Suchergebnisse

CHAPTER 1 It has been intensively and controversially discussed whether 'good' economic policies and governance in the recipient countries render foreign aid more effective in alleviating poverty and stimulating economic growth. By contrast, the question of whether aid recipient countries would benefit from stronger income effects if foreign donors provided higher quality aid has received scant attention so far. In Chapter 1, we make use of the index of donor performance from the Center for Global Development to compare the effects of quality-adjusted aid and unadjusted aid on changes in GDP per capita. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals significant and quantitatively important treatment effects for quality-adjusted aid after the introduction of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, while we do not find significant treatment effects for unadjusted aid. This implies that only recipient countries with increased aid inflows of high quality benefit in terms of increasing GDP per capita. The quality of aid matters most when accounting for delayed effects. However, our results depend on the sample of recipient countries. CHAPTER 2 Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international development cooperation in 23 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee since the organization started reporting detailed ODA data in 1967. Understanding their role in foreign aid giving is crucial since their decisions can influence aid effectiveness and thus economic development on the ground. Chapter 2 examines whether development ministers' personal characteristics are associated with aid budgets and aid quality. To this end, we create a novel database on development ministers' gender, political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, education, and time in office over the 1967-2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, we find that more experienced ministers with respect to their time in the development office obtain larger aid budgets. Moreover, our results suggest that female ministers as well as officeholders with prior professional experience in development cooperation and a longer time in office provide higher-quality ODA. CHAPTER 3 The bulk of IFC lending benefits companies from rich countries, and projects in countries with middle income. Large conglomerates such as Lidl or Mövenpick have been among its direct beneficiaries. This contrasts to some extent with the IFC's official mandate, which is to finance poverty-reducing projects for which private capital is not available on reasonable terms. In Chapter 3, we investigate the drivers of this mismatch. According to our theory, the governments of industrialized countries where borrowing companies are based form coalitions with governments of middle-income countries where the projects are implemented. We therefore expect preferential treatment to be most pronounced when the representatives of both the recipient's and the company's countries are best able to collude in exerting their influence. We argue that this will be the case when both countries' governments are represented among the IFC's Board of Executive Directors, and when they have extraordinary clout with major IFC shareholders. Using data for more than 3,000 IFC projects over the 1995-2015 period we show that the (joint) influence of these countries helps them to receive a disproportional share of IFC funding. CHAPTER 4 The success of development interventions crucially depends on their uptake in the targeted population. We investigate incentives for uptake of those interventions, making use of a framework grounded in psychological theory, "The Theory of Planned Behavior". The framework suggests three determinants for intervention uptake: personal attitudes, the social influence of important others and the perceived ease of intervention use. We use the setup of two randomized controlled trials in Indonesia and Pakistan to test the theory for development intervention purposes. Our findings show that the proposed determinants are indeed associated with increased uptake. We investigate further on the determinant personal attitudes, which is most relevant to our intervention, by conducting a framed field experiment in Indonesia. The experiment shows that the study population in the Indonesian context exhibits higher levels of support for the project if the participation of international actors is highlighted. Consequently, our results encourage international research and development cooperation, first, to consider the determinants suggested by the "Theory of Planned Behavior" in the design of projects in order to increase intervention uptake. Second, depending on the country context, explicitly framing international participation in the conducted project might be a cost-effective way to increase supportive behavior towards the intervention. CHAPTER 5 This chapter assesses the impact of impact evaluations based on impact evaluation studies in developmental health interventions, collected through the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation's repository. Considering the steady increase in impact evaluations and financial resources already spent, policy and research are demanding evidence on whether the growing effort indeed leads to learning, improved projects and finally, improved outcomes. I analyze this empirical question for the period 1995-2014 in a cross-country panel for general health outcomes and at a sub-national level for the country Uganda with regard to infant mortality rates per districts. Results are very robust and show a significant correlation between impact evaluations in health and improved outcomes on a cross-country level. Based on more precise data measurement and linkages, also sub-national findings indicate that impact evaluations in maternal and neonatal health conditional on increased corresponding ODA disbursements lead to reduced infant mortality.

I want to develop this issue's invitation to think and reflect on establishing links with different life systems from an approach to certain cultural practices and daily care actions that are configured from a position of fragility and which create solidarity fabrics to inhabit the world and to sustenance. I will develop this argument through two ethnographies that I made in previous years and which now I want to reread and rethink based on these problems. The first fieldwork is the result of a process of audiovisual and ethnographic approach to two social movements: the Peace Community of San José de Apartado and the Wayuu Munsurat Women's Organization. The second work is an approximation to the processes that emerged from the common claims and demands by women who led the land occupations in the 80s in the San Martin de Porres neighborhood in Bogotá. The questions that guided me throughout this research are: How do these ethnographies push us to rethink and question what we understand about politics from the perspective of care and its possibilities to repair and create different links between territories and bodies? And why is it necessary to have an approach to care and its relationship with sustaining the body and the territories? The actions and coalitions created and generated by these women from a position of vulnerability were aimed at sustaining themselves and surviving, that is, at repairing vital tissues. And this is precisely what interests me, to inquire into this articulation between care - as the need to sustain yourself - and politics - as a way to appropriate the world and reformulate existence. ; La invitación de este numero a pensar y reflexionar sobre establecer vínculos con diferentes sistemas de vida quiero desarrollarla a partir de una aproximación a ciertas prácticas culturales y acciones cotidianas de cuidado que se configuran desde lo frágil y crean tejidos de solidaridad para habitar el mundo y mantener la vida. Este argumento lo desarrollaré a través de dos etnografías que realicé en años anteriores y que hoy quiero releerlas y repensarlas desde dichas problemáticas. El primer trabajo de campo es el resultado de un proceso de acercamiento audiovisual y etnográfico a dos movimientos sociales: la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado y la Organización de Mujeres Wayuu Munsurat. El segundo trabajo es una aproximación a los procesos que emergieron de las reclamaciones y demandas comunes por parte de las mujeres que lideraron la toma de tierras en los 80 en el barrio San Martin de Porres/Bogotá. Las preguntas que me han acompañado a lo