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The text examines the organization of the competitive model in the area of telecomunication services in Brazil, the privatization process in the Telebrás System and the crucial state mediations in the negociations for the insertion of the private sector in the area. It starts f rom the viewpoint that decisions about the public policy of opening the sector were influenced, basically, by the interets of the actors involved, by their coalitions and alliances, by the modifications and recompositions engendered around the policy and by the crucial state mediations. The text intends to aprehend the actors' dinamics in the moment of their concrete actions by means of proposals, strategies, alliances and coalitions, alternatives and counter iniciatives from the system of public, private and political actors, foreign agents, trade unions and others. The text treats the following topics: organization of the competitive model, the movement of the system of actors to consolidate their interets, the result of the privatization process and the new owners of telecomunications in Brazil. ; The text examines the organization of the competitive model in the area of telecomunication services in Brazil, the privatization process in the Telebrás System and the crucial state mediations in the negociations for the insertion of the private sector in the area. It starts f rom the viewpoint that decisions about the public policy of opening the sector were influenced, basically, by the interets of the actors involved, by their coalitions and alliances, by the modifications and recompositions engendered around the policy and by the crucial state mediations. The text intends to aprehend the actors' dinamics in the moment of their concrete actions by means of proposals, strategies, alliances and coalitions, alternatives and counter iniciatives from the system of public, private and political actors, foreign agents, trade unions and others. The text treats the following topics: organization of the competitive model, the movement of the system of actors to consolidate their interets, the result of the privatization process and the new owners of telecomunications in Brazil.

This article analyzes how subnational governments request transfers from the federal government in Brazil. Using microdata on applications for discretionary transfers from the Brazilian federal government to municipalities between 2009 and 2016 and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), I show that mayors affiliated with the president's party demand substantially more resources than opposition mayors, meaning that the partisan alignment is an important channel to request transfers. On the other hand, the effect varies among mayors from other coalition parties. Thus, the results show that partisan alignment between different levels of government is a key factor in explaining the requests for discretionary resources in Brazil. ; Este artículo investiga cómo gobiernos subnacionales en Brasil solicitan transferencias federales al gobierno central. A partir de microdatos sobre las solicitudes de transferencias discrecionales de los municipios brasileños al gobierno central (2009-2016) y de un diseño de regresión discontinua (RD) se demuestra que los alcaldes del partido que ocupa la presidencia requieren sustancialmente más recursos que los alcaldes opositores, lo que indica que la alineación partidaria es un canal importante para solicitarlos. Por otro lado, este efecto es heterogéneo entre los alcaldes de partidos que integran la coalición de gobierno a nivel federal. Los resultados demuestran que la alineación partidaria entre diferentes niveles de gobierno es importante para explicar la demanda de recursos discrecionales en Brasil. ; Este artigo investiga como governos subnacionais solicitam transferências federais junto ao governo central no Brasil. Usando microdados sobre os pedidos de transferências voluntárias dos municípios à União entre 2009 e 2016 e um desenho de regressão descontínua, mostra-se que prefeitos do partido que ocupa a Presidência da República requerem muito mais recursos do que prefeitos oposicionistas — indicando que o alinhamento partidário constitui canal importante para solicitá-los. Por outro lado, esse efeito é heterogêneo entre prefeitos de partidos que integram a coalizão de governo federal. Desse modo, os resultados mostram que o alinhamento partidário entre diferentes níveis de governo importa para explicar a demanda por recursos discricionários no Brasil.

