Autor razmatra promjenu uloge parlamentarizma u modernim demokratskim državama. Oslanjajući se na stavove Carla Schmitta razlaže tezu da je parlament kao politička institucija u krizi jer se odluke u njemu ne donose na temelju boljih argumenata, nego na temelju volje vladajuće stranke ili koalicije stranaka. Autor stoga smatra da je riječ o krizi parlamentarizma koju, pozivajući se na Schmitta, ocjenjuje kao odbacivanje argumentativne parlamentarne demokracije u ime demokracije koja u svom središtu ima borbu različitih stranačkih interesa. Posljedica toga je, smatra autor, da zastupnici u parlamentu više ne zastupaju narod, nego interese svojih stranaka kojima su izravno odgovorni, što Niklas Luhmann sažima ocjenom da su "stranke razvlastile svoje zastupnike". U drugom dijelu članka autor razmatra transformaciju zakonodavne funkcije parlamenta. Pritom slijedi normativni stav da se parlament mora vratiti u okvire svoje političke funkcije i preispitati svoje mjesto ekskluzivnog zakonodavca. Problem je u tome, smatra autor, što ga zakonodavni monopol autoimunizira od izvanparlamentarnih i pravosudnih zakonodavnih inicijativa. ; The author deals with the transformation of the role of parliamentarism in modern democratic countries. Drawing on the views of Carl Schmitt, the author argues that the parliament as a political institution is in a crisis because its decisions are based on the will of the party or coalition in power rather than on the most pertinent arguments. Therefore, the author suggests that there is a crisis of parliamentarism, which he, referring to Schmitt, assesses as a rejection of argumentative parliamentary democracy to the advantage of a democracy characterised by a confl ict of various party interests. According to the author, this implies that parliament members represent the interests of their parties, to which they are directly responsible, and no longer the people, as summarised by Niklas Luhmann's assessment that "parties have disempowered their members of parliament". In the second part of ...
Članak analizira učinke Europskog semestra, okvira EU-a za socijalno-ekonomsku koordinaciju, na promjenu politike zapošljavanja u Hrvatskoj. Slučaj Hrvatske treba ilustrirati kako, pod kojim uvjetima i u kojoj mjeri arhitektura Europskog semestra utječe na politike zapošljavanja u Hrvatskoj. U žarištu su analize dvije stavke javnih politika: Garancija za mlade i dob za umirovljenje. Nalazi vezani za Garanciju za mlade podržavaju očekivanje prema kojemu pojačani nadzor i obveze izvještavanja pridonose promjeni nacionalnih javnih politika. Koristeći intervjue kao izvore podataka, auto pronalazi dva ključna elementa utjecaja: administrativni pritisak i slabu upoznatost s načinom rada Europske komisije u sklopu Europskog semestra. Istodobno, Hrvatska je opetovano zanemarivala preporuke za usklađivanjem dobi umirovljenja za muškarce i žene. Razlozi slaba utjecaja Europskog semestra na tom području mogu se pronaći u ograničavajućem efektu sastava koalicijske vlade, krutosti javne politike, suprotstavljenih uvjerenja i vrlo neizvjesne političke situacije. Ti su uvjeti bili čimbenici odvraćanja od promjene javnih politika, unatoč mogućim sankcijama EU-a. ; This paper analyzes the effects of the European Semester, EU's framework for socio-economic policy coordination, on change of Croatian employment policy. The case of Croatia is used to illustrate in what manner, under which conditions and to what extent the European Semester architecture actually influences Croatian employment policies. The focus is on two policy items: the Youth Guarantee and the retirement age provision. The findings on the Youth Guarantee lend crucial support to the expectation that intensified monitoring and reporting obligations will contribute to domestic policy change. Drawing on interview data, the author identifies administrative pressure and low familiarity with the European Commission's modus operandi within the European Semester as two crucial elements of influence. On the other hand, Croatia repeatedly neglected EU's recommendation to step up the harmonization of female and male retirement age. Reasons for low European Semester impact on this issue can be found in a number of constraining conditions that were at play: coalition politics, the stickiness of the policy issue, opposite policy beliefs and a highly uncertain political situation. These factors acted as factors from policy change despite potential EU sanctions down the pike.
