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In: Publications of the Graduate Inst. of Internat. Studies, Geneva 12
In: Handbook of Commercial Policy v.1A
In: Handbooks in Economics
In: ProQuest Ebook Central
Front Cover -- Handbook of Commercial Policy -- Copyright -- Introduction to the Series -- Contents -- Preface -- Contributors -- Part I: Commercial Policy: Empirical Facts, Determinants and Effects -- Chapter 1: The Empirical Landscape of Trade Policy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Import Tariffs -- 2.1. MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) Ad Valorem Import Tariffs Under the WTO -- 2.1.1. MFN Applied Rates, Tariff Bindings/Caps, and Binding Commitments -- 2.1.2. MFN Applied Tariffs Across Sectors -- 2.1.3. MFN Applied Tariffs Within Sectors by End-Use
In: Politics within the EU Multi-Level System: instruments and strategies of European Governance, p. 59-79
In: Series of reprints of scarce works on political economy 14
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Common Commercial Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Series in international business and economics
In: U. S. Tariff Commission. One of a Series of Reports on Economic Controls and Commercial Policy in the American Republics
Following a brief historical introduction and a discussion of different types of commercial policy, this paper reviews the arguments for and against trade protection. In the bench-mark case of a competitive, small, open economy, free trade maximizes aggregate national welfare, although some individual groups will lose unless compensation is actually paid. Guidelines for policy include the uniform reduction and concertina rules for tariff cuts, and the principle of targeting: corrective measures should be applied as close to the source of the distortion as possible. Relaxing the bench-mark assumptions allows exceptions to the case for free trade: optimal tariffs to manipulate world prices; strategic tariffs or export subsidies when home firms engage in oligopolistic competition with foreign rivals; and infant industry protection to allow home firms benefit from learning by doing. Protection can also raise the growth rate, though it is less likely to raise welfare in a growing economy. Overall, with due allowance for some ambiguity, both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest a pragmatic case for free trade. Finally, the paper notes the political pressures for and against protection, and the role of international institutions such as the GATT in underpinning moves towards freer trade.
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In: Foreign affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, p. 68
ISSN: 0015-7120
In: Foreign affairs, Volume 13, p. 68-81
ISSN: 0015-7120
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Volume 13, Issue 1, p. 68
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: Common Market Law Review, Volume 17, Issue 2, p. 229-249
ISSN: 0165-0750