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ABSTRACT Irving Fisher offered a 'tentative' debt-deflation theory of great depressions rather than a fully consistent theory of his 'creed': "I say 'creed' because, for brevity, it is purposely expressed dogmatically and without proof. [...] it is quite tentative" (Fisher 1933, p. 337). The paper argues that prominent authors who strived to explain his ideas within the Walrasian apparatus could not deliver a consistent theory of deflation with protracted depression. This is basically because destabilizing market forces cannot dominate in that conceptual framework. By contrast, owing to the way competitive forces operate under fundamental uncertainty, Keynes' General Theory escapes the contradiction.

Cover -- Introduction -- What is Economics? -- Trade-Offs and Opportunity Cost -- The Emergence of Free Trade and the Importance of Comparative Advantage -- International Trade and Trade Barriers -- Traditional Economies, Command Economies, and Market Economies -- Capitalism Versus Socialism -- Barter and the Development of Money -- Inconvertible Fiat Explored -- The Time Value of Money and Interest Rates -- The Origin of Banking -- How Banks Create Money -- Banks as a System: Regulation and Deregulation -- Supply and Demand: Markets -- Supply and Demand: Consumer Behavior -- Supply and Demand: A Price is Born -- Changes in Supply and Demand -- Accounting Versus Economics -- The Production Function -- Controlling Costs -- Perfect Competition in the Short Run -- Perfect Competition in the Long Run -- Oligopolies and Imperfectly Competitive Markets -- Collusion and Cartels -- Game Theory -- Pricing Behaviors -- Monopoly: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly -- Government in the Marketplace: Price Ceilings and Price Floors -- Government in the Marketplace: Taxes and Subsidies -- Market Failures -- Financial Markets and Loanable Funds Theory -- The Money Market -- The Bond Market -- The Stock Market -- Foreign Exchange and Exchange Rates -- Exports and the Balance of Trade -- Official Reserves and Exchange Rate Policy -- The Private Sector and the Public Sector -- The Foreign Sector -- The Financial Sector and Financial Markets -- The Gross Domestic Product -- GDP: Private Spending and Investment -- GDP: Government Spending and Exports -- Approaches To GDP -- Real GDP Changes and the Business Cycle -- What GDP Doesn't Tell Us -- Unemployment Defined -- Unemployment Classified -- Why Unemployment is Bad -- Inflation Defined -- Types of Inflation -- Inflation: Winners and Losers -- Disinflation and Deflation -- Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply.

As forecasted by the Japanese government, the country's economy will grow, although slowly. This expectation is determined by the risk that the labour market situation and the worldwide business cycle will keep deteriorating. It is believed that the economy will not be spurred by exports growing as a result of worldwide recovery, but rather by a series of stabilization packages and gradually expanding domestic demand61. The expectations should be treated with a great deal of cautiousness, because of the highly unpredictable rate of unemployment, the concerns about deflation and the probability of the global recession turning out more serious than expected. According to the AFP (Gazeta Wyborcza of 08 Dec. 2009), in the third quarter of 2009 the Japanese economy finally showed some signs of recovery and reached positive values; unemployment also dropped from 5.3% to 5.1% between September and October. The widespread opinion is that the recovery is very fragile, as proved by the steadily falling prices, deflation, and the rising yen exchange rate (the highest in the last 14 years - 84 yen to 1 US dollar), threatening the Japanese exports. ; Zgodnie z prognozami rządowymi gospodarka Japonii będzie dźwigać się w górę, chociaż w powolnym tempie. Istnieje bowiem niebezpieczeństwo dalszego pogarszania się sytuacji w sferze zatrudnienia i koniunktury na rynkach zagranicznych. Panuje przekonanie, że nie należy się spodziewać pobudzenia gospodarki wskutek wzrostu eksportu, będącego z kolei efektem ożywienia w skali międzynarodowej, a raczej w wyniku kolejnych pakietów stabilizacyjnych i stopniowego wzrostu popytu wewnętrznego. Te prognozy należy traktować z dużą ostrożnością ze względu na znaczną nieprzewidywalność co do wysokości stopy bezrobocia, obawy odnośnie deflacji oraz prawdopodobieństwo, że recesja światowa może się okazać głębsza, niż się przypuszcza. Jak podaje agencja AFP (Gazeta Wyborcza z 08.12.2009) japońska gospodarka wreszcie ożywiła się w trzecim kwartale ...

