigeland steckt mit seiner Automobilindustrie in einer ähnlich tiefen Strukturkrise wie
das Ruhrgebiet mit seiner Kohle- und Stahlindustrie in den 60er Jahren. 



 



Ich kenne mich gut aus mit der Geschichte des Strukturwandels im Ruhrgebiet. Meine Mutter kommt aus Dortmund, mein Opa hat untertage gearbeitet. Ich erinnere mich an die Debatten am
Abendbrottisch, wie mein Opa und seine Kollegen weiter auf die Kohle gesetzt haben, obwohl längst absehbar war, dass es so nicht weitergeht. Schau ich mir die Situation heute in Baden-Württemberg
an, gibt es Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede. Erstens: Wir werden uns eben nicht von der Automobilindustrie lösen müssen, wie Nordrhein-Westfalen sich von der Kohle lösen musste. Zweitens: Viele
Dinge werden sich trotzdem grundsätzlich ändern. Ministerpräsident Winfried Kretschmann hat schon 2017 einen Strategiedialog zur Transformation der Automobilindustrie eingerichtet, bei dem die
Chefs der großen Auto- und Zulieferkonzerne regelmäßig zusammensitzen mit Gewerkschaften, Lobbygruppen, aber auch mit der Wissenschaft, mit den Landesministerien. Alle Beteiligten eint: Wir
bleiben ein starker Automobilstandort, aber unsere Geschäftsmodelle wandeln sich, die Antriebsformen werden andere, der Schwerpunkt der Wertschöpfung verschiebt sich vermutlich Richtung
Hochtechnologie. 



 



Namentlich: die Künstliche Intelligenz in all ihren Ausprägungen. Tatsächlich hat Baden-Württemberg mit Aleph Alpha aus Heidelberg jetzt sogar einen von nur zwei europäischen
Hoffnungsträgern, um ChatGPT Parolie zu bieten. Wiederum seit kurzem größter Geldgeber: die Schwarz-Gruppe und die Dieter-Schwarz-Stiftung. Deutschland war es dann auch, das neben Frankreich am
meisten Druck gemacht hat, um eine Regulierung sogenannter Foundation Models im europäischen KI-Gesetz zu verhindern. Auf Initiative Baden-Württembergs?



 



Es trifft zu, dass wir uns als baden-württembergische Landesregierung dafür eingesetzt haben, bei dem Gesetzgebungsverfahren die Interessen von Innovation und Forschung zu berücksichtigen. Wir
müssen ein europäisches KI-Modell hinbekommen, das nicht alle Freiheiten lässt, das die Möglichkeiten von Überwachung etwa am Arbeitsplatz in den Blick nimmt, zugleich aber nicht den Weg der
Überregulierung geht. Wir reden die ganze Zeit darüber, dass wir als Gesellschaft risikofreudiger werden müssen. Dann sollten wir auch danach handeln. Wir wissen heute nicht, wie der
wissenschaftliche Fortschritt in fünf oder in zehn Jahren aussieht. Darum dürfen wir jetzt nicht alle technologischen Entwicklungspfade blockieren. Wir müssen in Zukunft vermutlich lernen, unsere
Gesetzgebung den Erkenntnissen entsprechend laufend anzupassen und nicht zu meinen, ein Gesetz gilt für Jahrzehnte. Und wir sollten im Zweifel die Innovationskraft von Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft
zulassen. Das gilt bei der KI, aber auch bei der grünen Gentechnik und anderswo.




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Ob Industrie, Mobilität, Ernährung, Gesundheit: Überall, wo der Strukturwandel in Gang kommt, wo Deutschland sich neu erfinden muss, soll immer die Forschung es richten. Die Hoffnungen
sind gewaltig. Sehen Sie nicht die Gefahr, dass Politik Wissenschaft nur noch instrumentell begreift? Als Mittel zum Zweck? 



 



Wir müssen uns ehrlich machen. Es gab eine Zeit, da hat sich die Wissenschaft zu wenig den Erwartungen und den Bedürfnissen der Gesellschaft gestellt. Das ist vorbei. Unsere
Wissenschaftslandschaft verändert sich und damit die Forschungsförderung, die wir betreiben. Alle wissen: Wir werden den Wandel in der Gesellschaft ohne neue Technologie nicht hinbekommen. Aber
natürlich nicht nur über Technologie. Wir müssen genauso über soziale Innovationen reden, womit auch und gerade die Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften gefragt sind. Es wird jedenfalls deutlich
schwieriger einfach zu sagen: Das geht mich alles nichts an, mir ist egal, wie es der Gesellschaft geht und was sie braucht. Das ist aber nur die eine Seite. Die andere ist: Wir wissen genau,
dass es die freie Grundlagenforschung gerade um der Anwendung von morgen und übermorgen willen braucht. Sie ist die Basis aller wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis, sie gehört grundlegend geschützt und
unterstützt. Und sie wird es auch.



 



Dieser Paradigmenwechsel, den Sie beschreiben, ist besonders für die Grünen heftig. Wenn Sie etwa Spielraum und Experimentierlust auch in der grünen Gentechnik fordern, tun Sie das im
Einklang mit Ihrer Parteifreundin, Hamburgs grüner
Wissenschaftssenatorin Katharina Fegebank, aber konträr zu langjährigen Überzeugungen des grünen Mainstreams. 



 



Die grünen Wissenschaftsministerinnen und Wissenschaftspolitiker waren sich in der Hinsicht immer weitestgehend einig, das umfasst auch unsere scheidende hessische Kollegin Angela Dorn. Aber
natürlich gibt es die andere Seite, Parteifreundinnen und -freunde, die ihren Fokus stärker auf der Biolandwirtschaft haben. Es ist gut, dass wir beide Strömungen in der Partei haben. Wir Grünen
waren und sind eine Partei, die viele Themen der Gesellschaft in Tiefe und Breite offen ausdiskutiert. Das ist in erster Linie eine Stärke, aber manchmal auch eine Schwäche.



 



"Darüber zu sprechen, ist mit diesem BMBF
im Moment leider nicht so einfach möglich."



 



In Bundesforschungsministerin Bettina Stark-Watzinger (FDP) hatten Sie immer eine Verbündete, was den Schutz von KI oder grüner Gentechnik vor einer aus ihrer Sicht zu starken Regulierung
anging. Doch bei vielen Themen in der Bildungs-, Wissenschafts- und Innovationspolitik knirscht es zurzeit zwischen Bund und Ländern. Woran liegt das? 



