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In his article Dr Pribicevic analyze relation between two largest political parties in Serbia: Democratic Party and Serbian Progressive Party and possibility of the creation of the so-called large coalition after the next parliamentarian elections scheduled for the beginning of the next year. Author explains the meaning of the conception of large coalition and pointed out its results in Germany where this idea of coalition between main parties of right and left was firstly implemented. Starting from the German experience of the large coalition between CDU and SPD Dr Pribicevic analyze the benefit and the damage such coalition might bring to its participants in Serbia. In spite of the fact that both Serbian parties reject such coalition and in spit of the fact that German experience shows that SPD and CDU lost a substantial number of votes after mutual government author concludes that voters in Serbia similar to German case in 2005 could create such option as a realistic one after next elections.

In his first interview to Croatian media after a long period of silence, in October 1989 the leader of the newly formed Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Franjo Tudjman, described himself as 'a Croat man, Marxist, Revolutionary and Historian'. Why did he use concepts such as 'Marxist' and 'Revolutionary' at the time when elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe these concepts became politically incorrect and unpopular? In this article we argue that Tudjman's views on self-determination and secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia were driven by life-long commitment to Leninism and (especially when it comes to the 'national question') Stalinism. When he reappeared in Croatian politics in 1989, Tudjman used the Leninist - not Wilsonian - concept of 'self-determination', which in Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation includes the 'right to secession'. This position enabled him to form an unusual - but logical - coalition with former Communists who were at the same time also nationalists, as well as with anti-Communist separatists. The author analyses the link between Tudjman's politics in the 1990s and Leninist-Stalinist principles of the 'right to self-determination' and 'right to secession'. Adapted from the source document.

The history of nuclear energy, as one of the possible ways out of energy crisis and the transition into the post-oil period is analysed Since its discovery, nuclear energy has been used for military purposes and consequently shrouded in mystery and volatility. The coalition formed during World War II found the new legitimacy for the continuation of nuclear power use via its programme "Atoms for Peace". The atomic bomb has evolved into atoms for peace, a complementary means by which the USA have been trying to secure global domination through nuclear technology. The programme has not achieved its objectives, although external conditions should have warranted that. (SOI : PM: S. 260)

The author provides a short review of the most important events in Croatian history during the 20th century. He begins by emphasizing the importance of the burning of the Hungarian flag in Zagreb during the visit of emporer Franz Joseph in 1895. Other turning points of Croatian history in the 20th century were: declaration of the Rijeka resolution, which was the basis of the Croato-Serbian Coalition; the end of long term relations with the Habsburg monarchy, and the entry into a unified state with Serbia; the experience of Serbian domination in that state; the events of the Second World War; and the renewal of Yugoslavia under a communist dictatorship. The author has decided to publish this review as a model for a further historical study of this period. (SOI : CSP: S. 453)

The authors analyse the constitutional position of the Polish parliament after the democratic revolution of 1989 as well as its internal political dynamics. The parliament has two houses, endowed with different constitutional competences: Sejm (lower House) and Senate (upper House). The 460 members of the Sejm were elected in three electoral cycles (1989, 1991, and 1993) by means of majority and a proportional electoral system with various prohibitive clauses, while the 100 senators were elected by the majority electoral system. The changes in the electoral rules resulted in the altered parliamentary "contractual" Sejm. The seats (in accordance with a political agreement) were divided between the ruling communist bloc and the oppositional "Solidarity", the first freely elected Sejm had an extremely fragmented party structure with 28 parties, while the second Sejm is moderately pluralist, with two parties of the government coalition and four opposition parties. The most remarkable feature of the Polish political culture is an increasing professionalization of the parliament members as well as a growing political apathy of general public and a meagre turnout at the polls. (SOI : PM: S. 120)