As forecasted by the Japanese government, the country's economy will grow, although slowly. This expectation is determined by the risk that the labour market situation and the worldwide business cycle will keep deteriorating. It is believed that the economy will not be spurred by exports growing as a result of worldwide recovery, but rather by a series of stabilization packages and gradually expanding domestic demand61. The expectations should be treated with a great deal of cautiousness, because of the highly unpredictable rate of unemployment, the concerns about deflation and the probability of the global recession turning out more serious than expected. According to the AFP (Gazeta Wyborcza of 08 Dec. 2009), in the third quarter of 2009 the Japanese economy finally showed some signs of recovery and reached positive values; unemployment also dropped from 5.3% to 5.1% between September and October. The widespread opinion is that the recovery is very fragile, as proved by the steadily falling prices, deflation, and the rising yen exchange rate (the highest in the last 14 years – 84 yen to 1 US dollar), threatening the Japanese exports. ; Zgodnie z prognozami rządowymi gospodarka Japonii będzie dźwigać się w górę, chociaż w powolnym tempie. Istnieje bowiem niebezpieczeństwo dalszego pogarszania się sytuacji w sferze zatrudnienia i koniunktury na rynkach zagranicznych. Panuje przekonanie, że nie należy się spodziewać pobudzenia gospodarki wskutek wzrostu eksportu, będącego z kolei efektem ożywienia w skali międzynarodowej, a raczej w wyniku kolejnych pakietów stabilizacyjnych i stopniowego wzrostu popytu wewnętrznego. Te prognozy należy traktować z dużą ostrożnością ze względu na znaczną nieprzewidywalność co do wysokości stopy bezrobocia, obawy odnośnie deflacji oraz prawdopodobieństwo, że recesja światowa może się okazać głębsza, niż się przypuszcza. Jak podaje agencja AFP (Gazeta Wyborcza z 08.12.2009) japońska gospodarka wreszcie ożywiła się w trzecim kwartale bieżącego roku, wychodząc na wielkości dodatnie, spadło też bezrobocie z 5,3% we wrześniu do 5,1% w październiku. Przeważają głosy że ożywienie jest bardzo kruche. Mogą o tym świadczyć wciąż spadające ceny, deflacja, a także rosnący kurs jena (najwyższy od 14 lat w stosunku do dolara: 84 jeny na 1 dolara), co zagraża japońskiemu eksportowi.

THIS PAPER REVIEWS THREE INTRPRETATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS NOW STUMBLING TO SOME SORT OF 'FIRST-STAGE RESOLUTION'-IF THE FINANCIAL TIMES (24/11/83) IS RIGHT SO TO DESCRIBE A SITUATION WHERE THE THIRD WORLD IS IN DEBT TO THE TUNE OF 590 BILLIONS DOLLARS, AND WHERE THE IMF IS ACTIVE IN THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OF AT LEAST 14 SOUTHERN NATIONS. IT LOOKS FIRST AT THE MONETARIST PERSPECTIVE ADVANCED BY LAL AND BEENSTOCK, AND GIVEN POLITICAL EXPRESSION AT THE RECENT WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USA, THE UK AND WEST GERMANY. THIS DRAWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A CRISIS OF GLOBAL INSOLVENCY AND (TODAY'S) TEMPORARY LIQUIDITY SHORTFALL IN A SELF-EQUILIBRATING WORLD SYSTEM. POLITICALLY, IT CAUTIONS NORTHERN TREASURIES AGAINST A PRECIPITATE INCREASES IN WORLD RESERVES, AND ASKS THEM TO SIT TIGHT FOR THE SPONTANEOUS RECOVERY WHICH WILL FOLLOW PRESENT SOUND MONEY POLICIES. SECTION TWO CONTRASTS THIS VIEW WITH THE KEYNESIAN THEORIZING THAT UNDERLINES THE SECOND REPORT OF THE BRANDT COMMISSION, COMMON CRISIS (1983), AND WHICH IS EVIDENT IN THE CALLS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR A SECOND BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE. THIS CHALLENGES THE CYCLICAL SCHEMAS OF MONETARISM AND INSISTS THAT THE PRESENT CRISIS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS THE SECULAR OUTCOME OF: (1) THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF OFFICIAL CAPITAL FLOWS, (2) THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF PETRODOLLARS RECYCLED THROUGH THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS, (3) THE SECOND OIL PRICE HIKE, AND (4) THE POLICIES OF COMPETITIVE DEFLATION PURSUEDPY: 1984

