Suchergebnisse

Artykuł prezentuje wyniki badań stanowiących część historyczno-porównawczego studium wyzwań, jakie wejście do NATO postawiło przed siłami zbrojnymi i polityką obronną Polski. Badając ewolucję stosunków cywilno-wojskowych (SCW) w Polsce przed i po jej wstąpieniu do NATO pytaliśmy czy mają one formę kopii, szablonów czy progów uznanych "zachodnich" rozwiązań instytucjonalnych. Pytaliśmy też, czy można uznać, że Polskie siły zbrojne zaakceptowały demokratyczną kontrolę cywilną nad sobą behawioralnie, postawowo i konstytucjonalnie. Przeprowadziliśmy trzy serie bezpośrednich, częściowo ustrukturalizowanych wywiadów w latach 1996, 2006 i 2015–2016 przy użyciu własnego kwestionariusza zawierającego pytania otwarte. W wywiadach wzięło udział 41 osób reprezentujących istotną część polskich decydentów i ekspertów zaangażowanych w proces poszerzania NATO. Ich wyniki zostały zweryfikowane rezultatami badań archiwalnych pierwotnych źródeł polskiej doktryny obronnej, w tym ustaw i publikowanych oświadczeń dotyczących koncepcji, praktyk i procedur militarnych. Krytyczny przegląd istniejącej, głównie angielskojęzycznej literatury posłużył poszerzeniu perspektywy badawczej. Rezultaty naszych badań wskazują, że Polska przyjęła zachodnie szablony SCW, co wskazuje, że przyjęcie to było dobrowolne, ale użyte tylko w przybliżeniu. Sugerują one też, że polscy wojskowi zaakceptowali kontrolę cywilną konstytucjonalnie i behawioralnie, ale ich akceptacja postawowa jest jeszcze ciągle niepełna. ; The paper is based on the results of a longitudinal study tracing the challenges that joining NATO created for the armed forces and the defense policies of Poland. Examining the evolution of civil-military relations (CMR) in Poland, before and after it joined NATO we were seeking, whether those relations are copies, templates, patches or thresholds of established "Western" institutions. We also asked whether the Polish armed forces can be seen to accept democratic civilian control behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. We conducted three series of face-to-face semi-structured interviews in 1996, 2006 and 2015–2016, using a proprietary questionnaire with a set of open questions. It was possible to interview 41 people, forming a sizeable part of Polish key decision makers and experts involved in the process of NATO enlargement. Findings were validated with the results of archival work on primary sources of Polish military doctrine, including the laws and the published statements of military concepts, practices and procedure. A critical review of the existing, mainly English-language literature of the subject was used to broaden the perspective. The results of our investigation show that Poland has accepted templates of CMR, which indicates that, although their adoption was voluntary, it was only approximate. They also suggest that the Polish military has accepted civilian control constitutionally and behaviourally but its attitudinal acceptance is still incomplete.

Artykuł prezentuje wyniki badań stanowiących część historyczno-porównawczego studium wyzwań, jakie wejście do NATO postawiło przed siłami zbrojnymi i polityką obronną Polski. Badając ewolucję stosunków cywilno-wojskowych (SCW) w Polsce przed i po jej wstąpieniu do NATO pytaliśmy czy mają one formę kopii, szablonów czy progów uznanych "zachodnich" rozwiązań instytucjonalnych. Pytaliśmy też, czy można uznać, że Polskie siły zbrojne zaakceptowały demokratyczną kontrolę cywilną nad sobą behawioralnie, postawowo i konstytucjonalnie. Przeprowadziliśmy trzy serie bezpośrednich, częściowo ustrukturalizowanych wywiadów w latach 1996, 2006 i 2015–2016 przy użyciu własnego kwestionariusza zawierającego pytania otwarte. W wywiadach wzięło udział 41 osób reprezentujących istotną część polskich decydentów i ekspertów zaangażowanych w proces poszerzania NATO. Ich wyniki zostały zweryfikowane rezultatami badań archiwalnych pierwotnych źródeł polskiej doktryny obronnej, w tym ustaw i publikowanych oświadczeń dotyczących koncepcji, praktyk i procedur militarnych. Krytyczny przegląd istniejącej, głównie angielskojęzycznej literatury posłużył poszerzeniu perspektywy badawczej. Rezultaty naszych badań wskazują, że Polska przyjęła zachodnie szablony SCW, co wskazuje, że przyjęcie to było dobrowolne, ale użyte tylko w przybliżeniu. Sugerują one też, że polscy wojskowi zaakceptowali kontrolę cywilną konstytucjonalnie i behawioralnie, ale ich akceptacja postawowa jest jeszcze ciągle niepełna. ; The paper is based on the results of a longitudinal study tracing the challenges that joining NATO created for the armed forces and the defense policies of Poland. Examining the evolution of civil-military relations (CMR) in Poland, before and after it joined NATO we were seeking, whether those relations are copies, templates, patches or thresholds of established "Western" institutions. We also asked whether the Polish armed forces can be seen to accept democratic civilian control behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. We conducted three series of face-to-face semi-structured interviews in 1996, 2006 and 2015–2016, using a proprietary questionnaire with a set of open questions. It was possible to interview 41 people, forming a sizeable part of Polish key decision makers and experts involved in the process of NATO enlargement. Findings were validated with the results of archival work on primary sources of Polish military doctrine, including the laws and the published statements of military concepts, practices and procedure. A critical review of the existing, mainly English-language literature of the subject was used to broaden the perspective. The results of our investigation show that Poland has accepted templates of CMR, which indicates that, although their adoption was voluntary, it was only approximate. They also suggest that the Polish military has accepted civilian control constitutionally and behaviourally but its attitudinal acceptance is still incomplete. ; 2 ; 145 ; 162 ; Przegląd Politologiczny