 



Ich nenne Ihnen ein Beispiel: Bei der geplanten Deutschen Agentur für Transfer und Innovation (DATI) erfahren wir kaum etwas zum Stand, zur Konzeption und zur Ausstattung. Vielleicht wird die DATI am Ende
hilfreich sein, vielleicht wird sie ein Erfolg. Aber als Länder bleiben wir außen vor. Wir haben Vertrauen in die gebildete Gründungskommission, außerdem bin ich erfreut, dass das BMBF offenbar
innovative Themen setzen und neue Formate ausprobieren will. Die Länder hätten allerdings auch Expertise bei der Frage zu bieten, wie die Agentur noch besser bzw. wie die Anschlussfähigkeit an
bestehende Länderprogramme sichergestellt werden könnte. Nur: Darüber zu sprechen, ist mit diesem BMBF im Moment leider nicht so einfach möglich. 



 



Aber warum ist das so?



 



Ich würde lieber darüber sprechen, wie wir das ändern. Bei den Verhandlungen um die Fortsetzung des Programms zur HAW-Forschungsförderung hatten wir zwischendurch auch sehr schwierige Phasen. Es
hätte schneller und vertrauensvoller gehen können, wir haben miteinander gerungen, aber am Ende sind wir zu einem Ergebnis gekommen. Das könnte, das sollte doch jetzt unser gegenseitiges Vertrauen in unsere
Kooperationsfähigkeit stärken – bis zu dem Punkt, dass der Bund unseren Wunsch, als Länder früher und besser mit ihm ins Gespräch zu kommen, ernst nimmt. Dass man im BMBF ein Gefühl dafür
entwickelt, dass wir nicht nur die Schreckgestalten des Föderalismus sind, sondern Partner, die am Ende das gleiche Interesse haben: die Wissenschaft in Deutschland stark zu machen. 



 



Wobei die Länder sich mitunter selbst schon genug Probleme bereiten. Die Wissenschaftsminister waren so frustriert über ihre Rolle in der Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK), dass sie jetzt ihre
eigene Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz
bekommen sollen. Droht die Scheidung von den Bildungsministern?



 



Ich hoffe nicht. Bis Sommer werden wir prüfen, was das richtige Format für die Wissenschaft sein wird: innerhalb oder außerhalb der KMK. Ich plädiere sehr dafür, dass wir die Verknüpfung
erhalten, aber anders gestalten als bislang, denn so, wie es war, hat es wirklich nicht funktioniert. Dafür sind die Dynamiken und Schwerpunktsetzungen zwischen Bildungs- und Wissenschaftspolitik
doch zu unterschiedlich. Umgekehrt gibt es viele Themen, bei denen wir eng verbunden sind. Bei der anstehenden Reform der Lehrerbildung, aber auch bei der Frage, wie das Abitur künftig die
Verbindung zwischen Schule und Hochschule darstellen kann.  



 



"Manchmal hatte ich eher den Eindruck, dass unter den Kultusministerinnen und Kultusministern einige sind, die die Wissenschaft ganz aus der KMK verabschieden
wollten."



 



Bayerns Wissenschaftsminister Markus Blume (CSU) rief schon mal eine "Revolution statt Evolution" aus.



 



Es mag zutreffen, dass Karin Prien…



 



…Schleswig-Holsteins CDU-Ministerin für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur…



 



…und ich eher zu denen gehören, die die Einrichtung einer eigenen Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz schmerzt. Bei Karin Prien schon deshalb, weil sie Bildung und Wissenschaft in ihrem Ressort
vereint. Bei mir, weil ich zwar als Kulturministerin durchaus die Vorteile sehe, seit die Kulturminister ihre eigene Kulturministerkonferenz haben. Weil ich zugleich aber ungute
Loslösungserscheinungen bemerke, obwohl sich die Kulturministerkonferenz sogar unter dem Dach der KMK befindet. Wir sind Wissenschaftsministerium, wir sind aber auch Hochschulministerium und
haben damit auch die Bildung im Haus. Deshalb bin ich dafür, dass die neue Konferenz zumindest ebenfalls Teil der KMK wird. Übrigens sieht auch Markus Blume den Wert starker Verbindungen zu den
Kultusministern. Manchmal hatte ich eher den Eindruck, dass unter den Kultusministerinnen und Kultusministern einige sind, die die Wissenschaft am liebsten ganz aus der KMK verabschieden wollten.



 



Wie stellen Sie sich den Neuanfang praktisch vor?



 



Es ist zu früh, das zu sagen. Aber sicherlich würde es Sinn ergeben, die Sitzungen einer Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz an die Termine der Gemeinsamen Wissenschaftskonferenz (GWK) von Bund und
Ländern anzubinden, denn dann treffen wir uns ohnehin schon. Und die Termine mit dem Wissenschaftsrat müssen wir außerdem koordinieren. Was allein schon zeigt: Mehr Gremien haben nicht
automatisch einen Mehrwert an sich.



 



Zumal Sie die Reform der Lehrerbildung eben schon ansprachen. Da werden Sie ohnehin wieder alle zusammensitzen müssen, wenn es keinen Wildwuchs geben soll. Die Ständige Wissenschaftliche
Kommission (SWK) hat die Länder gerade dringend zu einer föderalen Stimmigkeit und Systematik bei der Neugestaltung aufgerufen.



 



Mein erster Eindruck ist, das Gutachten der SWK bestätigt in vielen Teilen die Richtung, die wir in Baden-Württemberg bereits eingeschlagen haben. Es gibt allerdings einige Punkte, bei denen wir
anderer Meinung sind. 



 



"Den Ein-Fach-Lehrer in
einigen Hauptfächern ermöglichen."



 



Sie meinen: das duale Lehramtsstudium, das Baden-Württemberg und andere Länder pushen, das die SWK-Experten aber ablehnen.



 



Zum Beispiel. Wobei man sich genau anschauen sollte, was mit dualem Studium gemeint ist. Wenn das Gutachten etwa empfiehlt, das Referendariat zu kürzen und die Praxisanteile in den Master zu
packen, entspricht das genau dem, was wir unter der Überschrift "duales Studium" planen. Die Sorge der SWK besteht vor allem darin, dass die Wissenschaftlichkeit des Studiums leidet, das muss
aber nicht der Fall sein, wenn man die Praxiselemente vernünftig einarbeitet. Noch wichtiger sind die Themen, bei denen sich das Gutachten deckt mit dem, was wir Länder, übrigens schon jetzt
recht einheitlich, vorhaben. Beispiel Ein-Fach-Lehrer: Dass es diesen in bestimmten Mangelfächern geben muss, dafür gibt es nach meiner Einschätzung in der KMK eine Mehrheit. Und trotzdem wird
ein Flächenland wie Baden-Württemberg, in dem es auch kleine Grundschulen auf dem Land gibt mit nur 15 Schülern in der Klasse, teilweise andere Lösungen entwickeln müssen als ein Stadtstaat wie
Hamburg. 