[Maastricht : Mistaking One Europe for Another ?] - The author first claims the right to criticize the monetary aspects of the Maastricht agreement without being accused of anti-european nationalism. He wonders whether European construction will be undertaken in such a way as to preserve the synthesis of economic efficiency and social solidarity which has for so long distinguished Western Europe from other parts of the world. After having examined the underlying logic of present policies designed to maintain the twofold objective of monetary stability and competitive deflation, the paper analyses the negative effects of this strategy. It shows that European construction can not be expected to automatically enable a convergence in the member countries' economies for, paradoxically, the contrary, i.e. divergence, is more likely. Having suggested that the Community will be unable to get by without a variety of economic policies, the paper examines the choice available if the twin goals of economic efficiency and social well-being are to be pursued. This choice is, to either speed up the movement towards a single currency coupled with the strengthening of national budgetary policies, or to envisage another kind of process for European construction with preference given to the development of a parallel currency. ; L'auteur, après avoir revendiqué le droit de contester les aspects monétaires des Accords de Maastricht sans encourir l'accusation de nationalisme anti-européen, se demande si la voie choisie dans ces accords est la plus à même de préserver la synthèse d'efficacité économique et de solidarité sociale qui a longtemps distingué l'Europe occidentale des autres parties du monde. Après avoir examiné la logique qui sous-tend la politique actuelle fondée sur le couple stabilité monétaire / désinflation compétitive, il analyse les effets pervers inhérents à cette stratégie. Il montre ensuite qu'on ne saurait attendre de la construction européenne qu'elle induise spontanément un rapprochement des économies des pays ...

[Maastricht : Mistaking One Europe for Another ?] - The author first claims the right to criticize the monetary aspects of the Maastricht agreement without being accused of anti-european nationalism. He wonders whether European construction will be undertaken in such a way as to preserve the synthesis of economic efficiency and social solidarity which has for so long distinguished Western Europe from other parts of the world. After having examined the underlying logic of present policies designed to maintain the twofold objective of monetary stability and competitive deflation, the paper analyses the negative effects of this strategy. It shows that European construction can not be expected to automatically enable a convergence in the member countries' economies for, paradoxically, the contrary, i.e. divergence, is more likely. Having suggested that the Community will be unable to get by without a variety of economic policies, the paper examines the choice available if the twin goals of economic efficiency and social well-being are to be pursued. This choice is, to either speed up the movement towards a single currency coupled with the strengthening of national budgetary policies, or to envisage another kind of process for European construction with preference given to the development of a parallel currency. ; L'auteur, après avoir revendiqué le droit de contester les aspects monétaires des Accords de Maastricht sans encourir l'accusation de nationalisme anti-européen, se demande si la voie choisie dans ces accords est la plus à même de préserver la synthèse d'efficacité économique et de solidarité sociale qui a longtemps distingué l'Europe occidentale des autres parties du monde. Après avoir examiné la logique qui sous-tend la politique actuelle fondée sur le couple stabilité monétaire / désinflation compétitive, il analyse les effets pervers inhérents à cette stratégie. Il montre ensuite qu'on ne saurait attendre de la construction européenne qu'elle induise spontanément un rapprochement des économies des pays ...