Mimo ścisłych związków między technologią i stosunkami międzynarodowymi istnieje niewiele prac w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, które podejmują próbę teoretycznego połączenia obu tych sfer rzeczywistości społecznej. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest historyzacja technologii militarnej w społecznej historii stosunków międzynarodowych. Autor przedstawia proces historycznego wzrostu znaczenia technologii militarnej w funkcjonowaniu społeczeństw i jej destruktywny wpływ na życie społeczne. Przekonuje, że nowe technologie rozwinaje są przez istoty ludzkie, a nie "odkrywane". Dokonane wynalazki odzwierciedlają określone interesy, posiadanie adekwatnych zasobów do ich dokonania i istnienie określonego instytucjonalnego wsparcia. W takim rozumieniu nauka, technologia i innowacje są funkcją ludzkich wyborów, interesów, idei, instytucji i zasobów. ; Despite close connections between technology and international relations, there are few works in international relations studies that would make an attempt to theoretically connect both of these two spheres of social reality.The main aim of the article is a historization of military technology in a social history of international relations. The author presents the process of historical growth of importance of military technology in functioning of societies and its destructive influence on social life. He convinces one that new technologies are developed, not "discovered" by human beings. Inventions reflect specific interests, owning proper resources to develop them and the existence of determined institutional support. In this understanding, science, technology and innovations are functions of human choices, interests, ideas, institutions and resources.In the first part of the article, the author presents relations between science, technology and innovations, as well as main attitudes in international relations studies in the context of comprehending these relations. Problems caused by technological development are also discussed. In the second part of the article, the author presents the meaning of military technology in international relations through its historization. By showing different contexts of "war machines" (horse, chariot, cavalry, cannons, conventional and nuclear weapon, information technology),one can observe the influence of military technology on international relations in the process of uneven and related development of different societies in different times from antiquity to the present day. In particular, the results of transformation of relations between armed forces and scientific institutions after World War II into permanent structures of society and government are shown. On the example of United States of America, the author points negative consequences of forming bureaucratic national security services for many aspects of social life. Finally, referring to James Der Derian's analysis, the author presents transformative influence of information technology on international relations.