 



Beim Ein-Fach-Lehrer, sagen Sie, herrsche weitgehend Konsens zwischen den Ländern. Tatsächlich? Es macht einen großen Unterschied, ob man das Modell nur für Mangelfächer etablieren will,
als Notmaßnahme gegen den akuten Lehrkräftemangel – oder es durch die Bank einführt als dauerhafte strukturelle Neuordnung der Lehrerbildung. 



 



Im Moment liegt der Fokus sehr stark auf der Mathematik, weil dort der Mangel am stärksten und der Reformbedarf zugleich besonders groß ist in einem Studium, das als extrem anspruchsvoll und
angstbehaftet gilt. Wir sehen zudem, dass internationale Bewerberinnen und Bewerber nicht an Schulen arbeiten können, weil ihnen das zweite Fach fehlt. Ein entscheidender Punkt könnte sein, ob
wir von Haupt- oder Nebenfächern sprechen. Das hielte ich für eine sinnvolle Unterscheidung: den Ein-Fach-Lehrer in einigen Hauptfächern ermöglichen und, wenn er sich über den akuten
Lehrkräftemangel hinaus bewährt, auf weitere Fächer ausweiten. 



 



Die SWK empfiehlt, den Absolventen der Ein-Fach-Studiengänge die berufsbegleitende, aber nicht weniger wissenschaftsbasierte Fortbildung zum zweiten Fach zu ermöglichen. Reicht das? Muss
es nicht eine Verpflichtung geben? Die würde schließlich auch die Länder binden, genügend Kapazitäten dafür zur Verfügung zu stellen.



 



Ich wäre dafür. Möglicherweise ist es keine erstrebenswerte Perspektive, als Lehrerin oder Lehrer über Jahrzehnte hinweg immer nur Mathematik zu unterrichten. Hinzu kommt, dass die Weiterbildung
im Lehrerberuf trotz aller Bemühungen nie die Bedeutung bekommen hat, die ihr zusteht. Viele Lehrkräfte beklagen seit langem, dass sie sich nicht richtig in ihrem Schulalltag weiterentwickeln
können. Es wäre eine wunderbare Folge der Ein-Fach-Lehrer-Debatte, wenn wir neue, hochwertige Weiterbildungsoptionen für alle eröffnen könnten. 



 



"Darum plädiere ich dafür, dass wir jetzt erstmal
aus den Studiengebühren aussteigen und offen bleiben
für weitere Entwicklungen."



 



Einen Alleingang ist Baden-Württemberg vor Jahren bei Studiengebühren für Nicht-EU-Studierende gegangen. Im vergangenen Frühsommer sprachen sich die Regierungsfraktionen von Grünen und
CDU dann für die Abschaffung aus, auch der unabhängige Monitoring-Beirat empfahl diese. Wie geht es weiter?



 



Die Entscheidung wird Teil der Haushaltsberatungen 2024. Die Zahlen, die wir zuletzt wieder vorgelegt bekamen, sprechen allerdings für sich. Die Diskrepanz zwischen dem Angebot an akademischen
Fachkräften und dem Bedarf, den wir in Baden-Württemberg bis 2040 haben, ist so groß, dass sie die Transformation, von der wir eingangs sprachen, erschwert. Darum ist es mein oberstes Interesse,
eine möglichst große Zahl hochqualifizierter Studierender an unseren Hochschulen zu haben. Erfreulicherweise kommen auch zu uns wieder mehr internationale Studienanfänger, aber im Vergleich der
Bundesländer sind wir zurückgefallen. Wir haben unsere Exzellenzuniversitäten, wir haben wunderschöne Orte zum Studieren von Heidelberg über Konstanz am Bodensee bis nach Freiburg und Tübingen,
da bleibt nur ein Grund übrig, der die Entwicklung erklärt: die Studiengebühren. Das ergeben diverse Umfragen: Für Studieninteressierte aus dem Ausland sind die Studiengebühren neben der
Visavergabe und anderen Barrieren die eine Hürde zu viel, um zu uns zu kommen. 



 



Sagen Sie – während die TU München zum Wintersemester 2024/25 selbstbewusst Studiengebühren für internationale Studierende aus sogenannten Drittstaaten einführt, die sogar deutlich höher
liegen. 



 



Natürlich schauen wir uns das bayerische Modell an, das die Entscheidung über die Einführung den einzelnen Hochschulen überlässt. Was das mit der Dynamik der bayerischen Hochschullandschaft
macht, wenn ein Hochschulstandort immer mehr zusätzliche Mittel generiert, während andere abfallen, wird man sehen. Umgekehrt stimmt ja, dass die deutschen Universitäten im internationalen
Wettbewerb mit den USA, Kanada oder Großbritannien auch von ihrer Ausstattung her attraktiv sein müssen, und die kostet. In Bayern können die Hochschulen das Geld, das sie durch die Gebühren
einnehmen, behalten. Bei uns fließen sie zum großen Teil in den Topf der Hochschulfinanzierung – verteilen sich also gleichmäßig auf alle Standorte. Die TUM kann sich bei der Betreuung ihrer
internationalen Studierenden in Zukunft Dinge leisten, für die an anderen Hochschulen die Mittel einfach nicht reichen. 



 



Sie glauben also, für die TU München könnte es sich lohnen, und die internationalen Studierenden kommen weiterhin?



 



Das werden wir sehen und sicher auch für uns prüfen. Auch in Baden-Württemberg gibt es mit Standorten wie Heidelberg international attraktive Orte, auch aufgrund ihrer Geschichte. Gleichzeitig
brauchen wir internationale Studierende aber vielleicht gerade an den Standorten, die in den MINT-Fächern stark sind, wo die Städte aber vielleicht nicht so bekannt sind. Das könnte ein
Spannungsfeld sein. Darum plädiere ich dafür, dass wir jetzt erstmal in Baden-Württemberg aus den Studiengebühren aussteigen und offen bleiben für weitere Entwicklungen. 









In eigener Sache: Blog-Finanzierung














Wie dieser Blog finanziell aufgestellt ist, warum er Ihre Unterstützung braucht – und welche Artikel im November am meisten gelesen
wurden. 



