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Is science a 'market of ideas'? Not according to the economics of science. Science is competitive, but scientific competition is not market competition. Nor is scientific competition the same as competition between universities. Scientific competition is, first of all, competition between individual scientists. Current science policies shift the boundary between scientific competition, where scientists provide public goods in the hope to acquire status among their peers, and market competition in science, where the results of research are private property protected by patents or other means, in favor of the market. However, the economic ring of the political slogans cannot conceal a serious lack of understanding of scientific competition behind the reform proposals.

Enth. 5 Beitr. Locating economic concentration / Jeroen Hinloopen and Charles van Marrewijk -- Transport costs, location and the economy / Jan Osterhaven and Piet Rietveld -- Agglomerations in equilibrium? / Jan G. Lambooy and Frank G. van Oort -- Policy competition in theory and practice / Ruud A. Mooij, Joeri Gorter and Richard Nahuis -- Clustering, optimum currency areas and macroeconomic policy / Roel Beetsma and Koen Vermeylen

The period under review (January 2010 – June 2012) has been a time of consolidation (or exhaustion) for the Union generally, as the Lisbon changes are allowed to bed in. The competition sphere is no exception. There has been limited initiative, certainly nothing ambitious to come out of the Commission over the period. At the same time a new Commission took up office—three months late, and by a little-remarked constitutional sleight of hand1—in 2010, and with it came a new Commissioner for Competition (Mr Almunia) and with him a new Director-General of DG Competition (Mr Italianer—Dutch notwithstanding the name), which event sometimes, but not always, marks a reorientation of Union competition policy. Both are economists which, again, may or may not influence the direction of policy. At the same time the Union has been buffeted by a financial crisis not wholly of its own making in which the competition rules must have a significant role to play.

Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and `taxable' resources, but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases, this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destructive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is sufficiently long.

THE AUTHOR REFLECTS ON THE SCHOLARSHIP OF NORMAN SCHOFIELD, FOCUSING ON "POLITICAL COMPETITION AND MULTIPARTY COALITION GOVERNMENTS." IN THIS ESSAY, SCHOFIELD OFFERED A COMPETITIVE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF MULTIPARTY COALITION BEHAVIOR.

Competition policy and economics -- Overview of EU and UK competition law -- Article 101 (1) -- Article 101 (3) -- Article 102 -- The obligations of Member States under the EU competition rules -- Articles 101 and 102 : public enforcement by the European Commission and national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003 -- Articles 101 and 102 : private enforcement in the courts of Member States -- Competition Act 1998 : substantive provisions -- Competition Act 1998 and the cartel offence : public enforcement and procedure -- Enterprise Act 2002 : market studies and market investigations -- The international dimension of competition law -- Horizontal agreements (1) : cartels -- Horizontal agreements (2) : oligopoly, tacit collusion, and collective dominance -- Horizontal agreements (3) : cooperation agreements -- Vertical agreements -- Abuse of dominance (1) : non-pricing practices -- Abuse of dominance (2) : pricing practices -- The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law -- Mergers (1) : introduction -- Mergers (2) : EU law -- Mergers (3) : UK law -- Particular sectors.

Analyzes costs and benefits of involving more than one firm in a contract for development and production of weapon systems.

James McKinnon, the Director General of Gas Supply, outlines the regulation of the gas industry and suggests that competition, actual and surrogate, has an important role despite the privatisation of the industry as a single corporation.