Suchergebnisse

"Det Konservative Folkeparti kan i ar fejre deres 100-ars jubilAeum som parti. Og umiddelbart lever konservatismen i bedste velgaende: Konservative debattorer ytrer sig ivrigt i medierne, og konservatismen markerer sig i den politiske offentlighed. Men virkeligheden er en anden. Partiet er splittet og star reelt midt i en tillidskrise, ligesom mange iagttagere mener, at det har mistet politisk fodfAeste. Det ser vi fx, nar Soren Pape onsker at give partiet en hojredrejning, selvom det reelt kun er fa ar siden, at den tidligere partiformand vendte sig mod midten.Denne interne splittelse er dog langtfra ny. Allerede i mellemkrigstiden oplevede partiet stAerke brydninger, tvivlede pa de liberale vAerdier og var uenige om, hvilken vej de skulle ga.Konservatisme i mellemkrigstiden er historien om mellemkrigstidens splittelse hos de konservative. Om en tid, hvor der var modstridende holdninger til, hvad konservatisme skulle vAere, og hvor kimen blev lagt til den moderne konservatisme, vi kender i dag."--

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails. ; In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

This report is based on the seminar: "Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond" organized by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen, October 2016. The report includes perspectives by the speakers of the seminar and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that seeks to identify present challenges and opportunities on the table for both states. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report addresses initiatives and processes that could be applied in igniting paths of reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. ; This report is based on the seminar: "Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond" organized by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen, October 2016. The report includes perspectives by the speakers of the seminar and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that seeks to identify present challenges and opportunities on the table for both states. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report addresses initiatives and processes that could be applied in igniting paths of reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I den stadig voksende litteraturen om NATOs ISAF-operasjon i Afghanistan, er alliansens partnerskap med afghanske aktører et understudert tema. Denne artikkelen forsøker å belyse partnerskapet mer utførlig. Ved å anvende en diskursanalyse på NATOs fremstilling av afghanske myndigheter og sikkerhetsstyrker i perioden 2003–2014, viser artikkelen hvordan et partnerskap preget av mistillit tar form og endres over tid. Funnene viser at i perioden 2003–2009 representerte NATO sine egne og de afghanske partnernes verdier som felles. NATOs representasjon av sine egne og de afghanske partnernes verdier som felles, forstås som et verktøy for å forandre de afghanske samarbeidspartnere i retning av NATOs liberale verdigrunnlag. Et betydelig skifte i denne fremstillingen ser vi fra 2009 til 2014, da NATO i stadig økende grad begynner å anse partnerne som et sikkerhetsproblem istedenfor en partner. Analysen viser dermed hvordan representasjoner av en partner over tid har betydning for politikken som føres på bakken, og for hvordan denne legitimeres.

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.