Suchergebnisse

Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and `taxable' resources, but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases, this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destructive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is sufficiently long.

Many parts of the world are currently experiencing the outcome of processes of economic integration, globalization and transformation. Technological advances in telecommunications and in transport facilities have opened up new possibilities for contracts and exchanges among regions. External effects among regions have increased in importance. As a result, competition among regions has intensified. Except some pioneering work by regional scientists and scholars of public finance and economics, the phenomenon of regional competition has yet to attract the attention it warrants, despite its importance for policy-making. The present volume is intended to remedy this neglect by providing high-level contributions to the three main topics of the book, the theory of regional competition, methods of analysis of regional competition and policies of regional competition

The article is devoted to competition advocacy as an important component of the activity of antimonopoly body. The specific features of objects, methods and results of competition advocacy as compared with the enforcement of antitrust legislation are demonstrated. The authors analyze the main directions of competition advocacy by the antimonopoly body. It is stressed that such an advantage of competition advocacy as an opportunity of its broad use not connected strongly with the antitrust legislation in force is extremely important for the Russian economy. Recently the Federal Antimonopoly Agency has included competition advocacy in the framework of departmental target programs that makes necessary the analysis of indicators of the targets attainment level.