 



Mehr lesen...

Deutschlands Neuntklässler erreichen bei der neuen PISA-Studie historisch niedrige Testwerte. Was das bedeutet – und warum ein neuer PISA-Schock vermutlich trotzdem ausbleiben wird.






Illustration: Venita Oberholster / Pixabay.






ERINNERT SICH noch jemand an die Aufregung nach der Veröffentlichung der ersten PISA-Studie 2000? Sie war so außerordentlich und so nachhaltig, dass das Narrativ vom "PISA-Schock" prägend
wurde für die deutsche Bildungsdebatte der Nullerjahre. Und einen ungeahnten Bildungsaufbruch markierte. 



 



22 Jahre später ist es passiert. Nach einem langsamen, mühsamen, aber bemerkenswerten Aufstieg bei den Schülerleistungen bis Mitte der Zehnerjahre folgte der umso rasantere Abstieg. Und
jetzt, bei den am Dienstagvormittag veröffentlichten Ergebnissen der achten Pisa-Studie, haben Deutschlands Neuntklässler in zwei von drei getesteten Kompetenzbereichen mit
der historisch schlechtesten Punktzahlen abgeschnitten, schlechter noch als bei PISA 2000, und im dritten nur knapp über den damaligen Werten.



 



Das bedeutet, dass die heute 15-Jährigen im Schnitt maximal so lesen, rechnen und naturwissenschaftliche Probleme bearbeiten können wie ihre Altersgenossen vor zwei Jahrzehnten. Was damals, siehe
oben, einen enormen bildungspolitischen Veränderungsdruck erzeugte. Und heute? Dazu später mehr. Zunächst die wichtigsten Ergebnisse von PISA 2022 im Überblick



 



o In Mathematik erreichten Deutschlands 15-Jährige 475 PISA-Punkte, satte 25 weniger als vor vier Jahren. 30 Punkte entsprechen Bildungsforschern zufolge etwa dem Lernstoff
eines Schuljahres. Damit liegt Deutschland nur noch drei Punkte über dem OECD-Schnitt, was im Gegensatz zu 2018 statistisch nicht mehr bedeutsam ist. Von den erreichten Höchstwerten Mitte
der Zehnerjahre haben sich die Schüler inzwischen rund 40 PISA-Punkte entfernt. Jungen schneiden im Mittel etwas besser ab als Mädchen. Mit Ausnahme von Japan verschlechterte sich die
überwiegende Mehrheit der OECD-Staaten gegenüber 2018. International auf den vorderen Plätzen: Japan (536), Korea (527), Estland (510), Schweiz (508), Kanada (497).


Wer hat mitgemacht? Wer hat getestet?


In Deutschland haben 6116 Schüler:innen an 257 Schulen aller Schularten an dem "Programme for International Student Assessment", kurz PISA, teilgenommen, womit die
ermittelten Kompetenzniveaus für die Bundesrepublik insgesamt statistisch repräsentativ sind. Wegen der Corona-Pandemie wurde die turunusmäßige Erhebung um ein Jahr nach hinten geschoben, und es
waren nur halb so viele Schüler bei den Tests dabei wie 2018.



 



Gleichzeitig wurden die Jugendlichen zu ihren Lernbedingungen und Einstellungen sowie ihrer sozialen Herkunft befragt, auch Schulleiter, Lehrkräfte und Eltern
wurden einbezogen.



 



Jede PISA-Runde leuchtet einen Kompetenzbereich besonders intensiv aus, diesmal, im achten Durchgang seit 2000, war wieder die Mathematik
dran. 



 



Weltweit nahmen rund 690.000 Schüler:innen an der Studie teil, sie stammen aus 81 Ländern und Volkswirtschaften. Anders als in den ersten
PISA-




Runden werden die Testaufgaben und Fragebögen seit 2015 am Computer bearbeitet.



 



Der Wert von 500 PISA-Punkten entspricht dem durchschnittlichen Kompetenzniveau aller Teilnehmerstaaten bei der ersten PISA-Runde 2000. Damals erreichte Deutschland
in Mathematik 490, im Lesen 484 und in den Naturwissenschaften 487 Punkte.



 



Verantwortlich für den deutschen Teil der Studie ist das Zentrum für internationale Vergleichsstudien (ZIB), ein An-Institut der TU München (TUM), an dem
außerdem das Leibniz-Institut für Bildungsforschung und Bildungsinformation (DIPF) und das Leibniz-Institut für die Pädagogik der Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik (IPN) beteiligt sind. Als
nationale PISA-Leiterin fungiert  die TUM-Bildungsforscherin und ZIB-Vorstandsvorsitzende Doris Lewalter. Auftraggeber sind Kultusministerkonferenz und Bundesministeriums für Bildung
und Forschung.








o 30 Prozent der deutschen Neuntklässler sind nicht in der Lage, vollständig beschriebene mathematische Aufgaben zu lösen, sie liegen damit unterhalb der sogenannten Kompetenzstufe II . Im
Schnitt aller OECD-Länder gilt das für 31 Prozent. Gegenüber 2018 ist die Gruppe der leistungsschwachen Schüler in Deutschland mit acht Prozentpunkten sehr stark gewachsen, gegenüber 2012 beträgt
die Zunahme sogar zwölf Prozentpunkte. Ihr Anteil ist durch alle Schulformen hindurch gestiegen, auch an Gymnasien, dort von 0,7 Prozent (2012) auf allerdings immer noch niedrige vier
Prozent. Zum Vergleich der Anstieg bei den nichtgymnasialen Schulformen: von 25 auf 40 Prozent. Am anderen Ende der Leistungsskala sind nach PISA-Maßstäben nur noch neun Prozent aller
deutschen Schüler leistungsstark (Kompetenzstufen V und VI) – eine Halbierung gegenüber 2012 (17 Prozent).



 



o Im Fragebogen äußerten die deutschen Neuntklässler 2022 deutlich mehr Ängstlichkeit in Bezug auf die Mathematik als 2012, während umgekehrt die Freude und das Interesse an der Mathematik
sowie die Motivation und die sogenannte Selbstwirksamkeitserwartung bei klassischen Matheaufgaben stark nach unten gegangen sind. Am häufigsten empfinden die deutschen Schüler während des
Mathematikunterrichts Müdigkeit und Langeweile.


