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Most critical analyses assess citizenship-deprivation policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of citizens. This report considers instead from a political theory perspective how deprivation policies reflect specific conceptions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: i) a 'State discretion' view, according to which governments should be as free as possible in pursuing State interests when determining citizenship status; ii) an 'individual choice' view, according to which individuals should be as free as possible in choosing their citizenship status; iii) an 'ascriptive community' view, according to which both State and individual choices should be minimised through automatic determination of membership based on objective criteria such as the circumstances of birth; and iv) a 'genuine link' view, according to which the ties of individuals to particular States determine their claims to inclusion and against deprivation while providing at the same time objections against including individuals without genuine links. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative views in different ways, but that from a democratic perspective the 'genuine link' view is normatively preferable to the others. The report subsequently examines five general grounds for citizenship withdrawal – threats to public security, non-compliance with citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss and loss of genuine links – and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal provision motivated by these concerns. The final section of the report examines whether EU citizenship provides additional reasons for protection against Member States' powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather than merely to one of its Member States.

This article addresses the regulation of citizenship in the UK, in particular the recent increased powers of citizenship deprivation against individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. It examines the genealogy of such a practice and explains the juridical context of its use. It argues that changes in citizenship policies, broadening state power and removing substantive and procedural safeguards, have eroded equal citizenship by creating a hierarchy among British citizens. This radical policy shift has been enacted in the context of counter radicalisation policies that posit commitment to British values as a key weapon in the 'war on terror'. Muslims are at best 'Tolerated Citizens', required to demonstrate their commitment to British values. Muslims holding unacceptable extremist views are 'Failed Citizens' while the 'home-grown' radicalised terrorist suspect is conceived of as the barbaric Other to British values, whose failure as a citizen is severe enough to justify the deprivation of citizenship.

Most critical analyses assess citizenship-deprivation policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of citizens. This report considers instead from a political theory perspective how deprivation policies reflect specific conceptions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: i) a 'State discretion' view, according to which governments should be as free as possible in pursuing State interests when determining citizenship status; ii) an 'individual choice' view, according to which individuals should be as free as possible in choosing their citizenship status; iii) an 'ascriptive community' view, according to which both State and individual choices should be minimised through automatic determination of membership based on objective criteria such as the circumstances of birth; and iv) a 'genuine link' view, according to which the ties of individuals to particular States determine their claims to inclusion and against deprivation while providing at the same time objections against including individuals without genuine links. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative views in different ways, but that from a democratic perspective the 'genuine link' view is normatively preferable to the others. The report subsequently examines five general grounds for citizenship withdrawal – threats to public security, non-compliance with citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss and loss of genuine links – and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal provision motivated by these concerns. The final section of the report examines whether EU citizenship provides additional reasons for protection against Member States' powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather than merely to one of its Member States.

In response to the rise of IS and the growing problem of foreign fighters, deprivation of citizenship of persons deemed to threaten the interests of the state has been revived as a key tool for security and counterterrorism. Yet, citizenship deprivation raises profound issues for human rights. In the UK, the Immigration Act 2014 includes a power to deprive naturalized British citizens of their citizenship on security grounds, even if doing so would render individuals stateless. The UK government has argued that deprivation would satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality under Article 8(2) ECHR, provided it could be shown to be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the UK. Yet the risks are not only to private and family life. Citizenship deprivation may also involve other rights (not least Articles 2 and 3) where the consequence of deprivation is that individuals suffer loss of life, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This article explores the genesis of citizenship deprivation resulting in statelessness and offers a strong critique on grounds of legality and rights. It also raises serious questions about its efficacy as a security strategy.

Since the proclamation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Caliphate in June 2014, an unprecedented number of jihadi supporters in Europe have left their countries to fight alongside the organisation in Iraq and Syria. Over the years, ISIS has lost much of its territory and was militarily defeated in 2019, leaving a large number of members waiting in Kurdish camps and Iraqi prisons for their fate to be decided. Instead of repatriating foreign fighters, many European countries have started to use citizenship deprivation as a tool of preventing them from returning. Under the rationale of protecting national security and deterring possible supporters, it has been argued that citizenship deprivation is nothing more than risk exportation, with notable implications for a whole international community. This article provides an overview of the rationale behind citizenship deprivation as a counterterrorism measure and highlights how, from a counterterrorism perspective, shifting the problem instead of addressing it, could be counterproductive and undermine the fight against terrorism. The article concludes that despite numerous implications, following the public pressure to harshly respond to terrorism, it is unlikely that the popularity and use of citizenship deprivation as a counterterrorism measure will be in decrease soon.