largo de estas investigación tienen que ver con ¿Cómo estas etnografías nos empujan a repensar y cuestionar lo que estamos entendiendo por lo político desde el cuidado y sus posibilidades de reparar y crear vínculos diferentes entre territorios y cuerpos? y ¿Porqué es necesario tener un acercamiento al cuidado y su relacionalidad con mantener el cuerpo y los territorios? Las acciones y coaliciones creadas y generadas por estas mujeres desde la vulnerabilidad tenían como principal objetivo mantenerse y sobrevivir, es decir, reparar los tejidos vitales. Y es precisamente esto lo que me interesa de sobremanera, el indagar en esa articulación entre el cuidado-como la necesidad de mantener la vida- y lo político- como forma de apropiarse del mundo y de reformular la existencia. ; Quero desenvolver o convite deste número a pensar e refletir sobre estabelecer vínculos com diferentes sistemas de vida a partir de uma aproximação a certas práticas culturais e ações cotidianas de cuidado que se configuram desde o frágil e criam tecidos de solidariedade para habitar o mundo e manter a vida. Este argumento será desenvolvido através de duas etnografias que realizei em anos anteriores e que hoje quero reler e repensar a partir dessas problemáticas. O primeiro trabalho de campo é o resultado de um processo de abordagem audiovisual e etnográfica a dois movimentos sociais: a Comunidade de Paz de San José de Apartado e a Organização de Mulheres Wayuu Munsurat. O segundo trabalho é uma aproximação aos processos que emergiram das reclamações e demandas comuns por parte das mulheres que lideraram a tomada de terras nos anos 80 no bairro San Martin de Porres/Bogotá. As perguntas que me acompanharam ao longo destas pesquisas têm a ver com: como estas etnografias nos empurram a repensar e questionar o que estamos entendendo pelo político a partir do cuidado e suas possibilidades de reparar e criar vínculos diferentes entre territórios e corpos? E porque é necessário ter uma aproximação ao cuidado e sua relacionalidade com manter o corpo e os territórios? As ações e coalisões criadas e geradas por estas mulheres desde a vulnerabilidade tinham como principal objetivo se manter e sobreviver, ou seja, reparar os tecidos vitais. E é precisamente isto o que me interessa grandemente, o indagar nessa articulação entre o cuidado-como a necessidade de manter a vida- e

The development of the Ukrainian party system and its ideological component can not be considered in isolation from the specifics of the transformational processes in Ukrainian society, which largely determined the nature and principle of the functioning of the political system and the state mechanism, as well as world trends.Factors such as the war on the Donbas, the need to reform all spheres of society's life (often through its opposition), advancement through European integration, which necessitates the adaptation of Ukrainian realities to modern European norms, will, for a long time, determine the framework conditions for the development of the party system and parties as key subjects of socio-political processes and will have an unconditional influence on the formation of ideological foundations of certain political actors. It should also be noted that, since the process of determining the basic parameters of the functioning of the party system is far from complete, as well as the process of developing party ideologies, it is obvious that it is in the early stages of its development.The definition of the ideological spectrum inherent in contemporary political parties, theoretically, taking into account the traditional definition of the term "political party", makes it possible to recreate the socio-political and transformational development of the state in an instantaneous time perspective.At the same time, the gradual opening of the country means the penetration of trends typical of the modern West of the political life. Among these trends – for example, the departure of mass parties in favor of the so-called which leads to the transformation of parties into powerful machines for receiving electronic support from society, the gradual convergence of classical ideologies, the departure of the ideological component of campaigns and political activity in the second plan.In recent decades it has come to the conclusion about crises as traditional, classical ideologies (such as conservation, liberalism, social democracy, nationalism) so that in developing countries in the best countries of the world (in particular, the USA, EU countries, NATO, the Organization economic cooperation and development) and the so-called neo-ideologies (neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism, etc.).So, it is primarily about narrowing, and in some cases, the actual disappearance of ideological differences between key political actors (first and foremost, parties). Obviously, it was the narrowing of ideological differences that made it possible, in particular, to have rather strong positions of the socalled A "broad coalition" in Germany (between the CDU / CSU party bloc traditionally defending Christian-democratic, right-centered and liberal approaches, and the Social-Democrats historically belonging to the center-left spectrum).In this context, it's worth mentioning the phenomenon of the so-called. "Comprehensive", or "universal" party (in Y. Shvedi – a party of voters, or a party for all (the general party)). Such parties are trying to focus on the most common at this moment in the public sentiment in order to first receive as many votes as possible in the elections, and then decide on the main lines of their policies. ; Розвиток української партійної системи та її ідеологічної складової неможливо розглядати у відриві як від специфіки трансформаційних процесів в українському суспільстві, які багато в чому визначили природу і принцип функціонування політичного устрою і державного механізму, так і загальносвітових тенденцій.Такі чинники, як війна на Донбасі, необхідність реформування всіх сфер життя суспільства (часто через його спротив), просування шляхом європейської інтеграції, що зумовлює необхідність адаптації українських реалій до сучасних європейських норм, ще довгий час визначатимуть рамкові умови розвитку партійної системи і партій як ключових суб'єктів суспільно-політичних процесів і чинитимуть безумовний вплив на формування ідеологічних засад тих чи інших політичних акторів. Необхідно також зазначити, що оскільки процес визначення базових параметрів функціонування партійної системи далекий до свого завершення, тож і процес розвитку партійних ідеологій знаходиться, очевидно, на початкових стадіях свого розвитку.Визначення ідеологічного спектра, властивого сучасним політичним партіям, теоретично, з урахуванням традиційного визначення терміну "політична партія", дає змогу змоделювати соціально-політичний і трансформаційний розвиток держави в осяжній часовій перспективі.Разом з тим, поступове відкриття країни світу означає й проникнення характерних для сучасного Заходу тенденцій політичного життя. Серед цих тенденцій – наприклад, відхід від масових партій на користь т.зв. виборчих, що зумовлює перетворення партій на потужні машини для отримання електоральної підтримки з боку суспільства, поступове зближення класичних ідеологій, відхід ідеологічного компонента кампаній і політичної діяльності на другий план.Ситуація в найбільш розвинутих країнах світу (зокрема, США, країничлени ЄС, НАТО, Організації економічного співробітництва та розвитку) в останні десятиліття підводять до висновку щодо кризи як традиційних, класичних ідеологій (таких як консерватизм, лібералізм, соціал-демократія, націоналізм), так і т.зв. неоідеологій (неолібералізим, неоконсерватизм тощо).Отже, йдеться передусім, про звуження, а в деяких випадках – і про фактичне зникнення ідеологічних розбіжностей між ключовими політичними акторами (в першу чергу, партіями). Очевидно, саме звуження ідеологічних розбіжностей уможливило, зокрема, достатньо міцні позиції т.зв. "широкої коаліції" у Німеччині (між блоком партій ХДС/ХСС, що традиційно відстоюють християнсько-демократичні, правоцентристські і ліберальні підходи, та соціалдемократами, що історично належать до лівоцентристського спектра).У цьому контексті варто було б згадати феномен т.зв. "всеохоплюючої", або "універсальної" партії (у Ю.Шведи – партія виборців, або партія для всіх, (catch-all party)) . Такі партії намагаються орієнтуватися на найбільш поширені на цей момент суспільні настрої з тим, щоб спочатку здобути якомога більше голосів на виборах, а вже потім визначатися з основними лініями своєї політики.

