Suchergebnisse

Intro -- CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: PROTECTIONS AND ISSUES -- CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: PROTECTIONS AND ISSUES -- LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: SECURITY CLASSIFIED AND CONTROLLED INFORMATION: HISTORY, STATUS, AND EMERGING MANAGEMENT ISSUES -- SUMMARY -- CLASSIFICATION BACKGROUND -- CONTROL MARKINGS DISCOVERED -- CONTROL MARKINGS TODAY -- COMPARISON OF SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION (SSI) POLICIES -- USDA Marking -- USDA Management -- TSA/DOT Marking -- TSA/DOT Management -- Management Regime Comparison -- IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION SHARING -- IMPROVING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT -- REMEDIAL LEGISLATION -- H.R. 984 (Waxman) -- H.R. 4806 (Harman) -- RELATED LITERATURE -- End Notes -- Chapter 2: PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS -- SUMMARY -- CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES -- Chamber Offices of Security and Security Manuals -- Senate -- House -- Security Clearances and Nondisclosure Agreements for Staff -- Secrecy Oaths for Members and Staff -- Sharing Committee-Held Information with Non-committee Members -- Limiting Access to Special Groups: The "Gang of Eight" and "Gang of Four" -- Investigation of Security Breaches -- PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE -- Mandate that Members of Congress Hold Security Clearances to Be Eligible for Access to Classified Information -- Pros -- Cons -- Direct Senators or Senate Employees to Take or Sign a Secrecy Oath to Be Eligible for Access -- Direct All Cleared Staff-or Just Those Cleared for the Highest Levels-to File Financial Disclosure Statements Annually -- Require Polygraph Examinations and/or Drug Tests for Staff to Be Eligible for Access to Classified Information -- End Notes -- Chapter 3: CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND

"We estimate the impact of coups and top-secret coup authorizations on asset prices of partially nationalized multinational companies that stood to benefit from US-backed coups. Stock returns of highly exposed firms reacted to coup authorizations classified as top-secret. The average cumulative abnormal return to a coup authorization was 9% over 4 days for a fully nationalized company, rising to more than 13% over sixteen days. Pre-coup authorizations accounted for a larger share of stock price increases than the actual coup events themselves.There is no effect in the case of the widely publicized, poorly executed Cuban operations, consistent with abnormal returns to coup authorizations reflecting credible private information. We also introduce two new intuitive and easy to implement nonparametric tests that do not rely on asymptotic justifications"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Intro -- CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526 -- CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526 -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526 -- SUMMARY -- RECENT HEIGHTENED INTEREST -- OVERVIEW: CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY -- Definition -- Executive Orders -- Statutes -- Estimated Annual Federal Expenditures -- Classified Information Policy: Who Does What? -- Information Security Oversight Office -- Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel -- Public Interest Declassification Board -- National Declassification Center -- THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION"S REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY -- CURRENT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY: E.O. 13526 -- Classification Levels -- The Types of Information That May Be Classified -- Challenges to Classification and Classification Levels -- Persons Authorized to Classify Information and Derivative Classification -- Duration of Classification -- Declassification -- A New Entity: National Declassification Center -- Safeguarding Classified Information -- Possible Issues for Congress -- End Notes -- Chapter 2: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526 - CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION MEMORDANDUM OF DECEMBER 29, 2009 -- TITLE 3-THE PRESIDENT -- Classified National Security Information -- PART 1-ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION -- PART 2-DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION -- PART 3-DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING -- PART 4-SAFEGUARDING -- PART 5-IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW -- PART 6-GENERAL PROVISIONS -- Chapter 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, "CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION" - MEMORDANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES -- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, ""CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION"" -- 1. Initial Implementation Efforts

Intro -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- Contents -- Preface -- Oversight Hearing on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege -- I. Introduction -- II. State Secrets and the NSA Litigation -- III. Congress Can and Should Legislate to Reform the State Secrets Privilege -- IV. FISA and the State Secrets Privilege -- V. Electronic Surveillance Cases do Not Require Transfer to the FISA Court -- VI. Conclusion -- End Notes -- Oversight Hearing on the Reform of State Secrets -- I. The State Secrets Privilege Serves a Critical Function in Preventing the Disclosure of National Security Information -- II. The Privilege Is Rooted in the Constitutional Authorities Assigned to the Executive Branch -- III. Congress Should Not Attempt to Substitute the Judgment of the Judiciary for the Executive Concerning What Information Merits Secrecy for Foreign Affairs or National Security Reasons and Should Beware of Analogies Concerning CIPA in the Context of... -- End Notes -- Oversight Hearing on the Reform of State Secrets -- Clarification of the State Secrets Privilege is Needed -- ABA Recommendations for Legislation to Codify the State Secrets Doctrine -- Congressional Response -- Conclusion -- End Notes -- Regarding the State Secrets Privilege -- Hearing on H.R.5607, State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 -- Secrecy and Accountability -- Litigation in Secrecy Cases -- The State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 -- End Notes -- Testimony of Steven R. Shapiro, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties -- History of the Privilege -- The ACLU Cases -- Extraordinary Rendition, Torture -- National Security Agency Warrantless Surveillance -- National Security Whistleblower -- The State Secret Protection Act (H.R. 5607) -- Conclusion -- End Noters.