"Wir brauchen einen fast schon revolutionären Neuanfang"



Was Deutschlands Politiker, Bildungsexperten und Verbände zu den historisch schlechten PISA-Ergebnissen sagen. (05. Dezember 2023) >>>


o Bei den naturwissenschaftlichen Kompetenzen erreichten die Neuntklässler in der Bundesrepublik bei PISA 2022 noch 492 Punkte, was nur sieben Punkte, aber immerhin noch
statistisch signifikant über dem OECD-Mittel von 485 liegt. 2018 wurden 503 Punkte erreicht. Gegenüber 2012 summiert sich der Rückgang inzwischen auf über 30 Punkte. Jungen und Mädchen schneiden
in etwa gleich gut ab. International auf den vorderen Plätzen: Japan (547), Korea (527), Estland (526), Kanada (515), Finnland (511). 



 



o Der Anteil leistungsschwacher Schüler ist in Deutschland auch in den Naturwissenschaften signifikant gestiegen, um drei Prozentpunkte auf 22,9 Prozent, was etwas unterhalb des OECD-Schnitts
liegt. Besonders häufig sind sie mit 31,9 Prozent an den nichtgymnasialen Schulformen anzutreffen (+4,4 Prozentpunkte gegenüber 2018), an Gymnasien befinden sich 2,9 Prozent der Schüler unterhalb
von Kompetenzstufe II, was indes fast einer Verdopplung gegenüber 2018 (1,6 Prozent) gleichkommt. 9,7 Prozent der deutschen Schüler erreichen die Kompetenzstufen V und VI und sind daher als
leistungsstark anzusehen, ähnlich viele wie 2018 (10,0 Prozent) und deutlich mehr als im OECD-Mittel (7,5 Prozent).



 



o Beim Lesen schafften die deutschen Neuntklässler diesmal 480 PISA-Punkte, 18 weniger als 2018 und knapp 30 unterhalb von 2012 – womit Deutschland von der
statistischen Signifikanz her auf den OECD-Durchschnitt zurückfällt. Mädchen erreichen deutlich bessere Ergebnisse als Jungen. Außer Deutschland haben sich 18 weitere OECD-Staaten in den
vergangenen vier Jahren deutlich verschlechtert. International auf den vorderen Plätzen: Irland (516), Japan (516), Korea (515), Estland (511), Kanada (507). 



 



o 25,5 Prozent der deutschen Schüler erreichten beim Lesen nur Kompetenzstufe I und gelten damit als leistungsschwach (+5 Prozentpunkte im Vergleich zu 2018). An den Gymnasien hat sich ihr
Anteil von einem niedrigen Niveau kommend auf 3,8 Prozent der Schülerschaft mehr als verdoppelt. An den übrigen Schulformen liegt er allerdings mit 35 Prozent neunmal so hoch, nochmal
sechs Prozentpunkte mehr als 2018. Das bedeutet laut nationalem PISA-Bericht: "Diese Jugendlichen verfügen nur über sehr eingeschränkte Lesekompetenzen und sind kaum in der Lage,
sinnentnehmend Texte zu lesen, was mit Problemen der gesellschaftlichen Teilhabe einhergehen kann." Die Gruppe der besonders lesestarken Neuntklässler verringerte sich seit 2018 um drei
Prozentpunkte auf 8,2 Prozent – wobei der Rückgang an Gymnasien von 27,3 auf 19,2 Prozent ebenfalls rasant ausfiel. 



 



o Die soziale Herkunft spielte bei den Leistungen in Deutschland, gemessen an den Mathematikkompetenzen, erneut eine größere Rolle als im OECD-Durchschnitt, zumindest bezogen auf
die Berufe der Erziehungsberechtigten und deren sozioökonomischen Status. Allerdings: Werden weitere Faktoren wie Bildungsdauer der Erziehungsberechtigten, das Vorhandensein von Büchern oder die
Anzahl der Computer im Haushalt einberechnet, verschwindet der Unterschied. Die Stärke des statistischen Zusammenhangs (gemeint ist hier der Anteil der aufgeklärten Varianz) zwischen
sozialer Herkunft und Pisa-Leistungen bleibt aber trotzdem über den OECD-Mittel.



 



o Die deutschen Schülerleistungen sind in der Pandemie stärker gesunken sind als in vielen anderen Ländern, vor allem deutlich stärker als im OECD-Schnitt. 71 Prozent der
deutschen 15-Jährigen gaben an, dass in ihrem Schulgebäude wegen der Corona-Krise mehr als drei Monate lang kein Unterricht stattgefunden habe (im OECD-Durchschnitt sagten das 51 Prozent).
Die Auswertung der internationalen Daten zeige allerdings, dass es keinen systematischen Zusammenhang zwischen der Dauer der Schulschließungen und Leistungsrückgängen zwischen 2018 und 2022
gegeben habe, betont die deutsche PISA-Studienleiterin Doris Lewalter. Weiter ergab die PISA-Befragung, dass der Distanzunterricht in Deutschland signifikant seltener mithilfe digitaler
Geräte und viel häufiger mithilfe versendeter Materialien zum selbständigen Lernen ablief. Dass deutsche Schüler gleichzeitig seltener Tipps zum eigenständigen Lernen erhielten und seltener
gefragt wurden, wie es ihnen ging. Und dass Gymnasiasten nach Angaben von Schulleitungen weitaus besser erreicht wurden durch den Distanzunterricht als Schüler nichtgymnasialer Schulen.
"Deutschland war im internationalen Vergleich nicht gut auf den Distanzunterricht vorbereitet, was die Ausstattung mit Digitalgeräten angeht – hat dann aber aufgeholt“, sagt PISA-Studienleiterin
Lewalter.



 



o Jugendliche aus Einwandererfamilien (bis einschließlich zweite Generation) schneiden in fast allen europäischen Staaten schlechter ab. Auffällig ist zudem, dass unter den vier Staaten, die in
wechselnder Reihenfolge die PISA-Spitze unter sich ausmachen, drei sind fast ohne Einwanderung: Japan und Korea, die meist vorn liegen, außerdem Estland, das mit Abstand beste europäische Land.
Dann folgen allerdings mit Kanada schon ein klassisches Einwanderungsland und nicht weit dahinter weitere Staaten mit viel Zuwanderung: die Schweiz, Australien, das Vereinigte
Königreich. 