The development of the Ukrainian party system and its ideological component can not be considered in isolation from the specifics of the transformational processes in Ukrainian society, which largely determined the nature and principle of the functioning of the political system and the state mechanism, as well as world trends.Factors such as the war on the Donbas, the need to reform all spheres of society's life (often through its opposition), advancement through European integration, which necessitates the adaptation of Ukrainian realities to modern European norms, will, for a long time, determine the framework conditions for the development of the party system and parties as key subjects of socio-political processes and will have an unconditional influence on the formation of ideological foundations of certain political actors. It should also be noted that, since the process of determining the basic parameters of the functioning of the party system is far from complete, as well as the process of developing party ideologies, it is obvious that it is in the early stages of its development.The definition of the ideological spectrum inherent in contemporary political parties, theoretically, taking into account the traditional definition of the term "political party", makes it possible to recreate the socio-political and transformational development of the state in an instantaneous time perspective.At the same time, the gradual opening of the country means the penetration of trends typical of the modern West of the political life. Among these trends – for example, the departure of mass parties in favor of the so-called which leads to the transformation of parties into powerful machines for receiving electronic support from society, the gradual convergence of classical ideologies, the departure of the ideological component of campaigns and political activity in the second plan.In recent decades it has come to the conclusion about crises as traditional, classical ideologies (such as conservation, liberalism, social democracy, nationalism) so that in developing countries in the best countries of the world (in particular, the USA, EU countries, NATO, the Organization economic cooperation and development) and the so-called neo-ideologies (neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism, etc.).So, it is primarily about narrowing, and in some cases, the actual disappearance of ideological differences between key political actors (first and foremost, parties). Obviously, it was the narrowing of ideological differences that made it possible, in particular, to have rather strong positions of the socalled A "broad coalition" in Germany (between the CDU / CSU party bloc traditionally defending Christian-democratic, right-centered and liberal approaches, and the Social-Democrats historically belonging to the center-left spectrum).In this context, it's worth mentioning the phenomenon of the so-called. "Comprehensive", or "universal" party (in Y. Shvedi – a party of voters, or a party for all (the general party)). Such parties are trying to focus on the most common at this moment in the public sentiment in order to first receive as many votes as possible in the elections, and then decide on the main lines of their policies. ; Розвиток української партійної системи та її ідеологічної складової неможливо розглядати у відриві як від специфіки трансформаційних процесів в українському суспільстві, які багато в чому визначили природу і принцип функціонування політичного устрою і державного механізму, так і загальносвітових тенденцій.Такі чинники, як війна на Донбасі, необхідність реформування всіх сфер життя суспільства (часто через його спротив), просування шляхом європейської інтеграції, що зумовлює необхідність адаптації українських реалій до сучасних європейських норм, ще довгий час визначатимуть рамкові умови розвитку партійної системи і партій як ключових суб'єктів суспільно-політичних процесів і чинитимуть безумовний вплив на формування ідеологічних засад тих чи інших політичних акторів. Необхідно також зазначити, що оскільки процес визначення базових параметрів функціонування партійної системи далекий до свого завершення, тож і процес розвитку партійних ідеологій знаходиться, очевидно, на початкових стадіях свого розвитку.Визначення ідеологічного спектра, властивого сучасним політичним партіям, теоретично, з урахуванням традиційного визначення терміну "політична партія", дає змогу змоделювати соціально-політичний і трансформаційний розвиток держави в осяжній часовій перспективі.Разом з тим, поступове відкриття країни світу означає й проникнення характерних для сучасного Заходу тенденцій політичного життя. Серед цих тенденцій – наприклад, відхід від масових партій на користь т.зв. виборчих, що зумовлює перетворення партій на потужні машини для отримання електоральної підтримки з боку суспільства, поступове зближення класичних ідеологій, відхід ідеологічного компонента кампаній і політичної діяльності на другий план.Ситуація в найбільш розвинутих країнах світу (зокрема, США, країничлени ЄС, НАТО, Організації економічного співробітництва та розвитку) в останні десятиліття підводять до висновку щодо кризи як традиційних, класичних ідеологій (таких як консерватизм, лібералізм, соціал-демократія, націоналізм), так і т.зв. неоідеологій (неолібералізим, неоконсерватизм тощо).Отже, йдеться передусім, про звуження, а в деяких випадках – і про фактичне зникнення ідеологічних розбіжностей між ключовими політичними акторами (в першу чергу, партіями). Очевидно, саме звуження ідеологічних розбіжностей уможливило, зокрема, достатньо міцні позиції т.зв. "широкої коаліції" у Німеччині (між блоком партій ХДС/ХСС, що традиційно відстоюють християнсько-демократичні, правоцентристські і ліберальні підходи, та соціалдемократами, що історично належать до лівоцентристського спектра).У цьому контексті варто було б згадати феномен т.зв. "всеохоплюючої", або "універсальної" партії (у Ю.Шведи – партія виборців, або партія для всіх, (catch-all party)) . Такі партії намагаються орієнтуватися на найбільш поширені на цей момент суспільні настрої з тим, щоб спочатку здобути якомога більше голосів на виборах, а вже потім визначатися з основними лініями своєї політики.