The 1960s were the historical climax of the "Yugoslav experiment" (Rusinow). They began with a crisis of stability of the existing Stalinist system, the model of which was barely altered, and of the autocratic activity of SKJ (League of Communists of Yugoslavia). The process consisted of three stages: 1) 1962-1963: Tito's project of overcoming the crisis through a radical, but inconsistent de-Stalinization in the programme of social self-government (assembly system with a functional representation), and economic and social reforms, with reliance on the trade union and the League of Communists as the main instruments of economic and political subjectivization of the working class; but on the basis of the Leninist model of the Party, strengthening of party unity and discipline, and suppression of the federative component. 2) 1966: failure of the project, and beginning of a new course; self-critical avowal of SKJ leaders that SKJ itself, dominated by political police, was the main obstacle to the de-Stalinization process; period of economic liberalization, political democratization and pluralization of intellectual life; Tito's compromise with the prevalent coalition of republics' leaderships, with reliance on the leadership of the League of Communist of Croatia; federalization of the League of Communists (Ninth Congress of SKJ in 1969) and of the state (1971-1974), and Tito's struggle for political survival (1966-1972). 3) Tito's political confrontation with the leaderships of the League of Communists of Croatia (1971) and of Serbia (1972), and the end of the decade of political and economic liberalization, of some sort of polycentric poliarchy system. The result of the denouement: the SKJ crisis from the early 1960s was not resolved, but stabilized through a structural compromise in the organization of the League of Communists and of Yugoslavia as a federation, with Tito as political arbiter; and historical regression of social, political and intellectual life caused by unsuccessful transformation of the inherited type of Bolshevik Party into a Marxist and democratic League of Communists. Adapted from the source document.
The purpose of this essay is to prove the connections among political culture, political structure, & democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analyzed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture & structure ie, within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims -- primarily in line with the functional theory of culture -- that there is a functional concordance between culture & structure, & that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture ie, that "culture is a structure's way of life," that culture determines the structure) & the contemporary interactional approach (in which -- primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" -- complex relations among various cultural variables & structural variables are analyzed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition," but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture & structure. The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate & useful in understanding & maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important & more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis shows how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depends on the elements of the political structure (party systems & coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently, its role depends on the relations among political actors & the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture & structure are extremely sophisticated & that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" & gradual development. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.
The purpose of this essay is to prove the connection among political culture, political structure, & democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analyzed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture & structure, ie, within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims -- primarily in line with the functional theory of culture -- that there is a functional concordance between culture & structure, that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture, ie, that "culture is a structure's way of life," that culture determines the structure) & the contemporary interactional approach (in which -- primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" -- complex relations among various cultural variables & structural variables are analyzed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition" but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or the end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture & structure. The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate & useful in understanding & maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important & more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis has shown how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depend on the elements of the very political structure (party systems & coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc.). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently its role greatly depends on the relations among political actors & the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture & structure are extremely sophisticated & that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" & gradual development. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.
ParlaMint 2.1 is a multilingual set of 17 comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (from November 1st 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, while the text version is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1432. The ParlaMint.ana linguistic annotation includes tokenization, sentence segmentation, lemmatisation, Universal Dependencies part-of-speech, morphological features, and syntactic dependencies, and the 4-class CoNLL-2003 named entities. Some corpora also have further linguistic annotations, such as PoS tagging or named entities according to language-specific schemes, with their corpus TEI headers giving further details on the annotation vocabularies and tools. The compressed files include the ParlaMint.ana XML TEI-encoded linguistically annotated corpus; the derived corpus in CoNLL-U with TSV speech metadata; and the vertical files (with registry file), suitable for use with CQP-based concordancers, such as CWB, noSketch Engine or KonText. Also included is the 2.1 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. As opposed to the previous version 2.0, this version corrects some errors in various corpora and adds the information on upper / lower house for bicameral parliaments. The vertical files have also been changed to make them easier to use in the concordancers.