 



o In Deutschland indes ist der Effekt des Zuwanderungshintergrunds auf die Schulleistungen laut PISA-Forschern überdurchschnittlich stark ausgeprägt. Ihr Rückstand zu
Nicht-Einwanderern erkläre sich zu erheblichem Anteil durch die soziale Herkunft und ihren häuslichen Sprachgebrauch. Gegenüber 2012 hat sich der Anteil der Einwandererkinder auf 38,6
Prozent veranderthalbfacht. Knapp über die Hälfte von ihnen spricht zu Hause Deutsch, von Jugendlichen der ersten Einwanderergeneration tun dies lediglich zwölf Prozent. 16 Prozent der ersten
Einwanderergeneration besucht ein Gymnasium – im Vergleich zu 44 Prozent der Neuntklässler aus Nicht-Einwandererfamilien. Die Ergebnisse der ersten Generation nennen die deutschen PISA-Forscher
"alarmierend": "Es ist offensichtlich, dass die Integration der Jugendlichen der ersten Generation in das deutsche Bildungssystem nicht gelingt. Die pandemiebedingten Schulschließungen der Jahre
2020 und 2021 dürften hier zusätzliche negative Effekte gehabt haben."



 



Wohlgemerkt: zusätzliche negative Effekte. Diese Betonung ist den Forschern offenbar besonders wichtig, und das aus gutem Grund. Denn keinesfalls darf über den vermutlichen Folgen der
Schulschließungen und anderer Corona-Einschränkungen aus dem Blick geraten, dass der PISA-Abwärtstrend teilweise seit einem Jahrzehnt läuft. Die Pandemie habe insofern "eher als Verstärker
bereits bestehender Probleme gewirkt", so formulieren das die Forscher.



 



Womit wir bei der Frage sind, was die Ergebnisse bedeuten – und was aus ihnen folgten sollte. Dazu drei Thesen:



 



1. Die deutschen PISA-Ergebnisse sind so schlecht wie nie, trotzdem droht ein zweiter PISA-Schock auszubleiben



 



Die Zahlen sind – nüchtern betrachtet – dramatisch: In allen drei Kompetenzbereichen fallen die deutschen Neunklässler auf oder unter die niedrigsten Werte zurück, die jemals im Rahmen von
PISA gemessen wurden. Die Anteile der leistungsschwachen und damit besonders gefährdeten Schüler sind seit 2018 durch die Bank gestiegen, teilweise sehr stark. Folgt jetzt ein öffentlicher
Aufschrei, der den des PISA-Schocks nach 2000 noch in den Schatten stellt?



 



Leider unwahrscheinlich. Denn unsere Gesellschaft ist, was schlechte Schülerleistungen angeht, inzwischen abgestumpft. Das hat viel mit den Folgen der Corona-Krise zu tun. Nach einer ganzen
Batterie mieser Studienergebnisse von IGLU
bis zum IQB-Bildungstrend haben Medien und Öffentlichkeit den enormen Lernschaden durch die Pandemie-Maßnahmen bereits "eingepreist", schon auf die letzten Studien reagierten sie nur noch mit
einem Zucken, nach dem Motto: Schade, war aber ja erwartbar und ist nicht zu ändern. Was zwar nicht stimmt, aber scheinbar seine Rechtfertigung dadurch erhält, dass es anderswo kaum besser lief
zwischen 2018 und 2022, Deutschland also quasi im OECD-Geleitzug nach unten gerauscht ist.



 



Paradoxerweise leiden die heute 15-Jährigen, vor allem aber auch die noch jüngeren Schüler, auf diese Weise ein zweites Mal unter der Pandemie – weil sich der Handlungsdruck auf die
Bildungspolitik verringert. Forderungen nach einem grundsätzlichen Ruck könnten mit dem Narrativ von historisch einmaligen Umständen wegmoderiert werden, deretwegen man – ebenfalls anders
als nach PISA 2000 – jetzt nicht gleich bildungspolitisch alles in Frage stellen oder die große Krise ausrufen dürfe.



 



Gegen einen PISA-Schock wirkt zudem, dass die gemessenen Werte zwar niedrig sind wie nie, aber Deutschland mit ihnen noch etwas über dem OECD-Mittel liegt. Das war vor 22 Jahren
anders: Damals befand sich Deutschland mit ähnlichen PISA-Ergebnissen international unter dem Durchschnitt. Was so gar nicht dem damaligen Anspruch entsprach, eine führende Bildungsnation
mit fairen Chancen für alle zu sein. Heute reicht das gleiche Niveau für ein (leicht) überdurchschnittliche internationale Mittelmaß. Indes: Macht es das irgendwie besser? Haben wir noch den
bildungspolitischen Anspruch von einst? Oder haben wir auch diesen längst wegmoderiert? Sind wir zu müde, um noch einmal erschüttert zu sein? Nicht die kurzfristigen Reaktionen auf PISA
2022, die betroffenen Sprüche werden es zeigen, sondern die mittelfristigen, die bildungs- und finanzpolitischen Weichenstellungen der nächsten Monate und Jahre. Und zwar schonungslos.



 



2. Die Zuwanderung nicht als Ausrede nutzen, sondern als Gelegenheit



 



Es ist ein gefährlicher Satz – gefährlich, weil er zu falschen Schlussfolgerungen einlädt: Deutschlands Einwandererkinder ziehen die PISA-Ergebnisse merklich runter. Sie erreichen in Mathe 59
Kompetenzpunkte weniger als Gleichaltrige ohne Zuwanderungsgeschichte, das entspricht zwei Schuljahren. In Lesen ist der Abstand mit 67 Punkten noch größer. Wer das allerdings den
Einwandererkindern und ihren Familien vorwirft, sie womöglich sogar bei den nationalen Ergebnissen rausrechnet, um zu zeigen, wo die Bundesrepublik ohne sie stehen würde, hat nichts verstanden.
Die Wahrheit ist: Deutschland hat sich für Millionen Menschen geöffnet, viele davon Geflüchtete ohne ausreichende Schul- oder Berufsbildung, nun muss Deutschland sich aber auch auf sie und ihre
Bedürfnisse einstellen. Hinzu kommt etwas, was PISA-Studienleiterin Lewalter betont: "Die mathematischen Kompetenzen der Jugendlichen ohne Zuwanderungshintergrund sind im Vergleich zu 2012
ebenfalls geringer geworden – sogar deutlicher als bei den Jugendlichen, deren Eltern zugewandert, die aber selbst in Deutschland geboren sind."