The article is devoted to analysis of president Obama foreign policy. Political speeches of the American leader and their correlation with American foreign policy regarding Syria are described. Tendency to the change of official position of the White House due to the course of events in Syria is analyzed.The main idea of B. Obama foreign policy is to renew American leadership. During the first period of presidency Obama positioned himself as a pacifist, but during the second facts indicate to the other way round. Expenses for the defense of the United States doubled in comparison with 2001 and now it is about 700 billion dollars.Peaceful statements made by Obama reflect imperatives of interventionism. There are serious doubts about the course change, because neither democrats whose interests the president defends, nor republicans allow him considerably change the vector of American foreign policy. Last events in Syria prove it.Due to the statements made by representatives of White House, the United States are ready to attack Syria. Obama is inclined to attack deliberately selected military objects in Syria. The goal of the attack is not only to punish the Asad's government, but also to take control of the use of chemical weapons against civilians. There are evident indicators of preparation to the assault on Syria. The United States moved four warships close to the shores of Syria.The issue of allies is also important in the Syrian context. Australia, France, Turkey and Israel are ready to support American attack against Syria. Position of the US is enthusiastically supported by France. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France stated that the responsibility of Asad in the chemical attack is evident. Similar statement was made by the Prime-Minister of Australia.For decisive measures president Obama needs an approval of Congress. As a commander-in-chief, Obama doesn't need any approval, but from his point of view the discussion of this issue is important. There is no doubt that the president will get its approval. This result will correspond to the traditional course of the USA.Despite the intention of the American political elite to attack Syria, ordinary Americans keep another opinion. By the poll, conducted by the Washington Post and ABC News, about 60% of Americans are against the assault and only 36% are for it.White House administration applies similar approach in treating Syria to the one used by the former administration of G. Bush-junior. Today's situation reminds similar one in Iraq before the war in March 2003. At that period of time high rank American officials said that Iraq possessed chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. When the war in Iraq started no kind of weapons was found. So, now Americans, as well as the rest of the world, are quite doubtful about the necessity of using force against Syria.To my mind it is interesting to follow the technique, used by the White House officials planning aggression against Syria. In August 2013 Obama's administration just mentioned chemical weapon, used in Syria. A couple of days later it was mentioned that the government forces applied it though there was no evident facts. Unexpectedly on the 30th of August Washington high-rank officials started up the official information campaign, trying to persuade world community in posing danger from Bashar Asad side. The USA was making steps to form a coalition in waging war against Syria. On the same day White House officials stated a danger of Asada's possession of chemical weapons not only for the people of Syria, but also for the whole world. It's strange, because 189 countries in the world, including the USA and the RF, possess chemical weapons. Quite soon, on the 17th of September American President said that it was necessary to put B. Asad down as a dangerous leader for his own people and the democratic countries.American superiority is the ideological basis for foreign policy of the United States. And in this context Obama's administration is similar to Bush's administration. Statements, made by B. Obama, sound simultaneous with the statements made by European politicians. It makes sense, because it reduces critics from the world community and it doesn't reduces the role of the United States as the world leader. Despite the talks between the USA and the Russian Federation, the State Secretary of the US John Kerry, on the eighth of October, stated that president Obama hasn't made any decision regarding Syria. It means that the United States will decide on their own what to do and how react to the events in Syria.There are reasons to make conclusions that foreign policy of Barack Obama in the Middle East will increase instability in the region and strengthen American positions in order to get political and economic advantages. ; Статья посвящена анализу внешнеполитической деятельности президента Обамы. Выявлено корреляцию политических речей американского лидера с внешней политикой Соединенных Штатов по отношению к Сирии. Рассмотрено тенденцию к изменению официальной позиции Белого дома, принимая во внимание изменение событий в Сирии. ; Статтю присвячено аналізу зовнішньополітичної діяльності президента Обами. Виявлено кореляцію політичних промов американського очільника із зовнішньою політикою Сполучених Штатів щодо Сирії. Розглянуто тенденцію змін офіційної позиції Білого дому з огляду на перебіг подій у Сирії.

The Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC) was established by the former Howard government to regulate the building and construction sector. The establishment of the regulatory body followed damning reports by a Royal commission which alleged that building and construction workplaces were characterized by a widespread disregard for the law. An Interim Building Industry Taskforce was established subsequent to the release of the findings. The Royal commission's recommendations were then put before the federal parliament which led to the passage of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (BCII Act 2005). The office of the Australian Building and Construction Commission first began operations in October 2005. The Howard government had hoped the BCII Act (2005) would vastly improve the workplace relations framework for building and construction operations and ensure that all building work was carried out in a fair, efficient and productive manner. The Howard government had long been an advocate of industrial reform in the building and construction sector. It believed that the crucial economic role played by the building and construction industry in Australia was being undermined and had been hindered by a perceived trade union dominance of the workplace. The government also alleged that inefficient workplace production was occurring as a result of direct interference by unions in the workplace. Therefore, it was hoped that the establishment of the ABCC would promote respect for the law and lift the economic capacity of the industry. The ABCC is legislated with coercive information-gathering powers. These powers enable the agency to request information from industry participants that is believed to be of relevance to an investigation. The ABCC may also request building industry participants to attend secret meetings in which they are required to swear an oath or make an affirmation. The triggers for the use of coercive powers in most cases are based on a ' reasonable belief that an offence may have been committed. The government's agency has been criticized for the number of prosecutions it has made against trade unions. Led by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) Labour organizations accused the former Howard government's building and construction regulator of being a political mouthpiece for the Coalition and of having an ideological 'union busting' agenda, rather than adhering to the role of a genuine industrial regulator. Where as, prominent industry groups such as the Masters Builders Australia (MBA) and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) have come out strongly in support of the ABCC citing a steady on-going decline in industrial disputation in the building and construction industry since the ABCC began operations as evidence that the ABCC is functioning effectively in its regulatory role. The role of the ABCC as an active industrial regulator has always been controvers ial within the building and construction industry. However, the ABCC gained national attention following the agencies decision to take legal action against 107 individual workers employed on the Perth- Mandurah Rail project in Western Australia whom allegedly took part in illegal industrial activity. Despite the high profile of this individual case and others similar, the ABCC has managed to remain in relative national anonymity. Regardless of public perceptions, the ABCC's extensive coercive information-gathering powers and the trigger's for their usage has been a controversial subject amongst participants in the industry and this remains true today. Critics of the ABCC suggest that the BCII Act (2005) has not achieved its desired purpose of restoring a respect for the law within the industry as the Royal commission intended. They argue that the ABCC has instead provoked hostility between employee's and employers and their representative bodies which had a detrimental impact on the long-term growth of the industry. The election of a new federal Labor government in November 2007 has provided a real opportunity for the new government to develop a fairer and more balanced regulatory role for the ABCC. The new Rudd government has pledged to retain the ABCC until January 2010 when the governments new industrial relations body 'Fair Work Australia' will take control of regulating the building and construction industry. In order for the transition between the current regulator and the future body to be successful, reforms will need to take place in the operating structure of the ABCC to ensure the industrial regulator is representative of the new government's commitment to achieving a fair and balanced workplace. Division between employers and employees must be resolved as such barriers prevent the industry from performing at its maximum capacity which is pivotal to the success of the Australian economy. This report will examine the active role that has been played by the ABCC, and provide a critique of government intervention into the building and construction industry. To improve industrial relations for building and construction work a fresh approach is needed to ensure a productive, efficient and more balanced industrial workplace. A fair and balanced ombudsman for the building and construction industry is of vital importance to both the future of the national economy and the social fabric of our society.

