Suchergebnisse

La llamada coerción federal (o estatal) es una herramienta de carácter excepcional que el ordenamiento jurídico pone en manos del Gobierno de la Federación o del Estado central para garantizar el respeto al ordenamiento jurídico por parte de todas las entidades político-territoriales integrantes de esa Federación o Estado (Länder en Alemania y Comunidades autónomas en España). Su conexión con el principio de lealtad federal es evidente; de hecho, la adopción de las medidas coercitivas presupone, normalmente, la existencia de una actuación desleal por parte de alguna de estas entidades político-territoriales. En último término, lo que está en juego es la garantía del principio de unidad del Estado, fundamento de todo el ordenamiento jurídico. Palabras clave: federalismo; Estado federal; Estado autonómico; Alemania; España; unidad del Estado; lealtad federal; coerción federal; coerción estatal ; The so called federal (or state) coercion is an exceptional tool recognized by the law in favour of the Federal or Central Government in order to ensure respect for the law by all the political-territorial entities members of the Federation or State (Länder in Germany and autonomous Communities in Spain). Its connection with the principle of federal loyalty is evident; in fact, the adoption of coercive measures presupposes normally the existence of an unfair action by any of these political-territorial entities. Ultimately, what is at stake is the guarantee of the unity of the state, foundation of the whole legal system ; Este trabajo se enmarca en el Proyecto de investigación del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (DER2012-34428) sobre "Las posibilidades del Estado jurisdiccional autonómico tras la sentencia del Estatut en la actual situación de crisis económica y bloqueo institucional" (IP: Prof. Dr. D. Juan José Solozábal Echavarría)

La llamada coerción federal (o estatal) es una herramienta de carácter excepcional que el ordenamiento jurídico pone en manos del Gobierno de la Federación o del Estado central para garantizar el respeto al ordenamiento jurídico por parte de todas las entidades político-territoriales integrantes de esa Federación o Estado (Länder en Alemania y Comunidades autónomas en España). Su conexión con el principio de lealtad federal es evidente; de hecho, la adopción de las medidas coercitivas presupone, normalmente, la existencia de una actuación desleal por parte de alguna de estas entidades político-territoriales. En último término, lo que está en juego es la garantía del principio de unidad del Estado, fundamento de todo el ordenamiento jurídico.Palabras clave: federalismo; Estado federal; Estado autonómico; Alemania; España; unidad del Estado; lealtad federal; coerción federal; coerción estatal.Abstract:The so called federal (or state) coercion is an exceptional tool recognized by the law in favour of the Federal or Central Government in order to ensure respect for the law by all the political-territorial entities members of the Federation or State (Länder in Germany and autonomous Communities in Spain). Its connection with the principle of federal loyalty is evident; in fact, the adoption of coercive measures presupposes normally the existence of an unfair action by any of these political-territorial entities. Ultimately, what is at stake is the guarantee of the unity of the state, foundation of the whole legal system.Keywords: federalism; Federal State; Autonomous State; Germany; Spain; State unity; federal loyalty; federal coercion; state coercion.

When a collective-choice situation places coercive pressure on individual participants, the law's traditional protection of individual autonomy against coercion must be reconciled with its necessary role in resolving problems of collective action. On the one hand, the law might seek to remove coercion from the equation so that individuals are free to make their own decisions. On the other hand, the law might empower a central authority to decide, thereby solving a problem of collective action in order to maximize the group's shared interests. The tension between these two approaches creates deep uncertainty for the regulation of collective-choice situations. It is palpable in the law's conflicted response to corporate takeover bids in that applicable federal and state laws simultaneously enhance and diminish shareholder choice. Elsewhere—for example, the structure of government buyout programs, or the imposition of mandatory fees for nonunion employees—the intersection of coercion and collective choice may be overlooked altogether. By situating the literature on coercion in the context of offers that exploit collective-action problems, this Article proposes a unifying framework for identifying and remedying problems of collective coercion.