The name of special services is applied to the civil and military services that organize and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Their operations are an element generating social and political trust between the political authorities and citizens. Given the current conditions of international relations and the international situation, a state is required to have efficient special services at its disposal. Anegative impact of globalization on state functioning, both in its external and internal dimensions, forces Polish special services to strengthen their fundamental function, that is providing information. The weakness of military intelligence and counterintelligence follows from the dissolution in 2000 of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI), and wasting their potential for political reasons. The role and task of special services in a democratic state should be to protect the liberty and democracy of the political system's principles, as set out in the Constitution, instead of protecting particular interests. The nature of the transformations occurring in security circles in Poland and related globalization processes, as well as civilizational, cultural and technological changes and the emergence of a civil society, demand a different attitude to the special services to be taken both by the public authorities and society, and make changes in their functioning necessary. This also calls for the need for a theoretical interpretation of the operations of modern Polish special services in a democratic state of law. ; The name of special services is applied to the civil and military services that organize and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Their operations are an element generating social and political trust between the political authorities and citizens. Given the current conditions of international relations and the international situation, a state is required to have efficient special services at its disposal. Anegative impact of globalization on state functioning, both in its external and internal dimensions, forces Polish special services to strengthen their fundamental function, that is providing information. The weakness of military intelligence and counterintelligence follows from the dissolution in 2000 of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI), and wasting their potential for political reasons. The role and task of special services in a democratic state should be to protect the liberty and democracy of the political system's principles, as set out in the Constitution, instead of protecting particular interests. The nature of the transformations occurring in security circles in Poland and related globalization processes, as well as civilizational, cultural and technological changes and the emergence of a civil society, demand a different attitude to the special services to be taken both by the public authorities and society, and make changes in their functioning necessary. This also calls for the need for a theoretical interpretation of the operations of modern Polish special services in a democratic state of law.

The article is an attempt to make an assessment of arguments for the development of civil nuclear power (non-carbon energy source) in the context of concerns on weakening the non-proliferation regime. The article analyzes dilemmas associated with the spread of civil nuclear power in the world and threats to international security (risk of utilization of dual-use technology for military purposes, trafficking of radioactive materials for the military or terrorists). Therefore, the key condition for the development of civil nuclear power is increasing the effectiveness of the NPT regime, including the acceptance of rigorous checks and inspections from IAEA officials by countries aspiring to join the nuclear program. ; The article is an attempt to make an assessment of arguments for the development of civil nuclear power (non-carbon energy source) in the context of concerns on weakening the non-proliferation regime. The article analyzes dilemmas associated with the spread of civil nuclear power in the world and threats to international security (risk of utilization of dual-use technology for military purposes, trafficking of radioactive materials for the military or terrorists). Therefore, the key condition for the development of civil nuclear power is increasing the effectiveness of the NPT regime, including the acceptance of rigorous checks and inspections from IAEA officials by countries aspiring to join the nuclear program.

The name of special services is applied to the civil and military services that orga-nize and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Their operations are an element generating social and political trust between the political authorities and citizens. Given the current conditions of international relations and the international situation, a state is required to have efficient special services at its disposal. A negative impact of globalization on state functioning, both in its external and in-ternal dimensions, forces Polish special services to strengthen their fundamental func-tion, that is providing information. The weakness of military intelligence and counterintelligence follows from the dissolution in 2000 of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI), and wasting their potential for political reasons. The role and task of special services in a democratic state should be to protect the liberty and democracy of the political system's principles, as set out in the Constitution, instead of protecting particular interests. The nature of the transformations occurring in security circles in Poland and related globalization processes, as well as civilizational, cultural and tech-nological changes and the emergence of a civil society, demand a different attitude to the special services to be taken both by the public authorities and society, and make changes in their functioning necessary. This also calls for the need for a theoretical in-terpretation of the operations of modern Polish special services in a democratic state of law.

Afghanistan has been suffering because of military conflicts for 30 years. Due to the soviet military occupation and later on civil war thousands of people have lost their lifes and millions were forced to abandon their homes. Civil service and enterprises collapsed. Ruling the state from the 1996 Talibs changed the country into confessional state, almost completely closed for the entire world. Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center from the 11 September 2001 and in the consequence NATO's military intervention in Afghanistan got rid ofthe Talibs but at the same time entangled NATO into long-lasting peacekeeping mission. In the polish-afghan's relationship we can single out to periods: 1989-2001 which limited our relationship due to the internal situation in Afghanistan and priorities of the polish foreign policy ( NATO and UE accession). The decision ofsending the polish military troops in 2001 opened the second period - the active polish participation in creating interior safety and balance in Afghanistan and also establishing political and economical cooperation. ; Projekt Operacyjny Polska Cyfrowa POPC.02.03.01-00-0039/18

