V magistrskem delu raziskujemo model in delovanje Slovenske digitalne koalicije (SDK) ter različne poglede deležnikov, ki so vanjo vključeni. V uvodnem delu opišemo strateške dokumente na področju vloge in razvoja informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije in informacijske družbe. Na podlagi obstoječih dokumentov in empiričnih podatkov, pridobljenih prek strukturiranih intervjujev, ter po analizi prednosti, slabosti, nevarnosti in izzivov s strani različnih deležnikov ocenimo model in delovanje SDK, v okviru raziskovalnega dela pa je izvedena tudi primerjalna analiza nacionalnih digitalnih koalicij držav članic Evropske unije. Rezultati so pokazali, da je model SDK vzpostavljen po smernicah Evropske komisije, delovanje vzpostavljene SDK pa še ni optimalno in ne izkorišča vseh potencialov delovanja. ; The Master's thesis analyses the model and the functioning of the Slovenian digital coalition (SDK) and the different views of the stakeholders who are part of it. The introduction presents the strategic documents regarding the role and the development of information-communications technology and information society. Based on the current documents, the empirical data we collected through structured interviews and the analysis of the advantages, the disadvantages, the risks and the challenges faced by different stakeholders we evaluate the SDK model and its functioning ; moreover, the research also includes a comparative analysis of national digital coalitions in European Union member states. The results show that the SDK model has been developed in accordance with the guidelines of the European Commission, while its functioning has not yet reached the optimal level and does not fully take advantage of all its potential.
ParlaMint is a multilingual set of comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (after October 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the ParlaMint TEI-encoded corpora with the derived plain text version of the corpus along with TSV metadata on the speeches. Also included is the 2.0 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. Note that there also exists the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, which is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1405.
ParlaMint 2.1 is a multilingual set of 17 comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (after November 1st 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the ParlaMint TEI-encoded corpora with the derived plain text version of the corpus along with TSV metadata on the speeches. Also included is the 2.0 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. Note that there also exists the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, which is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1431.
On 28th April 2019 parliamentary elections were held in Spain, which won the left-wing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. As a result of the elections the party system, which was characterised by the dominance of two main political forces (the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the People's Party) continued to transform significantly. The People's Party suffered one of the worst election results during the three decades of its history, which could be explained by the strengthening of Ciudadanos and the emergence of the radical political force, Vox.It must be noted that neither the left-wing, nor the right-wing political parties succeeded gaining absolute majority (176 mandates) in the Congress of Deputies. Taking into account of the division of political sphere and the ideological differences among the parties, it will probably take a long time until the main political forces can strike a compromise to form a coalition government in the Iberian country. This requires mutual concessions by the Spanish political elite.Besides the evaluation of the antecedents of parliamentary elections the objective my paper is to analyse the peculiarities of election campaign, but I will also highlight which factors played crucial role in the transformation of the party system in Spain. In my essay emphasis will be given to the different scenarios as regards negotiations for constructing a stable government. Because of length constraints, I will not deal with the foreign affairs- and economic policy of the socialist government.
In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia. ; In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia.
ParlaMint is a multilingual set of comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (after October 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, while the text version is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1388. The ParlaMint.ana linguistic annotation includes tokenization, sentence segmentation, lemmatisation, Universal Dependencies part-of-speech, morphological features, and syntactic dependencies, and the 4-class CoNLL-2003 named entities. Some corpora also have further linguistic annotations, such as PoS tagging or named entities according to language-specific schemes, with their corpus TEI headers giving further details on the annotation vocabularies and tools. The compressed files include the ParlaMint.ana XML TEI-encoded linguistically annotated corpus; the derived corpus in CoNLL-U with TSV speech metadata; and the vertical files (with registry file), suitable for use with CQP-based concordancers, such as CWB, noSketch Engine or KonText. Also included is the 2.0 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project.