Prethodna su istraživanja pokazala da hrvatska politika mentalnog zdravlja nije politički prioritet, da joj nedostaje interdisciplinarnosti, međusektorske suradnje i holističkog pristupa. Slijedeći pretpostavku da je jedan od glavnih razloga za takvo polazište niska razina korištenja znanja pri stvaranju politike mentalnog zdravlja, ova studija pokušala je ispitati ulogu ekspertize i prijenosa znanja u razvoju hrvatske politike mentalnog zdravlja. Istraživanje je provedeno metodom snowball u proljeće 2018., obuhvatilo je 124 sudionika, stručnjaka iz različitih ustanova koje se bave mentalnim zdravljem. Za potrebe ove studije razvijen je upitnik "Razvoj hrvatske politike mentalnog zdravlja". Prikupljeni kvalitativni i kvantitativni podatci pokazali su da stručnjaci iz sektora mentalnog zdravlja kreiranje politike u svome polju opisuju kao nekvalitetno i u ovisnosti o visokim vladinim tijelima kojima upravlja politička elita nezainteresirana za mentalno zdravlje. Podatci također pokazuju da stručnjaci iz područja mentalnog zdravlja o poboljšanju politike mentalnog zdravlja razmišljaju u skladu s međunarodnim smjernicama. Pa ipak, sebe rijetko smatraju aktivnim činiteljima u procesu kreiranja politike. To nas vodi zaključku da stručnjaci trebaju podršku za umrežavanje, udruživanje radi zagovaranja i bolje međusektorske odnose kako bi utjecali na političku volju. ; Previous research shows that Croatian mental health policy is not a political priority, that it lacks interdisciplinarity, intersectoral collaboration and a holistic approach. Following the assumption that one of the main reasons for this position is the low level of knowledge in mental health policy-making, this study was set to examine the role of expertise and knowledge translation in Croatian mental health policy development. The study was conducted during spring 2018 and has included 124 participants, professionals from different institutions dealing with mental health, using the snowball method. The questionnaire "Development of Croatian Mental Health Policy" was developed for the purpose of this study. The gathered qualitative and quantitative data shows that professionals in the mental health sector describe policymaking in the field as being of poor quality and highly dependent on top governmental bodies that are run by the political elite uninterested in mental health. The data also proves that mental health professionals in Croatia think about the improvement of mental health policy in line with international guidelines. Still, they rarely consider themselves an active force in policy-making. That leads us to the conclusion that experts and professionals need support to form networks, advocacy coalitions and better inter-sectoral relationships in order to influence the political will.
Nasuprot shvaćanjima o energetskoj politici kao funkcionalno-tehničkom problemu, ili na drugoj strani, kao borbe između materijalističkih i postmaterijalističkih vrijednosnih obrazaca u industrijskom, odnosno postindustrijskom društvu, ovaj rad dokazuje sljedeće hipoteze: a) u korijenu današnjih energetskih problema leže konflikti oko raspodjele, b) vrijednosti o kojima se radi, čak i na području zaštite okoline, materijalističke su naravi, c) razlike u energetskoj politici Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Zapadne Njemačke mogu se objasniti različitim obrascima raspodjele, a težište im je u različitim vrednotama proizašlim iz razlika između industrijskih i demografskih struktura, te geološkog bogatstva, d) energetska politika, a posebno izbor pravca fleksibilne »soft energy«, može se uspješno provoditi nastajanjem »pobjedničke koalicije« poklanjanjem dovoljno pažnje pitanjima raspodjele koja su u to uključena. Zaokrete k fleksibilnoj energetskoj politici autor veže uz pokrete za zaštitu okoline i programe novih energetskih projekata na lokalnoj razini i razini globalnog društva. Na taj način, zaključuje se, »energetski sindrom« i redistributivni konflikti ne moraju biti uzroci dublje političke i društvene dezorganizacije. ; As opposed to the notion of energy policy as a functional-technical issue, and — on the other hand — as a struggle between materialistic and post-materialistic value patterns in the industrial and post-industrial society, the article is arguing the following hypotheses: (1) distributional conflicts represent the roots of the contemporary energy problems, (2) the values involved, even in the field of environmental protection, are of a materialistic nature, (3) the differences in energy policies of the United States and Western Germany can be explained by different distributional patterns, having as their core divergent values stemming from differences between industrial and demographic structures and geological resources, (4) the energy policy, especially the choice of the path of flexible »soft-energy «, can be successfully implemented by the emergence of a »winning coalition« which takes sufficient account of the distributional issues involved. Switches toward flexible energy policies are, according to the author, tied to activities of movements for environmental protection and to programs of new energy projects on the local level and on the global societal level. In such a manner, it is concluded, the »energy syndrome« and redistributional conflicts are not necessarily causes of a profound political and societal disorganization.
