Suchergebnisse

The regulatory breakthrough of competition law: definitions and worries / Mariateresa Maggiolino -- Anti-anti regulation: the supplanting of industry regulators with competition agencies and how antitrust suffers as a result / Adi Ayal -- (Re-)joining the regulatory fold : problem-solving innovations in competition enforcement / Yane Svetiev -- New powers - new vulnerabilities : a critical analysis of market inquiries performed by competition authorities / Tamar Indig and Michal S. Gal -- New frontiers for competition advocacy and the potential role of competition impact assessment / Nicoletta Rangone -- A reassessment of the relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation / Mario Siragusa and Fausto Caronna -- Regulatory approach to competition law in the practice of the polish competition authority - a critical assessment / Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk -- Enforcement of competition rules in regulated industries: abuse-of-dominance practices in the new EU member states, candidate countries and potential candidates / Alexandr Svetlicinii and Marco Botta -- From competition law to sector-specific regulation in internet markets : a critical assessment of a possible structural change / Rolf H. Weber -- The regulatory approach in competition law enforcement for innovation-intensive industries: the case of broadband access regulation in Japan / Toshiaki Takigawa -- Abuses of information and informational remedies: rethinking exchange of information under competition law / Fabiana Di Porto -- Competition law as an instrument of IP regulation? the case of strategic patent filings / Emanuela Arezzo -- Competition law as the limit to standard-setting / Björn Lundqvist

Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a natural monopoly no longer reflect reality. As a result, policymakers often lack the guidance of economic theorists. Competition in Telecommunications is written in a style accessible to managers, consultants, government officials, and others. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyse regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organisation, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book opens with background information for the reader who is unfamiliar with current issues in the telecommunications industry. The following sections focus on four central aspects of the recent deregulatory movement: the introduction of incentive regulation; one-way access (access given by a local network to the providers of complementary segments, such as long-distance or information services); the special nature of competition in an industry requiring two-way access (whereby competing networks depend on the mutual termination of calls); and universal service, in particular the two leading contenders for the competitively neutral provision of universal service: the use of engineering models to compute subsidies and the design of universal service auctions. The book concludes with a discussion of the Internet and regulatory institutions.

THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL IN GOVERNMENT RENDERS POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS ONLY PARTLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE DEMANDS OF CONSUMER/TAXPAYERS. AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT COMPETITION VIA THE ELECTORAL PROCESS LEAVES POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS CONSIDERABLE LATITUDE BECAUSE OF THE RATIONAL IGNORANCE EFFECT (TULLOCK, 1967). BEGINNING WITH TIEBOUT (1956), IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT COMPETITION AMONG JURISDICTIONS RESTRICTS A BUREAUCRAT'S ABILITY TO PURSUE POLICIES WHICH DO NOT REFLECT THE DESIRES OF TAXPAYERS AND TO SHIRK THE MONITORING OF PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION. RECENT THEORETICAL WORK BY WAGNER (1974) AND EPPLE AND ZELENITZ (1981) HAS SHOWN THAT JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IS INDEED EXPECTED TO ESTABLISH CONSTRAINTS ON THE CHOICES MADE BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TO INDUCE COST EFFECTIVENESS IN THE PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES. EPPLE AND ZELENITZ FOUND THAT SUCH CONSTRAINTS ARE EXPECTED TO EXIST, BUT ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM EXERCISING SOME MONOPOLY POWER.