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IN VIEW OF POST-COLD WAR PRACTICE, SERIOUS EXAMINATION IS REQUIRED OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE UN CHARTER WHICH PLACE NO MATERIAL LIMITS ON SECURITY COUNCIL PREROGATIVES TO ISSUE DECISIONS BINDING ON STATES. TO ACCEPT THIS INTERPRETATION WITHOUT QUESTION WOULD MEAN THAT, BY ADOPTING THE UN CHARTER, STATES HAVE EFFECTIVELY GIVEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE LIMITS OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS IN ALL AREAS, NO MATTER HOW UNRELATED TO FIGHTING WARS. FOR DECADES AFTER 1945 THAT ISSUE WAS LARGELY ACADEMIC BECAUSE THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD HARDLY RESORT TO CHAPTER VII. NOW THAT IT CAN DO SO, THE CALL FOR SECURITY COUNCIL "EFFECTIVENESS" IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECRETA IS REVEALED AS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC. TESTIMONY IS PROVIDED BY THE TENSIONS APPARENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S LEGITIMATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, THE MISTAKE OF "FORCIBLE PEACEKEEPING" AND THE USE OF CHAPTER VII FOR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS.

In the past two decades, regional organizations and coalitions of states have deployed more peace operations than the UN. Yet most quantitative studies of peacekeeping effectiveness focus on UN peacekeeping exclusively, a decision owed to data availability more than to theories about the differential impact of UN and non-UN missions. As a result, we know little about the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping in mitigating violence. In this paper, we introduce and analyse monthly data on the approximate number of troops, police, and observers in both UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations between 1993 and 2016. Using these data, we show that when accounting for mission size and composition, UN and regional peacekeeping operations are equally effective in mitigating violence against civilians by governments, but only UN troops and police curb civilian targeting by non-state actors. We offer some theoretical reflections on these findings, but the main contribution of the article is the novel dataset on non-UN peacekeeping strength and personnel composition to overcome the near-exclusive focus on UN missions in the scholarship on peacekeeping effectiveness.

Text of the Secretary General Boutros Gali's farewell statement to the UN General Assembly, Dec. 17, 1996.

Introduction -- 1 The Meaning of Regionalism -- 2 Regional Organisations and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter -- 3 A Decentralised Enforcement Action An Evaluation of Surrogate Collective Security under Chapter VII -- 4 Regional Organisations and Residual Responsibility for Collective Security -- 5 Regional Intervention after the Cold War -- 6 Regional Enforcement Action and the Prohibition of the Use of Force -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

While the evolving nature and proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period is well documented, we know less about how personnel are recruited for these missions. Furthermore, recent developments have rendered existing supply-side explanations for troop contributions less convincing. The increasing demand for personnel, along with stagnant UN reimbursement rates and the rising costs of participation that began during the 1990s, mean that it is less attractive than ever for developing countries to offer their own troops to what have become increasingly ambitious operations. Yet, we see a large pool of developing countries continuing to do so. To address this puzzle, we argue that UN member states with strong preferences for establishing peacekeeping missions have begun using foreign aid as an inducement to help potential contributors overcome the collective action problem inherent in multilateral peacekeeping operations. We uncover strong empirical evidence that these 'pivotal states' strategically allocate foreign aid to persuade contributing states to boost their contributions, and also to ensure that these missions continue to be staffed and maintained as costs rise, particularly during the post-1999 period. We also find that states are responsive to these financial inducements: foreign aid increases both the likelihood of contributing personnel and the size of a state's contribution. Theoretically, this article advances the scholarly understanding of international organizations and cooperation by illuminating an informal, extra-organizational strategy by which IOs can facilitate cooperation.