ParlaMint 2.1 is a multilingual set of 17 comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (from November 1st 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, while the text version is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1432. The ParlaMint.ana linguistic annotation includes tokenization, sentence segmentation, lemmatisation, Universal Dependencies part-of-speech, morphological features, and syntactic dependencies, and the 4-class CoNLL-2003 named entities. Some corpora also have further linguistic annotations, such as PoS tagging or named entities according to language-specific schemes, with their corpus TEI headers giving further details on the annotation vocabularies and tools. The compressed files include the ParlaMint.ana XML TEI-encoded linguistically annotated corpus; the derived corpus in CoNLL-U with TSV speech metadata; and the vertical files (with registry file), suitable for use with CQP-based concordancers, such as CWB, noSketch Engine or KonText. Also included is the 2.1 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. As opposed to the previous version 2.0, this version corrects some errors in various corpora and adds the information on upper / lower house for bicameral parliaments. The vertical files have also been changed to make them easier to use in the concordancers.
POVZETEK Prvi del magistrske naloge zajema razlago ustavnih ureditev treh držav, Združenih držav Amerike, Francije in Slovenije, ter instrumente in institucije, podobne slovenski interpelaciji. Ustavne ureditve so vključene zaradi razumevanja razmerja med parlamentom in vlado, saj to igra ključno vlogo pri sprožitvi procesa interpelacije ter pri postavljanju poslanskih vprašanj. Interpelacija po slovenski ureditvi pomeni formalno vloženo pisno vprašanje skupine deset ali več poslancev z namenom, da bi odstavili bodisi ministra ali vlado. Interpelacija je orodje opozicije, da izpostavi trenutno oblast in jo postavi v položaj, kjer se mora javno zagovarjati. V ta kontekst so postavljeni primeri interpelacije v Sloveniji, ker so primer dejanskega nadzora parlamenta nad delovanjem vlade. Interpelacij se je v naši 26 let stari državi zgodilo kar nekaj, za magistrsko delo smo izbrali obdobje devete vlade Republike Slovenije, ki jo je vodil Borut Pahor. V času od novembra 2008 do februarja 2012 so se zgodile štiri interpelacije, ki so dober primer tega, kako je delovalo določeno ministrstvo v tistem obdobju, kakšen je bil sproten pritisk parlamenta na vlado in stališče opozicije do takratne oblasti. Z najprej opisanim razmerjem med parlamentom in vlado ter s primerjavo z drugimi državami smo pojasnili razmerje v slovenski ureditvi, nato pa s primeri interpelacije prikazali, kako to razmerje deluje v praksi. ; ABSTRACT The first part of the thesis consists of the overview of constitutional orders from three states: United States of America, France and Slovenia with the instruments and institutions similar to Slovenian interpellation. Constitutional orders are included because of the easier understanding of relationship between the Parliament and Government, which is crucial for the initiation of the interpellation process and for asking the parliamentary questions. Under the Slovenian constitution interpellation means a formal written question handed in by a group of ten or more members of the parliament with the intent to remove the minister or the government from its position. Interpellation is the instrument of the opposition, to call the coalition in question. In this context we have included the actual cases of interpellation in Slovenia, because they represent the control of Parliament above the work of Government. In our 26 years old country, there has been a significant number of interpellations, and the selected period is the ninth Government of Republic of Slovenia, which was under a leadership of Borut Pahor. In this precise time, from November 2008 to February 2012, four interpellations were processed, which show a good example of how a specific Ministry worked at the time, and what was the consistent pressure of Parliament on the Government, and the position of opposition towards the leadership at that time. With firstly described correlation between Parliament and Government and with the comparison with other countries, we have explained a relationship in Slovenian constitutional order, and afterwards I have presented how this relationship practically works with the cases of interpellations.