 



Und doch bleibt es eine der wichtigsten PISA-Botschaften: dass es gerade auch in den Schulen bisher nicht ausreichend gelingt, sich auf die Realitäten einer Einwanderergesellschaft
einzustellen. Da nützt kein Lamentieren über die mangelnde Unterstützung durch die Eltern, die nicht vorhandenen Sprachkenntnisse der Jugendlichen – oder gar der Hinweis, dass erfolgreiche
PISA-Länder wie Kanada oder Großbritannien fast ausschließlich hochqualifizierte Einwanderer ins Land lassen. Es sind jetzt alles unsere Kinder, und wir brauchen sie alle: weil die Gesellschaft
dramatisch altert, weil schon jetzt hunderttausende Fachkräfte fehlen – und weil eine vielfältige Gesellschaft besser auf künftige Veränderungen wird reagieren können. Wie groß das Potenzial der
Einwandererkinder ist, auch das hat neulich eine Studie gezeigt: Beim IQB-Bildungstrend standen neben alarmierend schlechten Deutsch-Ergebnissen starke Englisch-Werte –
und gerade eingewanderte Jugendliche schnitten gut ab.



 



3. Deutschland hat Handlungsoptionen, es muss sie nur nutzen



 



Die deutschen PISA-Forscher mahnen in ihrem nationalen Bericht, die 2022er Ergebnisse seien "besorgniserregend und zeigen, dass großer Handlungsbedarf für das Bildungssystem in Deutschland
besteht. Es bedarf entschiedener gemeinsamer Anstrengungen von Bildungspolitik, Bildungsforschung, Bildungspraxis und Zivilgesellschaft, um flächendeckende Maßnahmen auf den Weg zu bringen." Eine
gemeinsame, man könnte auch sagen: eine nationale Kraftanstrengung. Doch schafft die Politik die auch ohne zweiten PISA-Schock?



 



Immerhin haben schon die  IQB-Englischergebnisse gezeigt: Der Unterricht kann so gestaltet werden, dass Schüler mit unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen mitgenommen werden. Deshalb wird die
Unterrichtsgestaltung im Fokus der Bildungspolitik stehen müssen, das umfasst Lehreraus- und Fortbildung genauso wie die Schulentwicklung. Es geht ums Hinschauen, Abgucken und
Weiterentwickeln. 



 



Und da schulischer Erfolg stark mit Sprache verknüpft ist, muss Deutschland dessen Förderung noch absoluter setzen als bislang. Das bedeutet: Ähnlich wie etwa in Hamburg sollte es überall in
Deutschland eine Vorschulpflicht schon für Fünfjährige geben, die in Deutschtests Defizite aufweisen. Denn die Pflicht geht dann in beide Richtung: Die Gesellschaft wird damit
verantwortlich, die Kinder auf einen Sprachstand zu bringen, der ihnen die Bildungsteilhabe erst eröffnet. Also: systematisch diagnostizieren und systematisch fördern.   



 



Richtig ist darüber hinaus, dass mit dem geplanten Startchancen-Programm ein Anfang gemacht werden soll, besonders jene Schulen zu fördern, an denen viele sozial benachteiligte Kinder lernen.
Doch ist das vorgesehene Volumen mit zwei Milliarden pro Jahr und zehn Prozent der deutschen Schulen viel zu klein. Es muss mehr Geld fließen, und es muss noch deutlicher umgesteuert werden
dorthin, wo es gebraucht wird. Nicht zu den Gymnasien und statt dessen besonders in den Kita- und Grundschulbereich. In die Bundesländer, Regionen und Stadtviertel, wo die sozialen
Herausforderungen am größten sind. Das Gegenteil von Gießkanne. Wenn Bildung die soziale Frage des 21. Jahrhunderts ist, dann ist das der entscheidende Teil der Antwort. PISA 2022
akzentuiert sie einmal mehr. 