The nature of Dutch democracy, once considered a highly stable product of cooperation, compromise and consensus-seeking practices across socioeconomic and sociocultural lines, has changed. Whereas the accessibility and levels (not forms) of participation have changed little, autocratically led protest parties have won ground and in the polls draw support from a stable 15% – 17% of the electorate. Corruption prevention in politics, especially regarding party finances, appears to fall under the bar of international standards. Political rhetoric has grown increasingly polarized (or politicized) as the political middle is waning and extreme positions on either side are on the rise. The Dutch media landscape remains highly pluralistic, although there are some concerns about the growing concentration of media ownership, a situation aggravated by the present financial economic crisis, rapid commercialization, and international ownership of national media outlets. In legal arrangements, citizens" right to privacy is subject to pressures from the information revolution and the massive use of information technology (IT) in all kinds of policy fields, primarily relating to internal and external security. In addition, some conspicuous miscarriages of justice have spawned a public debate on the quality of the justice system, including the need for a special court charged with handling mistrials. Anti-terrorism and integration policies have put considerable pressure on the exercise of basic political liberties, such as the freedoms of speech, religion and press as well as protection against unreasonable search and seizure actions. Tough immigration laws have come under international legal scrutiny, in particular where the rights of children and family reunion are concerned. In short, although the quality of Dutch democracy remains satisfactory, it has suffered several blows in several areas. Policy-specific performance during the Balkenende IV government – the coalition cabinet formed by the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Labor (PvdA) and Christian Union (CU) parties – was in general incremental, save for the proposal to phase-in an extension of the pension age to 67 that was adopted by the cabinet in 2009. Policy performance in matters relating to internal and external safety remained adequate, although at rising public cost. The Health Care Insurance Act (Zvw) of 2006 was continued, although its impact on cost control issues and enhancing market-like competition between health care providers remains unclear. Stagnation continues to characterize environmental, research and development, and innovation policies alike. No changes have been made to education Netherlands report SGI 2011 | 4 policy, although it is now generally judged to be in crisis. Serious concerns have been raised about the lack of good teachers, literacy and numeracy skills among elementary students, and high attrition rates at all levels of education. As is the case in most other European countries, the financial and banking crisis (followed by the euro crisis) has proven detrimental to economic policy performance, which negatively affects prospects in almost all other policy areas. Strategic Outlook The long-term viability of the D utch polity depends on the acumen with which the three following challenges are treated: the state"s weakened fiscal position; facilitating technology innovation in order to develop an ecologically modernized and sustainable economy; and societal integration and coherence. (1) Improving the state"s weakened fiscal position. The state"s financial problems can in large part be attributed to recent bailouts of Dutch banks and financial businesses, as well as individual euro zone countries and the euro itself. An effective long-term solution to these fiscal problems therefore requires (domestic as well as European-level) reforms involving stricter regulation and oversight in order to improve risk-management. The Dutch government must also undertake substantive reforms in the banking and financial sector. (2) Improve technology innovation in order to ensure an ecologically modernized and sustainable economy. The Dutch government must invest more wisely in efforts targeting the transition to renewable and alternative energy sources, such as wind and solar energy. The government will also need to pursue a structural reform of the education system, which is in a state of crisis. (3) Facilitate societal integration and coherence while implementing flexicurity policies. The Dutch welfare state urgently needs reforms that ensure continued investment in human capital while protecting workers and families from the brunt of structural adjustments. Opportunities for combining work and family life ought to be expanded and improved. The pension system and the moribund state of its financial underpinning must also undergo reforms. Social coherence will not be advanced through tighter immigration and citizenship policies. Instead, policies focused on urban and residential area renewal should be sustained through adequate funding. Netherlands report SGI 2011 | 5 A sound, functional democracy requires clearly structured forms of issue-specific, interactive policy-making in which citizens" voices are represented. In tripartite governance structures like that of the Netherlands, the primacy of politics vis-à-vis markets and civil society ought to be reconfirmed. Where possible, politics should respect the self-regulation of citizen life and markets. But as the only institution capable of regulating tripartite relations, the state must also live up to its responsibilities in maintaining the framework in which democratic decision-making takes place.