The paper explores the history of the Serbian Progressive Party in the Kingdom of Serbia from 1887 to 1896. After the fall of the government of Milutin Garašanin in June 1887, the Serbian Progressive Party ended among the opposition parties. After the fall of the Progressive Party from power, the first coalition liberal-radical government was formed, headed by Jovan Ristić. The Progressive Party members and supporters were persecuted by the ruling People's Radical Party. The Progressive Party lost the voters and deputies in the National Assembly, which suggested that it would not be able to recover for an extended period. However, less than two years later, in May 1889, the Progressive Party managed to organize a General Assembly, attended by over 2,000 members, who adopted the party program and statute which did not differ substantially from the one from 1881. It was quite obvious that the party leadership wanted to show that the Progressive Party did not disappear from the political scene, but that it temporarily withdrew to reconsolidate and focus on gathering voters. Yet, due to the unrest that erupted in Belgrade during the party assembly, the Party leadership announced in June 1889 that the Progressive Party would temporarily suspend its activities. As the withdrawal from the political scene did not produce any results, the Party leaders decided to resume the Party's activities, hoping that the situation would eventually change in their favor. In the September 1890 elections, the Progressive Party won one parliamentary mandate, which went to the Party's leader, Milutin Garašanin. In the National Assembly, his political struggle against the ruling Radical Party government was hardly observable, but his articles published in the Progressive Party newpaper 'Videlo' (Daylight) had a much greater impact on the readers. During the minority liberal government of Jovan Avakumović, in 1892-1893, there were attempts to reach an agreement on a pre-election coalition between the Liberals and the Progressives against the Radicals, but these attempts failed. After the coup of 1st April 1893, when the Radicals regained power, it was quite clear to the Progressive Party leaders that they could not fight the Radicals on their own. The idea of forming a new political grouping of liberals and progressives was soon abandoned. After the 1888 Constitution had been repealed and the 1869 Constitution had been reinstated, King Alexander tried (with the assistance of rare non-partisan people) to avoid the intransigence of the Progressive Party leaders and the supremacy of the Radicals. After the period of several neutral governments headed by Đorđe Simić (January - April 1894), Svetomir Nikolajević (April - October 1894), and Nikola Hristić (October 1894 - July 1895), the Progressive Party government headed by Stojan Novaković (July 1895 - December 1896) was formed. This government initiated a change in the Constitution but the idea was not upheld by King Alexander, as the Liberals and the Radicals did not agree to instituting the constitutional reform under the administration of the weakest party in the country. In such circumstances, Novaković resigned on 29 December 1896. The next day, the Progressive Party was dissolved by the decision of the Party leadership.

A number of military units were active on the territory of the Independent Stat of Croatia (ISC). Since the end of 1941 there were, in the operational sense, one side the armed forces of ISC, Germans, Italians and chetniks, and on the other side partisans. Numerical ratio changed depending on the events in the field and the international situation. The armed forces of the ISC were repeatedly trained and getting more numerous. Until the middle of 1944 their number exceeded the chetniks and partisans together, which jeopardized ISC. The force of ISC were dependent on Germans, and until 1943 on Italians too. German and Italian units were getting stronger, but they were not supported by the local population. Italian units supported the chetniks, thus provoking strong resistance of the population, who in the so-called Italian zones joined the partisans. Chetniks were also supported by Germans, chetniks from Serbia and Montenegro, and the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Near the end of the war, chetniks went over to the partisans in great number because of loss o support by the Germans and Italians. Partisans, making use of the enemy's mistakes, got stronger and stronger. The partisan predominance was realized only when the countries of the antifascist coalition decided to support Josip Tito, the communist-partisan leader. Since the autumn of 1944 partisans got abundant military and political support which helped them win the war. (SOI : CSP: S. 196)

The Vrhbosnian Archbishop dr. Josip Stadler was one of the ecclesiastical prelates who was most vigorously disputed and attacked. One group, which was particularly bitter toward Archbishop Stadler, was the Progressive youth. Trough their weekly and later daily Hrvatski pokret, published in Zagreb, they constantly attacked the archbishop, sometimes approaching the limit of insult. Upon a closer analysis of their writing, however, it is clear their attack was motivated primarily, almost exclusively, by the fact that the archbishop of Sarajevo espoused a diametrically opposite political vision of the future of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Furthermore, due to the fact that the Progressives, as they were called, adhered to an ideology impregnated with anti-Catholicism, the Archbishop, who was an ardent protector of the interests of his Catholic flock in a land where they were a minority, their bitterness toward archbishop can also be understood from that standpoint. Politically, Stadler agreed with the ideas of dr. Josip Frank, the head of the Pure Party of the State Right, who supported first the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and then her incorporation to Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, so that all Croatian lands can be unified in a single body within the confines of the Habsburg domain. The Progressives, on the other hand, who were members of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition in Croatia, advocated a complete independence of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Since the Serbs were majority population in that region, their opponents accused them of promoting and advocating Serbian interests. In any event, the accusations against Archbishop Stadler by the Progressives should be looked upon with the awareness of their ideological and political presuppositions, and, in that sense, considerably modified. The same applies to the former Yugoslav historiography, for it uncritically appropriated both the ideology and political assessments of the Progressives and other "liberal", anti-Catholic groups. (SOI : CSP: S. 49f.)