[Maastricht : Mistaking One Europe for Another ?] - The author first claims the right to criticize the monetary aspects of the Maastricht agreement without being accused of anti-european nationalism. He wonders whether European construction will be undertaken in such a way as to preserve the synthesis of economic efficiency and social solidarity which has for so long distinguished Western Europe from other parts of the world. After having examined the underlying logic of present policies designed to maintain the twofold objective of monetary stability and competitive deflation, the paper analyses the negative effects of this strategy. It shows that European construction can not be expected to automatically enable a convergence in the member countries' economies for, paradoxically, the contrary, i.e. divergence, is more likely. Having suggested that the Community will be unable to get by without a variety of economic policies, the paper examines the choice available if the twin goals of economic efficiency and social well-being are to be pursued. This choice is, to either speed up the movement towards a single currency coupled with the strengthening of national budgetary policies, or to envisage another kind of process for European construction with preference given to the development of a parallel currency. ; L'auteur, après avoir revendiqué le droit de contester les aspects monétaires des Accords de Maastricht sans encourir l'accusation de nationalisme anti-européen, se demande si la voie choisie dans ces accords est la plus à même de préserver la synthèse d'efficacité économique et de solidarité sociale qui a longtemps distingué l'Europe occidentale des autres parties du monde. Après avoir examiné la logique qui sous-tend la politique actuelle fondée sur le couple stabilité monétaire / désinflation compétitive, il analyse les effets pervers inhérents à cette stratégie. Il montre ensuite qu'on ne saurait attendre de la construction européenne qu'elle induise spontanément un rapprochement des économies des pays ...

Coalitional politics in southern Europe is not evidence of genuinely competitive multiparty politics; rather, it reflects a crisis of founding coalitions that has important implications for the issue of legitimation. Neither Gaullist government nor syncretic coalitions offer the possibility of competitive politics; thus, the acceptance & long-range operation of a scheme of political alternance requires mutual party & coalitional legitimation. Transitions between political regimes are informative periods, because they are accompanied by a deflation of power, a period of unpredictable political currents, & difficulty predicting the future developments of political forces. Transitional periods, however, are hardly unimportant. The complex of political forces during significant recent transitional periods is discussed & analyzed in detail for Portugal, Spain, Italy, & Greece. 5 Tables. R. Currier.

The Côte d'Ivoire has experienced a rapid succession of development models and policies. In the first twenty years after independence, indigenous planning experts designed and implemented large 'agribusiness' and then 'integrated development' projects. By the end of this period, the sanctions imposed by international markets had transformed these grandiose projects into financial black holes.
In the 1980s pressure from international authorities imposed, successively, global economic adjustment (disinflation), sector adjustments (competitive) and the social dimensions of adjustment (anti‐poverty). However, deflation of public spending and disinflation with competitive and social objectives proved incapable of restraining financial deficits whilst simultaneously causing a deterioration of human development indicators.
The 1990s confirmed the Côte d'Ivoire's leading position in development 'technology', in particular the national approach to programmes (demand led). Prime Minister Ouattara's medium term economic programme and 'national approach to programmes', adopted by the government in 1993, established the basis for a new form of planning.
Finally, in 1994, the Côte d'Ivoire discovered the practical consequences of monetarism in an open economy. The devaluation on 11 January gave it access to large loans and gave hopes of further improvements in competitivity. Would this change from competitive disinflation to competitive devaluation resolve financial problems and improve the standard of living?
In this article I will illustrate, against a backdrop of failure, the succession of adjustment policies, from standard adjustment (1980s) to the social dimensions (end of the 1980s). Then I will discuss the national approach to programmes (beginning of the 1990s) and finally monetary stabilisation (since January 1994).