Sistemi organizacije državne oblasti se razlikujejo po načinu delitve oblasti, organih, ki so nosilci te oblasti ter njihovih medsebojnih odnosih. Parlamentarni sistem, ki je uveljavljen tudi pri nas, temelji na načelu delitve oblasti. Organi državne oblasti med seboj sodelujejo, se nadzorujejo, med njimi pa je z namenom preprečitve zlorabe oblasti vzpostavljen sistem zavor in ravnovesij. V moderni demokraciji med strankami na volitvah vedno poteka tekma za čim višje število glasov, zmago na volitvah in prevzem oblasti. Zmagovalna večina se poveže ter oblikuje vlado, stranke, ki niso članice koalicijske večine, pa čakajo na svojo priložnost na naslednjih volitvah. Vendar mora biti njihov glas vseeno slišan, saj odločitve večine postanejo tudi odločitve manjšine, ki mora zato imeti možnost vpliva na sprejemanje odločitev, poleg tega je pomembna tudi možnost nadzora dela koalicijske večine in izvršilne veje oblasti, v ta namen pa ima opozicija na voljo različne instrumente nadzora. Opozicija ima možnost uporabe svojih sredstev na različnih področjih, v okviru zakonodajne, volilne ter nadzorne funkcije Državnega zbora. Nosilec izvršilne oblasti je v parlamentarnih sistemih vlada, ki je parlamentu odgovorna za svoje delo, brez njegove podpore pa ne more delovati. Parlament, znotraj njega zlasti tudi opozicija, ima na voljo več instrumentov nadzora nad delom vlade, najpomembnejši so poslansko vprašanje, interpelacija in konstruktivna nezaupnica. Nesoglasja med parlamentom in vlado lahko privedejo do politične krize, v končni posledici pa tudi do razpustitve parlamenta in novih volitev. Obstaja več različic parlamentarnega sistema, razlikujejo pa se po načinu oblikovanja, sestavi in delovanju vlade. Naša ureditev se zgleduje po nemškem modelu, pri čemer pa v smeri skupščinske ureditve od njega odstopa v nekaterih pomembnih elementih. Predvsem je tu mišljeno imenovanje ministrov s strani Državnega zbora ter s tem povezani instrumenti, ki povečujejo individualno odgovornost posameznih ministrov v razmerju do Državnega zbora, kar je neskladno z modernimi parlamentarnimi sistemi, ki poznajo predvsem kolektivno odgovornost vlade. Taka ureditev relativizira pomen instituta konstruktivne nezaupnice, ki smo ga sprejeli iz nemškega modela. Zaradi naše neučinkovite ureditve bi bile smiselne ustavne spremembe, kar je zaznal tudi Državni zbor, saj je skupina poslancev predlagala spremembo ustavnih določb, ki se nanašajo na oblikovanje Vlade, v odzivu na ta predlog pa je nastal še predlog Strokovne skupine, ki je predlog poslancev analizirala. Ta naloga obravnava predlagani spremembi Ustave, predlog poslancev in predlog Strokovne skupine, s poudarkom na učinke predlaganih sprememb na položaj opozicije. Poleg tega so v nalogi predstavljene tudi nekatere druge možne spremembe Ustave, ki se nanašajo na način oblikovanja Vlade. Vsak predlog spremembe Ustave našo veljavno ureditev približuje določeni podvrsti parlamentarnega sistema. Pred sprejetjem kakršnekoli spremembe Ustave je torej vredno razmisliti, kateri ureditvi se želimo približati in kakšen vpliv na našo trenutno ureditev bi imel sprejem določene spremembe Ustave. ; The systems of state authority differ in the way they separate powers, branches of power that are holders of the power and their relations. The parliamentary system, which is established also in Slovenia, is based on the principle of separation of powers. The branches of state authority collaborate with each other and control the work of one another. The system of checks and balances is set up to prevent the abuse of power. In the modern democracy there has always been a race to get as many votes as possible, win the elections and take over the power among parties in the elections. The majority that wins is united and forms the Government, while parties that are not members of the majority coalition wait for their opportunity in the next elections. However, their voice has to be heard, because the decisions of majority become the decisions of minority as well, that is why they have to have an impact on decision-making. Besides, the possibility of supervision over the part of the majority coalition and the executive branch is important, for this purpose the opposition has different instruments of supervision. The opposition has a possibility of the use of its means on various areas, within the legislative, electoral and supervisory functions of Parliament. The government, which answers to the parliament for its work, but without its support cannot work properly, is the holder of the executive body in the parliamentary systems. The Parliament, and within it, also in particular the opposition, has several instruments for controlling the work of the Government, the most important are parliamentary question, interpellation and constructive vote of no confidence. Disagreements between the Parliament and the Government can lead to the political crisis and ultimately to the dissolution of the Parliament and new elections. There are several variants of parliamentary system, they differ in the way of forming, structure and working of the Government. Our system follows the German model's example, but as far as assembly is concerned, it differs in some important elements. This mainly refers to the appointment of ministers coming from the National Assembly and instruments referring to it. These instruments are increasing individual responsibility of individual ministers in relation to the National Assembly and that is inconsistent with modern parliamentary systems which are familiar with collective responsibility of the Government in particular. Such system relativizes the meaning of the institute of constructive vote of no confidence which is based on the German's model. Constitutional changes would be logical due to our ineffective system, this was also noticed by our National Assembly. The group of members of the Parliament proposed a change for constitutional provisions which refer to the forming of the Government. In response to this proposal, the Professional group, which analysed the proposal of the members of the Parliament, formed another one. This master's thesis deals with the proposed change of the Government, the proposal of members of the Parliament and the proposal of the Professional group, with emphasis on the effects of proposed changes regarding the position of the opposition. The thesis also presents some of the other possible constitutional changes that refer to the way of forming the Government. Each proposal of the constitutional change brings about our valid system to get closer to the certain category of the parliamentary system. It is worth considering which system is better and what kind of effect would passing a certain constitutional change cause, before even considering constitutional changes of any kind.
