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Some recent arguments for paternalist government interventions have been based in empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics that would seem to show that adult human beings are far removed from the ideals of rationality presupposed by much of philosophical and economic theory. In this paper it is argued that we need to move to a different conception of human decision-making competence than the one that lies behind that common line of philosophical and economic thinking, and which actually still lies in the background of some of these recent approaches to paternalist interventions. An alternative picture of human decision-making competence is outlined and four criteria for identifying areas where paternalist interventions have a basic moral and political legitimacy are then identified on the basis of this picture.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- CONTRIBUTORS -- PREFACE -- INTRODUCTION -- 1. COMPENSATION AND THE BOUNDS OF RIGHTS -- 2. DOES COMPENSATION RESTORE EQUALITY? -- 3. JUSTICE BETWEEN GENERATIONS: COMPENSATION, IDENTITY, AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP -- 4. SET-ASIDES, REPARATIONS, AND COMPENSATORY JUSTICE -- 5. COMPENSATION AND REDISTRIBUTION -- 6. COMPENSATION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF RELIANCE ALONE -- 7. ON COMPENSATION AND DISTRIBUTION -- 8. COMPENSATION AND GOVERNMENT TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY -- 9. PROPERTY AS WEALTH, PROPERTY AS PROPRIETY -- 10. DIAGNOSING THE TAKINGS PROBLEM -- 11. THE LIMITS OF COMPENSATORY JUSTICE -- 12. COMPENSATION AND RIGHTS IN THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE -- 13. BEYOND COMPENSATORY JUSTICE? -- INDEX

This Major Reference series brings together a wide range of key international articles in law and legal theory. Many of these essays are not readily accessible, and their presentation in these volumes will provide a vital new resource for both research and teaching. Each volume is edited by leading international authorities who explain the significance and context of articles in an informative and complete introduction.

Preferential policies, though they are not required by justice, are not seriously unjust; the system from which they depart is already unjust. Deliberate barriers against admitting blacks or women, however, had to be abolished--without explicit barriers discrimination could be conscious or unconscious (motivationally), thus giving support to a self-conscious effort to act impartially. The realization that a social system may continue to deny different races or sexes equal opportunity & equal access to desirable positions even after such barriers have been lifted became evident, since society automatically provides different rewards for different groups. The question is raised: How great is a social contribution to injustice, to what extent is it due to social causes not involving injustice, or to causes which are not social but biological? Can unjustly caused disadvantages be overcome by special programs of preparatory or remedial training? What grounds are to be used in assigning individuals to desirable positions? People less qualified, for whatever reason could be compensated for this disadvantage by having suitably different standards for these different groups. Obviously, this would not be a stable position. Compensatory procedures would then have to be applied in individual bases. The concept of differences advocated by liberals is too weak to combat inequalities dispensed by nature & ordinary workings of the social system. In most societies rewards are a function of demand, & many of the human characteristics most in demand result from gifts & talents. If racial & sexual injustice were reduced we would still be left with the injustice of the smart & the dumb; "at present we do not have a method of divorcing professional status from social esteem & economic reward. In the absence of this, what remains is the familiar task of balancing liberty against equality." S. Cummings.