U našoj historiografiji prevladava mišljenje da je atentat u Narodnoj skupštini 20. lipnja 1928. bio izvršen iz nacionalnog razloga, tj. zahtjeva poslanika iz Hrvatske da Hrvatska bude tretirana kao posebna jedinica, odnosno da joj se poštuju njena stečena prava za autonomijom. O smrti Stjepana Radića i događajima koji su posljedica atentata u Narodnoj skupštini pisali su mnogi - i političari i povjesničari - i gotovo su svi apostrofirali nacionalni karakter tog sukoba, ali analiza zbivanja pokazuje da je sukobljavanje srpskih radikala i Kluba Seljačko-demokratske koalicije imalo više uzroka među kojima gospodarski razlozi zauzimaju značajno mjesto. ; The widespread view in Croatian historiography is that the assassination in the National Assembly that took place on 20 June 2018 was motivated by nationalism, i.e. that it came about due to the request of the Croatian deputies for Croatia to be treated as a single unit, that is to respect the vested right of Croatia to autonomy. Many politicians and historians wrote about the death of Stjepan Radić and the events that unfolded as a consequence of the assassination in the National Assembly, most of which emphasized the ethnic character of that conflict, but an analysis of events shows that the cause of the conflict between Serbian nationals and the Peasant-Democratic Coalition deputies was multifaceted, with economic grounds having a prominent place. It is worth noting that the harshest conflict in the Assembly was over Glavnjača and economic/financial issues. The Radicals wanted to reap the benefits of sending food into impoverished parts of the country because they already owned large swaths of land, but Radić believed Croatian regions should also take part in that state-funded operation. His idea was supported by Svetozar Pribićević, while the text of the Nettuno Conventions further exacerbated the conflicts in the Assembly. His efforts in the field of nutrition did not begin just before he passed away. He was supposed to become the Commissioner for Economic Affairs, which included food-related issues, as early as November 1918, but his appointment fell through due to him promoting republicanism and the opposition of Pribićević. Radić and Pribićević operated in unison during 1928, which represented a massive improvement. It is a shame that the assassination severed this connection and worsened the relations between Croatians and Serbs. Stjepan Radić died on 8 August 1928, which was a consequence of the gunshot wound inflicted during the session of the National Assembly held in Belgrade on 20 June. Dr Đuro Basariček died in the Assembly, Pavao Radić was mortally wounded and died shortly after being hospitalized, while three CPP deputies suffered gunshot wounds (Ivan Granđa and Ivan Pernar, as well as S. Radić).
Rad istražuje razloge nastanka obrasca asimetrične stranačke mobilizacije u hrvatskom stranačkom sustavu nakon 1990. godine i pokušava povezati kretanje stranačke potpore s obrascem veza između stranaka i birača. U članku se polazi od nalaza da je biračka potpora HDZ-u kroz čitavo razdoblje nakon prvih izbora bila prilično stabilna, dok je potpora birača stranaka ljevice i centra bila vrlo promjenjiva. Razlog tome autor nalazi u tipu veza između stranaka i birača koje se primarno temelje na simbolima i vrijednostima oblikovanim kroz više desetljeća. Oni imaju vrlo stabilan utjecaj i otežavaju promjene biračkih lojalnosti. Asimetrični se obrazac mobilizacije javlja zato što se birači HDZ-a identificiraju sa strankom na osnovi vrijednosti i simbola koje povezuju sa samom strankom, dok se birači stranaka ljevice i centra više identifi ciraju s vrijednostima koje ove stranke manje ili više uspješno zastupaju. Empirijska analiza faktora koji oblikuju odnos prema strankama potvrđuje da najveći utjecaj imaju odnos prema religiji, povijesti i tradicionalnim vrijednostima. Međutim, analiza isto tako pokazuje da se važnost ovih faktora s vremenom mijenja i ovisi o obrascima koalicija između stranaka odnosno o porukama stranačkog vodstva. ; The article analyses the reasons behind the establishment of the asymmetrical pattern of mobilization of party support in the Croatian party system after 1990. It aims to asses to what extent linkages between parties and voters aff ect the volatility of electoral support. The argument starts with an observation that electoral support for HDZ was very stable throughout the period after the 1990 elections, while the support for left and centre parties exhibited a high degree of volatility in each election since 1990. The article posits that the reasons behind this pattern of shifts in electoral support lies in the type of linkages between parties and voters based on symbols and values shaped over a longer period of time, which were mobilized in the party system in 1990s and established stable linkages between parties and voters, eff ectively preventing any transmission of support across party bloc lines. Reasons behind the formation of asymmetrical pattern of mobilization lie in the fact that HDZ voters identify with their party based on values and symbols linked with the party itself, while voters of left and centre parties identify more with values these parties represent, more or less eff ectively, than with the parties themselves. Empirical analysis of factors shaping party voter linkages fi nds that attitudes toward religion; history and traditional values are principal factors defi ning linkages between parties and voters. But at the same time, it appears that the character of these linkages is changing over time and that it depends on coalition patterns and shifts in messages of the party leadership.