ESPAÑOL: Presentamos una revisión del problema de la génesis del reino de Pamplona. Frente a la idea de un cápsula hispanovisigótica destinada a hacer eclosión tras la crisis del emirato, proponemos comprender la historia de este periodo en términos dialécticos. Por un lado, las estructuras políticas del Pirineo occidental se articulan como un sistema periférico del emirato, lo que genera procesos de jerarquización interna y regional. Por otro, un sector de la sociedad enarbola el estandarte de un cristianismo de combate opuesto a las estrechas vinculaciones de los dirigentes de Pamplona con AlÁndalus, lo que acelera la destilación de un discurso de monarquía cristiana. Este juego de tensiones se salva con una legitimidad doble: los Íñigo son emires dependientes de Córdoba hacia el exterior y príncipes cristianos hacia el interior. Al tiempo, instrumentos como la justicia o el dominio del yermo son utilizados por los dirigentes para convertir el poder político en formas de control social y territorial de la población rural. / ENGLISH: Constructing a kingdom on the edge of al-Andalus: Pamplona and the Western Pyrenees in the eighth and ninth centuries. The traditional vision of Navarrese society during the two centuries after the Muslim conquest is of an hispanovisigothic island, protected from direct Islamic influence by the initial pact of rendition to Cordoba and the payment of the corresponding tributes, that only would develop into a true Christian monarchy with the emergence of the Jimena dynasty at the start of the tenth century. However, there are various reasons to re-address the question of the origins of the kingdom of Pamplona. Some are quite recent: the work done in the last ten years on the funeral archaeology of the period after the Islamic conquest; and a recent and important reappraisal of the neighbouring Banu Qasi, alternately allies and enemies of Pamplona. More generally, and going further back, previous explanations of the process by which fragmented local powers turned into a kingdom have hardly been satisfactory. In the area around Pamplona we know of the existence of three eighth century necropoleis. One of them is a Muslim cemetery, which suggests the pacific presence of an Islamic community during several generations, but it is the two Christian cemeteries which contain the most striking finds. Shortly after the arrival of the Muslims, in the higher ranking tombs artefacts have appeared which suggest links with the new masters of the land, above all signet rings bearing cufic inscriptions. That this should happen in a context so sensitive to representations of social order suggests that the links between the ruling families and the Muslims were closely than had previously been thought. During the ninth century the political structures of the Western Pyrenees function as a peripheric part of the Emirate, with each individual or group's position determined by their role in the different alliances, conflicts or processes of wealth redistribution that connected them with al- Andalus. The rulers of Pamplona appear as the principal regional interlocutors with Muslim power, both when it came to organising military coalitions or when tributes (jizya) had to be paid. This last point is particularly eloquent: the people of the Western Pyrenees paid the jizya the same as all other Christians in al-Andalus. As J. Lorenzo has recently shown in his doctoral thesis, the Navarrese were not regarded as foreigners, but rather were protected by Islam. The governor of Pamplona was not a sovereign, but rather a dependent of the Emir of Cordoba. That, however, is but one side of the coin. The eventual emergence of the kingdom is best understood as the resolution of a series of tensions, and in contrast to the rulers of Pamplona who paid the jizya, fought alongside the Banu Qasi, married their daughters to Muslims and were in general seduced by al-Andalus, with a power base in the Pyrenean monasteries there was a section of society that embraced militant Christianity. The clearest manifestation of which is the earliest anti-Muslim pamphlet in Western Europe, the Life of Mohammed that Eulogius of Cordoba came across in the Navarrese monastery of Leire in 848, although there would also be links forged with the voluntary martyrs of Cordoba. Such tensions never reach breaking-point because the two tendencies needed each other. The rulers of Pamplona had to respect the rules in operation in al-Andalus, but they also needed a legitimising discourse for internal consumption that only the Church could provide. For their part, the abbots, bishops and related families were dependent upon their Christian ruler while no suitable alternative was available. What's more, the divergent tendencies actually made the emergence of a Christian monarchy possible: with the concentration of power in Pamplona on the one hand, and by way of reaction sections of the Church coming to favour a Christian monarchy. To all this we can add the use by the rulers of Pamplona of instruments such as justice and control of uncultivated land as means of exercising social and territorial control over the rural population. The paradox of the situation, then, is that it would be the influence of al-Andalus on Navarrese society that enabled the emergence of a monarchy which, after the crisis of the Emirate, would unite with the Leonese against al-Andalus itself.

From the Publisher: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government-all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was-or was not-done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the "Surge" in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations. ; A chronological history submitted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. ; Shipping list no.: 2009-0246-P. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 359-456). ; Preface -- Key U S figures in Iraq reconstruction -- Acronyms -- Map of Iraq -- Part 1: Planning To Rebuild Iraq -- 1: Planning begins -- 2: Agencies engage -- 3: Department of Defense takes charge -- 4: Staging in Kuwait -- 5: ORHA in Baghdad -- Part 2: Coalition Provisional Authority Leads Reconstruction -- 6: Charting a new course -- 7: CPA's shortfalls -- 8: Treasury's triage -- 9: Bremer's grand vision -- 10: Contracting billions for reconstruction -- 11: Restoring Iraq's capacity to govern -- 12: Reconstructing Iraqi security forces -- 13: Restarting oil production -- 14: Rebuilding the electricity sector -- 15: Iraq reconstruction in transition -- Part 3: U S Embassy Takes Charge -- 16: Negroponte's revisions -- 17: Contingency contracting and program management -- 18: Building in a war zone -- 19: Iraqi security forces and counterinsurgency -- 20: Elections, rule of law, and fighting corruption -- 21: Investigating fraud -- Part 4: Overcoming Roadblocks To Reconstruction -- 22: Khalilzad's adaptations -- 23: Returning to the provinces -- 24: Primacy of capacity development -- 25: Reconstruction amid sectarian violence -- 26: Civilian surge -- Part 5: Lessons Learned -- 27: Hard lessons -- 28: Afterword: Reforming Contingency Relief And Reconstruction Operations -- Annexes -- 1: Genesis and methodology of Hard Lessons -- 2: Oversight of reconstruction programs and expenditures -- Acknowledgements -- Notes. ; From the Publisher: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government-all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was-or was not-done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the "Surge" in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper considers the effects on the local labour market, for both women and men, of the relocation of Kiruna, a large town in the north of Sweden. Whilst the area of Kiruna has been dominated by mining activity for many years this has now become the source of both problems and opportunities for those in the labour market, if not the whole community, as they ready themselves for the relocation of their town - presently situated above a number of deep