Pri izpolnjevanju svoje primarne naloge ohranjanja mednarodnega miru in varnosti, ki mu jo nalaga Ustanovna listina Organizacije združenih narodov, Varnostni svet Združenih narodov deluje predvsem v okviru II. in III. stebra odgovornosti zaščititi. Nabor ukrepov, ki jih pri tem uporablja, je kljub temu, da je Varnostni svet edini organ, ki lahko zakonito po VII. poglavju Ustanovne listine odobri izjemo od splošne prepovedi uporabe sile, bistveno širši od gole uporabe sile, ki je bila brez privolitve države doslej odobrena le enkrat, leta 2011 v Libiji. Hipoteza naloge je, da potencial, ki ga odgovornost zaščititi ponuja pri reševanju kompleksnih kriznih situacij, ki lahko vodijo k množičnim grozodejstvom, ni docela izkoriščen zaradi nepopolnega uveljavljanja, ki je predvsem posledica blokade Varnostnega sveta zaradi uporabe veta stalnih članic. Izziv so tudi različne razlage njegovih resolucij, ki so že večkrat privedle do očitkov, da izvajalci resolucij slednje izrabljajo z namenom menjave režima v posameznih državah. Zaradi hudih posledic neaktivnosti z vetom blokiranega Varnostnega sveta, kar se kaže zlasti v primeru Sirije, so se kot alternativne možnosti delovanja mednarodne skupnosti v situacijah, kjer je uporabljiva odgovornost zaščititi, pojavile delovanje preko Generalne skupščine Združenih narodov na podlagi resolucije ˝Združeni za mir˝, regionalnih organizacij (denimo po vzoru Afriške unije) ter intervencija ad hoc koalicij. Ker nobena od navedenih možnosti ne ponuja primerne alternative odločitvi Varnostnega sveta, sta se v okviru odgovornosti neuporabe veta oblikovali dve pobudi za reformo odločanja v Varnostnem svetu, ki predlagata vzdržanje stalnih članic od uporabe veta v primerih štirih grozodejstev, vendar je njuna uspešnost vprašljiva, saj zaenkrat nobena od njiju nima podpore vseh petih stalnih članic. ; Authorized by the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nation Security Council fulfills its primary task of maintaining international peace and security by acting primarily within Pillars II and III of the Responsibility to Protect. Despite the fact, that the Security Council is the only body entitled to legally authorize an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force, this is only one of many measures it can adopt. In fact, the use of force against the will of a state has only been carried out once, in 2011 in Libya. The hypothesis of the present thesis is that the potential that the Responsibility to Protect offers in addressing crisis situations that could lead to mass atrocities is not fully utilized due to a blockage imposed by a veto from a permanent member state. The rising reproaches that those carrying out the resolutions exceed their mandates by changing the regimes in some states also represent a great challenge. This is caused by different interpretations of the language of the resolutions. Due to major consequences of the Security Council's inactiveness, as seen primarily in Syria, some suggestions of alternative actions that could be taken by the international community include acting through the United Nations General Assembly and its ˝Uniting for Peace˝ resolution, regional organizations (following the example of the African Union) and intervention by ad hoc coalitions. Since none of the mentioned possibilities represent a suitable alternative to a decision of the Security Council, two petitions in light of the Responsibility not to Veto have arisen. They suggest the permanent members abstain from the use of veto in the cases of four mass atrocities. Their success, however, is questionable, since neither has so far obtained the support from all five permanent members.