The United Kingdom has amended its nationality legislation in order to make it easier for the state to exercise citizenship deprivation powers. The new powers target citizens who have engaged in behaviours labelled by the UK executive as not conducive to the public good. Statelessness operates as the outer limit of the government's capacity to transform citizens into foreigners and plays an important role in limiting the exercise of executive powers.

Most critical analyses assess citizenship deprivation policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of citizens. This paper considers citizenship deprivation policies instead from a political theory perspective--how deprivation policies reflect specific conceptions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: a 'State discretion' view, an 'individual choice' view, an 'ascriptive community' view, and a 'genuine link' view. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative views, but that from a democratic perspective the 'genuine link' view is most preferable. The paper subsequently examines five general grounds for citizenship withdrawal--threats to public security, non-compliance with citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss, and loss of genuine links--and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal provision motivated by these concerns. The final Part examines whether European Union (EU) citizenship provides additional reasons for protection against Member States' powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather than merely to one of its Member States.

Increasing numbers of people are travelling from Australia and other countries to Iraq and Syria to fight along side jihadi and rebel groups such as ISIS. The governments of Australia and other countries are concerned that foreign fighters will return to their home country and carry out terror attacks, or radicalize and inspire others to carry out attacks or become foreign fighters. This has prompted the introducing and passing of legislation which give governments the power to strip individuals of their citizenship as a means to prevent the return of citizens fighting in foreign wars. The Australian Parliament has passed legislation – named Allegiance to Australia - which provides for a dual citizens to have their Australian citizenship revoked if they engage in terrorist-related activity. Similar legislation is being introduced in Canada titled Strengthening Canadian Citizenship, and has been present and practiced in the UK for a number of years with a recent amendment: 2014 Immigration Act. The Bills in Australia and the UK allow for citizenship to be revoked without a court conviction. Grounds for revocation may also extend to allegation or suspicion of being involved in terrorism overseas. Legislation to revoke citizenship has had a mixed response among different stakeholders. Legal experts have charged that the laws do not comply with domestic or constitutional law. Human rights groups have alleged that the bill violates international conventions and denies justice to individuals such as the right to presumption of innocence. Others raise practical concerns, such as the sufficiency of information required prior to revoking citizenship. The lack of adequate guards against statelessness is also a concern for some parties. The legislation appears popular among the public in Australia but controversial in Canada. Allegiance to Australia has received cross-party political support, where as Canada's main opposition party have pledged to revoke Strengthening Canadian Citizenship. There a few risks for political parties in continuing to support the legislation in Australia as it enjoys near-universal support. However the Australian policy community should be aware of the potential for further policy which punishes individuals based on suspicion of misconduct, and where the decision to issue punishment does not take place in a court, but based on interpretable information.

In this paper, I interrogate the English case law on citizenship deprivation and its effects on the migrant and diasporic communities most affected by it from a critical postcolonial perspective. I explore how it forms part of state responses to national security that are rooted in racist imperialist ideologies. These underpinnings are ignored in law because such responses are supposedly reserved for exceptional circumstances. This has led to a lack of critical awareness of the wider damage they cause. The damage caused is compounded by the ways that citizenship deprivation constitutes a technology of the politics of belonging. It orientalises people, "othering" and dividing them into those who belong and those who do not based on their differences. This approach leaves racialised and minoritised citizens more vulnerable to losing their citizenship which is a deliberate form of control reminiscent of the longstanding behaviour of colonialist imperialists.

Offers a rare and vivid insight into the everyday lives, attitudes and behaviours of the rich as well as the poor across the UK, demonstrating how those marginalised and validated by the existing welfare system make sense of the prevailing socio-political settlement and their own position within it.

This article will analyse the use of genealogy in the context of race, place, and justice via the concepts of nationality/citizenship and cultural/national identity, including "imagined communities". Analysis is undertaken through the legal concept of "jus sanguinis" and simultaneous differing interpretations of "citizen", including the concept of "effective nationality". The latter incorporates the Nottebohm principle "shared sentiments and interests" and is particularly relevant in "security situations. This article argues that "effective nationality" is indicative of the Anderson's famous landmark study of nationalism, "Imagined Communities". The legal concept of jus sanguinis draws upon genealogy: "A line of descent traced continuously from an ancestor". However, the imagined communities to which someone perceives they belong, through ancestral lineage, or cultural, political or religious affinity are often highly contested cultural notions, not least in times of political unrest. This article will focus on the UK and show how liberal policies and criteria initially aimed at the expansion of citizenship have, in the 21st century, similarly enabled exclusion. However, I argue that the current exclusion process is the simultaneous use of jus sanguinis and cultural interpretations of "effective nationality" when applied to those who supported proscribed groups, for example ISIS in Syria. This paper uses legislation, media comment, and the legal case studies of Nottebohm and Shamima Begu.