The Brazilian budgetary process has historically been questioned based on the alleged use of political bargaining in the inclusion and implementation of amendments from deputies to the executive's budget, which affects the principles, criteria, and practices of allocative choices. Supported by the theory of coalition formation, this article examines a possible political bargaining relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the budgetary process at the federal level. The study analyzed the execution of amendments from deputies over five mandates (between 2000 and 2017) and the deputies' votes on projects proposed by the executive. Data regarding the execution of singular amendments were also analyzed, together with information concerning the deputies' political position toward the executive when proposing amendments. Econometric techniques were employed to correct selection bias, assessing the presence of political bargaining. The results corroborate the hypothesis that there is political bargaining in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Brazil. The deputy who had more of their amendments executed by the government was also the one that voted with the government in the bills sent from the executive to the legislative, even though they were not part of the governing coalition in the Congress. Therefore, the executive targeted deputies who were not part of the governing coalition to increase the number of votes in Congress. ; El proceso presupuestario brasileño ha sido históricamente cuestionado por la supuesta presencia de regateo político en la inclusión y ejecución de enmiendas al presupuesto, hecho que interfiere con las premisas, criterios y prácticas de las decisiones distributivas. Este artículo, apoyado en la Teoría de la Formación de Coaliciones, investiga la existencia de una posible relación de regateo político entre los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo en el proceso presupuestario a nivel federal. Dicha investigación se da a través del análisis de las ejecuciones de enmiendas parlamentarias singulares en cinco legislaturas (entre 2000 y 2017) y de las decisiones de los diputados en la votación de proyectos propuestos por el Ejecutivo. Se analizaron datos referentes a la ejecución de enmiendas singulares, así como los referentes a la posición política del parlamentario frente al Ejecutivo al momento de la proposición de las enmiendas. La metodología involucró técnicas econométricas que tratan la corrección del sesgo de selección para evaluar la presencia o ausencia de la referida relación de regateo. Los resultados obtenidos corroboran la hipótesis de existencia de regateo político entre los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo, ya que el parlamentario con mayor aporte de ejecución de sus enmiendas singulares fue quien, además de haber apoyado al Ejecutivo a través de votos a favor de los proyectos remitidos al Congreso Nacional, era ajeno a la coalición de gobierno, objetivo del Ejecutivo en la formación del quórum mínimo para la aprobación de sus proyectos. ; O processo orçamentário brasileiro tem sido historicamente questionado pela suposta presença de barganha política na inclusão e na execução de emendas ao orçamento, fato que interfere nas premissas, nos critérios e nas práticas das escolhas alocativas. Este artigo, sustentado pela Teoria da Formação de Coalizões, investiga a existência de uma possível relação de barganha política entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo no processo orçamentário na esfera federal. Tal pesquisa ocorre por meio da análise das execuções de emendas parlamentares singulares ao longo de cinco legislaturas (entre 2000 e 2017) e das decisões dos deputados na votação de projetos propostos pelo Executivo. Analisaram-se dados referentes à execução de emendas singulares, bem como aqueles concernentes à posição política do parlamentar com relação ao Executivo no instante da proposição das emendas. A metodologia envolveu técnicas econométricas que lidam com a correção do viés de seleção para avaliar a presença ou não da referida relação de barganha. Os resultados obtidos corroboram a hipótese de existência de barganha política entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo, pois o parlamentar com maior aporte de execução de suas emendas singulares foi aquele que, além de ter exercido apoio ao Executivo através de votos favoráveis aos projetos enviados ao congresso nacional, era de fora da coligação de governo, alvo do Executivo na formação do quorum mínimo para a aprovação de seus projetos.

In the months since the national elections, Italy has been in political turmoil. Parliament was dissolved & new coalitions have been formed that bear little resemblance to their predecessors. One major contentious issue has been that of immigration. Romano Prodi contends that the three million immigrants who have entered Italy in recent years, especially since the enlargement of the European Union, have had an "incredible social & psychological impact" on Italy. The situation in Italy is discussed in relation to that in Portugal. Adapted from the source document.