Artykuł dotyczy rozwoju polityki bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, od chwili jej powstania do 2014 r. W ramach tej polityki próbowano także pozyskać zdolności wojskowe, niezbędne do zbudowania systemu reagowania kryzysowego. Dokonywało się to na zasadzie pełnej dobrowolności, a w związku z tym wszystkie Państwa Członkowskie UE kierowały się głównie interesami narodowymi. W ramach Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony, przemianowanej w Traktacie lizbońskim na Wspólną Politykę Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej, zrealizowano dwa tzw. Cele Zasadnicze/Operacyjne. Pierwszy z nich został ogłoszony w grudniu 1999 r. w Helsinkach i zrealizowany do końca 2003. Europejski Cel Zasadniczy/Operacyjny 2010 miał na celu doskonalenie zdolności wojskowych, w tym zbudowanie sił szybkiego reagowania pod nazwą Grup Bojowych UE. Zorganizowano i przeszkolono ok. 15 takich jednostek, ale dotychczas żadna z nich nie została skierowana do działań w rejonie kryzysu. Polska należy do aktywnych uczestników WPBiO UE i dotychczas zorganizowała trzy grupy bojowe o składzie wielonarodowym. Dwie spośród nich pełniły dyżury 2010 r. i 2013 r. Kolejna grupa pod polskim dowództwem jest przewidziana w harmonogramie dyżurów na rok 2016 r., ale mało prawdopodobne jest wykorzystanie jej do realnych działań. Temat zdolności wojskowych nie należy do priorytetowych zadań Unii Europejskiej. ; The paper concerns the development of the European Union's security policy, from its beginnings to 2014. The framework of this policy also served the purpose of developing the military capacities that are necessary to establish an emergency response system. The principle of totally voluntary participation has always operated in this respect, therefore all EU member states have mainly been concerned with their national interests. Under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDF), renamed in the Lisbon Treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the European Union, two Headline Goals have been achieved. One was announced in Helsinki, in 1999, and achieved by the end of 2003. The European Headline Goal 2010 involved the improvement of military capability, including rapid response forces, named EU Battle Groups. Around fifteen units have been organised and trained, none of which, however, has been deployed in a crisis region so far. Poland is among the active participants of the CSDP and has organised three multinational battle groups. Two of them were on duty in 2010 and 2013. Another group under Polish command is scheduled to be on duty in 2016, but it is not likely to participate in real action. The issue of military capability is not a priority for the European Union. ; 8 ; 105 ; 120 ; 8 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

The article aims to present the current situation in Ukraine through international relations theory that is able to provide the necessary theoretical background to analyse the complex problems that unfold in the contemporary international environment. These problems are analysed through several perspectives including realist, postmodern and socialconstructivist dimensions, as well as from the point of view of classical institutionalism. What is more, on the basis of their deliberations, the authors describe several possible scenarios of the future events, including the strategy of Russia to continue destabilization in Ukraine in order to seize control over its entire territory and the long-term effects of international sanctions on the Russian economy with the possibility of the collapse of the aggressor state. Nonetheless, the Crimean crisis reveals an important fact that, according to the authors, has deep ramifications for the entire international security system – at present, the international community is not able to exert influence on any of the nuclear powers through military means. While other, non-military means of influence can be used, such as broad economic sanctions or political isolation of an aggressor-state, they are not effective immediately thus allowing the aggressor states to violate international law with a feeling of impunity and invincibility.

The article aims to present the current situation in Ukraine through international relations theory that is able to provide the necessary theoretical background to analyse the complex problems that unfold in the contemporary international environment. These problems are analysed through several perspectives including realist, postmodern and socialconstructivist dimensions, as well as from the point of view of classical institutionalism. What is more, on the basis of their deliberations, the authors describe several possible scenarios of the future events, including the strategy of Russia to continue destabilization in Ukraine in order to seize control over its entire territory and the long-term effects of international sanctions on the Russian economy with the possibility of the collapse of the aggressor state. Nonetheless, the Crimean crisis reveals an important fact that, according to the authors, has deep ramifications for the entire international security system – at present, the international community is not able to exert influence on any of the nuclear powers through military means. While other, non-military means of influence can be used, such as broad economic sanctions or political isolation of an aggressor-state, they are not effective immediately thus allowing the aggressor states to violate international law with a feeling of impunity and invincibility.