The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate and useful in understanding and maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important and more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis has shown how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depend on the elements of the very political structure (party systems and coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc.). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently its role greatly depends on the relations among political actors and the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture and structure are extremely sophisticated and that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" and gradual development. (SOI : PM: S. 131) + The purpose of this essay is to prove the connection among political culture, political structure and democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analysed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture and structure i.e. within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims - primarily in line with the functional theory of culture - that there is a functional concordance between culture and structure, that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture, i.e. that "culture is a structure's way of life", that culture determines the structure) and the contemporary interactional approach (in which - primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" - complex relations among various cultural variables and structural variables are analysed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition" but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or the end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture and structure

Doktorska disertacija nastoji da objasni rezultate višestranačkih parlamentarnih izbora u Srbiji od 1990. godine do prve mirne smene vlasti 2000. godine sa stanovišta informisanosti publike o izbornim opcijama. U njoj je potvrđena generalna hipoteza da su informativni televizijski programi o izborima za Skupštinu Srbije tokom 1990-tih godina onemogućavali slobodnu i poštenu utakmicu izbornih rivala. Umesto da biračima ponude adekvatne informacije kao osnovu za racionalan izbor, oni su sistematski favorizovali jednog izbornog učesnika u odnosu na druge. U radu se utvrđuju glavne medijske strategije uticaja na mišljenje birača na osnovu empirijske analize televizijske prezentacije izbora u periodu 1990-2000. godina. Kvantitativno-kvalitativna analiza sadržaja obuhvata redovne informativne programe i specijalizovane izborne programe proizvedene tokom kampanje za izbore za Skupštinu Srbije 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997. i 2000. godine. Analiza je fokusirana na utvrđivanje centralne strategije medijske prezentacije izbora u svakom pojedinačnom ciklusu, identifikovanje slike društvene i političke realnosti kao konteksta u koji se smeštaju informacije o aktivnostima izbornih učesnika, utvrdjivanje glavne teme-dileme izborne kampanje u odnosu na koju se pozicioniraju izborni učesnici i utvrđivanje televizijskih imidža glavnih izbornih rivala. Analizi medijske slike izbora prethodi razmatranje političkog, pravnog i medijskog konteksta u kome su izbori održani. Analiza je potvrdila radne hipoteze da je izborno izveštavanje državne televizije RTS (RTB) od 1990. do 2000. godine podsticalo biračku podršku za vladajuću stranku – Socijalističku partiju Srbije (SPS) ili njenu koaliciju – sistematskom diskriminacijom njenih izbornih rivala; da su specijalizovani izborni programi državne televizije favorizovali interese vladajuće partije SPS ili njene koalicije u odnosu na interese drugih izbornih učesnika i favorizovali interese izbornih učesnika u odnosu na interese birača; i da je redovno TV izveštavanje o aktuelnim neizbornim događajima omogućavalo da izborne poruke jednog izbornog učesnika budu lakše prihvatljive za birače od poruka njegovih izbornih rivala. Način na koji je izveštavanje o izborima kontekstuirano u specifičnu sliku neizbornih događaja identifikovan je kao ključna dugoročna strategija uticaja na birače, zajedno sa medijskim definisanjem smisla izbora u skladu sa interesima jednog izborno učesnika - poželjnog izbornog pobednika. Doktorska disertacija je potvrdila teorijsku hipotezu da kulturološke studije nude pogodnu teorijsku i analitičku osnovu za istraživanje uloge medija u izbornoj komunikaciji u Srbiji tokom 1990-tih godina. ; The doctoral thesis aims to explain the results of multiparty parliamentary elections in Serbia from 1990 until the first peaceful change in power in 2000 from the standpoint of information about election options available to voters. The thesis confirms a general hypothesis that the information TV programs about elections for the Parliament of Serbia during the 1990-ies prevented a free and fair competition of election rivals. Instead of offering adequate information to voters as a basis for a rational choice, TV programs systematically favored one election participant over others. The thesis identifies the main media strategies of influencing the opinion of voters on the basis of empirical analysis of television presentation of elections in the period 1990-2000. The quantitative-qualitative content analysis is applied to regular news programs and specialized electoral broadcasts produced during campaigns for elections for the Parliament of Serbia in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997 and 2000. The analysis is focused on identifying the central strategy of the media presentation in each election cycle, the picture of social and political reality as a context for the information on activities of election participants, the main issue of the election campaign and TV images of the main election rivals. The analysis of the media picture of the elections is preceded by a review of political, legal and media context in which the elections took place. The analysis confirmed the working hypothesis that the election coverage of the state television RTS (RTB) from 1990 until 2000 mobilized the voters' support for the ruling party – Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) or its coalition – by a systematic discrimination of its election rivals; that the specialized programs of the state television favored the interests of the ruling party SPS or its coalition in comparison to interests of other election contestants as well as the interests of election participants over the interests of voters; and that the regular Serbian television news reporting about non-election events made the messages of one election participant more easily acceptable by voters than the messages of other contestants. The way the coverage of election events was placed into a specific picture of non-election events is identified as the key long-term strategy for influencing the voters' decision, together with the media definition of the meaning of the election which was in accord with the interests of one election participant – the preferred election winner. The thesis confirmed a theoretical hypothesis that cultural studies offer a convenient theoretical and analytical basis for studying the role of the media in election communication in Serbia during the 1990's.