The objective of the article is to demonstrate that the international protagonism of Lula's government seeks to bring back to international politics the development issue based, on one hand, on regionalism, & on the North/South cleavage on the other hand, in order to advance the new demands of developing countries. It is asked, based on this assumption, if the international strategies & the South-South dialogue both present on rhetoric & actions of Lula's government foreign policy represent enduring alliances or ephemeral coalitions among developing & least developing countries. References. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case. (Rev Econ Polit/GIGA)

One of the most vibrant theories that constitute the theoretical framework of Foreign Policy Analysis is the Decision Unit Framework created by Margaret & Charles Hermann. This article aims to present a critical view of this theory, demonstrating its strengths & weaknesses, always with the attempt of demystifying some of its excessive simplifications in relation to actors' characteristics. We exemplify a more sharpened analysis of the coalition decision-making process through the demonstration of the conflict that opposed then Portuguese President Spinola & the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) during the Portuguese democratic transition process between 1974 & 1975. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Having just completed its second consecutive "lost decade", the Venezuelan case confirms that there are no short cuts to sound political economic management in the era of high capital mobility and securitized capital flows. The maintenance of a muddling-through exchange rate strategy has triumphed, at least for the time being, and enabled an elite executive-level coalition to prevail in pursuing a less than optimal macroeconomic policy. The author argues that Venezuela has avoided a full-blown Mexican or Brazilian-style devaluation by virtue of the Central Bank's ability to effectively manage the exchange rate. (Rev Econ Pol/DÜI)

The text discusses the course of the public policy, established between 1986 and 1998, towards the opening of telecomunications in Brazil, that had as its goals, first, to improve private sector's flexibility of entry and, second, to exclude the state as a producer and to reestablish new regulation functions. The text examines the decision process involved in the policy established along the period. It takes the perspective that decisions about the policy adopted in the sector were affected, mainly, by the interests of the actors involved, by their coalitions and alliances, by the changes and recompositions engendered around the policy and by the crucial state mediations. The text deals with the opening policy, so called private-liberal, in each period, and the alternative proposals that presented themselves in the decision arenas, in the Congress, Executive and market ambit. ; The text discusses the course of the public policy, established between 1986 and 1998, towards the opening of telecomunications in Brazil, that had as its goals, first, to improve private sector's flexibility of entry and, second, to exclude the state as a producer and to reestablish new regulation functions. The text examines the decision process involved in the policy established along the period. It takes the perspective that decisions about the policy adopted in the sector were affected, mainly, by the interests of the actors involved, by their coalitions and alliances, by the changes and recompositions engendered around the policy and by the crucial state mediations. The text deals with the opening policy, so called private-liberal, in each period, and the alternative proposals that presented themselves in the decision arenas, in the Congress, Executive and market ambit.

The aim of this article is to analyze the current characteristics and dynamics of the Italian political system, focussing on the main patterns of continuity and change that emerged after the 2013 legislative elections. The disintegration of the centre-right coalition, the emergence of new political forces, as well as the rise of new leaders have profoundly reshaped the Italian party system. On the other hand, the economic crisis has reinforced negative attitudes towards democratic institutions and the main political actors. These phenomena have led to an extremely fluid political system and an uncertain future, which has been aggravated by a never-ending debate on institutional reforms. Adapted from the source document.

The author begins by asking why Brazilian policymakers opted to target the exchange rate to stabilize inflation when this strategy had already failed in Mexico. The answer: It was no longer possible to accomodate the country's high inflation rate through the pervasive use of price indexation and a competitive exchange rate policy. The anchoring of the exchange rate within the Real Plan was the quickest route toward price stability. Brazil's recovery under a flexible currency regime suggests that the macroeconomic fundamentals are back on track. The challenge now lies in the crafting of a viable coalition that can cut through the mumerous parochial interests that converged to provoke the 1999 devaluation. (Rev Econ Pol/DÜI)

This paper analyzes the proposals under discussion in the Brazilian Congress concerning the direct elections for Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur), originally planned to be held on 2014. The proposed rules are investigated in order to find out which changes may impact the profile of the new representation to be elected and the consequences by either strengthening or weakening the institutional role of Brazilian representation in Parlasur. Pending electoral legislation for Parlasur may represent the most important experiment in political reform in the country in recent years - changing the open list of candidates to the closed list (with strict party nomination), prohibiting party coalitions, establishing exclusive public financing of campaigns, besides rules targeting gender equality. Notwithstanding, if members of congress do not strengthen reform to provide a more robust institutional framework, Brazilian representation in Parlasur will be weakened rather than strengthened.