Ensuring security in the civil aviation sector is a priority activity for many aviation organizations. This is confirmed by numerous documents regulating civil aviation security problems, issued not only at the level of national and EU law, but also in conventions of international scope. The risk of security disruption in civil aviation is enormous because there are many risks that can contribute to the loss of security. There are attempts to counteract them, however, if they are be effective, it is necessary to be aware of the dangers and their potential consequences. They may have a military, non-military background, or come from an internal or external environment of a given aviation organization. Various possible threats originating from these sources have been presented and described in the article. ; Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa w sektorze lotnictwa cywilnego jest priorytetowym działaniem wielu organizacji lotniczych. Potwierdzeniem tego są liczne dokumenty regulujące kwestie ochrony lotnictwa cywilnego, wydane nie tylko na szczeblu prawa krajowego i unijnego, ale również w konwencjach o zasięgu międzynarodowym. Ryzyko zaburzenia bezpieczeństwa w lotnictwie cywilnym jest ogromne, ponieważ istnieje wiele zagrożeń, które mogą przyczynić się do jego utracenia. Dąży się do przeciwdziałania im, jednak aby były one skuteczne niezbędna jest świadomość istnienia zagrożeń i ich potencjalnych skutków. Mogą one posiadać podłoże militarne, nie militarne, bądź też pochodzić z otoczenia wewnętrznego lub zewnętrznego danej organizacji lotniczej. Różne możliwe zagrożenia pochodzące właśnie z tych źródeł, zostały przedstawione i opisane w tym opracowaniu.

The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.

The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.

In this paper Author has defined and classified a "militarized non-state actor" pointing that this term comprises many different non-state actors like for example: political parties with their military wings, international criminal groups, terrorist organizations, private military companies or independence movements. It is also a disputable issue if armed forces deployed within governmental organizations (like theUNorNATO) are treated as militarized non-state actors or not.Lebanese Hizballah has been used here as an example to describe the specificity of a militarized non-state actor. Hizballah has its own armed forces and has been active in international relations. As a result of the analysis, such actors like Hizballah are well adoptable to new phenomena and processes which occurred in international relations, they are challenging states in their activities, moreover: they are used in many cases by states to achieve their goals. It shows the ambiguity in functioning of such a non-state actor. ; In this paper Author has defined and classified a "militarized non-state actor" pointing that this term comprises many different non-state actors like for example: political parties with their military wings, international criminal groups, terrorist organizations, private military companies or independence movements. It is also a disputable issue if armed forces deployed within governmental organizations (like theUNorNATO) are treated as militarized non-state actors or not.Lebanese Hizballah has been used here as an example to describe the specificity of a militarized non-state actor. Hizballah has its own armed forces and has been active in international relations. As a result of the analysis, such actors like Hizballah are well adoptable to new phenomena and processes which occurred in international relations, they are challenging states in their activities, moreover: they are used in many cases by states to achieve their goals. It shows the ambiguity in functioning of such a non-state actor.

The article is devoted to the establishing and beginnings of Latvian-Polish international relations in 1919 when political and military situation in Latvia was stabilized. Shortly are reviewed also the first contacts between Latvian and Polish political movements already from the end of the 19th century. During the spring and summer of 1919, distinctly emerged the conditions which led to definite Latvian-Polish military and political cooperation. The article analyzes motives and aims of both sides, the first contacts of both delegations at Paris Peace Conference, the first contacts in Latvia, the establishing of Latvian-Polish military relations and their development during the summer, the activities of first Latvian state delegation in Poland in September. During the summer of 1919, it became visible the establishing of friendly relations of both countries which was determined by common interests, first of all – the common enemies – the Soviet Russia and a reactionary German factor in the region. ; Artykuł porusza kwestię początków, nawiązania międzypaństwowych stosunków łotewsko-polskich w 1919 r. Kiedy sytuacja polityczna i wojskowa na Łotwie ustabilizowała się, wkrótce pojawiło się także zagadnienie nawiązania kontaktów między łotewskimi i polskimi ruchami politycznymi, których geneza sięgała jeszcze okresu końca XIX w. Już wiosną i latem 1919 r. wyraźnie zaznaczyły się warunki, które w końcu tego roku doprowadziły do określonej łotewsko-polskiej współpracy wojskowej i politycznej. W artykule zanalizowano motywy oraz cele obydwu stron, pierwsze kontakty obu delegacji na Konferencję Pokojową w Paryżu i te mające miejsce na Łotwie, wpływy ziemiaństwa polskiego Łatgalii (b. Inflant Polskich) na stosunek Polski do tego obszaru, ustanowienie łotewsko-polskich stosunków wojskowych oraz ich rozwój latem, a następnie pobyt pierwszej łotewskiej delegacji rządowej w Polsce we wrześniu 1919 r. Właśnie latem tego roku nastąpiło stosunkowo dobrze widoczne zbliżenie obydwu państw, co było wywołane pewnymi wspólnymi interesami, a przede wszystkim zagrożeniem ze strony tych samych wrogów – bolszewickiej Rosji i reakcyjnego czynnika niemieckiego w regionie.