Suchergebnisse

Both in the Czech and European contexts, the Council of the EU is a relatively frequent subject of interest in political science research. A substantial amount of work (both in the tradition of qualitative and quantitative research) focuses especially on the process of coalition building and the impact and functioning of the different levels of the Council. This theoretical discussion analyzes the possibilities which both the qualitative and quantitative approaches offer concerning research dealing with the coalition behavior of one concrete EU member state. In doing so, it takes into account various specifics which characterize the Council of the EU and which substantially influence the behavior of its member states. The paper concludes that the qualitative approach (while being to a substantial degree complementary to the quantitative tradition) offers better tools for an analysis focusing on the coalition behavior of one member state than its quantitative counterpart. One of the reasons lies in the nature of our research which deals with the process of promoting the interests of the Czech Republic in the EU Council, with a special emphasis on coalition building and searching for compromises. ; Both in the Czech and European contexts, the Council of the EU is a relatively frequent subject of interest in political science research. A substantial amount of work (both in the tradition of qualitative and quantitative research) focuses especially on the process of coalition building and the impact and functioning of the different levels of the Council. This theoretical discussion analyzes the possibilities which both the qualitative and quantitative approaches offer concerning research dealing with the coalition behavior of one concrete EU member state. In doing so, it takes into account various specifics which characterize the Council of the EU and which substantially influence the behavior of its member states. The paper concludes that the qualitative approach (while being to a substantial degree complementary to ...

The goal of the study is to research the coalition strategies of the Slovak political parties in the municipal elections. Two basic research questions are raised: 1. When do parties let themselves be part of a coalition, and when do they take part in the elections on their own?; and 2. What is the underlying logic of coalition formation?. On the basis of these questions we propose several hypotheses which are tested by use of statistical methods. In the cases of HZDS, KDH and ANO, the study argues that there are significant connections between the national and municipal levels, which are expressed in two dimensions: a.) conflicts on the national level expressed in terms of the coalition – opposition divide are carried down to the municipal level and become an important factor in coalition formation; b.) specific organizational patterns are crucial for the parties' behaviour on the municipal level. These patterns, meanwhile, depend on processes that occur on the central level.

The theory of coalitions has been a significant part of political science analysis since 1960. We can distinguish two traditions in the theory of coalitions -- the American tradition & the European one. While the American theory of coalitions puts an emphasis on game theory, the European theory of coalitions focuses on political culture, traditions & social environment. The two traditions evaluate existing coalitions differently. This article demonstrates these different approaches by analyzing governmental coalitions in Saxony in the 1990s. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

The collapse of the Italian "partitocrazia" in the early 1990s was followed by the emergence of a completely new party system. All but one of the relevant parties from the previous regime were affected by corruption scandals & had to struggle for survival. This situation created opportunities for the originally protest parties (LN), for transformed parties (AN, PDS) & for new political actors (FI). Forced by the logic of the mixed electoral system, these parties quickly started to form pre-election coalitions that were intended to guarantee political relevance for the small parties & to secure electoral victory for the bigger parties. The center of the political continuum has consequently been deserted in the last three elections. Any political actor situated between the two principal coalitions would be mercilessly squeezed or absorbed by them. Therefore, the Italian party system has gradually become a bipolar one. This means that the system has turned into a competitive one & has opened a possibility for alternation. Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.

The present article comments on the contemporary development of the Austrian party stage, deals with the governmental crisis of the Schüssels cabinet and the situation before the early elections to the National Council in November 2002. Analyzing the basic programme outputs and potential coalition strategies of the relevant Austrian parties, it considers all the possible configurations after the elections. The article also briefly analyses the consequences of various alternatives of post-electoral coalition for alteration of the Austrian party system that undergoes the long-term process of transformation. ; The present article comments on the contemporary development of the Austrian party stage, deals with the governmental crisis of the Schüssels cabinet and the situation before the early elections to the National Council in November 2002. Analyzing the basic programme outputs and potential coalition strategies of the relevant Austrian parties, it considers all the possible configurations after the elections. The article also briefly analyses the consequences of various alternatives of post-electoral coalition for alteration of the Austrian party system that undergoes the long-term process of transformation.

The article deals with the relationship between EU Council Presidency & governmental stability. After reviewing the character of governments assuming EU Council Presidency since the Treaty on European Union has been adopted, the article explores the possible impact of the EU Council Presidency on governmental stability & governmental duration. The article argues that the EU Council Presidency does not have to be executed by a majority government, & that the EU Council Presidency exerts a stabilizing effect. Adapted from the source document.

This article focuses on proving some of the earlier published hypotheses that criticized the possibility applying the electoral bonus (bonus seats) to elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic. The results of the Czech parliamentary elections held at the very end of May 2010 provide some empirical data for this analysis and help to prove that the mechanism of the electoral bonus is not useful in the Czech political system. The main reasons for this claim are the hypotheses that the electoral bonus should not reinforce the position of the government coalition and that it erodes the will of the people, whose votes in fact count towards the bonus seat(s) of another party (namely that party which receives the electoral bonus). Adapted from the source document.