Ove se godine (2009.) slavi šezdeseta obljetnica postojanja i uspješnoga djelovanja Sjevernoatlantskoga saveza, poznatijega kao NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). NATO je međunarodna vojno-politička organizacija koja je osnovana 4. travnja 1949. potpisivanjem Sjevernoatlantskoga ugovora (Washingtonski ugovor) između dvanaest zemalja zapadnoga bloka (Belgija, Danska, Francuska, Italija, Island, Kanada, Luxemburg, Nizozemska, Norveška, Portugal, SAD i Velika Britanija). Na stvaranje NATO-a utjecali su sljedeći čimbenici: razilaženje protuhitlerovske koalicije zbog suprotnih ciljeva, stvaranje zemalja "narodne demokracije" pod sovjetskom dominacijom, Marshallov plan gospodarske pomoći Sjedinjenih Američkih Država razrušenoj Europi koji je odbio Sovjetski Savez, Trumanova doktrina iz 1947. godine koja je označila veće angažiranje SAD-a, politika SSSR-a pod Staljinovim predsjedanjem i sve veće "prijetnje komunizma i socijalističkih zemalja". Sjevernoatlantski ugovor počiva na četrnaest članaka, a prema petomu članku "strane su suglasne da će se oružani napad na jednu ili više zemalja Saveza smatrati napadom na sve njih". Sjedište je NATO-a u Bruxellesu, službeni su jezici engleski i francuski, a aktualni glavni tajnik jest Anders Fogh Rasmmunsen. Savez funkcionira u skladu s načelima međuvladine suradnje, a odluke se donose pristankom svih zemalja članica (28 zemalja). Misija NATO-a u BiH od 1992. do 1995. godine bila je najopsežnija u povijesti Saveza. U njoj je zabilježeno i prvo oružano djelovanje ove organizacije. Danas je NATO ne samo vojna nego i politička organizacija. ; The sixtieth anniversary of existence and successful functioning of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more famous as NATO is celebrated in this year (2009). NATO is international military-political organization established on April 4, 1949 by signing North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) between twelve countries of the Western block (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Iceland, Canada, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, USA and Great Britain). Following factors influenced on establishment of NATO: separation of anti-Hitler coalition because of opposing goals, development of "national democracy" countries under Soviet domination, Marshall's plan of the USA help to demolished Europe, which was rejected by the Soviet Union, Truman's doctrine from 1947 which marked greater engagement of USA, politics of U.S.S.R. under Stalin's presiding and bigger "threats of communism and socialist countries". North Atlantic Treaty is based on fourteen articles, and according to the fifth article "the parties agreed that an armed attack against one or more of the organization members shall be considered as an attack against them all". The NATO headquarters are in Brussels, official languages are English and French and Anders Fogh Rasmmunsen is the current Secretary General. The alliance functions in accordance with the principles of intergovernmental cooperation and decisions are made by common consent of all members (28 countries). NATO mission in B&H from 1992 to 1995 was the most extensive in the history of Alliance. The first military action of this organization took place during this mission. Today NATO is not only military, but also political organization.
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
