Competition
In: Population and community biology series Volume 26
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In: Population and community biology series Volume 26
We show that, in the case when innovations are for sale, increased product market competition, captured by reduced product market profits, can increase the incentives for innovations. The reason is that the incentive to innovate depends on the acquisition price which, in turn, might increase despite firms in the market making lower profits. We also show that stricter, but not too strict, merger and cartel policies tend to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation and by increasing the relative profitability of being the most efficient firm in the industry. Moreover, it is shown that increased intensity of competition can increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale, relative to innovation for entry.
BASE
The notion of workable or effective competition is at the centre of EU competition law and policy, as it strives to achieve and maintain it. Some scholars do not mention it at all. Those who refer to it either do not explain it in any way or explicate it very shortly. In fact, the concept is too important to be ignored totally or elucidated briefly. The objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept by focusing on the theory of workable or effective competition. It is argued that effective competition is the key for an in-depth study of the political economy (i.e. real policy goals, economic rationale behind individual competition rules, institutional requirements, and implications for distribution of wealth) of EU competition law and policy.
BASE
The notion of workable or effective competition is at the centre of EU competition law and policy, as it strives to achieve and maintain it. Some scholars do not mention it at all. Those who refer to it either do not explain it in any way or explicate it very shortly. In fact, the concept is too important to be ignored totally or elucidated briefly. The objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept by focusing on the theory of workable or effective competition. It is argued that effective competition is the key for an in-depth study of the political economy (i.e. real policy goals, economic rationale behind individual competition rules, institutional requirements, and implications for distribution of wealth) of EU competition law and policy. Full text available at:https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v1i1.161
BASE
In: History of political economy, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 559-561
ISSN: 1527-1919
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The major network carriers dominate traffic at most of their large hubs and extensive evidence exists that fares in markets where competition is absent are consistently above competitive levels. GAO believes that the oversight scheme contemplated when the industry was deregulated--with antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and oversight of unfair trade practices by the Department of Transportation (DOT)--has not been entirely successful in preserving and ensuring competition. Although the current legislative scheme grants explicit authority for DOT to regulate unfair competitive practices, the legislation does give DOT substantial leeway on the scope of its action. Thus, with the range of competitive challenges confronting the industry and directly affecting consumers, especially in the face of unprecedented industry consolidation, GAO believes there is merit in the overall intent of the proposed Aviation Competition Restoration Act to direct DOT to actively monitor the state of competition in the industry and to institute remedial actions as appropriate."
BASE
Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and 'taxable' resources but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destrucrive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is long.
BASE
In: Journal of peace research, Band 39, Heft 4, S. 435-446
ISSN: 1460-3578
Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and `taxable' resources, but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases, this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destructive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is sufficiently long.
SSRN
In: Advances in Spatial Science
In: Advances in Spatial Science, The Regional Science Series
Many parts of the world are currently experiencing the outcome of processes of economic integration, globalization and transformation. Technological advances in telecommunications and in transport facilities have opened up new possibilities for contracts and exchanges among regions. External effects among regions have increased in importance. As a result, competition among regions has intensified. Except some pioneering work by regional scientists and scholars of public finance and economics, the phenomenon of regional competition has yet to attract the attention it warrants, despite its importance for policy-making. The present volume is intended to remedy this neglect by providing high-level contributions to the three main topics of the book, the theory of regional competition, methods of analysis of regional competition and policies of regional competition
In: Studies in global competition v. 24
In: Routledge Studies in Global Competition Ser.
In: Voprosy Ekonomiki, Heft 12, S. 109-121
The article is devoted to competition advocacy as an important component of the activity of antimonopoly body. The specific features of objects, methods and results of competition advocacy as compared with the enforcement of antitrust legislation are demonstrated. The authors analyze the main directions of competition advocacy by the antimonopoly body. It is stressed that such an advantage of competition advocacy as an opportunity of its broad use not connected strongly with the antitrust legislation in force is extremely important for the Russian economy. Recently the Federal Antimonopoly Agency has included competition advocacy in the framework of departmental target programs that makes necessary the analysis of indicators of the targets attainment level.
In: Policy Framework for Investment, S. 89-101