A tanulmány célja a 2015-ben indult Modern városok program (MVP) iparfejlesztési elképzeléseinek kritikai elemzése a hazánkban kialakult függő piacgazdasági modell és a tartós gyengeségekkel küzdő fejlesztéspolitikai intézményrendszer tükrében. A gazdasági válság utáni Magyarországon a főáramú fejlesztéspolitikák kudarca, az ország gyenge felzárkózási teljesítménye növekvő érdeklődést eredményezett az alternatív gazdaságfejlesztési receptek iránt. Az új teret nyert developmentalista felfogás visszanyúl az erős állami beavatkozás ideájához, ezt azonban paradox módon olyan környezetben teszi, amelyben a gazdaság jelentős hányada külföldi beruházók kezében van, a hazai fejlesztéspolitika eszköz- és intézményrendszere pedig tartós és öröklődő gyengeségekkel küzd. A kormány és a fejlesztésre kijelölt megyei jogú városok külön megállapodásain nyugvó, uniós forrásokat újraelosztó Modern városok program projektszemléletű, vonásaiban a francia és a lengyel tervszerződésekhez hasonló (de azoknál gyengébb és esetlegesebb) fejlesztési eszközként, az új fejlesztési filozófia megtestesítőjeként jelent meg az állami cselekvésben. A program, bár elsősorban városfejlesztési eszköz, jelentős számban tartalmaz újraiparosításra irányuló vagy azt támogató fejlesztési célokat (77 projekt). A program elképzeléseit jelentős regionális különbségek fémjelzik. Az ország nyugati felében inkább a hagyományos fejlesztési eszközök alkalmazása és néhány tudásintenzív tevékenység letelepítésére irányuló törekvés figyelhető meg; a Dél-Alföldön és környezetében az endogén növekedési modell számára is kedvező komplex iparfejlesztési célok kerültek előtérbe; az ország ipari perifériáin azonban egyáltalán nem került sor igazi áttörést sejtető, előremutató fejlesztési célok megfogalmazására. Feltehető, hogy az MVP nyertesei elsősorban a már iparosodott vagy újraiparosodó térségek lesznek; a területi különbségek mérséklődése helyett a különbségek további növekedésére számíthatunk. A critical analysis of the Modern Cities Programme, a development programmelaunched by the Hungarian government in 2015, considers the reindustrialisation components as part of the debate on the varieties of capitalism (in particular the issue of Central and Eastern European dependent market economies) and the persisting institutional deficiencies in the Hungarian planning system. After the 2008 crisis, the low efficiency or failure of mainstream development policies and Hungary's poor convergence record have contributed to a growing interest in alternative development policies. The emerging development-policy vision is returning to the idea of strong state intervention, although paradoxically it continues to operate in an environment characterised by exceptionally high foreign participation in the economy, particularly in its most competitive segments. In addition, domestic development policy struggles with permanent and self-reinforcing institutional weaknesses that significantly reduce its effectiveness. The resulting re-centralisation has not only led to an increase in regional differences, but also to a further weakening of development institutions operating in cities and regions. Effective development systems (development coalitions and early-stage urban regimes) that are capable of setting and achieving coherent, systematic development goals exist only in a few select locations across the country. The Modern Cities Programme, essentially a redistribution of EU funds based on special agreements between the central government and the major Hungarian cities, is a project-based development agenda that somewhat resembles French and Polish planning contracts, albeit in a diluted and less coherent form. As an instrument of development policy, it fits into the new etatist development philosophy. Although the programme is predominantly an instrument of urban development, it also includes 77 projects directly or indirectly related to reindustrialisation. These initiatives focus mainly on improving transport links, developing specific sectors, vocational training, education and a limited R&D+I component. The programme characteristics vary greatly from region to region. In the western half of the country, traditional development instruments predominate with limited evidence of attempts at building up knowledge-intensive activities. In the Southern Great Plain, also complex industrial development goals are found that are conducive to endogenous growth, partly reflecting the lack of FDI in the region and a more SME-based development trajectory. The programme has not been able to realise favourable reindustrialisation initiatives in the peripheral industrial areas of Hungary. The fact that the programme tended to benefit 'winners' is likely to increase existing development gaps rather than reduce existing regional disparities.