This monograph offers a uniquely comprehensive and in-depth legal account of official secrets in the European Union. It critically analyses their implications for oversight and fundamental rights. Based on forty interviews with practitioners and other stakeholders, it offers an understanding of the practices of official secrets and provides a critical and much-needed perspective on how parliamentary, judicial and administrative oversight institutions deal with access to classified material and the dilemma of oversight to concurrently ensure secrecy necessary for EU security policies and openness needed for democratic processes and fundamental rights. The book discerns shifts in institutional practice of oversight at the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union that disproportionately favour secrecy and the protection of classified documents while creating serious limitations to open democratic deliberations and access to justice, and delivers new insights on the EU's development as a security actor as well as its autonomy from Member States, showing how rules on official secrets were a means for the EU to gain more autonomy in external security cooperation.

Classified is a fascinating account of the British state's long obsession with secrecy and the ways it sought to prevent information about its secret activities from entering the public domain. Drawing on recently declassified documents, unpublished correspondence and exclusive interviews with key officials and journalists, Christopher Moran pays particular attention to the ways that the press and memoirs have been managed by politicians and spies. He argues that, by the 1960s, governments had become so concerned with their inability to keep secrets that they increasingly sought to offset damaging leaks with their own micro-managed publications. The book reveals new insights into seminal episodes in British post-war history, including the Suez crisis, the D-Notice Affair and the treachery of the Cambridge spies, identifying a new era of offensive information management, and putting the contemporary battle between secret-keepers, electronic media and digital whistle-blowers into long-term perspective

This book contains full bibliographic information (inclusive keywords) aboutthe literature on Stochastic Orderings and their Applications in the following fields: Choice under Risk, Finance, Inequality, Measurement, Economic Theory, Special Economic Applications, Decision Methodology, Queueing, Reliability, Mathematical Pogramming, Stochastic Processes, Dependence of Random Variables, Probability Inequalities, Statistical Testing and Estimation, Experimental Design, Mathematical Physics, Algorithms and Computation, and other Applications in Statistics, Probability and Operations Research

For its operational planning and budget programming, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs frequent access to current, detailed data on authorized force structures for all the services. Having users aggregate this information themselves was difficult, time consuming, and error prone. Hence, DoD launched the Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI). While most of the data from the GFM DI are unclassified, the fact that it facilitates data aggregation raised concerns about what a potential adversary might be able to do with access to it and whether it would be better to classify such data and store it exclusively on the secure network. The authors address this question by looking at why material should or should not be classified, concluding that classification is warranted only (1) if it reduces the amount of information available to adversaries, (2) if the information kept from adversaries would tell them something they did not know, (3) if they could make better decisions based on this information, and (4) if such decisions would harm the United States. Using this framework, the authors balance the risks GFM DI poses against the costs to DoD of not having this information readily available to its own analysts. The authors conclude that overall classification is not necessary but suggest that some limited subsets may warrant additional protection

"Was Edward Snowden a patriot or a traitor? Just how far do American privacy rights extend? And how far is too far when it comes to government secrecy in the name of security? These are just a few of the questions that have dominated American consciousness since Edward Snowden exposed the breath of the NSA's domestic surveillance program. In these seven previously unpublished essays, a group of prominent legal and political experts delve in to life After Snowden, examining the ramifications of the infamous leak from multiple angles: Washington lawyer and literary agent RONALD GOLDFARB acts as the book's editor and provides an introduction outlining the many debates sparked by the Snowden leaks. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist BARRY SIEGEL analyses the role of the state secrets provision in the judicial system. Former Assistant Secretary of State HODDING CARTER explores whether the press is justified in unearthing and publishing classified information. Ethics expert and dean of the UC Berkley School of Journalism EDWARD WASSERMAN discusses the uneven relationship between journalists and whistleblowers. Georgetown Law Professor DAVID COLE addresses the motives and complicated legacy of Snowden and other leakers. Director of the National Security Archive THOMAS BLANTON looks at the impact of the Snowden leaks on the classification of government documents. Dean of the University of Florida Law School JON MILLS addresses the constitutional right to privacy and the difficulties of applying it in the digital age"--

Security clearances allow personnel access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can, in some cases, cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. To safeguard classified data and manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether civilian positions require a clearance. This book discusses agencies needing clearly defined policies for determining civilian position requirements; answers frequently asked questions on the security clearance process; and provides statements and testimonies from a hearing on the insider threat to homeland

Europe enlarged its boundaries in 2004 with the accession of ten new member states to the European Union. The creation of an effective information society is seen as critical to the global competitiveness of Europe. Based upon detailed data collection and rigorous analysis, the book presents a benchmarking study of the 10 new member states and 3 candidate countries of the European Union as compared to the 15 incumbent countries with respect to the development of their information societies. Using a framework based on the Europe 2005 benchmarking framework, the 28 EU members and candidate countries are ranked according to their level of information society development, and then classified into 4 categories. The results presented in this book are of importance to all managers and companies doing business in the IT sector in the European Union.