Suchergebnisse

Comparative research emphasize Social Democratic parties as leading political forces when universal welfare states are reformed in accordance with market-oriented principles. Considering the traditional portrayal of universal welfare states as an institutional feature of Nordic political economics, which tends to favor the Social Democrats in the political power struggle, this is a highly surprising conclusion. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, that Social Democratic market reforms are caused by economic constraints, this article postulate reforms to be conducted for political & strategic purposes. The theoretical argument goes like this: Social Democrat governments decide upon reforms when the parry-elite perceive policy problems as potential threats to the legitimacy of the universal welfare state. Hence, market-oriented reforms are expected to re-invigorate the legitimacy of the universal welfare institutions. For political institutions to be efficient power resources they are requited to be deemed legitimate by a democratic constituency. Otherwise they can work counterproductive in the ongoing power-struggle. The theory is tested empirically in a structured comparison of Swedish & Danish school policy in the 1990s, & is confirmed with some slight modifications. References. Adapted from the source document.