This essay argues that the German Social Market Economy -- which has underpinned the stability of continental currencies for decades; which has had outstanding productivity & innovation; & which affords German workers & citizens the most extensive rights of any capitalist society known to history -- is under siege by the stringent requirements of the Maastricht convergence & by related pressures of European unification. It is suggested that these requirements are threatening not only the social guarantees embodied in the model but also the substantive practices of production that have provided Germany with its industrial durability. The causes of internal German deflation & unemployment do not lie in the institutions of the Social Market. It is the fiscal orthodoxy imposed through the terms of the Maastricht convergence criteria, not democratic work practices, that have put the brakes on the German economy. The German Social Market Economy is described here; it is explained that this system offers the possibility of constraining the commodification of human beings & nature while retaining a competitive market in real commodities. It is emphasized also that the political & social outcome in Germany will have momentous implications for the Continent as a whole. 22 References. T. K. Brown

Bosnia and Herzegovina intends to become a member of the EU, and then to join the EMU. A key issue for B&H is to achieve a higher level of competitiveness to increase potential benefits and reduce the potential costs of membership in the single eurozone market. The subject of this paper is an analysis of economic policy measures to increase the competitiveness of the B&H economy for the monetary union and the introduction of the euro. Due to the currency board rules, fiscal policy and tax reform have a relatively high importance in creating greater competitiveness. B&H cannot apply nominal devaluation, but real depreciation has to be achieved by measures of structural reforms of internal adjustment. Internal adjustment, i.e. deflation as a way of real depreciation and creating greater competitiveness, should be implemented through fiscal consolidation and tax reform. A simple, efficient and relatively more competitive tax system is the basis for the faster economic development of the B&H economy towards EU. The aim of this paper is to propose the direction of economic policy, especially fiscal consolidation and tax reforms to adopt B&H's economy for potentially higher benefits and lower costs, up to the final entry into the EU and EMU.

"Preface" -- "Contents" -- "Notes on Authors" -- "List of Figures " -- "List of Tables " -- "Monetary Policy Since the Global Financial Crisis" -- "1 Introduction " -- "2 Inflation Targeting" -- "2.1 Theoretical Aspects of IT" -- "2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Problems of IT" -- "3 Monetary Policy Reactions Following the GFC and GR" -- "3.1 Reaction of the Main Central Banks" -- " US Fed Reactions" -- " UK BoE Reactions" -- " EMU ECB Reactions" -- "3.2 Unorthodox Monetary Policies" -- " Quantitative Easing" -- " Zero and Negative Interest Rates" -- "4 Financial Stability" -- "5 Summary and Conclusions" -- "References" -- "Lessons on Fiscal Policy After the Global Financial Crisis" -- "1 Introduction " -- "2 Fiscal Policy as Seen Before the Financial Crisis" -- "3 First Responses of Fiscal Policy After the Financial Crisis" -- "4 Second Rounds of Responses of Fiscal Policy" -- "5 The 'Debt Scare'" -- "6 The 'Multiplier'" -- "7 Composition of Deficit Reduction" -- "8 Structural Budgets" -- "8.1 Introduction to Structural Budgets" -- "8.2 'Potential Output'" -- "8.3 Estimating 'Potential Output'" -- "8.4 'Potential Output' and Unemployment" -- "8.5 Why Do Structural Budget Deficits Persist?" -- "9 Concluding Comments" -- "References" -- "Inequality and the Need for Relevant Policies" -- "1 Introduction " -- "2 Inequality Since 2008" -- "3 Why Is There So Much Inequality?" -- "3.1 Dimensions of Inequality" -- "3.2 Structural Factors" -- "3.3 Competitive Advantage Versus Comparative Advantage" -- "3.4 A Race to the Bottom" -- "3.5 Further Distortions" -- "3.6 Mechanisms of Rent Extraction" -- "4 Rentier Capitalism Par Excellence" -- "4.1 Rent Deflation" -- "4.2 Dominance of Financial Capital" -- "4.3 Illicit Financial Outflows