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I look puzzled or annoyed as the anchorgot my title wrong, suggesting I run NPSIAI have been thinking a lot lately about profs and punditry.  To start, I am just going to accept that profs who appear on TV are "pundits" as the definition of a pundit is: "an expert in a particular subject or field who is frequently called on to give opinions about it to the public."  Yep, that's us, among other folks.  Plenty of profs who aren't pundits, plenty of pundits who are not profs, but those who profess in the media are, indeed, pundits.   This came up last week at the International Studies Association as there was a panel on "How Not To Bridge The Gap" which is about as deceptive as one can get in a panel title since it was really about how to bridge the gap--how to have the academics talk to the policy people and vice versa.  After a couple of decades of Bridging the Gap [BTG], a group dedicated to fostering the exchange, and a few years of a bit of that in a Canadian accent--the CDSN which has as BTG as a founding partner--folks are now asking about whether this is a good thing, whether it is dangerous, how to do responsible engagement, and such.While all of this can be and should be quite complicated, I have a basic take on whether or not to do media stuff (and since I do a fair amount, you can guess where this is headed):We get public money to do our research, so we should give back.  Indeed, many grant applications require a dissemination plan.A fundamental part of professing is to disseminate knowledge.And if not us, then who?This last thing is my focus today and was when I piped up from the audience last week.  That if we don't speak, the media will find someone else to fill that time slot, that page, that podcast, whatever.  So, one must ask themselves if one can bring more to something than whoever else they might get or whether one might not be as fit for that topic or issue than whoever else they might get.This is where I borrow a concept from the analytics revolution in sports.  There have been all kinds of ways to measure the value of baseball players compared to each other, basketball players (one measure is called RAPTOR!), and so on.  My personal favorite happens to be from baseball.  I like it so much both because it has a good conception and has a fun acronym is VORP: Value Over Replacement Player.  This enables one not only to assess how a generic player in their position in the same season or time frame, but to compare players at different positions or in different time frames.  While technology, strategy, and medical care and the rest have changed over time, we can use this measure to figure out the relative value of players from different generations.  Babe Ruth is still #1 followed by Walter Johnson, Cy Young, and then Barry Bonds and then Bonds's godfather Willie Mays (this settles the Mantle/Mays thing).  I am happy to see Tom Seaver above Greg Maddox, that Seaver was much better than the replacement level starting pitcher of his era compared to Greg Maddox to the replacement level starting pitcher of his era.  In basketball, this puts Lebron over Jordan, which folks might disagree with just a bit. The point is not to stir up a debate about sports, but the idea of measuring someone compared the person a team could get that is easily available--off the street, from the waiver wire, from the minor leagues, whatever.  When it comes to media stuff, the producers of the various radio, television, podcast, and other programs need to fill content, so they will grab someone, anyone, to fill in a spot.  So, the point I raised at the conference and part of the reason why I do media stuff is: would we rather have a knowledgeable expert or some schlub off the street?  Of course, they don't get just any schlub, they go to the experts who are already on their rolodex (to date myself even further).  We tend to see mostly the same folks again and again depending on the issue, so the question is, for every expert, are they more expert or less (dare I say it) hacky than the person who might be called instead?  The VORP in sports is easy to calculate even if what goes in the calculations can be and is debated--how much does excellence at anyone time count compared to lifetime achievement, etc.  In punditry, how do we calculate VORP?  It will be less about what is quantified and more about what can be compared and ranked.  So, what may be in the minds of the producers and should be in our minds as we come up with a Value Over Replacement Pundit:How well they know the topic at hand?  Some folks are super sharp at one thing, others know a bit about a lot.  This measure here is about how much they know about the specific topic?What is their range?  How broadly can they speak?  Because you know the anchor is going to go off script and ask questions that are not necessarily in the strikezone.How articulate are they?  Can they speak/write clearly and dynamically?  I will mention my Lebron/Babe Ruth in Canadian circles on this measure below.How measured or responsible are they?  Folks saying that war between US and China is inevitable, for instance, have a lower VORP because they may very well be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.  My speculating about terrorism in 1996 Lubbock should have set my VORP at a negative number.  On the other hand, I was far more responsible last March about calls for a No Fly Zone than a bunch of retired military officers in the US and Canada.  Availability: in sports, health is a gift/attribute in its own right, which means that some players rank higher because they can play most days.  Kevin Durant's VORP has been hurt by his various injuries.  In the pundit game, the question is whether one is willing to do it a bit, some, or a lot.  This can obviously tradeoff with expertise/responsibility pieces.  There are probably other ingredients/variables, but let's stick with those for now, and folks can suggest additional ones.The first item--how well they know the topic--allows us to bring in the positions from sports.  That one can have a high VORP if one is playing a position they are good at and a low one if they play one that is not their strength.  Babe Ruth has an incredible VORP because he was both a terrific hitter and an amazing pitcher.  So, some folks will have high Value Above Replacement Pundit because they know a lot about a lot, and they have the other key ingredients. In thinking about this and my experiences both in the media and watching other folks, I thought I should use a few key issues to highlight who has a high VORP.  And, yes, this was partially inspired by watching two NPSIA colleagues and one PhD student absolutely rock the Canadian intelligence beat.  So, enough with the explanations and definitions, who has a high VORP in Canada?  Note, this is illustrative, not exhaustive.I think number one on Canadian foreign policy, broadly defined, is Roland Paris.  He brings his years of academic experience on peacekeeping and international relations to bear along with his various times in government at different levels.  He is simply terrific at articulating complex stuff--his quotes today about Biden's visit to Ottawa were both accurate and delightful.  He is also very responsible--he's not going to say something that is wildly speculative.  If I were a producer, I would always go to him first on damn near anything.  When I appeared on TV with him once, I just basically said: "I agree with Roland." It did not make for good tv.  Bessma Momani has wide-ranging expertise, is compelling and clear, so she's a great go-to for Canadian relations with a variety of places.On intelligence matters, Canada has quite a few folks who are super sharp on this: Stephanie Carvin, Leah West, Jess Davis, Artur Wilcyznkski, and Craig Forcese clearly have very high VORPs (I think Amar Amarasingam does too, but I haven't seen as much of his stuff).  Stephanie, Leah, Jess, and Craig have done extensive research, Artur has far more experience than the others in government in so many spots (he is a great podcast co-host for a couple of the podcasts on the CDSN Podcast Network).  Each are quite responsible, sticking within their lanes of expertise, not speculating wildly, and not having any ideological axes to grind (that's a hint for many of the folks who have low VORPs--who tend to dominate the editorial pages).On defence stuff, Thomas Juneau has among the highest VORPs because he has academic and policy expertise, a willingness to do the media stuff, is excellent in both official languages. Stéfanie von Hlatky would have the highest defence VORP except she does not do that much media.  I wish she did more as she is super responsible, knows the Canadian defence scene, knows the US and NATO well, again strong in both languages.  I had fun watching her at a couple of NATO summits where the Canadian media grabbed us to "scrum" with them.  Of the columnists, I think Shannon Proudfoot easily has the highest VORP.  Her columns always are well reported, provide valuable perspective, making one see things from a different angle. Where do I fit in?  I think I have a decent, positive VORP score, but not as strong as those mentioned above.  I am not as articulate or as responsible.  I have a wider range than most, except perhaps Thomas and Roland (reminds me of the polls that show that men are far more confident about landing planes or battling bears), but with that greater willingness to talk about stuff at the edges of my expertise, I say stuff like Ukraine is going to lose the war.  I was wrong (many were wrong about that).  I should have been a bit more circumspect about potential predictions even while being clear as I could why a No Fly Zone was super dangerous. I did have fun saying "your guess is as good as mine" when an anchor went against the instructions asking about the pipeline sabotage.One of the things I have been emphasizing in recent years is saying no to the media where my VORP trends negative or where I know folks who have much more value.  During the Vance/McDonald/Sajjan stuff of two years ago, I kept directing the media to people who studied gender and the military.  I was far more willing to talk when the story focused on civilian control of the military, something I study.  I have declined to speak much about balloons or about election interference as I really don't have that much to say.  I really don't know much about China, for instance.  I will speak beyond my areas of expertise on the Battle Rhythm podcast because it is a smaller audience, I can edit myself afterwards, and my co-host and guests can and will correct me.  For a five minute hit on radio or TV, the anchor person is not going to push back if I say something wrong.  They may want me to do so since it might make for better tv.  Who has negative VORPs, where a replacement pundit available off the street or waiver wire would be a significant improvement?  I could name a few obvious retired senior military officers, but that would be unnecessary.  I could also name some columnists for national papers in Canada including one who used to own a bunch of them before/after? he was convicted.So some caveats here--I don't watch as much tv and I certainly don't listen to too much radio, so I am mostly influenced by the times I have appeared with other folks.  And, yes, most of the people listed above are very good friends.  I don't think I have to agree with someone to give them a high score.... but it probably doesn't hurt. Does that make me biased or do I simply hang with people with high VORPs?  ¯\_(ツ)_/¯There
is a tradeoff I forgot to mention in the first posting of this: if you
say no a lot, they won't come back.  Which can be cool if one does not
want to be bothered.  But saying yes a fair amount means that when I do
say no, I can refer them to sharp, younger people who they don't know
about, and this allows me to connect the media to diverse voices.  And
they often listen.  The media wants good people, but they also have lots
of time pressure, so they often go to the easiest get.  But if you give
them help, they will add to their rolodex. Feel free to nominate in the comments folks in the Canadian IR media space who are at either end of the VORP spectrum or in between.