Suchergebnisse

Command responsibility, or executive accountability, assumes that leaders are responsible for the actions of their subordinates. If subordinates misbehave, violate basic moral laws, transgress international law, or thwart international standards of behavior, their leader may be called before to justice. Standards that set the boundaries of human action have been evolving for many millennia, with some degree of precision arriving after the post-World War II international war crimes prosecutions. The United Nations and other organizations have helped codify the international law under which commanders may be held responsible. This book explores the factor that have moved civilization closer to a standard approach to rule of law and the accountability of leaders for the actions of those they command

This is a comprehensive guide to the law of command responsibility. Originally invoked against Nazi leaders for failing to prevent or punish crimes of subordinates, and more recently in the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, command responsibility is of importance in cases arising from the Iraq War and the War on Terror

AbstractA recent report by the Australian Defence Force arrived at a conclusion that further investigation was not warranted of commanders regarding their responsibility for failing to investigate suspicious behaviour of subordinates in Afghanistan, who were accused of violations of international humanitarian law. This troubling conclusion calls for a better analysis and understanding of command responsibility in international law and gaps in the law of command responsibility. This article identifies the conflicting precedents and scholarship regarding the law of command responsibility, which create uncertainty, and proposes a clarification of that law, with a special focus on the "reason to know" standard that triggers responsibility for failing to prevent or punish war crimes. It refutes the popular claim that commanders must act wilfully, and it rejects the common dichotomy between a commander who orders or otherwise directly participates in the war crimes of subordinates and one who unwittingly fails to prevent or punish such crimes. Using the empirical psychological literature, the article further explains how commanders can insidiously signal toleration of war crimes without giving direct orders. Finally, the article argues that international law, by absolving commanders who fail to properly train their subordinates to respect the law of armed conflict, misses a rare opportunity to deter war crimes, and offers some suggestions to fill this gap in the law.

"The legal consquence of the superior orders defense has long been debated as one of the major problems in international criminal law. Several controversial issues such as the immunity of the state, the absolute character of military discipline, and immunity on the grounds of mistake of law/or coercion have been complexly interwoven in the debates. The execution of illegal orders and international criminal responsibility provides a comprehensive portrait of the relevant debates at the international level up to the present, analyzes the conflicting views, and shows the significance of the development of international rules for the superior orders defense as well as the implication of the fact that issues concerning some detailed or related rules have been left unresolved"--Provided by publisher