Са политичким преокретом 2000. године у Србији отпочео је истовемено и процес идеолошког преобликовања јавних простора. Међу најпроминентнијим видовима оваквог деловања је именовање или преименовање урбаног простора, првенствено улица и тргова, те бављење постојећим споменицима и меморијалима, као и градња и планирање нових. Овакви су случајеви посебно били уочљиви у Београду. Њима су се у неколико наврата супротставиле одређене политичке партије, те неполитичке групе које су организовале уличне акције 'против-именовања' београдских улица, те кампање против новопланираних јавних споменика. Односи моћи и идентитетске политике у овим случајевима биће коментарисани у овом раду. Пропратиће се праксе неколико уметничких и политичких скупина које су спровеле акције и перформансе незваничног преименовања улица, или су пак дискутовале и противиле се подизању новопредложених споменика. (Пре)именовањем одређених градских простора, хегемонске политичке коалиције покушавају да конституишу сигнификантна симболичка места, док, са друге стране, опозиционе противакције покушавају да преузму та иста места и да их реинтерпретирају. У овом ће се раду покушати да прикажу и анализирају поједине идеолошке политике и званични дискурси сећања, те поједине уметничке и политичке контраполитике и опозиционе праксе алтернативне комеморације ; With the onset of political overturn in Serbia in 2000, the process of the ideological reconfiguration of public places was simultaneously being put in motion. One of the most promi- nent means of this endeavor was naming and renaming of urban space, primarily of streets and squares, but also treatment of existing memorial sites and monuments and commissioning and erection of new ones. These undertakings were especially prominent in Serbia's capital Belgrade. Such processes were opposed several times by certain political parties and groups which organized street-actions of counter-naming of Belgrade's thoroughfares and campaigns against newly designated public monuments, and power-play and identity politics of such proceedings will be commented on here. This paper will discuss practices of several artistic and political groups which carried out unofficial street-renaming actions and performances, or discussed and opposed proposed new memorials. By (re)naming certain urban spaces, hegemonic political coalitions are trying to construct significant symbolic places, while oppositional counter-actions are seeking to overtake those same places and reinterpret them. This paper will attempt to sum up and inquire into the ideological politics of official memory discourses and artistic and political counter-politics and actions of opposition or alternative commemoration.

The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.