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE EXPERIENCES OF THREE IMPORTANT PARTIAL-PREEMPTION PROGRAMS-THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 (SMCRA), THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (OSCH ACT), AND THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976 (RCRA)-OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES TO IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTIONS HAVE SHAPED THE REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP. THE EVIDENCE THE AUTHORS GATHER SUGGESTS THAT THE CONTROL OF REGULATORY PROGRAMS HAS SHIFTED OVER TIME BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES. IN THE INITIAL YEARS OF THESE PROGRAMS, WHAT THE CONGRESS INTENDED TO BE A REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP WAS, IN EFFECT, ALMOST TOTAL FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AUTHORITY. UNDER THE RONALD REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, THE OPPOSITE OCCURRED; FEDERAL REGULATION IN MANY CASES BECAME DE FACTO STATE REGULATION AS FEDERAL OFFICIALS ESSENTIALLY ABDICATED THEIR OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY. BY THE END OF THE 1980S, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BEGAN AGAIN TO ASSERT GREATER CONTROL OVER INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY PROGRAMS. THE REGULATORY RELATIONSHIP THAT EMERGED IS ONE IN WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES SHARE RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS.

The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of soft power in the modern situation of international communication and multicultural interaction. The relevance of this topic is dictated, on the one hand, by the fact that soft power acts as a modern alternative to classical traditional forms of hard power – which gives it a signif-icant advantage of a humanitarian nature, on the other, by the understanding that soft power, unfortunately, is often not an end in itself, but acts only as an element or modification of hard power, i.e. situations when "tough arguments" are exhausted and costly in short-term implementation, and pushing through specific interests can be carried out much more effectively through informational influence on the opponent than by military or eco-nomic means, which is reflected in the famous phraseology: "A honey tongue, a heart of gall". Consequently, the search for a balance between altruism and egoism, as well as often irrational results of collective activity of subjects of international relations actualize the problem of philosophical reflection of forms of interaction and ethical justification of their use, which would lead to the solution of not only the classical problem "violence be-gets violence" ("hate begets hate"), but also the problem when paradoxically "nonviolence also begets vio-lence". In the latter case, we are talking about the use of "soft power" in a unilateral version, when the victory of one pole is achieved by destroying all other alternatives, which in the current international situation is reflected in the crisis of the unipolar system of the world. The methodology of the work is based on the principles and methods of socio-philosophical analysis, the concept of historicism, comparative analysis, which is interdisci-plinary.

The federal government has long utilized the practice of attaching conditions to the receipt of its funds. In the few instances that the Supreme Court had reviewed state challenges to conditions, it had ultimately set only minimal limitations on Congress' spending power. That is why, when the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was delivered, a host of scholarly predictions emerged. Some thought the ruling would prompt an unraveling of other conditional spending programs. Others anticipated more indirect, structural changes to flow from the decision. I find that elements of both have occurred. Over the past seven years, federal and state actions have revealed an interesting mix of results. A surge of recent legal challenges have relied on NFIB's coercion doctrine, but the courts have consistently rejected those challenges. Congress has also been careful when designing new programs to avoid the sort of federal coercion that was struck by the Court in NFIB.

For almost a decade, law reviews and hearing rooms have resounded with cogent arguments that, for corporations at least, the attorney-client privilege has been chilled, eroded, attacked, or even killed by the federal government's misuse of its bargaining leverage. Yet it is unclear whether this rhetoric is overstated or understated. Given that most federal criminal defendants plead guilty, and that an extraordinarily large percentage of them provide information and testimony against others in order to avoid harsh sentences (or to avoid being charged at all), one could as easily say that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are on their last legs, as are the rules of evidence and other adjudicatory principles.

Litigation challenging the legality of an Internal Revenue Service rule that became final on May 2012 has traveled a long, winding, and contentious path. The IRS rule authorized the distribution of federal premium assistance tax credits in all health benefits exchanges under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the "ACA"). However, potential legal problems with reconciling various sections of the final legislation involving those tax credits were identified as early as December 6, 2010. On September 19, 2012, the first of four different legal challenges to the IRS rule was filed in federal district court in Oklahoma. In 2013, subsequent lawsuits were filed in three different federal district courts in the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Indiana. After a mixed record of wins and losses in those lower courts, King v. Burwell became the first case to reach the Supreme Court