mine shafts - to a safer area. Mining, transport and engineering industries flourish in Kiruna, with the current labour market and the relocation of the town expected to generate growth and a regional expansion. But the labour market for mining has been dominated traditionally by men, with women found predominantly in the public sector. A question that rises is how much will change, and who might be winners and losers, when the town relocates? Equal opportunities in labour markets have long been a part of political and philosophical debates in a number of European countries, not least Sweden where achievements of political gender equality debates have earned it an international reputation as a world leader in gender equality (Regeringskansliet, 2007). Indeed, in Sweden equal opportunities in respect of gender have been promoted as a part of the school curriculum since 1970 (SCB, 2006; Regeringskansliet, 2007). Subsequent to this and other achievements during the 1970's, social democratic politicians and other campaigners have striven to keep equal opportunities at the forefront of social awareness. This remained the case throughout the 1980's and 1990's, and into the new millennium (SCB, 2006). In 2004, for example, strategies for the integration of gender equality in Government Offices in Sweden were implemented, followed by "new" gender equality policies, that also focused on equal opportunities, in 2006 (SCB, 2006). However, in 2007 a "new" liberal approach to gender equality emerged, its significance albeit somewhat unclear. It is this on which the study focuses: changes to gender equity and labour markets in Kiruna. In order to do this we draw on early results from an empirical investigation involving a subset of data comprising 1,732 questionnaires sent to men and women respondents in the Kiruna local authority area. Although limited, the evidence suggests that the current gender discourse in Kiruna, at least amongst those that participated in the empirical research, is that the attitudes of women and men in respect of gender are decidedly similar. The indication from the data is that work is prioritised over the family and home. Yet while securing an income is widely agreed to be a joint responsibility, the evidence also suggests that the expectation that women will contribute jointly is lower. Moreover, whilst a majority of the participants agree that responsibility for taking care of the home and family is mutual, there is nonetheless a desire for men to increase their contribution. Even so, this does not mean that the men are expected to reduce the amount of paid work they do. These somewhat contradictory findings might be expected - people after all may well say one thing and then do another - but the findings do indicate that ideas of gender equity are in the minds of our respondents, even if they appear to co-exist in ways that are perhaps far from complementary, suggesting the need for an exploration that sets their responses in context as they shift between discourses of gender equity and the experience of inequity in their daily lives.This is important because it has been shown that imbalanced gender distribution has and continues to exist in the labour market in Sweden. This is despite apparent opportunities, choices and legal rights, with many men and women in Sweden 'choosing' gender-segregated occupations and professions, raising questions about the degree of freedom in such choices even in a gender-friendly country that prides itself on equality of opportunity. Yet this appears to have predated the self-interest and competitiveness promoted by the "new" liberal equality-integration policies of the present neo-liberal coalition government concerning the freedom to choose between occupation, profession and parenthood. But what effect is this now having? In what ways have form(s) of gender discrimination persisted and are there new varieties, linked to neo-liberalism (Harvey 2005) at play? The current gender discourse allows women and men to make apparently free choices, with the prioritising of paid work over the home and family by both women and men indicating that parenthood is the least attractive option presently on offer. Indeed, the evidence suggests that denying oneself parental responsibilities - or maybe at least deferring - is becoming the norm. In order to do this parents are mutually dependent on one another and, in most cases, municipal day-care facilities provided through the offices of the local authorities. However, the present government is scrutinising the costs of this provision closely. It is issues such as these that the paper explores through a consideration of approaches to equal opportunity - a concept that is itself liberal in its promotion of equal opportunities to be unequal, in contrast to affirmative action and quotas - in changing contexts in Sweden as they impact on our case study of Kiruna ; Godkänd; 2008; 20081210 (allkin)

První zmínky o známém středočeském rodu Chotků pocházejí ze 14. století. Význam této šlechtické rodiny vzrostl po skončení třicetileté války. Chotkové působili v období raného novověku často ve službách rakouského habsburského dvora. Až do počátku 20. století najdeme jejich jména mezi významnými politiky, diplomaty, vojenskými a církevními hodnostáři či umělci. Hrabě Rudolf Chotek (1706 – 1771) byl povolán Marií Terezií do významné funkce prezidenta finanční komory, působil také jako císařský místodržící v Čechách a vedoucí dvorské kanceláře. Na počátku této závratné kariéry byl post vyslance na dvoře bavorského kurfiřta Maxe III. Josepha v Mnichově, který vykonával v letech 1745 – 1749. Chotek se do Mnichova dostal na samém počátku vlády tohoto kurfiřta. Stalo se tak krátce po uzavření míru ve Füssenu (22.4.1745), kterým Bavorsko ukončilo svou účast ve válce o dědictví rakouské. Vztahy mezi Rakouskem a Bavorskem byly i po uzavření míru stále na ostří nože. Úlohou prvního řádného vyslance po přerušení diplomatických styků bylo proto zamezit návratu Bavorska do protirakouské koalice. K tomuto účelu vznikl r. 1746 soubor spojeneckých smluv, na jejichž formování se Chotek výrazně podílel. Díky nim získalo Bavorsko také významnou finanční podporu, která zamezila hrozícímu státnímu bankrotu. O činnosti vyslance se dovídáme především díky rozsáhlé korespondenci, která byla vedena s rakouskou státní kanceláří ve Vídni. Další rozsáhlé materiály jsou součástí rodinného archívu Chotků, který je uložen v Praze. Zprávy pro státní kancelář byly r. 2000 poprvé vydány ve formě dvoudílné kritické edice: Alois SCHMID – Dietmar GRYPA (ed.), Die Berichte der diplomatischen Vertreter des Kaiserhofes aus München an die Staatskanzlei zu Wien während der Regierungszeit des Kurfürsten Max III. Joseph. München, Kommision für bayerische Landesgeschichte 2000, 1076 s. Tato edice obsahuje celkem 562 chronologicky seřazených číslovaných zpráv. Chotkovy zprávy přinášejí nejen pohled do složitých politických poměrů po skončení války o rakouské dědictví, ale díky jeho mimořádnému pozorovacímu talentu i řadu podrobností z barvitého života dvorské společnosti 18. století. Chotek se po celý svůj život hlásil ke svému českému původu, v duchu tehdejšího zemského patriotismu. Severně od Prahy si nechal vybudovat nový zámek Veltrusy. Chotek patřil k významným šlechticům raného novověku. Byla to právě šlechta, která podstatně přispěla k formování kulturního a společenského života této epochy. Vzdělaní šlechtici působili i mimo hranice vlastí země a přispívali tak k užší spolupráci zemí staré Evropy. ; The first records of the well-known Central Bohemian House of Chotek date back to the 14th century. The importance of this aristocratic family increased after the end of the Thirty Years' War. Throughout the Early Modern Age, the Choteks often acted in the service of the Austrian Habsburg court. Up to the early 20th century their names occur among prominent politicians, diplomats, military and church officials, as well as artists. Count Rudolph Chotek (1706-1771) was appointed by Maria