This article focuses on the classification of the cabinets in power during the era of the independent Czech Republic. The question we ask is whether we can generally identify any prevailing type of cabinet. Our conclusion is that there were mostly minimal winning coalitions based on the cooperation of ideologically distant political parties or minority cabinets. None of these versions provided government stability. Another aim of the text is to analyze the influence of party & electoral systems on governance. In this respect we tried to answer the question, what would contribute to the smoother formation of Czech governments & their increased stability? The crucial negative factor we identified in the sphere of the party system is the existence of a radical party with minimal coalition potential -- the Communist Party of Bohemia & Moravia. In our opinion, however, this fact can be changed by regular coalition cooperation with the Czech Social Democratic Party. We believe that as far as electoral system modifications are concerned, a positive factor could be represented by a reform that would introduce the mandate premium awarded to the winning coalition or party & at the same time a single electoral district. This would strengthen the position of the election winner & ensure greater homogeneity of governments. It would also eliminate the disproportion between the real electoral support of small parties & their significantly lower number of mandates won. Adapted from the source document.

This article concerns the position of Magyar minority political parties in the Slovak party system. An analysis of the Magyar minority position in the Slovak society in terms of Slovak-Magyar relations development is included. The Magyars are the largest ethnic minority in several Central European countries. Almost 2.5 million Magyars live in the countries adjacent to Hungary. Their highest population share, at nearly 10 %, is in Slovakia. Unlike in adjacent countries, the Magyar minority in Slovakia has far more options for political self-fulfilment. Thanks to the Magyar share in the Slovak population, the Magyar parties regularly take one-tenth of the seats in the Slovak parliament. To characterize the role of the Magyar parties in the current Slovak party system, it is necessary to understand their behaviour in interwar Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian party sub-system is fundamentally influenced by election legislation. This forces minority parties to cooperate in coalition and integrate. Coalition or even consolidation of like-oriented minority and majority parties is out of the question in Slovakia. An electoral coalition between the Slovak and Magyar parties took place just once, in 1990. Since 1998, all relevant Magyar political parties have been integrated into the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). The electoral gains of the party have been increasing to date. Owing to its firm electoral base, the party has profited, one of the few to do so, from decreasing participation in elections. Although three former parties representing three different political streams have been integrated into the SMK, it has always acted as a single unit. The party has a solid position in the Slovak party system and it seems apparent that it will remain the sole political representative of Slovak Magyars in the future.

The paper herein presents a summary of research targeting the attitudes of mayors of Czech municipalities towards the financing of municipalities and the submitted legislative determination of taxes. Data reflect expert interviews with a representative sample of nine municipalities in Central Bohemian region. The research was originally incorporated into the doctoral thesis by Ilona Kruntoradova accomplished at the Institute of Political Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague; it is contextualized in the paper with political debates about the new rules concerning the funding of municipalities. Such rules create divisions among the municipalities as well as the parties within the Necas coalition government. The main research findings underline the prevailing lack of funds facilitating the development of small municipalities, mediation of the interests of municipalities through personal contacts rather than special interest associations, and deeper divisions between small municipalities and large cities. The research herein should primarily serve as a pre-research for larger inquiries involving a broader sample of municipalities throughout the Czech Republic. Adapted from the source document.

In the Slovak parliamentary elections of 2010, the reformist centre-right parties defeated the left-nationalist coalition government led by Robert Fico. The election results brought some other surprises – the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and its leader, three-times Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, as well as the Party of Hungarian Coalition were eliminated from the national parliament. Moreover, the election outcome of the radical right-wing Slovak National Party declined significantly. On the other hand, two new parties entered parliament. All in all, the election outcomes show the weakening of the nationalist agenda and the nationalist vote. The paper examines why this has happened and raises the question of to what extent it is sustainable.

The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009. ; The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European ...

Slovak parliamentary election in September 2002 brought with it a few surprises. First, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) gained "only" 19,5% of votes (comp. 1992 – 37%, 1994 – 35% and 1998 – 27%). On the one side Mečiar´s HZDS formally won. On the other side it was not able to find some coalition partners and stayed outside government. Second, the election result of the new charismatic party Směr ("Direction") - 13,5% of votes, third place in election – was "weak" too. The main election aim of the party leader Robert Fico - the office of the primary minister – didn´t work out as he planned. The situation resulted in opposition position of Směr after election.Third surprise was a very good election result (15,1%, second place) of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ). Thus, the leader of SDKÚ Mikuláš Dzurinda could form relatively homogenous coalition government (with three small right – wing and centre – wing parties).

This article aims at explaining the success of the center-left coalition in the Italian regional elections in April 2005. Does it express voters real discontent with the government of the House of Freedoms? Or, alternatively, are the results due to the fact that in the so-called second-order elections governing parties are regularly punished & opposition parties preferred? This article takes into consideration the concept of second-order elections & explains on this basis the recent electoral results. References. Adapted from the source document.