Theresa to the significant post of the President of the Chamber of Finance; he also worked as the Imperial Governor in Bohemia and the Head of the Court Bureau. His stunning career began with the post of an envoy at the court of the Bavarian Elector Max III., Joseph in Munich, which he held in the years 1745 – 1749. Chotek came to Munich at the very beginning of the Elector's reign. It happened shortly after the conclusion of the peace treaty at Füssen (22 April 1745), whereby Bavaria ended its involvement in the War of the Austrian Succession. The relations between Austria and Bavaria continued to be balanced on a knife-edge even after the conclusion of peace. The diplomatic relations being broken off, the task of the first regular envoy was to prevent Bavaria's return to the anti-Austrian coalition. In 1746, a set of treaties of alliance was established for this purpose, to whose formation Chotek contributed significantly. As a result, Bavaria gained a significant financial support which prevented the impending state bankruptcy. The chief source of information about the envoy's activity is the extensive correspondence conducted with the Austrian State Bureau in Vienna. Other extensive materials can be found in the Chotek family archives, located in Prague. The reports for the State Bureau were first published in 2000 in the form of a two-volume critical edition : Alois SCHMID – Dietmar GRYPA (ed.), Die Berichte der diplomatischen Vetreter des Kaiserhofes aus München an die Staatskanzlei zu Wien während der Regierungszeit des Kurfürsten Max III. Joseph. München, Komission für bayerische Landesgerichte 2000, 1076 p. This edition contains 562 chronologically arranged and numbered reports. Chotek's reports provide not only an insight into the complex political circumstances after the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, but, owing to his extraordinary powers of observation, also many details from the colourful life of the 18th century court society. Throughout his life, Chotek professed his Czech origin, in accordance with the regional patriotism of that time. North of Prague he built a new chateau Veltrusy. Chotek ranked among the prominent noblemen of the Early Modern Age. It was nobility who significantly contributed to the formation of the cultural and social life of this epoch. Educated noblemen were also active outside their native country, contributing to a closer co-operation among the countries of old Europe.

The massive body of tax legislation enacted in the first two years of the Reagan Administration offers little guidance for predicting the future direction of United States tax policy. Dramatically different Congressional coalitions – each led by the President – passed by very narrow margins the nation's largest tax reduction (the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981) and then the next year enacted the largest peacetime tax increase (the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982). In each case, short-term political and fiscal concerns dominated the debates. The 1981 legislation reduced taxes in an effort to stimulate economic activity and investment by according substantial tax relief to businesses and high income individuals; the 1982 legislation requires significant additional taxes from these same sources to reduce triple-digit deficits, a reduction also deemed necessary for economic recovery. Although the two Acts together provide for an overall reduction in business taxes and a phased-in decrease in marginal tax rates applicable to individuals, they impart the overwhelming impression that uncertainty, confusion, and inconsistency currently dominate the tax legislative process. Despite the contradictory aspects of recent tax legislation, however, despair at the prospect of coherent revision of the federal income tax may be premature. During the last Congress, twelve bills were introduced by legislators ranging across the political spectrum, that proposed study or enactment of a so-called flat-rate income tax. The Monetary and Fiscal Policy Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee held hearings on the flat-rate tax in July and August of 1982, the tax writing committees directed staff to begin work, and the Senate Finance Committee held hearings on the idea in September of 1982, President Reagan voiced his tentative support of the basic concept, calling it "very tempting," and press commentary has been both widespread and favorable. As a result, the "flat-rate tax" has become the focus of current tax revision efforts. This Article addresses the problem of the transition to a flat-rate tax. Assuming that Congress wants to enact such a tax, how do we move from an income tax riddled with special exclusions, deductions, and credits to a broad-based income or consumption tax? Both political actors and professional groups, including Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole, Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Chapoton, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, have expressed particular concern with transitional problems, citing the need to protect people who have made economic decisions "in reliance" on the continued existence of special tax provisions. I argue here that the minimum tax amendments of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 placed into the Internal Revenue Code a transitional mechanism that can be regarded as a first step to phasing in a broad-based tax. I then outline a series of future amendments to the minimum tax and other changes necessary to complete the path to a broad-based income tax. Before proceeding to these observations, however, I first describe the flat-rate tax concept and make some general comments on the nature of the transitional problems involved in moving from current law to a broad-based tax with lowered rates. I then trace the intellectual and political origins of the minimum tax provision, describe the 1982 amendments to the minimum tax, and indicate why the minimum tax provides an appropriate vehicle for transition to a flat-rate tax. After illustrating the additional amendments required to move the minimum tax from its current secondary status to center stage as the vehicle for transition to a broad-based income tax, I demonstrate why the 1982 minimum tax amendments will not serve an identical purpose if a broad-based consumption, -rather than income, tax were the ultimate goal. This Article assumes that a move to a broad-based low-rate tax is both feasible and desirable and accepts the rather convincing case that has been made that a broad-based income tax could be superior to present law on economic efficiency, horizontal equity, and simplicity grounds. I have also generally accepted, at least for present purposes, the view that these goals are more likely to be realized with as uniform and as broad a tax base and low rates as is practical. By limiting my concern here to the problem of transition, I avoid detailed consideration of the merits of particular base broadening issues. Therefore, this Article only briefly addresses some of the many difficult and controversial issues which will arise in the move to a low-rate broad-based income or consumption tax. I attempt here merely to demonstrate that the problems of transition to such a regime, while important, are not insurmountable; that in fact Congress has taken an important first step in this direction in its 1982 amendments to the minimum tax; and suggest a general outline of subsequent steps to complete the path by building on that first step.

Drawing on personal experience, the author asks what the current administration can learn from the Clinton administration's implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 56, examines the real-world application of the directive during the Clinton administration and the pitfalls of its agency-centric successor during the Bush administration, and identifies recurring problems and best practices for successfully responding to current global crises.